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M.S Vasudev v. Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax.

Karnataka High Court
Jun 18, 1990
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (M. Rama Jois, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from two references under section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The common question referred is whether a reassessment could be validly sustained under section 17(1)(b) of the Act when the reopening had been initiated under section 17(1)(a).

The assessee (same in both references) related to assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76. On February 17, 1976, while the original assessment proceedings were pending, the Assessing Officer (AO) called for a valuation report of a building ("Harsha Mahal") from the Official Valuer under section 16. The AO, however, completed the original assessments on April 2, 1976 without waiting for that report, valuing the assessee's wealth at Rs. 2,53,100 and the building at Rs. 5,65,000 (by applying a multiplier of 15 to annual rental value).

The Official Valuer's report was subsequently received on June 8, 1977, valuing the building at Rs. 8,21,500 as on March 31, 1974 and at Rs. 10,05,000 as on March 31, 1975. The successor Wealth-tax Officer treated that report as fresh information and initiated reassessment proceedings (initially under section 17(1)(a)), issued notice, and the assessee filed fresh returns on November 2, 1977. The reassessment orders adopted the Official Valuer's higher valuations.

The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) who held that the valuation report under section 16, not having been received before the original assessment, was not binding and at best amounted to a change of opinion and therefore could not justify reopening under section 17. The Revenue appealed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that section 17(1)(a) did not apply (since the assessee had fully and truly disclosed facts) but that the Official Valuer's report constituted "information" so as to permit reassessment under section 17(1)(b); it set aside the AAC's order and remitted for other points. The assessee then obtained references under section 27(1).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the reassessment could be held to be valid under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth‑tax Act, though it was reopened under section 17(1)(a)?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee (Sri S. P. Bhat, counsel) — Arguments

  • The report of an Official Valuer under section 16 is binding on the assessing authority only if it had been called for and received before making the assessment; in the present case it was not received before assessment and therefore is not binding.
  • The statutory provision (sub-section (6) of section 16) makes the report binding only where it is received during the pendency of assessment; a subsequently received report could at best be a mere change of opinion as to value.
  • A mere change of opinion cannot constitute "information" or a valid basis to reopen assessment under either section 17(1)(a) or section 17(1)(b). As support, relied on the Supreme Court decision in ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur ([1974] 97 ITR 239) which held that a subsequent change of opinion does not justify reopening under section 147 (the Income‑tax counterpart).

Revenue (Sri Chandrakumar, counsel) — Arguments

  • Because the AO had called for the valuation report on February 17, 1976 (while assessment was pending) and the report was ultimately received on June 8, 1977, the report constituted "information" regarding the valuation of the building and could be used to reopen and reassess—if not under section 17(1)(a) then under section 17(1)(b).
  • Relied on precedent (K.G. Kemptur v. Second WTO [1984] 146 ITR 611) holding that a valuation by a Valuation Officer (reference under the Act) is binding on the Wealth‑tax Officer and therefore constitutes information for the purposes of reassessment under section 17(1)(b).
  • Also relied on Amrut Talkies v. Second ITO ([1984] 150 ITR 386), Asst. CED v. Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur ([1969] 72 ITR 376) (Estate Duty Act — opinion held to be "information"), and T.M. Kousali v. Sixth ITO ([1985] 155 ITR 739) for the proposition that, where reopening cannot be sustained under the (a) provision, recourse may validly be had to the (b) provision within the applicable limitation period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
ITO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur, [1974] 97 ITR 239 (Supreme Court) Holds that a subsequent change of opinion (here, on principles of Mohammedan law) does not constitute "information" to reopen assessment under section 147 of the Income‑tax Act (analogous to section 17 of the Wealth‑tax Act). The judgment was cited by assessee's counsel to support the contention that the Official Valuer's report (received after assessment) is only a change of opinion and cannot justify reopening. The Court considered this authority among competing precedents.
K.G. Kemptur v. Second WTO, [1984] 146 ITR 611 (this Court) Holds that a valuation made by a Valuation Officer to whom reference is made under the Act is binding on the Wealth‑tax Officer and thus constitutes "information" for reopening under section 17(1)(b). Reliance placed by Revenue; Court considered this decision in support of the Tribunal's conclusion that the Official Valuer's report amounted to information enabling reassessment under section 17(1)(b).
Amrut Talkies v. Second ITO, [1984] 150 ITR 386 (Kar) Under section 147 of the Income‑tax Act, a subsequent report of an Official Valuer estimating a higher amount was held to be "information" permitting reassessment. Adduced by Revenue to show consistent approach in related income‑tax jurisprudence that official valuation reports can constitute information for reopening; Court treated it as supporting authority.
Asst. CED v. Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur, [1969] 72 ITR 376 (Supreme Court) Interpreting the Estate Duty Act (section 59): the opinion of the Central Board of Revenue regarding valuation was held to be "information" and not merely opinion. Relied on by Revenue to analogize that authoritative valuation opinions can amount to "information" for reassessment purposes; considered by the Court in reviewing the legal landscape.
T.M. Kousali v. Sixth ITO, [1985] 155 ITR 739 (Kar) Affirms that where reopening under the (a) provision is unsustainable, reassessment may nevertheless proceed under the (b) provision if the recourse is within the prescribed limitation period. Used by Revenue and considered by the Court in support of the Tribunal's conclusion that reopening under section 17(1)(b) was permissible and time‑bar was satisfied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by setting out the facts and the competing legal arguments advanced by the parties and then reviewing the relevant authorities relied upon by each side.

Key steps in the Court's analysis, as reflected in the opinion:

  1. The Court noted the undisputed chronology: reference to the Official Valuer was made while the assessments were pending (February 17, 1976), the assessments were completed on April 2, 1976 without receipt of the report, and the Official Valuer's report was received later (June 8, 1977).
  2. The Court recorded the assessee's submission that a report of an Official Valuer binds the assessing authority only if it had been received before the assessment (relying on section 16(6) as described) and that a subsequent report is at best a change of opinion which cannot be the basis for reopening under section 17.
  3. The Court recorded the Revenue's submission that the later‑received report nevertheless constituted "information" because the reference had been made during the pendency of assessment and that, on authorities such as K.G. Kemptur and Amrut Talkies, a valuation by an Official/Valuation Officer is binding on the Wealth‑tax Officer and therefore could justify reassessment under section 17(1)(b).
  4. The Court noted further authorities relied upon (including a Supreme Court decision interpreting analogous provisions under the Estate Duty Act and a decision indicating that where (a) cannot be sustained recourse to (b) is permissible within limitation), and it observed the Tribunal's findings that:
    • section 17(1)(a) did not apply because the assessee had fully and truly disclosed the facts, and
    • the Official Valuer's report amounted to information under section 17(1)(b) and the reopening was within the four‑year limitation period applicable under clause (b).
  5. On the basis of the foregoing analysis and the authorities cited for the Revenue, the Court accepted the Tribunal's approach and answered the referred question affirmatively.

The Court therefore treated the Official Valuer's report — called for during the pendency of assessment and received subsequently — as sufficient "information" to permit reassessment under section 17(1)(b), notwithstanding that the reopening proceedings had been initiated under section 17(1)(a).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the reference in the affirmative and against the assessee — i.e., the reassessment could be validly sustained under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth‑tax Act even though the reopening had been initiated under section 17(1)(a).

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Court's answer supports the Tribunal's conclusion that the reassessment adopting the Official Valuer's higher valuation was maintainable under section 17(1)(b), and the decision is adverse to the assessee on the referred question.
  • Limitation point: The Court accepted that the reassessment was within the four‑year limitation period under clause (b) as the reopening was within four years from the date of the assessment orders (April 2, 1976).
  • Broader precedent: The opinion does not state that it is laying down a novel or distinct new precedent beyond applying and following existing authorities; the Court's decision resolves the reference by affirming the Tribunal's application of established principles to the facts at hand. No separate broader legal implications beyond the direct effect on the parties are discussed in the opinion.

Order (as recorded in the opinion): The question referred was answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.

Show all summary ...

M. Rama Jois, J.:— These are two references under section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (“the Act” for short).

2. The question referred for our opinion in both the references, which is common, is as under:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the reassessment could be held to be valid under section 17(1)(b) of the Act, though it was reopened under section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act?”

3. The brief facts of the case, necessary for answering the references, are these:

The assessee is the same in both the references. The assessment years concerned are 1974-75 and 1975-76. during the pendency of these assessment proceedings on February 17, 1976, the Assessing Officer called for a valuation report in respect of a building called “Harsha Mahal” from the Official Valuer under section 16 of the Wealth-tax Act. However, without waiting for the valuation report, the Wealth-tax Officer completed the assessment for both the assessment years on April 2, 1976. The wealth of the assessee was determined at Rs. 2,53,100 This included the value of the building “Harsha Mahal” at Rs. 5,65,000. This valuation had been arrived at by the Wealth-tax Officer by applying the multiplier of 15 to the annual rental value. Subsequently, on June 8, 1977, the valuation report as on the date relevant for both the assessment years was sent by the official valuer. He valued the building at Rs. 8,21,500 as on March 31, 1974 and at Rs. 10,05,000 as on March 31, 1975. The successor-Wealth-tax Officer considered this report as fresh information available in respect of the building property and commenced reassessment proceedings under section 17(1)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, a notice was issued to the assessee. The assessee filed fresh returns on November 2, 1977, declaring his net wealth at Rs. 2,55,600 as on the date of valuation for the assessment year 1974-75 and at Rs. 2,60,100 as on the date of valuation relevant to the assessment year 1975-76. The Wealth-tax Officer completed the reassessment adopting the valuation report furnished by the official valuer for the two assessment years. Aggrieved by the reassessment orders, the assessee preferred appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Range II, Bangalore. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner was of the view that, as the valuation reports under section 16 of the Act had not been received before the assessment order was passed, it was not binding on the Assessing Officer. The appellate authority was also further of the view that, as the Wealth-tax Officer, in the absence of a report of the official valuer under section 16 of the Act, had valued the house property on the basis of rental income by applying the well-known method of multiplier of 15, the matter could not have been reopened under section 17 of the Act. He also held that the opinion in the valuation report which was not binding, at the best, could be treated as a mere change of opinion and, therefore, could not constitute a basis for reopening the assessment under section 17 of the Act, The Revenue took the matter in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal gave a categorical finding that the provisions of section 17(1)(a) of the Act would not apply as the assessee had disclosed the facts fully and truly. The Tribunal, however, held that the assessee's case would fall under section 17(1)(b) of the Act as there was information which constituted a basis to say that a portion of the wealth of the assessee had escaped assessment. The Tribunal found that as the reference had been made by the Wealth-tax Officer to the Valuation Officer when the assessment proceeding was pending, though the, report was received subsequently, it could be used for making a reassessment under section 17(1)(b) of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and remitted the case for consideration on other points raised in the appeals. Thereafter, at the instance of the assessee under section 27(1) of the Act, the question set out in the second paragraph has been referred for our opinion.

4. Sri S.P Bhat, learned counsel appearing for the assessee, contended that it was true that a report of an official valuer under section 16 of the Act, unlike the valuation made by a Registered Valuer, was binding on the assessing authority, provided such a report had been called for and received by the assessing authority before making the assessment. In the present case, he pointed out that, admittedly, the report of the Official Valuer under section 16 of the Act had not been received. Any subsequent report, learned counsel maintained, would not be binding. He maintained that the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 16 of the Act make the report of an Official Valuer binding on the assessing authority, provided the assessment proceedings were pending. He submitted that the report received subsequently could, at best, be regarded as a change of opinion regarding the value of the property and that it was a well-settled position in law that a mere change of opinion would not constitute a basis for reopening the assessment either under section 17(1)(a) or under section 17(1)(b) of the Act.

5. In support of this proposition, learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in ITO v. Nawab Mir Bar-kat Alt Khan Bahadur, [1974] 97 ITR 239. In the said case, the Supreme Court held that though there was failure on the part of the assessing authority at the time of original proceedings to draw correct inferences under Mohammedan law, his subsequent opinion about the correct position under Mohammedan law would not Constitute a basis for invoking the jurisdiction under section 147 of the Income-tax Act which is similar to section 17 of the Wealth-tax Act. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court pointed out that such a mere change of opinion or inference which could be taken or drawn on the principles of Mohammedan law could not be taken as the basis for reassessment proceedings under section 147 of the Income-tax Act. If, in the present case, the assessing authority was making a reassessment of the liability under the Wealth-tax Act on the basis of a mere change of opinion regarding the value of the building, the contention urged by learned counsel for the assessee Would have been unexceptionable.

6. Sri Chandrakumar, learned counsel for the Revenue, however, contended that, having regard to the undisputed facts of the case, the valuation report which had been called for on February 17, 1976 during the pendency of the assessment proceedings and which was received on June 8, 1977, subsequent to the passing of the assessment orders, would certainly constitute information regarding the valuation of the building, and, therefore, reassessment could be made, if not under section 17(1)(a) of the Act, under section 17(1)(b) of the Act. In support of this contention, learned counsel relied on the judgment of this court in K.G Kemptur v. Second WTO, [1984] 146 ITR 611. In the said case, this court held that, unlike a valuation made by a registered valuer, a valuation made by a Valuation Officer to whom reference is made under section 16A of the Act, was binding on the Wealth-tax Officer and he was bound to complete the assessment in conformity with the valuation made by the Valuation Officer and, therefore, the said material would constitute information within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Act on which the Wealth-tax Officer could reopen the assessment. It was laid down that, while it was open to the assessee to contest the correctness of the report of the Valuation Officer in appropriate legal proceedings, as far as the Wealth-tax Officer was concerned, it was binding. Similar view was also taken in Amrut Talkies v. Second Income-Tax Officer., [1984] 150 ITR 386 (Kar). It was a case under section 147 of the Income-tax Act. The question for consideration was whether the assessment which had been made on the basis of a report of a registered valuer regarding cost of construction of a theatre can be reopened on the basis of a subsequent report of the Official Valuer estimating the cost of construction at a higher rate and whether the latter constitutes “information” for purposes of reassessment under section. 147(b) of the Act. Following the judgment in K.G Kemptur v. Second WTO, [1984] 146 ITR 611 (Kar) referred to above, the question was answered in the affirmative.

7. Learned counsel for the Revenue also relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Asst. CED v. Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur, [1969] 72 ITR 376. This case arose under the provisions of the Estate Duty Act and, interpreting the corresponding provisions of the Estate Duty Act, that is section 59, the Supreme Court held (headnote):

“The opinion of the Central Board of Revenue regarding the correct valuation of securities for purposes of estate duty, expressed in an appeal preferred by the accountable person, is ‘information’ within the meaning of section 59 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, and cannot be regarded as mere opinion.”

8. Learned counsel also relied on a judgment in T.M Kousali v. Sixth ITO, [1985] 155 ITR 739 (Kar) in support of the proposition that even if proceedings were initiated under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act which corresponds to section 17(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act, and if it is found that the assessment cannot be reopened under that provision, recourse can be had to section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, corresponding to section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act, provided the initiation of proceedings was within the period of limitation prescribed under clause (b). As stated earlier, this aspect has been specifically considered by the Tribunal. It found that though the proceedings for reassessment were initiated under section 17(1)(a) of the Act, proceedings cannot be sustained under that provision as the assessee has not committed any default in furnishing all the basic and primary facts. Therefore, on the basis that there was valid information regarding a higher value of the building property, proceedings for reassessment could be taken under section 17(1)(b) for which the period of limitation was four years and, in the present case, as the reopening was done within the period of four years from the date of assessment orders, which was April 2, 1976, it was competent for the authorities to complete the reassessment under section 17(1)(b) of the Act and that has been done in this case.

9. In the result, we make the following order:

We answer the question referred for our opinion in the affirmative and against the assessee.