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Adinaranappa v. Mallamma
Structured Summary of Opinion — Mallappa, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff-respondent sued the defendant-appellant for recovery of Rs. 513 on a promissory note dated 3 September 1937 executed by the defendant in favour of the deceased husband of the plaintiff. The plaintiff relied on an endorsement on the promissory note dated 7 September 1940 recording a payment towards interest. The defendant was an agriculturist within the meaning of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act and pleaded discharge under that Act. Both the trial court (II Munsiff, Bangalore) and the appellate court (Additional Subordinate Judge, Bangalore, in R.A. No. 105 of 47–48) disbelieved the defendant's plea of discharge and decreed the suit. The defendant appealed to the Court passing the present opinion; the sole contested point on appeal was whether Sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act apply so as to make the suit barred by limitation (the suit being filed on 6 September 1946 — more than three years after the 7 September 1940 endorsement but within six years from that date).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 20 of the Limitation Act (and the general provisions such as Sections 19 and 20) applies to suits brought against agriculturists who are entitled to relief under the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act (specifically suits mentioned in Section 24 of that Act), or whether those provisions are excluded because the Agriculturists' Relief Act prescribes a different period of limitation.
- If Section 20 of the Limitation Act is applicable, whether the plaintiff's suit (filed within six years of the last endorsement) is within time.
- Whether the Court should depart from the view taken in earlier decisions (notably 22 Mys. L.J. 27, which followed Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath) in the light of the Full Bench decision in Janardan Eknath v. Ganesh Sadashiv and the amendment to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Courts below erred in holding the suit was not barred by limitation because the endorsement dated 7-9-1940 did not make the suit within time if Sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act are inapplicable.
- Sections 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act do not apply to periods of limitation prescribed for agriculturists entitled to relief under the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act; the Agriculturists' Relief Act substitutes different periods and thus excludes these general provisions unless expressly included.
- It was contended that the decision relied on by the Court below (22 Mys. L.J. 27, which followed Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath) may no longer be correct because Kishore Lal was subsequently overruled by a Full Bench in Janardan Eknath v. Ganesh Sadashiv; consequently, the appellant urged reconsideration and (if necessary) a reference to a Full Bench.
Respondent's Position (as presented in the opinion)
- The plaintiff's case rests on the promissory note and on an endorsement dated 7 September 1940 recording interest payment; counting limitation from that endorsement, the suit filed on 6 September 1946 falls within six years and is therefore not barred if Section 20 applies.
- The courts below accepted the plaintiff's claim and disbelieved the defendant's plea of discharge under the Agriculturists' Relief Act, resulting in a decree for the plaintiff.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R. (31) 1944 Bom. 89 (I.L.R. (1944) Bom. 71) | Held that an Agriculturists' Relief Act which substitutes periods in the Schedule merely substitutes special periods and does not lay down an independent, self-contained body of limitation provisions; thus general provisions like Section 20 could apply. | The Court noted this decision was followed in 22 Mys. L.J. 27 and considered it an authority favouring applicability of Section 20. The opinion examined whether subsequent Full Bench decisions affected its continuing validity and ultimately adhered to the view followed in 22 Mys. L.J. 27 which relied on Kishore Lal. |
| Janardan Eknath v. Ganesh Sadashiv, A.I.R. (32) 1945 Bom. 200 (I.L.R. (1945) Bom. 167 F.B.) | Full Bench decision said to have overruled Kishore Lal; reasoning addressed interpretation of Section 29(2) and the meaning of when a special/local law "prescribes" a period of limitation. | The Court considered the Full Bench's reasoning (including Kania, C.J.'s analysis of Schedule I columns) but concluded that, after amendment of Section 29(2), the distinction relied upon in some earlier cases was no longer sound; the Court did not find Janardan a sufficient reason to depart from the view in 22 Mys. L.J. 27. |
| Keshav Krishna Dhopade v. Bhagwan Sambhu Chaudhari, A.I.R. (29) 1942 Bom. 131 (200 I.C. 12) | Divatia, J. (referring to Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act with identical wording) held that Section 20 of the Limitation Act could not be applied to cases of that kind. | The opinion records this contrary view as one of the authorities on the question and contrasts it with Kishore Lal; the present Court analyzed subsequent statutory amendment and preferred to follow the approach which treats the Agriculturists' Relief Act as not excluding Section 20. |
| Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Secretary of State, 38 Mad. 92 (A.I.R. (3) 1916 Mad. 1093) | Decision used to support the distinction that a special/local law must be a "complete code" of limitation before general Limitation Act provisions are excluded. | The Court explained that Srinivasa Aiyangar represented the line of authority addressing the "complete code" test, but held that the Limitation (Amendment) Act 1922 (and the present form of Section 29(2)) overruled that distinction as a test for applicability of general Limitation Act provisions. |
| Calcutta — Maharaja of Jeypore v. Vikarama Deo Garu, 24 C.W.N. 1 (A.I.R. (6) 1919 P.C. 84) | One of the cases cited in the legislative history showing conflicting High Court views on applicability of Limitation Act provisions to special/local laws. | Referred to in the opinion's discussion of the background to the 1922 amendment of Section 29 and used to demonstrate historical conflict among authorities which the amendment aimed to resolve. |
| Madras — Sivarammayya v. S. Bujanga Rao, 39 Mad. 593 (A.I.R. (3) 1916 Mad. 376) | Another case showing the conflicting views among High Courts about whether general Limitation Act provisions apply when special/local laws prescribe periods. | Also cited as part of the legislative history and rationale for amending Section 29 to clarify applicability of specified sections of the Limitation Act. |
| Reilly, C.J., 40 Mys. H.C.R. 435 | Warning about reopening long-settled questions where earlier decisions have been relied upon in transactions: reluctance to refer to a Full Bench if the prior view is neither unjust nor against public interest. | The Court relied on this policy consideration (stare decisis and commercial/legal stability) as an additional reason for not referring the matter to a Full Bench and for adhering to the existing view followed in 22 Mys. L.J. 27. |
| 22 Mys. L.J. 27 (decision of this Court) | Adopted the view in Kishore Lal that the Agriculturists' Relief Act does not provide a self-contained code of limitation and therefore general provisions like Section 20 apply (subject to modifications indicated by the Relief Act). | The present Court explicitly preferred and followed the view in 22 Mys. L.J. 27, declined to refer the question to a Full Bench, and held that Section 20 applies to suits under Section 24 of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps, grounded on statutory interpretation and precedent analysis as presented in the opinion:
- Identification of the precise legal question: whether Section 20 of the Limitation Act is applicable to suits against agriculturists entitled to relief under the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act (noting the substitution in Section 24 of that Act of longer limitation periods — six or twelve years — in place of the three years in the Limitation Act).
- Statutory framework and textual starting point: the Court examined Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act (as it then stood and in its amended form) which governs when provisions of the general Limitation Act apply to special or local laws. The Court emphasised that the Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special law and that applicability of general Limitation Act provisions depends on whether the special law "prescribes for any suit ... a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule" of the Limitation Act.
- Review of conflicting authorities: the Court set out the two conflicting views — (a) authorities (e.g. Keshav Krishna Dhopade) holding Section 20 not applicable to such cases, and (b) Kishore Lal Stores and the decision in 22 Mys. L.J. 27 adopting the opposite view. The Court also considered the later Full Bench decision in Janardan which was said to have overruled Kishore Lal and which analysed the meaning of "period of limitation" in Schedule I (columns 2 and 3).
- Effect of the amendment to Section 29(2): the Court examined the legislative history and the 1922 amendment to Section 29, noting that the amendment expressly clarified which sections of the Limitation Act apply to periods prescribed by special/local laws (making certain sections applicable unless excluded, and excluding others unless expressly included). The Court found that the amendment removes the earlier "complete code" test relied upon in Srinivasa Aiyangar and related decisions.
- Interpretation of what it means for a special law to "prescribe" a period of limitation: the Court reasoned that a statutory prescription of limitation, in the sense used by Section 29(2), must be equivalent to what appears in Schedule I of the Limitation Act — namely, the three-column ensemble: description of suit, period of limitation, and the time from which the period begins to run. The Court concluded that merely mentioning a period (e.g., six years) in the Agriculturists' Relief Act without specifying the starting point does not amount to "prescribing" a period in the requisite sense.
- Application of that interpretation to the Agriculturists' Relief Act: because the Agriculturists' Relief Act substitutes certain numbers of years to be read into Schedule I (a statutory fiction — "shall be deemed to be substituted"), the Limitation Act still provides the full prescription (including the time from which limitation runs). Accordingly, the Court held that the special Act does not independently prescribe a period so as to exclude the general Limitation Act provisions like Section 20; instead, the Limitation Act applies, subject to the statutory fiction imposed by the Agriculturists' Relief Act.
- Consideration of stare decisis and policy: the Court expressed reluctance to disturb the established view followed in 22 Mys. L.J. 27, both because that decision is consistent with the statutory interpretation adopted and because reopening a long-settled question could unsettle transactions that took place in reliance on the earlier ruling.
- Conclusion of legal analysis: the Court concluded that Section 20 of the Limitation Act is applicable to suits under Section 24 of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act (i.e., the general Limitation Act provisions, including S.19 and S.20, apply except insofar as the special Act indicates modifications). On that basis the Court held that the plaintiff's suit, instituted within six years of the last endorsement, was within time.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court DISMISSED the appeal and held that Section 20 of the Limitation Act is applicable to suits mentioned in Section 24 of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act; general provisions of the Limitation Act (including Sections 19 and 20) apply to such suits except insofar as they are expressly modified by the special Act.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's suit (filed on 6 September 1946) was within six years from the endorsement dated 7 September 1940 and therefore not barred by limitation; the decree in favour of the plaintiff was sustained and the appellant's challenge to limitation failed.
- Precedential effect: The Court adhered to the prior view expressed in 22 Mys. L.J. 27 (which followed Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath) and expressly declined to refer the question to a Full Bench despite arguments based on the Full Bench decision in Janardan. The opinion emphasised statutory interpretation (the effect of the amendment to Section 29(2)) and the principle of stare decisis; it did not announce a novel rule beyond reaffirming the view followed by this Court.
Note: All summaries above are based solely on the content of the provided opinion and do not add information beyond that text.
Mallappa, J.:— This is an appeal against the judgment and decree in R.A No. 105 of 47-48 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Bangalore, confirming those of the II Munsiff, Bangalore, in O.S No. 131 of 1946-1947 on the file of this Court.
2. The plaintiff-respondent filed the suit against the defendant-appellant for recovery of Rs. 513 due on a promissory note executed by the defendant on 3rd September 1937 in favour of the deceased husband of the plaintiff. The plaintiff relied on an endorsement on the promissory note dated 7th September 1940 for the payment made towards interest. The defendant is admittedly an agriculturist within the meaning of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act and he has pleaded discharge. This has not been believed by both the Courts and the suit is decreed as prayed for. The only point that was argued in this appeal is that the Courts below erred in the view that the suit is not barred by limitation by reason of the endorsement dated 7-9-1940 inasmuch as Ss. 19 and 20, Limitation Act do not apply to the periods of limitation prescribed for agriculturists entitled to relief under the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act. It is conceded that the law as laid down in 22 Mysore Law Journal 27 is against this contention of the appellant. It is argued, however, that as the decision in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89 : (I.L.R (1944) Bom. 71) on which the decision in 22 Mys. L.J 27 is based, has been overruled by a later Full Bench decision in Janardan Eknath v. Ganesh Sadashiv, A.I.R (32) 1945 Bom. 200 : (I.L.R (1945) Bom. 167 F.B) the point raised needs some consideration and it was urged that in case we are satisfied that the decision in 22 Mys. L.J 27 is not correct, the point might be referred to a Full Bench.
3. In this case the suit is based on a pronote dated 3rd September 1937. The suit was filed only on 6th September 1946 more than three years after 7th September 1940, the date of the endorsement of payment of interest, but within six years from the date. If the defendant was not an agriculturist within the meaning of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act, it is clear that the suit would have been barred by the provisions of the Mysore Limitation Act. But the period of limitation substituted in S. 21, Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act for three years prescribed in the Limitation Act to cases of the kind under consideration is six years, in case it could be held that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of S. 20, Limitation Act. The main point for consideration is whether S. 20, Limitation Act is applicable to suits filed against agriculturists entitled to relief under the Agriculturists' Relief Act, is within time.
4. Section 29(2), Limitation Act is as follows:
“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law:
(a) the provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 18 and S. 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.
5. It is not disputed that the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act is a special law. It cannot also be disputed that if this Act prescribed for any suit a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by sch. I, S. 20, Limitation Act would be inapplicable, unless the special law makes it applicable.
6. Under S. 24, Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act, the period of limitation of twelve years and six years as mentioned in cls. (a) and (b) of that section “shall be deemed to be substituted for the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act”. Can it be said that this section of the Agriculturists' Relief Act prescribes for any suit any period of limitation different from the one prescribed under the Limitation Act? The matter came up for consideration in Keshav Krishna Dhopade…Plaintiff v. Bhagwan Sambhu Chaudhari…Defendant ., A.I.R (29) 1942 Bom. 131 : (200 I.C 12) and Divatia, J. held with reference to the provisions of the Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act, containing the same wording as the section under consideration, that S. 20, Limitation Act cannot be applied to cases of this kind, as the Agriculturists' Relief Act, which is a special enactment itself prescribed a period of limitation different from that prescribed in the Limitation Act. But in a subsequent decision in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, 45 Bom. L.R 1064 : A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89, Wadia and Sen, JJ., held that:
“Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act merely substituted in the schedule to the Limitation Act a special period of limitation, and does not lay down as independent self-contained provision as regards limitation applicable to such suits.”
7. Of the two conflicting views, the view taken in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89 : (I.L.R 1944 Bom. 71) was preferred by Venkataramana Rao, C.J and Venkata Ranga Iyengar, J. in the case reported in 22 Mys. L.J 27. What is now to be considered is whether there is any point raised in the Full Bench decision reported in Janardan v. Ganesh, A.I.R (32) 1945 Bom. 200 : (I.L.R (1945) Bom. 167 F.B) which has overruled Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89 : (I.L.R (1944) Bom. 71) that justifies a change in the view taken by this Court in 22 Mys. L.J 27 following Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89 : (I.L.R (1944) Bom. 71). The decisions in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89 : (I.L.R (1944) Bom. 71) and 22 Mys. L.J 27 give two reasons for holding that all the provisions of Limitation Act including S. 20 are applicable to suits to which the provisions of Agriculturists' Relief Act are applicable except to the extent modified by that Act. The first reason is that the Agriculturists' Relief Act does not contain a complete body of provisions regarding limitation. The second reason is that Agriculturists' Relief Act does not prescribe any period of limitation different from those prescribed in the Limitation Act though it modifies the Limitation Act to some extent.
8. According to S. 29(2), Limitation Act, as it now stands, sections other than 4, 9 to 18 and 22 shall not apply.
“if any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by Sch. I”
of the Limitation Act. It need hardly be added that if the special law states that all the sections of the Limitation Act are applicable, they become applicable. The judgment of Lokur, J. who made the reference to the Full Bench shows that the distinction made between local or special Acts containing a complete body of provisions with regard to limitation and those not containing them, no longer arises for consideration after the amendment of S. 29, Limitation Act. There is much force in this line of argument as the amendment was made to avoid the conflict of opinion that existed on the point before amendment and the amended section is so worded as to make it clear what sections of Limitation Act are applicable to special or local Acts and when they are and when they are not applicable.
9. The opinion expressed in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89 : (I.L.R (1944) Bom. 71) on the distinction referred to above for holding that the general provisions of the Limitation Act like Ss. 19 and 20 are applicable to Agriculturists' Relief Act which does not contain a complete body of provisions with regard to limitation for suits, is based on the decision in Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Secy. of State, 38 Mad. 92 : (A.I.R (3) 1916 Mad. 1093), and it has been observed that:
10. Section 72, Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act merely substitutes in the Schedule to the Limitation Act a special period of limitation as regards suits falling under S. 3(w), Agriculturists' Relief Act, and does not lay down an independent and self-contained provision as regards the limitation applicable to such suits. The plaintiff in such a suit is entitled to the benefit of S. 20, Limitation Act, and to reckon limitation from the date on which date a certain payment towards the Khata balance has been made.”
11. Following Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89 : (I.L.R (1944) Bom. 71), 22 Mys. L.J 27 at page 29 states:
It is evident on a perusal of the various sections of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act that it does not provide a separate or self-contained body of provisions with regard to the limitation of suits and therefore it cannot be said that there is any means by which we can determine the period of limitation within the meaning of S. 29, Limitation Act.”
12. The above distinction made between special or local laws which are complete codes as regards limitation and those which are not complete codes as regards limitation in considering the applicability of general provisions of Limitation Act as per S. 29(2) of that Act, is based on decisions like Srinivasa v. Secy. of State, 38 Mad. 92 : (A.I.R (3) 1916 Mad. 1093) relied on in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89 : (I.L.R (1944) Bom. 71), followed in 22 Mys. L.J 27. Such a distinction does not arise, it has to be stated with respect after the amendment of S. 29(2), Limitation Act. Section 29(2) originally stood as follows:
“Nothing in this Act shall affect or alter any period of limitation specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India.”
13. Section 6, Limitation Act, 1877, was substantially re-enacted in this form in S. 29, sub-s. 1, cl. (b) of the Act of 1908 which has been now replaced by S. 29(2), Limitation Act in what used to be termed as British India. There is a similar amendment in the section of our Act. As observed in statement of objects and reasons for the amendment in Gazette of India Extraordinary dated gist February 1921:
“This provision (S. 29) has been the subject of conflicting decisions by High Courts. The Calcutta Maharaja of Jeypore v. Vikarama Deo Garu, 24 C.W.N 1 : (A.I.R (6) 1919 P.C 84) and Madras Sivarammayya v. S. Bujanga Rao, 39 Mad. 593 : (A.I.R (3) 1916 Mad. 376) High Courts have in effect held that the general provisions of the Act cannot be applied in computing the period of limitation specially provided by any special or local law, whereas the Allahabad High Court has taken the contrary view on the ground that the special or local law is not in itself a complete code of limitation. The object of the Bill is to make it clear that the provisions in certain sections of the Act apply to the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law unless they are specifically excluded.”
14. The commentary in Chitaley & Annaji Rao's Indian Limitation Act, vol. I pages 913 to 916 makes it clear also that the amendment is made to avoid this distinction and Srinivasa v. Secy. of State, 38 Mad. 92 : (A.I.R (3) 1916 Mad. 1093) is referred to in the notes at p. 915 as one of the decision which held that the “Test is whether Act is a complete code.” The commentary makes it also clear that.
“The amendment of the Section into its present form by the Limitation (Amendment) Act of 1922 has now set the conflict at rest. The words ‘affect or alter’ have been deleted, and the extent and applicability of the several general provisions of the Act, to the periods prescribed by the special or local laws, specially laid down.”
15. The result is that the distinction made between special and local laws which are complete codes as regards limitation and those which are not, in Srinivasa v. Secy. of State, 38 Mad. 92 : (A.I.R (3) 1916 Mad. 1093) and other decisions on which the decision in Kishore Lal Stores v. Jagannath, A.I.R (31) 1944 Bom. 89 : (I.L.R (1944) Bom. 71) followed in 22 Mys. L.J 92 does not arise after the amendment of S. 29, Limitation Act as the amendment has the effect of overruling the decisions like Srinivasa v. Secy. of State, 38 Mad. 92; (A.I.R (3) 1916 Mad. 1093) which are based on such a distinction. Section 29(2), Limitation Act as it now stands is applicable only if the special or local Act prescribes a period of limitation different from that prescribed in the Limitation Act. In such cases it states that certain sections of the Limitation Act are applicable unless excluded and that other sections are not applicable (unless included). This is so whether the special or local laws provide or do not provide a separate or self-contained body of provisions with regard to limitation of suits, appeals or applications. If the Agriculturists' Relief Act “prescribed for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from that prescribed therefor” by the Limitation Act the mere fact that it does not provide a separate or self-contained body of provisions with regard to the limitation of suits does not entitle the plaintiff in such a suit to the benefit of S. 20. Section 29 as it stands after amendment makes it clear that in such a case only Ss. 4, 9 to 18 and 22 are applicable unless excluded by such an enacment and that other provisions like S. 20 shall not apply. It has to be stated with respect that after the amendment of S. 29, Limitation Act, it is incorrect to apply the test whether the special or local law contains an independent and self-contained provisions as regards limitation or whether it does not, for the purpose of finding out whether general provisions of Limitation Act like S. 20 of that Act are applicable to suits governed by the special or local Act.
16. The question whether the provisions of the Limitation Act other than those contained in Ss. 4, 9 to 18 and 22 can be applied to suits governed by provisions of any special or local law such as the Agriculturists' Relief Act depends mainly on the determination of the point whether the special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from that provided in Sch. I, Limitation Act and it is, therefore, necessary to see whether the Agriculturists' Relief Act prescribes any period of limitation. The main basis on which the opinion of Kania, C.J in the Full Bench decision in Janardhan v. Ganesh, A.I.R (32) 1945 Bom. 200 : (I.L.R (1945) Bom. 167 F.B) rests is found in the following observation:
‘In order to appreciate the true effect of S. 29(2), Limitation Act, it is necessary to first turn to Sch. I, Limitation Act. It is divided into three columns; the first is headed ‘description of suit’, the second ‘period of limitation’ and the third ‘time from which period begins to run’. The expression ‘period of limitation’ is thus used in that schedule to mean what is prescribed under Col. 2. Incidentally, in my opinion it negatives the contention that a period of limitation, must prescribe the starting point because, if that was correct there was no necessity for the Legislature to make Col. 3 ‘time from which period begins to run’. It seems to me, therefore, that by the use of the words ‘period of limitation’ in S. 29(2), Limitation Act, the Legislature clearly meant a period stated in another special or local law which could be put in place of the period shown under Col. 2 Sch. I.”
17. If analysed, the decision is based upon the assumption that the mention of periods of limitation in the Agriculturists' Relief Act is equivalent to prescription of a period of limitation. The point for consideration is when it can be said that.
“A special or local law prescribes for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule of Limitation Act.”
18. How is a period of Limitation prescribed in any enactment?
19. Periods of limitation are prescribed for instance in the sch. I, Limitation Act, and in fact it is clear that S. 29, Limitation Act, uses the word “prescribed” in the sense it is used when it is said that a period of limitation is prescribed in Sch. I of that Act. Supposing the period of limitation alone or the period of limitation and of the nature of suit, appeal or application alone were stated in appropriate columns in the Sch. I of Limitation Act and not also ‘the time from which the period begins to run’, can it be said that the period of limitation is prescribed? The nature of the suit, application, or appeal and the period of limitation are no doubt stated in such a case but before it could be said that the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation, it has also to state ‘the time from which the period begins to run’. It would not have been possible to apply to any case S. 3, Limitation Act referred to in S. 29(2) of Limitation Act if in prescribing the period of limitation the Act had not stated the time from which the period begins to run. Section 6, Limitation Act refers to ‘the time prescribed therefor in column 3 of Sch. I.” According to S. 12(1).
“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded”.
20. Column (2) in Sch. I mentions the period of limitation but the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation by what is mentioned in all the three columns of sch. I taken as a whole. An enactment cannot prescribe a period of limitation by merely stating the period of limitation and the nature of suits, appeals and application. The time from which limitation starts must also be mentioned before any prescription is laid down. It is true that the Agriculturists' Relief Act mentions some periods of limitation for some suits, different from those prescribed in the Limitation Act but it does not prescribe those periods. The periods mentioned by it are to be read in place of periods mentioned in the Limitation Act which it is that lays the prescription by stating all that is necessary to state for that purpose. As the Agriculturists' Relief Act has not prescribed any period of limitation for the suits, referred to in it in the above sense it could be said that periods of limitation have been prescribed in Sch. I of Limitation Act, it cannot be said that S. 29(2) of that Act is applicable. The result is that all the provisions of limitation Act including those contained in Ss. 19 and 20 are applicable to suits under the Agriculturists' Relief Act, except to the extent the act indicates the Limitation Act to be read as modified. The only other point considered in the Full Bench decision is the construction of the meaning of the word ‘substituted’ found in the section of the Agriculturists' Relief Act, modifying in the case of suits mentioned in it, the period of limitation as given in Sch. I, Limitation Act. It has to be observed with respect that proper significance of the word is noticed in 22 Mys. L.J 27 and that the reasoning given in it cannot be improved upon. As observed at p. 29:
“The words ‘shall be deemed to be substituted are significant. The expression ‘the periods of limitation, in the specific context means the number of years mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of the Section. By a statutory fiction though six years is not mentioned in Col. 2 of the said Art. 67 you must read that article as though six years were there the said article so read will apply to the case. Thus, it is the Mysore Limitation Act that governs the case with the statutory fiction imposed thereon. Once the Limitation Act applies, S. 20 of the Act is attracted and the suit claim is not barred by limitation having been instituted within six years from the date of the last endorsement. This conclusion follows from the plain meaning of the language of S. 24, Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act”.
21. We would like to add one other reason for being reluctant to change the view already taken by this Court. As observed by Reilly, C.J in 40 Mys. H.C.R 435:
“When there is nothing in the view of the law adopted in such a case which is in itself unjust or opposed to the public interest, and the case was decided many years ago so that it is not improbable that many transactions have been made in the light of that decision, it would be improper to re-open such a question by a reference to a Full Bench and so possibly create confusion and unsettlement”.
22. Thus the principle of stare decisis stares us in the face. It cannot be said that there is any need to refer the matter for reconsideration by a Full Bench and we agree with respect with the view taken in 22 Mys. L.J 27 that S. 20, Limitation Act is applicable to suits mentioned in S. 24, Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act. The result is that the appeal stands dismissed.
23. Balakrishnaiya, J. I agree.
M.K
Appeal dismissed.Agriculturists' Relief Act,
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