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Shantha Bai Prabhu v. Shahul Hameed
Summary of the Judgment delivered by Murlidher Rao, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff and the late Matti Ranganatha Prabhu (the original defendant) entered into an agreement of sale dated 2-9-1980 for the suit schedule property for Rs. 1,09,000/-. On the date of the agreement the plaintiff paid Rs. 30,000/- as advance, leaving a balance of Rs. 70,000/-. The plaintiff alleges that he was put in possession of item No. 2 of the 'A' schedule property on 29-9-1980 in part performance of the contract and issued notices dated 1-10-1980 and 24-11-1980 calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed.
The defendant admitted execution of the agreement and receipt of Rs. 30,000/-, but contended that he never intended to alienate the property, having been coerced to sign, and claimed that the land was mulgeni land in which his wife and children had birthright interests. He offered to refund the Rs. 30,000/- with interest.
The trial court framed a series of ten issues addressing the agreement, part performance, coercion, maintainability (including statutory land law objections), readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, entitlement to specific performance or refund, non-joinder, and relief. After recording evidence the trial court decreed the suit. The defendants (now appellants) appealed against that decree. The appellate court (bench of Murlidher Rao, J.) heard the appeal and delivered the judgment summarized herein.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract (i.e., entitlement to specific performance).
- Whether the discretion exercised by the trial court in granting specific performance was just and proper (i.e., whether the appellate court should interfere with that discretion).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendant's) Arguments
- The notice dated 1-10-1980 was a concocted document and the claim of part performance (possession of a portion of the property) was factually incorrect.
- The defendant had no intention to alienate the property given the circumstances and the mulgeni nature of the land (birthright interests of wife and children).
- Greater hardship would be caused to the appellants if specific performance were ordered, so the trial court's exercise of discretion was unjust.
- The plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract because he had not furnished a draft sale deed enabling the defendant to obtain an Income Tax clearance certificate under Section 230A of the Income Tax Act.
- Consequently, the appellant pleaded for dismissal of the suit.
Plaintiff's (Respondent's) Position as Presented in Pleadings
- The plaintiff asserted in the plaint and in notices (Ex. P-2 and Ex. P-4) that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price and complete the sale.
- The plaintiff claimed to have been put in possession of a part of the property on 29-9-1980 in part performance of the contract and repeatedly requested the defendant to execute the sale deed.
- The plaintiff's pleading explicitly stated readiness and willingness to perform and alleged the defendant promised to execute the sale deed on 1-10-1980 but postponed execution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Motilal v. Nanhelal, AIR 1930 PC 287 | There is an implied covenant on the vendor to do all things necessary to effect the transfer, including applying to Revenue Officer for sanction. | The court relied on this principle to hold that the vendor is responsible for taking steps (such as securing statutory clearances) necessary to effect transfer upon decree of specific performance; this supports decreeing specific performance despite statutory formalities. |
| Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati v. C.L. Katial, AIR 1964 SC 979 | Where contract terms make it the vendor's duty to make necessary applications for statutory permissions, the court can enforce the contract and order the vendor to make such applications; the plaintiffs being ready and willing entitles them to decree where the vendor wilfully refuses to perform. | The court applied this decision to affirm that a vendor's duty to secure statutory permissions (e.g., from revenue authorities) can be enforced by the court and does not make the contract unenforceable as a contingent contract between the parties. |
| Srimathi Indira v. I.T.O., Tumkur Circle, 1984 ITR 351 (Karnataka High Court) | Section 230A's references to "such person" refer to the transferor (vendor) and the certificate procedure under Section 230A is for the transferor; the purchaser is not given a statutory obligation under that Section. | The appellate court adopted this construction to reject the appellant's contention that the purchaser must furnish the draft sale deed; the vendor may himself apply for the Income Tax clearance certificate based on the agreement of sale. |
| Smt. Fouzia Shahi Nazir v. Sri B.K. Lingappa, W.P. No. 7498 of 1989 (order dated 5-1-1990) | Followed the reasoning in Srimathi Indira regarding Section 230A and the role of the transferor in obtaining the certificate. | The court noted this decision as following the Srimathi Indira view, reinforcing the conclusion that a purchaser's failure to provide a draft sale deed under the contract is not a ground to refuse specific performance on the basis of Section 230A. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two principal parts corresponding to the points framed for consideration.
1. Readiness and Willingness (Point No. 1)
The court examined the plaintiff's pleadings and the notices (Ex. P-2 dated 1-10-1980 and Ex. P-4 dated 24-11-1980) in which the plaintiff reiterated his readiness and willingness to pay the balance and complete the sale, and called upon the defendant to nominate a date for payment and completion. The defendant's reply notice (Ex. P-3) denied handing over possession, asserted the agreement was invalid and unenforceable, and volunteered to refund the Rs. 30,000/-; the court characterized this reply as a demonstration of evasion of the contract rather than a substantive impeaching of the plaintiff's readiness or solvency.
On the terms of the written agreement (Ex. P-1) the plaintiff's obligation was limited to paying the balance of consideration; no other act on the plaintiff's part was contractually required. On this material, the court found the appellant's contention that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to be without substance and concluded the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part.
2. The Scope and Effect of Section 230A of the Income Tax Act
The appellants argued (without a corresponding pleading or issue) that the purchaser was required to furnish a draft sale deed so that the vendor could obtain an Income Tax clearance certificate under Section 230A. The court examined Section 230A and the prescribed rules (Form No. 34A) and noted that:
- The statutory form and Section 230A place the duty of application and information with the transferor (the vendor); the form does not require the purchaser's signature or a field specific to the purchaser.
- Clause (a) of Section 230A is intended to ascertain the existing liabilities of the transferor under various tax statutes and to ensure those liabilities are dealt with before registration.
- In suits for specific performance, registration follows execution of the sale deed; courts may enforce a decree and require the vendor to execute the sale deed and obtain registration.
Relying on Motilal v. Nanhelal and Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati v. C.L. Katial, the court noted the implied obligation of a vendor to take steps necessary to effect transfer (including applications to revenue authorities). The court also relied on the Karnataka High Court decision in Srimathi Indira which construes "such person" in Section 230A as the transferor and holds that the Section does not place obligations on the transferee. The court agreed with this view and rejected the appellant's contention that the purchaser's failure to furnish a draft sale deed justified refusal of specific performance.
3. Exercise of Discretion (Point No. 2)
The court considered whether the trial court had properly exercised its discretion in decreeing specific performance. The appellate court found no basis to characterize the trial court's discretion as unjudicious or improper. Relevant factual considerations included that the properties were non-agricultural with structures, the agreed consideration was not shown to be inadequate, and there was no demonstration that enforcing the contract would cause the appellants such miseries as to outweigh the plaintiff's interest in obtaining the property.
The court emphasized the defendant's untenable pleas, the offer to refund Rs. 30,000/- (which the court described as unacceptable), and the contractual clause (Clause 9 of Ex. P-1) providing for enforcement through the courts at the cost of the defaulting party. Given that enforcement was contemplated by the parties and the defendant was a defaulting party, the court concluded that the discretion should favor the purchaser and that the trial court's exercise of discretion did not warrant interference.
Outcome of Analysis
On the combined analysis — acceptance of the plaintiff's readiness and willingness, legal construction of Section 230A placing duties on the vendor (not the purchaser), and proper exercise of judicial discretion by the trial court — the appellate court found no grounds to disturb the decree for specific performance.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was dismissed and the decree of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff was upheld. The court ordered that the appellants pay costs to respondent-1. The core ruling may be stated as:
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's decree for specific performance as granted by the trial court stands; the appellants (defendants) must bear costs payable to the respondent-1.
- On the specific legal question about Section 230A: the court held that the statutory procedure for Income Tax clearance under Section 230A is directed at the transferor (vendor) and does not make the purchaser's failure to furnish a draft sale deed a valid ground to refuse specific performance. The vendor can themselves apply for the Income Tax clearance certificate based on the agreement of sale.
- The opinion applies and follows existing authorities on a vendor's implied obligation to take steps necessary for effecting transfer; the judgment did not state that it was creating a new legal precedent beyond applying and adopting those authorities.
This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions beyond the text of the opinion have been added.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Murlidher Rao, J.:— The appellants, respondents 2 and 3 are the legal representatives of the original defendant Matti Ranganatha Prabhu, in O.S No. 9/1981 on the file of the Civil Judge at Mangalore. First respondent is the plaintiff.
2. Plaintiff and the late Matti Ranganatha Prabhu entered into an agreement on 2-9-1980 under which the deceased agreed to sell suit schedule property to the plaintiff for Rs. 1,09,000/-; on the date of agreement Rs. 30,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, leaving a balance of Rs. 70,000/-. It is averred by the plaintiff that on 29-9-1980, he was put in possession of item No. 2 of the ‘A’ schedule property in part performance of the contract. Plaintiff issued a notice on 1-10-1980 calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed. This was followed by yet another notice on 24-11-1980. Regarding his readiness to perform his part of the contract plaintiff stated thus: in his plaint:
“7. That the plaintiff approached the defendant several times and requested him to execute the sale deed and receive the balance price as agreed upon.
8. That the plaintiff has been and is throughout ready and willing to pay the balance price as stipulated in the agreement and to purchase the property.
9. That on 1-10-1980 the defendant promised to execute the sale deed but postponed the execution of the sale deed on false grounds.”
3. Defendant admitted the execution of the agreement and the receipt of Rs. 30,000/-. He stated that he never intended to alienate the property. He was coerced to sign the document. He was willing to refund Rs. 30,000/- with interest. He contended that the property in question was a mulgeni land wherein his wife and children have interest by birth.
4. On these pleadings Court below framed following issues:—
1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant has agreed to sell the ‘A’ schedule property for Rs. 1,09,000/- on 2-9-1980 and received an advance of Rs. 30,000/-.
2. Whether the plaintiff further proves that he was pat in possession of a portion of that property on 29-9-1980 in part performance of the agreement?
3. Whether the defendant proves that he was coerced to sign certain papers without knowing the contents?
4. Whether the defendant proves that the suit specific performance is not maintainable in view of the provisions of the prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, the Karnataka Land Reforms Act?
5. Whether the plaintiff proves that he was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?
6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the specific performance of contract?
7. In case, if the contract cannot be specifically enforced, whether the plaintiff is entitled for refund of Rs. 30,000/- with interest at 20% p.a?
8. Whether the defendant proves that he offered to pay Rs. 30,000/- several times but plaintiff refused to receive it, and hence not liable to pay interest?
9. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
10. What order or decree?
5. The Court after recording evidence, decreed the suit. Hence this appeal.
6. Mr. Shevgoor learned Counsel for appellant contended that the notice dated 1-10-1980 is a concocted document; the plea of part performance on the allegation that the plaintiff is put in possession of a portion of the property is factually incorrect; in the circumstances, in which the defendant was placed, there was no necessity or need to conceive of the idea of alienating the property; lastly greater hardship would be caused to the present appellants, hence discretion exercised by Court below is unjust. He vehemently urged that plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the fact that he had not furnished the draft of the sale deed enabling the defendant to obtain Income Tax clearance certificate to comply with Section 230A of the Income Tax Act shows that he was neither keen nor anxious to purchase the property. He pleaded for dismissal of suit.
7. The points that emerge for consideration are:
(1) Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?
(2) Whether the discretion exercised by the Court below is just and proper?
8. Point No. 1:
Apart from the assertion in the plaint extracted above, in the notices dated 1-10-1980 (Ex. P-2) and dated 24-11-1980 (Ex. P-4) the plaintiff has reiterated that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He has called upon the defendant to inform the date so that he could pay the balance, which is with him, and complete the sale. In the reply notice dated 15th October 1980 (Ex. p-3) the defendant contended that the agreement was not valid and was unenforceable. While denying the fact of handing over possession he stated he is not bound to execute the sale deed. He pleaded that as it is a ‘mulgeni’ property; he, alone has no saleable interest. He volunteered to refund Rs. 30,000/-. The reply was a demonstration of evasion of contract. The defendant never doubted or suspected the solvency of the plaintiff. As per the terms of agreement Ex. P-1 except paying the balance of consideration, plaintiff was not required to do anything else. On the material, this part of the contention has no substance.
9. Another limb of this argument revolves round the scope of Section 230A of the Income Tax Act. Mr. Shevgoor without there being a pleading or arty issue, constructed an argument that the plaintiff, being a purchaser, was required to furnish the draft sale deed to enable the vendor to obtain Income Tax clearance certificate. He placed reliance on Section 230A Income Tax Act. The said Section reads thus:
“230A. Restrictions on registration of transfers of immovable property in certain cases (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, where any document required to be registered under the provisions of clause (a) to clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), purports to transfer, assign, limit or extinguish the right, title or interest of any person to or in any property (…) valued at more than fifty thousand rupees, no registering officer appointed under that Act shall register any such document, unless the Income Tax Officer certifies that-
(a) such person has either paid or made satisfactory provision for payment of all existing liabilities under this Act, the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 (15 of 1940), the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 (21 of 1947), the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), the Expenditure Tax Act, 1957 (29 of 1957), the Gift Tax Act, 1958 (18 of 1958), the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963 (14 of 1963) and the Companies (Profit) Surtax Act, 1964 (7 of 1964); or
(b) the registration of the document will not prejudicially affect the recovery of any existing liability under any of the aforesaid Acts.
(2) The application for the certificate required under sub-section (1) shall be made by the person referred to in that sub-section and shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in a case where the person referred to in that sub-section is any such institution association or body, or belongs to any such class of institutions, associations or bodies, as the Board may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, notify in this behalf in the Official Gazette.
Notifications:- The Board has notified that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 230A shall not apply to;
(i) an authority referred to in Section 10(20A) of the Act: Notification No. SO 143/21-5-1974 : (1976) 102 ITR (St) 63;
(ii) a banking company as defined in Section 5(c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949;
(iii) the State Bank of India;
(iv) a subsidiary bank as defined in Section 2(k) of the State Bank of India (subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959;
(v) a corresponding new bank constituted under Section 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970: Notification No. SO 144/9-7-1974 : (1976) 102 (ITR) 63;
(vi) a Government company as defined in Section 61A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
(vii) a Corporation established by or under a Central. State or Provincial Act: Notification No. SO 1534/24-3-1977 : (1976) 104 ITR (St) 1; and
(viii) cases in which the Government is a transferor: Circular No. 191/4-3-1976: Indian Tax Laws (1977), Pt III, page 148 : (1977) 109 ITR (St) 115.
Rules — Refer to Rules 44A and 44B and Forms 34A of the I.T Rules, 1962.”
10. The Rules framed under this Act have prescribed a form of application (Form No. 34A). There is no column pertaining to the purchaser nor is he required to sign the Form. The Section also does not require the purchaser to do any act or complete any formality. The application is to be filed by the transferor and with reference to his assessment returns, the certificate is issued.
11. Clause (a) of Section 230A makes it clear that it is intended to examine whether the existing liabilities of the transferor under the Income Tax Act, the Excess Profits Tax Act, the Business Profits Tax Act, the Indian Wealth Tax Act, the Gift Tax Act, the Expenditure Tax Act, the Super Profits Tax Act and Companies Profits Tax Act 1964 have been cleared by the assessee. The prescribed form requires the transferor to submit the application in duplicate to be accompanied by the copy of the document which has to be registered. Such copy need not be signed by the purchaser. This certificate is required to be produced before the registering authority as a condition precedent for registration of document. The right, title and interest gets conveyed after the registration of document. In a suit for specific performance the decree requires the Judgment Debtor to execute the sale deed, failing which on his behalf the Court executes the deed and gets it registered. Therefore, there is no legal impediment for passing a decree for specific performance. It is well settled that in such contracts it is implicit, that the vendor shall do all such acts which are necessary for conveying perfect title.
In Motilal v. Nanhelal . AIR 1930 PC 287. it was observed thus:
“There was an implied covenant on his part to do all things necessary to effect such transfer, which would include an application to the Revenue Officer to sanction the transfer.”
Following the above decision in Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati v. C.L Katial . AIR 1964 SC 979.. Their Lordship of the Supreme Court have observed thus:
“The main ground of attack on this appeal is that the contract is not enforceable being of a contingent nature and the contingency not having been fulfilled. In our opinion, there is no substance in their contention. So far as the parties to the contract are concerned, they had agreed to bind themselves by the terms of the document executed between them. Under that document it was for the defendant-vendor to make the necessary application for the permission to the Chief Commissioner. She had as a matter of fact made such an application but for reasons of her own decided to withdraw the same. On the findings that the plaintiffs have always been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and that it was the defendant who wilfully refused to perform her part of the contract and that time Court has got to enforce the terms of the contract and to enjoin upon the defendant-appellant to make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner.”
12. Therefore, it follows that the responsibility of the production of Income Tax clearance Certificate is on the Vendor. The statute does not require that purchaser as a part of contract, should furnish the draft sale deed to the vendor. Failure on his part will not preclude the vendor from drafting the sale deed and producing it before the authorities, to secure Income Tax clearance certificate, which has a reference to his Income Tax. In the instant case, neither the agreement nor the reply notice mentions this fact. Therefore, this contention is rejected. The conclusion is irresistible that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Such is the interpretation of Section 230A is supported by two decisions of this Court. The scope of this Section was considered by Sri K.S Puttaswamy, J. in Srimathi Indira v. I.T.O, Tumkur Circle . 1984 ITR 351. The learned Judge held thus:
“The words “such person” occurring in the Section refers to the transferor or the person creating interest in favour of another. In the context, the words “such person” cannot be read as any and every person comprehending both the “transferor” and the “transferee”. For reasons that are not far to seek, this Section requires the ITO to issue a certificate only to the person that proposes to transfer or create an interest in favour of another and to no other person. If the Legislature in its wisdom creates a right on the “transferor” only, the Court cannot create that right in favour of the “transferee” also. Any such attempt will really amount to legislation in the guise of interpretation, which is impermissible.”
This Judgment was followed in Smt. Fouzia Shahi Nazir v. Sri B.K Lingappa . W.P No. 7498 of 1989 DD 5-1-1990. by Sri M.P Chandrakantaraj Urs, J.
13. We are inclined to agree with the view expressed by Sri K.S Puttaswamy, J. We hold that decree for specific performance cannot be refused on the ground that the Purchaser has not furnished the draft Sale Deed. In our view, it is open to the Vendor to move the I.T.O with the Sale Deed, based on agreement of sale and secure the Income Tax clearance certificate.
14. Point No. 2:
This point deals with the exercise of discretion. On facts it is difficult to say that it is unjudicious or improper exercise. The properties in question are part of non-agricultural lands with certain structures. It is not shown that consideration agreed was inadequate nor is it established that eventually they would be exposed to miseries which outweigh the plaintiff's owning the property. In the light of the untenable pleas taken by the defendant in his reply notice and in the written statement and the unacceptable offer, of refund of Rs. 30,000/- the discretion must necessarily lean towards the purchaser, particularly when the contract is irrevocable. Clause 9 of the agreement (Ex. p-1) provides that-
“if either of the parties default — keeping to the terms the agreement shall be enforced through the process of the Court at the cost of the defaulting party.”
Enforcement of the contract being the intention of both the parties, the plaintiff is entitled to ask for specific performance because the circumstances establish that defendant is a defaulting party. For the aforesaid reasons we are inclined to hold that the discretion is properly exercised and does not warrant interference.
15. For the aforesaid reasons this appeal fails. It is dismissed.
At the instance of the appellants notices were issued to respondents and he is represented. The records have been called for and interim stay had been obtained. Therefore, the appellants should pay costs to the respondent-1.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
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