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Channabasavegowda And Others v. Rangegowda And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This Full Bench judgment arises from a suit in which grandchildren (the plaintiffs) of one Kavalu Thimme Gowda sought partition and possession of several ancestral properties (16 items listed in the plaint), claiming three-fourths shares and alleging that alienations effected by their fathers (defendants 1 to 3 and another deceased co-parcener) were not binding on their shares.
The contested alienations included: (a) a mortgage executed by defendant 1 on 9-7-1924 in favour of defendant 4 (Sri Sringeri Mutt) covering items 1–9 and subsequent suit, decree and sale in execution; (b) revenue sales for arrears of land revenue (items 2,3,5–7,9–11) in which defendant 5 purchased; and (c) documents of 1932 (Exs. I–V) and later sale-deeds (dated 16-11-1935 and thereafter) said to effect a family settlement and individual apportionment of liabilities and properties, followed by transfers to various alienees.
At trial the learned Munsiff decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs; that decree was confirmed on appeal. Defendants 7, 8, 10 and 11 preferred a second appeal to the High Court Full Bench after a Division Bench was divided on the result.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the several alienations (the 1924 mortgage and ensuing sale in execution, the revenue sales, and the later family settlement documents and sale deeds) were binding on the plaintiffs' shares in the ancestral properties.
- Whether a suit and decree obtained against the manager (or managing member) of a joint Hindu family (and in some instances other adult co-parceners) binds absent members or their after-born children — i.e., the scope and limits of representation by the manager in suits concerning family property.
- What is the appropriate allocation of burdens of proof regarding (a) the legal necessity or family benefit for the debts/alienations and (b) the correctness of plaintiffs' pleaded ages for purposes of challenge to earlier alienations.
- Whether the documents of 1932 (Exs. I–V) demonstrate a genuine partition and apportionment of liabilities such as to sever the family into separate branches and defeat the plaintiffs' claim to a joint-family share across all properties.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The properties are joint-family ancestral properties and the alienations by their fathers (defendants 1–3 and deceased Nanje Gowda) are ineffective and not binding on the plaintiffs' three-fourths share.
- The mortgage, the execution sale and the subsequent transfers were not valid as against the plaintiffs (in particular they impugn the mortgage and the sales as invalid).
- The later sales (1935 sale-deeds) are impeached as not grounded in legal necessity or family benefit and therefore not binding.
Defendants' Arguments
- The alienations were for legal necessity and/or for family benefit, and therefore binding on the entire family.
- The plaintiffs' rights are barred because their interests were bound by earlier proceedings (suits and executions) in which the manager or the adult co-parceners were sued in representative character.
- Some plaintiffs were not yet born at the dates of alienations and therefore cannot challenge them; the ages pleaded in the plaint are incorrect.
- There had been a partition among defendants 1–3 (and the deceased brother) and the suit is multifarious and misconceived in asking jointly for shares as if the family remained undivided; the 1932 documents evidence a real partition and apportionment of debts.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Daulat Ram v. Mehrchand, 15 Cal. 70 : (14 I.A. 187 P.C.) | Where a mortgage purports to extend to the entire interest of a family and the plaint claims satisfaction out of the mortgaged property, a manager sued in representative character effectively represents all members and the decree binds them. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that where the plaint and sale showed the mortgage and sale related to the whole family estate and the manager was sued as representative, the sale in execution could pass the entire property and bind absent members. |
| 6 Mys. L.J. 317 | Suits filed against the manager as representative bind all members where the debt is one due by the whole family; an ex parte decree does not necessarily permit absent members to avoid the effect unless manager was negligent or fraudulent. | Quoted to support the proposition that the mortgage suit and sale in execution against the manager and adult co-parceners bound the family, and that the purchasers thereby acquired title unless fraud/negligence proven. |
| Sheo Shankar Ram v. Mt. Jaddo Kunwar, 36 All. 383 : (A.I.R. (1) 1914 P.C. 136) | Principle that a manager sued in representative capacity may bind absent members where suit relates to family property. | Referenced among authorities supporting binding effect of representative suits against a manager on the rest of the family. |
| Shankara Narayana v. Rajamani, 47 Mad. 462 : (A.I.R. (11) 1924 Mad. 550) | Authority supporting that a suit and decree against the manager can bind other family members in matters of family property. | Referred to as part of a body of decisions affirming representation of family members by manager in suits concerning family property. |
| Unnamalai Ammal v. Abboychetty, 50 M.L.J. 172 : (92 I.C. 524) | Supports the proposition that suits against the manager relating to family property bind the family. | Used among precedents to justify treating the mortgage suit and execution sale as binding on the family. |
| Venkata Narayana Rao v. Venkata Somaraju, A.I.R. (24) 1937 Mad. 610 : (I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 880 F.B.) | Where a decree has been obtained against a manager as representative of the joint Hindu family liabilities, it will be binding on undivided brothers though they are not parties eo nomine. | Cited to affirm the settled principle that a manager's representative capacity can bind absent brothers and their branches in family property suits. |
| Papamma v. Narayana, A.I.R. (35) 1948 Mad. 54 : (1947-1 M.L.J. 274) | A decree in a suit against the manager of a Hindu family binds the others as res judicata; absence by name does not prevent them being bound. | Quoted to reinforce that a decree against a manager is binding on other family members. |
| Abbakka Shedthi v. Palli Vittai Hegda, A.I.R. (35) 1948 Mad. 129 : (1947-2 M.L.J. 177) | A decree against the manager relating to family property cannot be set aside merely because the manager remained ex parte or did not make available a good defence; absent members may still be bound. | Used to show that ex parte conduct of the manager is not necessarily a ground to nullify the binding effect of a decree on the family. |
| Balaraj v. Pichai Muthu Chettiar, A.I.R. (35) 1948 Mad. 136 : (1947-2 M.L.J. 161) | Decree against a father in a suit in respect of joint Hindu family property binds a child in the womb, who is deemed represented by the father. | Referred to for the proposition that even after-born or unborn members may be bound if the manager represented the family and the debt bound the family. |
| Abhey Singh v. Himta, A.I.R. (10) 1923 All. 234 : (65 I.C. 653) | Supports the view that adult co-parceners can effectively represent their respective branches at family proceedings. | Invoked to support the idea that adult co-parceners who participated in earlier proceedings represented minor branches and their interests. |
| 17 Mys. C.C.R. 7 | It is competent for a father (or manager) to represent his sons in a suit brought against him for enforcement of a mortgage; sons cannot maintain suit for redemption after sale in execution. | Cited as a Mysore decision establishing manager/father representation and binding effect of execution sale on absent sons. |
| 33 Mys. C.C.R. 850 | Full Bench holding that after-born and infant sons may be bound by an earlier mortgage decree obtained against a managing member where no fraud/collusion/neglect exists and representation is effective. | Used to support that minors/after-born children may be bound by a representative proceeding against the manager unless fraud or negligence is proved. |
| 4 D.L.R. (Mys.) 91 | Affirms principle that if adult co-parceners effectively represented branches and debts are proved binding, a presumption of necessity may be raised; decision relied on in discussion of representation and binding nature of debt. | Quoted and discussed by the Court; the Bench stated the decision relies on earlier Mysore decisions and was not intended to alter the established tests for binding effect. |
| 50 Mys. H.C.R. 118 | Where a mortgage deed over 40 years old contains necessity recitals and all adult members joined, a presumption of family necessity may be raised. | Referenced for the proposition that recitals and joined execution by adult members can raise a presumption of family necessity. |
| 15 Mys. L.J. 193; 18 Mys. L.J. 276; 18 Mys. L.J. 17; 14 Mys. L.J. 361 | These Mysore Law Journal authorities record judicial commentary on when a presumption of family necessity may or may not be raised and the extent to which it is a general rule; e.g., Reilly C.J. qualified the generality of the presumption. | Quoted to show limitations upon raising a general presumption of family necessity and to explain that the strength of presumption depends on factual circumstances such as whether more than one adult joined. |
| Jagannath v. Shri Nath, A.I.R. (21) 1934 P.C. 56 : (56 ALL. 123) | Sir John Wallis' remark that where parents appear as defendants but do not give evidence and allow their minor children to sue, such suits may be collusive. | Invoked to support inference that defendants 1–3's failure to give evidence and their participation as defendants while their children prosecute the suit suggested collusion and supported the presumption of family necessity. |
| Sant Bakhsh Singh v. Lachhman Prasad, A.I.R. (33) 1946 Oudh 92 | Similar observations to Jagannath concerning collusive suits where parents' conduct indicates collusion. | Used as supporting authority for treating non-examination of parents/manager as indicia supporting the presumption of necessity or collusion. |
| Ramackandriah v. Seetharamaih, 50 Mys. L.R. 60 | Holds that purchaser in execution against a member of a joint family cannot obtain possession of the whole family property on the mere ground that defendant was manager unless the original suit was brought against him as manager and decree passed as such. | Quoted in the Court's discussion as clarifying that a decree only binds other members when the initial suit was against the person as manager and the debt was binding on the family. |
| Nanomi Babuasin v. Maddun Mohun, 13 Cal. 21 : (13 I.A. 1 P.C.) | Rule that absent sons not parties to sale/execution proceedings are entitled to try the fact or nature of the debt in their own suit; they are not automatically barred. | Cited as foundational Privy Council authority limiting the absolute preclusive effect of proceedings against a manager and recognizing the right of absent members to contest binding nature of debt in subsequent suit. |
| Puttegowda v. Rudregowda, 12 Mys. L.B. 450 | Discussed Daulat Ram and similar authorities; where mortgage decree against whole property for family debt was obtained and purchaser paid for entire estate, purchaser may acquire whole estate if mortgage bound ancestral property. | Referenced to illustrate application of Daulat Ram principle in Mysore decisions where purchaser in execution acquired full estate when evidence showed the mortgage bound ancestral property. |
| 22 Mys. C.C.R. 250; 27 Mys. C.C.R. 155; 32 Mys. C.C.R. 247 | Various Mysore Bench decisions dealing with whether decrees against managers bind sons and the effect of mortgage/execution sale on sons' shares; these show differing fact-based outcomes. | Referred to in the Court's exposition of authorities showing the principles are fact-sensitive: sometimes sons' shares held extinguished, sometimes not, depending on whether debt was binding on family. |
| 13 Mys. L.R. 546 | Restates that non-participating members can claim the right to try whether a mortgage was binding on ancestral property in their own suit. | Quoted to reiterate that absent members may challenge the binding nature of a mortgage in a subsequent suit if the mortgagee cannot prove the debt bound the family. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench reviewed the factual matrix and prior proceedings and addressed the case in distinct stages corresponding to the contested transactions. The Court undertook a stepwise assessment of the trial and appellate findings and how legal principles apply to the particular documentary and oral evidence before it.
Approach to review of concurrent findings: The Bench noted that although disturbing concurrent findings is not usual in a second appeal, the appellate judgment below was a brief summary and the trial Court's findings were influenced by an erroneous approach — specifically a wrong allocation of the burden of proof and an inversion in appreciating documentary recitals (i.e., calling on defendants to independently prove recitals rather than requiring plaintiffs to explain why recitals did not bind them).
Items 1–9 (mortgage, suit and sale in execution):
- The mortgage deed (Ex. XII / plaint Ex. X) expressly recited that defendant 1 was the family manager and that the amount was borrowed for family benefit; defendant 4 sued not only defendant 1 but also the then adult co-parceners (defendants 2 and 3 and another), claiming recovery from the family properties. The decree was followed by a public auction sale (Ex. XIV sale certificate) showing sale of the properties in entirety.
- The Court applied settled authorities to hold that when the plaint and proceedings show the claim was to recover a family debt and execution sale encompassed the whole property, a purchaser in such sale may acquire an indefeasible title and absent members are bound unless fraud, collusion or negligence on the part of the manager is proved.
- The learned Munsiff was faulted for assuming the revenue sale conveyed only the interests of defendants 1–3; the Bench held there were no materials to support that narrow view and invoked the presumption under S.54, Land Revenue Code that revenue sale effects sale of the entire property.
Revenue sales (items including 2,3,5–7,9–11):
- The Court emphasized that revenue sale for arrears implies forfeiture of prior claims and encumbrances and vests an absolute title in the purchaser unless impeached on grounds of fraud; no particulars of fraud were alleged or proved and the suit was brought more than six years after purchaser's possession, making the plaintiffs' attack on revenue sale belated.
Items covered by Exs. I–V and later sale-deeds (post-1932):
- The 1932 documents (Exs. I–V) expressly recited a family settlement (panchayathi), division of debts and apportionment of properties and liabilities, and individual pledges/mortgages securing each brother's one-fourth share of liability.
- The Court observed that the pattern of the documents (Exs. II–V versus Ex. I) suggested a real division rather than a sham — if dissimulation had been intended, a uniform pattern would have been expected. The patel (P.W.1) and other witnesses corroborated that defendant 1 might have directed inclusion of properties in the documents; D.Ws. 3 and 4 spoke to the partition, whereas defendants 1–3 who could explain partition were not examined.
- Given the documentary evidence, the Bench concluded the 1932 settlement more likely effected a real severance of status among the brothers, which, in turn, severed the branches; therefore plaintiffs (children of those brothers) could not claim to remain members of a single undivided joint family for the contested properties without first obtaining cancellation of that partition.
Burden of proof and conduct of parents/manager:
- The Court stressed that while transferees bear the burden of proving validity of an alienation in litigation by or against sons, that rule must not be stretched to allow transfers to use their sons to nullify alienations. The Bench further noted that the plaintiffs' parents (defendants 1–3), who were well-placed to explain the nature of debts and partitions, deliberately chose not to give evidence, enabling an adverse inference (citing Jagannath v. Shri Nath and similar authorities) and supporting a presumption that debts were for family necessity.
Application of authorities and the controlling test:
- The Court canvassed a range of authorities (Privy Council and Mysore and Madras decisions) and distilled the controlling proposition: before a decree against a manager binds other members in a subsequent suit, it must be shown (1) that the first suit was brought against the person as manager of the joint family and (2) that the debt for recovery of which the suit was filed was a debt binding on the family. Where those conditions are fulfilled, absent members are precluded from re-opening the matter (but if not, they may contest the character of the debt in their own suit).
- Applying the facts — the plaint and decree indicating a family debt, the joining of adult co-parceners in the prior suit, the execution sale in which a purchaser paid for the entire estate, the 1932 partition documents and the absence of proof of fraud or particulars of fraud against revenue sales — the Court concluded legal necessity was established and the alienations were binding on plaintiffs' interests.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench allowed the appeal by defendants 7, 8, 10 and 11 and set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below; accordingly, the plaintiffs' suit for partition is dismissed.
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The plaintiffs' claim to three-fourths share in the plaint schedule properties is rejected in respect of the items held to have been validly alienated (mortgage and sale in execution, revenue sales and items affected by the 1932 settlement and subsequent transfers).
- The parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout (the Court ordered each side to bear its own costs).
Broader legal implication as discussed by the Court:
The Bench reiterated and clarified a two-part requirement before a decree against a manager can be held to bind other members in subsequent litigation: (1) the initial suit must have been brought against the person as manager of the joint family, and (2) the debt or alienation for which recovery was sought must have been a debt binding on the family. Where these conditions appear from the pleadings, decrees and execution/sale records, and absent any proof of fraud, collusion or negligent conduct on the manager's part, the rights of absent members may be bound and purchasers in execution or revenue sales may acquire title which the absent members cannot later upset in a collateral suit.
Note: This summary is strictly drawn from the text of the provided opinion. No facts, citations, or legal inferences beyond those explicitly stated in the opinion have been added.
Venkataramaiya, J.:— This appeal has been referred to the Full Bench for disposal as the Division Bench by which it was heard was of divided opinion as regards the decision in the case. The suit from which the appeal arises is of a familiar kind in which the sons seek shares in certain properties alleging that these are of a joint family and the alienations thereof by their fathers are ineffective so far as they are concerned. As can be seen from the following genealogical tree
the plaintiffs are the grand-children of one Kavalu Thimme Gowda by different sons and include grandsons as well as grand daughters. All of them together claim three fourths share in 16 items of property specified in the plaint alleging that these belong to a joint family consisting of themselves and defendants 1 to 3. It is admitted that none of the properties is in the possession of any member of the family and are all in occupation of the other defendants as a result of certain transactions entered into by defendants 1 to 3 and the father of plaintiffs 7 to 9 which in particular are a mortgage of items 1 to 9 by defendant 1 on 9-7-1924 in favour of defendant 4 and sale of other items by defendants 1 to 3 under deeds dated 16-11-1935. The plaintiffs impeach the mortgage as well as the sales as invalid and not binding upon them. Defendants 1 to 3 were ex parte. The substance of the defence of the other defendants is that there was legal necessity for the alienations and that the plaintiffs lost their right in their properties by virtue of the proceedings on the foot of the mortgage against defendants 1 to 3 in a representative character and also by reason of the revenue sale of items 1 to 11 on 18-7-1935. They also disputed the correctness of the share claimed by the plaintiffs on the ground that many of them were not born at all on the dates of the alienations and objected to the suit as being multifarious as defendants 1 to 3 had effected a partition of the family properties and the plaintiffs could not jointly seek a share pretending to be undivided. The learned Munsiff decreed the suit as prayed for and his decision was confirmed on appeal. Defendants 7, 8, 10 and 11 have preferred the second appeal.
2. Normally it is not the practice in second appeal to disturb a concurrent decision based on findings of fact. But the appellate judgment in this ease reads to be only a brief summary of what the learned Munsiff has stated about the matters involved for consideration and does not show that there has been any independent examination of the points at issue. Further, the findings of the learned Mnnsiff seem to have been coloured with an erroneous view of the nature and degree of proof reasonably expected of an alienee to support his title. He has overlooked the significance and the effect of the documents which purport to sever the joint status of the family and instead of requiring the plaintiffs who though apparently bound profess to be unaffected by the recitals to furnish reasons, called upon the defendants to adduce independent proof in support of them. It, therefore, seems that this is a case in which the conclusions reached by the Courts below are vitiated by a wrong approach to the case and influenced by the evidence being appreciated from a wrong angle and as such interference is not only justified but also necessary. That the properties in question belonged to the joint family cannot be doubted. Nor is it denied that up to the year 1932 the parties constituted a joint Hindu family. The claim as regards items 1 to 9 depends on the effect of the mortgage by defendant 1 on 9-7-1924 and the proceedings thereunder. On that date defendant 1 was, even according to the plaintiff's witnesses, the manager of the family. He borrowed Rs. 500/- from defendant 4 for purposes of cultivation of the dry lands and for domestic expenses as recited in Ex. XII, the deed of mortgage. For recovery of the mortgage debt defendant 4 sued not merely defendant 1 but also his brothers defendants 2 and 3 and another Nanjappa Gowda who is now dead alleging in the plaint, Ex. X, that defendant 1 is the manager of the family and that he borrowed that amount for family benefit. None of the defendants contested the suit or discharged the debt with the result that there was a decree which was followed up by a sale at which defendant 5 happened to be the purchaser. Exhibit XIV, the sale certificate, shows that the properties in entirety were sold in public auction for satisfaction of the decree. The contention of the defendants is that having regard to the character of the suit and the subject-matter of the sale, defendant 5 became the full owner of items 1 to 9 and that it is not open to the plaintiffs to question it. There cannot be any doubt that a suit filed against the manager qua manager of a joint Hindu family in a representative character binds all the members of the family even though they may not actually be made parties to the proceedings when “the debt was one due by the whole family”. (See 6 Mys. L.J 317.) In Daulat Ram v. Mehrchand, 15 Cal. 70 : (14 I.A 187 P.C) their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that where the mortgage extends to the entire interest of the family and not confined to the share of any particular member and where in the plaint the mortgagee claims not only to recover the amount of the mortgage from the individual mortgagor but asks that the “debt owed by the family as joint members of an ancestral trading firm” may be satisfied out of the mortgaged property, in short where these conditions are fulfilled, although the manager alone is impleaded, be effectively represents all the members who therefore become bound by the decree. (See also Sheo Shankar Ram v. Mt. Jaddo Kunwar, 36 ALL. 383 : (A.I.R (1) 1914 P.C 136); Shankara Narayana v. Rajamani, 47 Mad. 462 : (A.I.R (11) 1924 Mad. 550) and Unnamalai Ammal v. Abboychetty, 50 M.L.J 172 : (92 I.C 524). Having regard to the definite statements contained in the plaint and the fact that besides the mortgagor all the then adult members were made parties to the suit and the claim for recovery of the debt due from joint family was made from the entire properties, I think the proceedings were meant to bind the family as a whole. Irrespective of the question whether the manager acted beyond the scope of his authority or in excess of his powers, the claim with respect to items 1 to 11 is manifestly untenable on account of the revenue sale by which the purchaser acquired an indefeasible title. The learned Munsiff was, in my opinion, in error in assuming that what was conveyed in the revenue sale was not the entire property but only the right, title and interest of defendants 1 to 3 as there are no materials in support of it and the presumption under S. 54, Land Revenue Code is that the entire property is sold. The mere fact that subsequent to and in spite of the revenue sale the purchaser secured sale deeds from the previous owners, does not militate against these and if at all, can only suggest that it was meant to prevent attempts being made by the defaulters to get the sale cancelled. The sale for recovery of land revenue can be questioned in the civil Court only on the ground of fraud and the party who impugns it has to furnish particulars of the fraud. Absolutely no such particulars are alleged in the plaint or disclosed in the evidence. Further the suit as regards this appears to be belated as it was filed more than six years after the purchaser got possession under the Revenue Sale.
3. As regards the remaining items the sale deeds, Exs. 1-V, recite that the debts contracted by defendant 1 for liabilities incurred by him were for the benefit of the family and that at a family settlement each of the brothers undertook to discharge a portion of these from his own share of the properties. P.W 1 the patel is the scribe of these documents. Though apparently interested in the plaintiffs he states that defendant 1 might have instructed him as to what properties bad to be included in each of the documents as having fallen to the share of the executants. D.Ws 3 and 4 have also spoken to the partition amongst the brothers. Defendants 1 to 3 though made parties to the suit and were in a position to throw light on the question of partition, are not examined in the case and it looks as if it is they who have engineered this litigation to defeat or impair rights of the alienees. While it is true that the burden of proof to establish the validity of an alienation in a subsequent suit filed by or against the sons lies on the transferee, the rule should not be extended too far to enable the transfers themselves to nullify the alienation through the agency of their eons. There is clear reference in Exs. II to V that the debts were divided, properties were partitioned and specific portions were held by particular members of the family. The inference that the division was real and not make-believe gains strength from a comparison of these documents with Ex. I which alone refers to the properties not divided. The probability is, if parties wanted to practice dissimulation they would have followed a uniform pattern and not made a difference between one property and another. I am therefore inclined to hold that there is more in favour of the brothers having effected a division in 1932 than in their continuing undivided. If there was division amongst brothers, as I think there was, the plaintiffs cannot profess to be members of a joint family as the severance of status amongst the brothers operates as a severance amongst the branches as well. There is not even the faintest suggestion that defendants 1 to 3, who are fairly old, experienced in worldy affairs and not addicted to any evil habits, were tricked into executing sale-deeds or that they did it with any mala fide intent. The documents exhibited in the case show that the members of the family had incurred debts prior to the sales and if at a family settlement the liability for discharging these debts was distributed by common agreement, it cannot be said that the arrangement voluntarily entered into was imprudent or improper. Moreover, the case of the plaintiff is not that the partition was unjust or unfair but that it was unreal a plea which cannot be sustained. Defendants 1 to 8 could have explained the reasons for the recitals in Exs. II to V suggesting partition and the apportionment of debts. They were wantonly kept back perhaps because their examination would help the other defendants. In any case these documents clearly signify a severance in status amongst the brothers. The plaintiffs who are their children cannot therefore claim to be joint and seek a share in all the proper-ties without getting the partition thereof cancelled. It seems to me that the suit in its present form clubbing together several and different causes of action by separated members of the family against several defendants ignoring the partition is misconceived. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and dismiss the suit directing the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
4. Balakrishnaiya J.:—The case was originally heard by a Division Bench of which I was a party; and on divergence of opinion it was referred by me to the Full Bench, and my opinion has remained the same.
5. This Second Appeal by defendants 7, 8, 10 and his directed against the appellate decree confirming the decision of the trial Court. Briefly stated the facts leading to the case are as under:— The plaintiffs in the suit are the grand-children of one Kavalu Thimme Gowda by his sons, defendants 1 to 3, and one other Nanje Gowda, since deceased. The present suit is for partition of the plaint schedule proper, ties and for possession of their share alleging that the alienations made by their respective fathers, defendants 1 to 3, and the deceased Nanje Gowda are not for legal necessity or for family benefit and, therefore, not binding on their three-fourths share in the said properties. The fathers of the plaintiffs alive are impleaded as defendants 1 to 3. Defendants 4 to 11 the alienees are contesting the suit. Their defence may be summarised thus. The alienations were for family necessity and the plaintiffs who were not born at the time of the alienations cannot challenge the same; the ages of the plaintiffs as given in the plaint are incorrect and even otherwise, the plaintiffs were all duly represented in the previous litigations and the transfers that took place prior to the present suit, and therefore their interests, if any, are bound by the alienations effected by their parents.
6. Defendant 1 is the eldest member of the joint family of himself and his brothers, defendants 2 and 3, and the deceased Nanje Gowda; he borrowed Rs. 500 on 9-7-1924 from defendant 4 (Sri Sringeri Mutt) mortgaging items 1 to 9 of the plaint schedule properties. Defendant 4 filed a suit on the foot of the said mortgage in O.S No. 615 of 28-29 in the Court of the Mun-Biff of Chickamagalur, alleging that defendant 1 as the manager or Karta of the joint family borrowed the amount for family necessity and prayed for a decree against the mortgaged family properties and defendant 1 personally. Defendants 2 and 8 and the deceased Nanje Gowda who were all the then adult members of the family were impleaded in the said suit which was decreed as prayed for. In execution of the said decree, the mortgaged properties, items 1 to 9, were sold and purchased by defendant 5 in the court auction and the purchaser was put in possession of the properties by the Court in Misc. case No. 262 of 34-35. These form one stage of the proceedings which the plaintiffs claim as not binding on them or their interest in the plaint schedule properties.
7. Defendants 1 to 3 and Nanje Gowda had allowed the land revenue payable by them to the Government to fall into arrears and the properties were brought to sale by the revenue authorities. Defendant 5 who had acquired rights in some of the properties purchased in the revenue auction items 2, 3, 5 to 7 and 9 to ll. These form the second stage of the proceedings which the plaintiffs assert as not binding on their interest.
8. The third stage of proceedings brings us to 1932, the date of Exs. I to V. By this time the financial position of the family appears to have absolutely deteriorated. On 7-12-1926 defendant 1 borrowed Rs. 1000/- on a pronote from defendant 5 who filed a suit in O.S No. 34 of 88-29 in the same Munsiff's Court and obtained a decree. Again on 26-3-1927 defendant 1 borrowed Rs. 1000 under Ex. VI from defendant 5 for alleged family necessity and mortgaged the schedule items 10 to 12 and 15. There was also another decree obtained against defendant 1 by defendant 6 who in execution of the said decree bad purchased defendant 1's share in some of the schedule properties. In the meantime, the revenue payable to Government on these properties was in arrears owing to the default in payment by defendants 1 to 3 and the deceased Nanje Gowda and defendant 6 who presumably had acquired rights in the properties paid the arrears and filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 570/- the amount paid against all the adult members of the family including Nanje Gowda who was then alive and obtained a decree.
9. According to the recitals in the documents exhibited defendants 1 to 3 and their brother Nanje Gowda, since deceased, appear to have in pursuance of a family settlement divided amongst themselves the assets and liabilities of the family and subsequently executed documents in favour of defendant 6 in respect of their liability securing their respective shares in the properties. Exhibit 1 is the document executed on 15-1-1932 by all the brothers for Rs. 1200 securing the family properties in their common enjoyment. On the same date, the four brothers individually executed Exs. II to V for Rs. 850 each, securing their individual shares for their respective share of liability. Later on 16-11-1935 defendants 1 to 3 executed a sale-deed, Ex. VIII, Exs. IX and XVI, sale-deeds, were executed by defendants 1 and 2 respectively, of the properties covered under Exs. II to V in favour of defendant 6 and the properties covered by those sale-deeds are subsequently sold to defendants 7, 8 and 9. These form the last stage of the transactions impeached by the plaintiffs.
10. Both the Courts below have failed to appreciate the legal aspects involved from a proper perspective. The decisions, though concurrent, cannot be supported and warrant interference.
11. The crucial point for consideration is whether the several alienations are binding on the plaintiffs. The suit properties are undoubtedly the ancestral properties of the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 3 and the deceased Nanje Gowda. Defendant 1 who is the eldest member of the four brothers was in law and in fact the manager of the joint family in the year 1924 and continued as such till about 1932 the date of Exs. I to V. The first alienation by way of mortgage was in respect of items 1 to 9 made by defendant 1 in favour of Sri Sringeri Mutt, defendant 4 in the case, in the year 1924. Exhibit X is the copy of the plaint filed by defendant 4 against all the four brothers of whom defendant 1 is styled as manager. Exhibit XI is the copy of the decree. Exhibits XIV and XV are the Bale certificate and the delivery receipt respectively. It was alleged in the said suit that the debt was incurred for necessity binding on the family; in addition to the executant, defendant 1 though expressly sued as manager his three brothers who were the remaining adult members of the family were impleaded ex abudanti cautela; the decree which was passed as prayed for though ex parte concluded altogether the question of family necessity. Even otherwise, it is a well recognised principle of law that the manager of the joint Hindu family is its accredited representative; he has a right to represent the family in suits filed by him on behalf of the family; so also, the manager as representing the joint family may be proceeded against in suit concerning family properties so as to bind the entire family property including the shares of those members who are not eo nomine made parties to the suit.
12. The theory of representation of the members of the family by its manager in suits concerning the family property has long been settled in this Court by a series of decisions. In 17 Mys. C.C.R 7, it has been laid down that it is competent to a father to represent his sons in a suit brought against him for the enforcement of a mortgage and when the properties have been sold in execution or the decree, the sons could not maintain a suit for redemption of such properties on the ground that they were not made parties to the suit. Again, in another suit where the plaintiff, a mortgagee, had purchased the mortgaged property and sued for possession against the sons of the mortgagor one of whom was an infant at the time of the institution of the suit and the other was born after the decree both of them, having contended that their rights to redeem were not extinguished—a Full Bench of this Court in 33 Mys. C.C.R 850, in which Sir Leslie Miller C.J, who delivered the opinion, held that neither of them was entitled to an opportunity to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage as the after-born son only acquired interest after the decree and was consequently bound by it, and the infant son in the absence of fraud, collusion, or negligence on the part of the father was substantially represented by him in the mortgage suit. In 6 Mys. L.J 317 where in execution of a ex-parte decree obtained against the mortgagor in respect of the ancestral property of the family, the property was sold, the brothers of the judgment-debtor filed a suit for a declaration of title to their share on the ground that they were not parties to the previous suit, it was held that the mere fact that the decree being ex parte one is not of material importance, unless there is proof that the manager was negligent or guilty of fraudulent conduct and as the decree was against the whole property of the family the brothers of the judgment-debtor ware properly and effectively represented by the managing member and that the decree was binding even though the other members were not impleaded in the suit. The principle laid down in the above cases was con-firmed in the latest decision of this Court reported in 4 D.L.R (Mys.) 91. In the Madras High Court following the decision of the Judicial Committee, his Lordship Venkataramana Rao J., in a separate but concurring judgment of the Full Bench reported in Venkata Narayana Rao v. Venkata Somaraju, A.I.R (24) 1937 Mad. 610 : (I.L.R (1937) Mad. 880 F.B) observes that
“where a decree hag been obtained against a manager as representative of the joint Hindu family liabilities, it will be binding on his undivided brothers—and the fact that they are not parties eo nomine will not any the less render them parties to the suit.”
13. Again it is held in Papamma v. Narayana, A.I.R (35) 1948 Mad. 54 : (1947-1 M.L.J 274) that
“a decree in a suit against the manager of a Hindu family binds the others as res judicata. Merely because other members were not parties to the suit by name it does not follow that they are not bound by the decree in the suit.”
14. In a later case (Vide Abbakka Shedthi v. Palli Vittai Hegda, A.I.R (35) 1948 Mad. 129 : (1947-2 M.L.J 177), the same High Court has concluded that a decree passed against the manager, when it relates to the family property, cannot be set aside on the ground that the manager remained ex parte or that he did not put forward good available defence or even though he be grossly negligent. Apart from the sons that were in existence, a decree against a father in a suit in respect of a joint Hindu family property is held to be binding on a child in the womb who is deemed to have been in existence and represented by his father (Vide Balaraj v. Pichai Muthu Chettiar, A.I.R (35) 1948 Mad. 136 : (1947-2 M.L.J 161).
15. In the present case regarding the first stage of transaction all the other adult co-parceners in addition to the manager of the family were added as parties to the earlier mortgage suit referred to above. It was no doubt unnecessary to have done so, though it might have been presumably done by way of abundant caution which by no means affects the result. Further more, it could be said that each of the adult co-parceners effectively represented his branch of the family consisting of minor children that were in existence on that date. This view is supported by the decision reported in Abhey Singh v. Himta, A.I.R (10) 1923 ALL. 234 : (65 I.C 653). In this state of law both in Mysore and elsewhere, the decree and the subsequent proceedings against the member? collectively or against the manager as their representative is binding and cannot be re-opened by the minor members.
16. The second series of transactions impeached by the plaintiffs covers schedule items 10 and 11. Items 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11 were sold by the revenue authorities for arrears of revenue and purchased by defendant 5 as per Ex. XXIV. The sale for arrears of revenue implies forfeiture of all prior claims and encumbrances and the purchaser gets a free and absolute title. The sale is not otherwise impeached. The sale or transfer of the family properties for payment of claims due to Government on account of land revenue and taxes is undoubtedly recognised in Hindu Law as a justifiable necessity binding on the entire family and so it is not at all open to the plaintiffs at this stage to lay claim to these properties. Thus, it is seen that in respect of plaint schedule items 1 to 9 purchased in the court-sale in execution of a decree against the manager and all the adult co-parceners of the family and items 10 and 11 purchased in the revenue sale, legal necessity is proved beyond doubt and the plaintiffs must inevitably be non-suited in so far as these items are concerned.
17. By the year 1932 defendant 1 had incur, red other debts on pronotes and under a mortgage which covered items 12 to 16 of the schedule properties in addition to the other items about which conclusions have already been noted. Defendants 5 and 6 had not only obtained decrees but also sued out executions of their decrees. It was in these circumstances that the four brothers who were all the then adult coparceners of the joint family effected a settlement in respect of the assets and liabilities of the family. They took stook of the properties and liabilities of the family and apportioned the same amongst themselves. The recitals in Exs. I to V are a clear indication of the family partition effected amongst the four brothers. The brothers - defendants 2 and 3, and Nanje Gowda since deceased have not only admitted and acknowledged in unmistakable terms the debts incurred by defendant 1, the family manager, as debts incurred for family necessity but also undertook the individual responsibility of discharging the portion of the debt fallen to their respective share. Exhibit I which is the mortgage deed executed by all the four brothers in favour of defendant 6, in respect of a portion of the debt runs thus:
“In pursuance of the settlement of a panchayathi to which you and we are parties and which was held in respect of the discharge of the debts incurred for our joint family.”
18. In Ex. III the mortgage deed executed by defendant 2 in favour of defendant 6, it is mentioned that:
“In pursuance of a panchayathi …. a debt of Rs. 850/- had fallen to my one-fourth share out of the amount relating to the decree obtained by you against my brother Giri Gowda (defendant 1) which debt was incurred by him for our joint family.”
19. Similar recitals are found in Exs. IV and V executed by defendant 3 and the deceased Nanje Gowda in favour of defendant 6. These five documents not only cover the other properties of the plaint schedule, but also the entire debt due by the family at that stage. The four brothers who were the adult co-parceners of the plaintiffs' joint family have expressly consented to the debts incurred by defendant 1 and effected a division thereof. In the circumstances each member is deemed to have represented his branch of the family at the said partition.
20. Whether the alienation of the family property by a father or the manager of a joint Hindu family raised a presumption of necessity so as to bind other members had been the subject-matter of a number of decisions in this Court. In 7 Mys. C.C.R 15, it is laid down that in the absence of any circumstance to justify a contrary view the presumption where a father alienates the property during the minority of his sons is that the alienations was made for the sake of the family. In 21 Mys. C.C.R 145, it was held that where all the adult male members in the family joined in contracting a debt, there arises a presumption that the debt is contracted for the benefit or for the necessities of, the family. The same proposition is reiterated in 28 Mys. C.C.R 10, where Plumer J. observes, following the cases cited above that:
“We might no doubt readily infer from the circumstances and from the fact that the mortgage was executed by only two adult male members of the family, that the transaction was a family business, for the benefit of the family and intended to bind the family property.”
21. In 50 Mys. H.C.R 118, the learned Judges observe that:
“Where a mortgage deed more than 40 years old contained recitals as to the necessity for its execution and all the adult members of the family had joined in its execution a presumption that it was for family necessity may be raised.”
22. Considering the proposition that where all the adult male members of a family joined in the-execution or consented to the alienation or otherwise ratified the debt it was affirmed in the latest decision that a presumption of necessity may be raised (Vide 4 D.L.R Mys. 91). It therefore follows that in cases of transfer or alienation where family necessity is either implied or otherwise expressly proved want of necessity for such transfer or alienation cannot again be challenged. The following cases-relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondents do not help him. In 15 Mys. L.J 193, Reilly, C.J in discussing 7 Mys. C.C.R 15 and 21 Mys. C.C.R 145 observes that:
“The learned Judges who decided those cases were certainly entitled to raise a presumption in those cases if they thought appropriate in the circumstances of the eases,”
but he only doubted whether that could be a general ruling applicable to all cases. He further explained his own opinion in 18 Mys. L.J 276. wherein he observed that:
“No doubt it might well be more proper to raise such a presumption in a case, where more than one member of the joint family joined in incurring a debt than in regard to a debt incurred by the manager alone,”
and where the only adult male member of the joint family incurred a debt, the binding nature of the debt may require further proof, which necessitates comparatively little other evidence to satisfy the Court. In the case under consideration, unlike the only adult member or the manager alone all the adult male members confirmed and ratified the acts of the manager in having raised the loans accepted them to be the debts binding on the family and undertook to discharge their respective share of liability. The circumstances amply justify the raising of such presumption as against the plaintiffs who were represented by their parents; the plaintiffs have failed to rebut the said presumption; on the other hand, there is sufficient proof by the creditors that at the time the loans were advanced, they enquired about the needs of the family and were satisfied that the necessity binding on the family did exist. It is settled law of this Court that if all the adult co-parceners of a joint family incur a debt or give consent to or acknowledge a debt to be one for purposes binding on the family, the said debt is presumed to be one for legal Necessity and such consent and consequent presumption are binding as much on themselves as on their progeny.
23. It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the burden of proving legal necessity was heavily on the alienees, which burden according to their contention was not sufficiently discharged. I do not propose to dilate at length on this aspect, in view of the above conclusions; but it is necessary to note that this is a suit of the usual nature by the minor members of a Hindu family to avoid alienations effected by their fathers. The parents of the plaintiffs who are alive have arrayed themselves as defendants 1 to 3 but have not stepped into the witness box to prove the nature of the debts or to show for what purposes they were in-curred. They were certainly in a better position to explain the circumstances but have deliberately chosen to be ex parte and remain behind the screen. The remarks of Sir John Wallis in Jagannath v. Shri Nath, A.I.R (21) 1934 P.C 56 : (56 ALL. 123) that:
“They have allowed their children, who are all minors but one, to figure as plaintiffs and have them selves been impleaded as defendants 4 and 5, They have not gone into the box in support of the plaintiff's case, in which they are so largely interested … In these circumstances their Lordships have no hesitation in holding that this also was a collusive suit”
amply fit into the circumstances of the present case. Applying the same principles, the Oudh Chief Court has made similar observations in Sant Bakhsh Singh v. Lachhman Prasad, A.I.R (33) 1946 Oudh 92 : (1945 A.W.R.C.C 9). I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the evidence on record coupled with the default of defendants 1 to 3 in not having explained the nature of the debt raises a presumption that the debts were incurred for family necessity.
24. Except plaintiffs 1 and 2 the others are found not to have been born on the date of alienations according to the ages given in the plaint. Though the consideration of this matter is not very material for the decision of this case, a controversy was raised regarding the burden of proof about the ages of the plaintiffs. The correctness of the ages, as given by the plaintiffs, has been denied by the contesting defendants. It has been laid down in this Court that it is for the plaintiffs to establish the correctness of the fact of age averred by them in the plaint, and no attempt has been made by them to discharge that burden.
25. Considering the evidence as a whole, I have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiff's suit must fail; the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are therefore set aside and the suit is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs throughout.
26. Mallappa J.— I agree that the appeal has to be allowed and plaintiff's suit for partition should be dismissed. The plaintiffs have to cross too many hurdles before they can succeed in their suit for partition. Most of the properties have been sold in revenue sales for default of payment of kandayam by the manager of the family and the title of the plaintiffs in them has been extinguished. The oral evidence that the head a of the several branches of their family effected partition is corroborated by documentary evidence. The plaintiffs cannot ignore the partition and file this suit for partition of all the properties as if they all are still members of a single joint family. Moreover as pointed out in the judgments of my learned colleagues which I have had the advantage of going through, in the first place, there is evidence in this case of the plaint schedule properties having been purchased in execution of decrees obtained in suits filed against the manager of the joint family in his capacity as manager and in the second place there is material in this case justifying the conclusion that the debts were binding on all the members of the joint family. The finding of the Courts below to the contrary is due to their ignoring a very important piece of evidence and as such as pointed out in 18 Mys. L.J 17 it is liable to be set aside. This is the documentary evidence showing that all the debts were divided at the time of family partition as if they are debts binding on the joint family. This evidence clinches the point and it has to be held that debts for recovery of which previous suits were filed are debts due by the family. This being so, plaintiffs' suit is liable to be dismissed.
27. There is however one point which I think requires some clarification, as the point was raised at the time, this case was argued, and was also in fact raised in a recent case S.A 460 of 47-48 by the learned advocate who however opposed it in this case. To avoid any doubt in the matter, I am inclined to think that it is worthwhile making the law on the point clear. The contention raised was, that, once a decree is passed against the manager of the family as such as can be ascertained from the fact that the debt was sought to be recovered from the entire estate, the decree is binding on the other members of the joint family and it is not open to them to show in a subsequent suit that it is not a debt due by the joint family and that the decree as such is not binding on them. The contention is based on the ground that the manager should have raised the plea and his failure to do so is a bar. This is an incorrect statement of law. It is only in case the debt is binding on all the members of a joint family that a suit filed against the manager as such is binding on the other members of the family. It is only in such a case that persons not actually parties to the suit cannot be allowed to reopen the matter and claim to have a right to discharge such debts in spite of the manager who represented them having failed to discharge the debt and allowed a decree to be passed. On the other hand, it is equally clear that even if a suit is filed for recovery of the joint family debt, the right, title and interest of the person who is a party to it is alone liable if she suit is not filed against him as manager of joint family.
28. As regards this point I may refer to the decision in Ramackandriah v. Seetharamaih, 50 Mys. L.R 60. It was held in that case as follows:
“A person who in execution of a decree obtained by him against a member of a joint Hindu family has purchased the right, title and interest of his judgment-debtor cannot obtain possession of the whole of the family property on the ground that the debt for which he obtained the decree in execution of which the property was bought was a family debt contracted by the defendant as managing member of the family for its benefit unless the original suit had been brought against the defendant as manager of the family and the decree had been passed against him as such.”
29. The position on the point is clarified by Reilly C.J in a lucid manner in 14 Mys. L.J 361:
“Defendant 2's sens were no parties to that suit, and they were not represented in that suit directly or indirectly. They are entitled to appeal to another elementary principle, that no decree can be made against any one without his knowledge and behind his back, But somehow the question has been raised in the subsequent suit and tried by the learned District Judge on an issue framed in that suit, whether this debt was incurred for a family purpose. The learned Judge has found that it was not incurred for a family purpose. But in my opinion it was quite unnecessary for him to consider that question at all, and indeed in the circumstances improper. It cannot reasonably be suggested in my opinion that a lender can obtain a decree against the manager of a joint family alone and in execution of that decree bring to sale the shares of the junior members of the family and then in a subsequent suit such as this by the junior members either put them to the proof that the debt was not incurred in circumstances making it binding on the family or be allowed to show that he might have proved that it was a debt binding on the family in his own suit, though he never attempted to do. To my mind that would be a perversion of the legitimate procedure, which we could never properly countenance. Here we have a suit brought by defendant 1, in which he claimed and obtained a decree against defendant 2 alone, and with that he must be content. In my opinion it is quite unnecessary to spend any time on the question whether this debt was incurred for the benefit of the joint family. We are not interested in that question. We are only interested in the question whether the decree obtained by defendant 1 in O.S No. 339/17-18 was binding upon defendant 2's sons, and in my opinion unquestionably. It was not binding.”
30. It is however the other aspect that is seriously disputed. In the Privy Council decision Nanomi Babuasin v. Maddun Mohun, 13 Cal. 21 : (13 I.A 1 P.C) the question that arose for consideration was:
“How far the joint sons can be precluded from disputing the liability attaching to their shares where proceedings have been taken by or against the father alone.”
31. Lord Holborn who delivered the judgment of their Lordships answered this question as follows:
“All, the sons can claim is that, not being parties to the sale or execution proceedings they ought not to be barred from trying the fact or the nature of the debt in a suit of their own.”
32. This case was the basis for a later Privy Council decision Daulat Ram v. Mehrchand, 15 Cal. 70 : (14 I.A 187 P.C). In that case as is clear by the head-note:
“The managing members of a joint trading family having purported to mortgage the family estate to pay a debt due by the firm, were sued upon it by the mortgagee”. It was noticed that “In that plaint the mortgagee claims not only to recover against the mortgagors the amount of the mortgage debt with interest but asks that he may have execution and be satisfied out of the mortgaged property”, and “their Lordships find by the certificate of sale that the whole property was sold” (p. 78).
33. It is clear that the managing members were sued in a representative capacity. All the same it was held that the other members of the family could plead in the second suit that the debt was not one binding on the family estate. As evidence on the point had not been recorded the question of remanding the case for evidence arose. It was noticed that:
“The plaintiffs proposed to prove all the facts that were necessary to make the mortgage valid and binding upon them. The defendants had the opportunity of trying that question but they did not wish to try it.”
34. So the case was not remanded. In Puttegowda v. Rudregowda, 12 Mys. L.B 450 at p. 465 (sic) that:
“In the case Daulat Ram v. Mehr Chand, 15 Cal. 70 : (14 I.A 187 P.C) their Lordships hold that, if the managing member of a joint family having purported to mortgage the family estate to pay a family debt is sued upon it by the mortgagee, and the property is sold, such family estate may pass in its entirety to the purchaser if it be proved that the mortgage was a valid mortgage which bound the ancestral property, and the purchaser bargained and paid for the entire estate. In the present case it has been proved, that judgment was given in O.S No. 19 of 1885 against the whole of the property in question for a family debt; and that defendant 3 purchased that property and not merely the right, title and interest of defendant 1. On the other hand, the plaintiff, has failed to prove, that the mortgage effected by defendant 1 did not bind his share. It therefore follows, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover his half share in the coffee estate in question.”
35. The principle laid down in the Privy Council decisions is that in the second suit it is open to the members of the joint family other than the manager against whom the first suit was filed to raise the question whether the debt or alienation was binding on the entire family. In fact it is usual for mortgagors to file suits on hypothecation bonds against the manager of the family and bring to sale the entire property and not merely the share of the manager who executed the hypothecation deed. It is equally usual for the other members of his family to file suits for getting their share of the property by partition and in all those cases they succeed in getting a share if the mortgagee fails to prove in their suit that the debt or alienation was binding on them and they fail if he proves that the debt or alienation was binding on all the members of the family. The decision in 13 Mys. L.R 546 is again based on Daulat Ram v. Mehr Chand, 16 Cal. 70 : (14 I.A 187 P.C) and lays down the point clearly:
“All that the other members of the family who were not parties to the suit and other proceedings on the mortgage claim is that they ought not to be barred from an opportunity of trying the question whether the mortgage was a valid one binding the ancestral property or no.”
36. In the Full Bench decision 22 Mys. C.C.R 250 the shares of the sons were held to have been extinguished by sale held in execution of a mortgage decree against the father alone in view of the fact that the mortgage debt was binding on the sons as “neither of them had been born at the date of the mortgage” as clearly stated in the head-note itself. The order of reference to the Full Bench also states that “the mortgage is found to have been for necessity and binds on sons' interest.”
37. The doctrine laid down by their Lordships in Nanomi Babuasin v. Maddun Mohun, 13 Cal. 21 : (13 I.A 1 P.C) that “all the sons can claim is that not being parties to sale or execution proceedings, they ought not to be barred from trying the fact or the nature of the debt in a suit of their own”
is quoted with approval at p. 260 of the Full Bench decision. 27 Mys C.C.R 155 is a case decided subsequent to the above Full Bench decision. In that case the mortgagee obtained a decree for sale against the mortgagor but the minor members of the family filed a suit for a declaration that the decree does not affect their shares. In the case the question whether the debt was binding on the family was not only gone into but was answered in the negative. It was held that the decree against the father did not bind the shares of sons. I may refer to 32 Mys. C.C.R 247 also as it is to the same effect. In 6 Mys. L.J 317 it was observed at p. 319 as follows:
“Nagappa was the manager of the family and the debt was one due by the whole family. It seems to us that the plaintiffs were properly and effectively represented by Nagappa who was the managing member of the family of which the plaintiffs were also members and that the decree binds them even though they were not impleaded in the suits.”
38. It will be noticed that the conclusion was based not merely on the fact that Nagappa was the manager of the family but also on the fact that the debt was due by the whole family. As regards recent decision 4 D.L.R (Mys.) 91, relied on in support of the proposition, that all that is necessary to consider in the subsequent suit filed by members of the joint family not impleaded in the previous suit, is to find out whether the previous suit was filed against the manager as such and whether the entire family property was proceeded against, and that if it is so they are barred from questioning the fact or the nature of the debts in their suit, the scope of the decision is not properly understood and this proposition does not follow from the decision. At p. 98 the point for consideration was formulated as follows:
“The question now remains whether the debts are binding on plaintiff also and whether the plaintiff could be deemed to have been represented by his father in the court proceedings so as to bind his interest in the suit properties.”
39. It will thus be seen that both the points arose for consideration in the second suit. In the two previous paras the question was whether the father “Subbaraya did represent the minor in the court proceedings.” This was answered in the affirmative. It was then observed that “this leads us to the consideration of the point whether the hypothecation under Ex. IV is binding on the plaintiff.” It has to be stated that if the finding on the first point was in the negative, it would not have led to the consideration of the second point. The second point became necessary as the first point was answered in the affirmative. As on the second point it was held that the debt was binding on plaintiff, after it was held on the first point that his father must be deemed to have been represented in the suit on the hypothecation deed, plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The case relies on the earlier decisions of this Court already referred to and does not purport to differ from them. It is only necessary to add that one other decision of this Court (S.A 460 of 47-48) recently decided fully supports the view clarified by me. The question is a simple one but it required a detailed examination as from the arguments it appeared that recent decisions had raised some doubts and they required clarification. It was observed in that case:
“that before a degree that is passed against a person who happens to be the manager of a joint family could be said to be binding upon other members of the joint family it has to be shown in the second suit, filed by or against them that, in the first place the first suit was filed against that person as manager of the joint family and in the second place that the debt for recovering which that suit was filed was a debt binding on the family.”
40. The burden of proof in this case lay no doubt on the alienees to show that the debts were binding on the plaintiffs and the evidence adduced by them in this case justifies the conclusion that the debts for discharging which the properties were alienated were debts binding on the plaintiffs. The appeal is therefore allowed and the suit dismissed.
D.H
Appeal allowed.
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