The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Hiremath, J.:— The accused-appellant was committed to the City Sessions Court by the IV Metropolitan Magistrate of Bangalore City to face the trial for offences under Sections 18 and 20(b)(i) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘the Act’ for short hereafter). The allegations against her were brief and simple. P.W 1 the Superintendent of the Customs Intelligence, Headquarters, Bangalore, received an information on 22-7-1986 that Narcotic Drugs were concealed in the house of the appellant in her residence at No. 12, Devanahalli Subbanna Galli, Sadara Patrappa Road, Bangalore and he obtained authorisation for searching the aforesaid premises from his superior officer viz., the Assistant Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Bangalore under Section 41(1) of the Act and taking two panchas carried on search in that house at about 8-30 a.m in the morning. In one of the rooms they found two bags containing 2.5 kg. and 0.5 kg. Garija and also 30 grams opium all valued at Rs. 700/-. They were seized under a panchanama at the spot and thereafter the accused-appellant was taken to the office and questioned there. She made a statement admitting possession of the same which came to be recorded by one of the staff members of P.W 1. Sometime later a Cell for Narcotic Drugs was established to deal effectively the offences of this nature. P.W 1 handed over all papers to the said Cell and the seized contraband articles were lying in their godown till they were produced before the Court on 11-2-1988 during trial. It is also the case of the prosecution that some of the officials who came to handle these articles in course of time subjected samples from the contraband articles for chemical analysis to the State Forensic Laboratory and a report came to be received that the samples sent were of Ganja and Opium respectively. However, even before these reports could be received, P.W 1 filed his complaint under Section 200 Cr. P.C against the appellant before the Committal Court on 11/12-12-1986.

2. The Committal Court without examining the complainant presumably for the reason that he is a public servant and without calling upon him to examine all the witnesses in support of the case as required under proviso to Section 202(2) Cr. P.C passed the committal order whereupon the Sessions Court framed charge against the appellant and tried her for this offence. Two witnesses were examined viz., the complainant and the panch witness P.W 2 during trial. Accepting the prosecution evidence, the Sessions Court found the appellant guilty under Section 18 of the Act and sentenced her to R. I for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- with default sentence and also convicted her under Section 20(b)(i) of the Act and sentenced her to 3 years R. I and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with default sentence directing the substantive sentences to run concurrently. The appellant has preferred this appeal being aggrieved by this Judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Court.

3. As various points have been raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant they will be discussed seriatim in the course of this Judgment. The first contention is that non-examination of all the witnesses as required under proviso to Section 202(2) Cr. P.C has resulted in prejudice to the accused inasmuch as when the charge was framed, the appellant had not had the benefit of the case of the prosecution that he had to meet. Section 202(2) Cr. P.C reads thus:

“In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath: provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.”

It is particularly necessary to note the words “he shall call upon” under this proviso which obviously makes it mandatory to the Magistrate to examine all the witnesses that the complainant proposes to examine during trial. In this behalf, the procedure to be followed in a trial of warrant cases by Magistrate as laid down under Chapter XI Cr. P.C may be of considerable help to know the intent of the Legislature.

4. Sections 244 to 246 Cr. P.C lay down the procedure to be followed in cases instituted otherwise than on Police report in warrant cases. In such a case under Section 244(1) the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. Under Section 245(1) if upon, taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. Under Section 246(1) if when such evidence has been taken, or at any previous stage of the case, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. Therefore, in the trial of warrant cases by Magistrate it is mandatory for the Magistrate to take all evidence and for the complainant to adduce all the evidence on which he proposes to rely. Thus when the Magistrate proceeds to consider whether the accused should be discharged or charge should be framed he shall have to consider the evidence that is so led before him.

5. The Sessions Court under Section 227 Cr. P.C has to consider the record of the cases, the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf if it considers that there is no sufficient ground in proceeding against the accused it shall discharge the accused and record reasons for doing so. Under Section 228 Cr. P.C however if after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then he shall frame charge in writing against the accused. There is no distinction as far as the Sessions trial is concerned between a case instituted on a police report or on a complaint filed. Therefore, it is quite necessary that when in the Sessions Court when a case is taken for framing of charge it should have necessary material before it to form an opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. It follows that the accused is at liberty to satisfy the Sessions Court that there are no grounds for presuming that he has committed an offence on the material before the Court.

6. It is not disputed that when in the instant case the Sessions Court proceeded to frame charge as aforesaid against the appellant it had before it only the complaint of the complainant and there was no evidence of any of the witnesses for its consideration. In our view therefore the mandatory requirement of examining all the witnesses in the Committal Court was not adhered to and that was in violation of proviso to Section 202(2) Cr. P.C It may be necessary to state here that when the trial had commenced the appellant took up the matter in Revision before this Court in Criminal Petition No. 1392/1988 before the learned Single Judge. In its brief order this Court observed that it might be that procedure followed in committing the case to the Court of Sessions was not proper and that the Court below was wrong in not holding the examining of the complainant on oath and it is sufficient to commit the case to the Court of Sessions without compliance of the provisions of law as contained in sub-section (2) of Section 202 Cr. P.C But at that stage the learned Judge observed that the Sessions Judge having taken cognizance had framed charge and proceeded with the trial and therefore, the petitioner could not be allowed to make any grievance as to the procedure followed in the case. It only directed that in case copies of the statements of any of the witnesses examined if not furnished should be furnished and liberty be given to the appellant to cross-examine the witnesses. In our view though this Court sitting in Revision over the order of the Committal Court did observe that at that stage it did not find it necessary to interfere with the committal order that does not preclude this Court from considering whether prejudice is caused to the accused in the matter of trial.

7. It may be necessary to state that the Amendment Act to the said Enactment of 1985 came into force on 29-5-1989 which dispenses with the earlier procedure of filing a complaint or a report as the case may be to the Magistrate and then requiring the Committal Court to commit the case to the Sessions Court for trial in view of the punishment involved and the limited powers of the Magistrate to impose punishment. Therefore, we have only to consider the procedure that was to be followed before the Act was amended in the year 1988. If we consider the procedure laid down for trial of warrant cases and the procedure laid down for being followed by the Committing Magistrate under Section 202(2) Cr. P.C it obviously follows that the sole purpose behind this provision as already pointed out by us is to enable the accused to have in his possession the necessary material on which the complainant or the prosecution as the case may be wants to rely during trial against him. If only all the witnesses as required under the proviso to Section 202(2) Cr. P.C were examined in the Committal Court itself, the accused could have been in a position to put forth her case in the Sessions Court in the first instance at the time of framing of the charge and thereafter during trial to put forth her defence. If there is violation of the procedure prescribed and if that violation causes prejudice to the accused and a right vested in the accused to know his case at the earliest is taken away certainly prejudice could be inferred. In the instant case in our view non-examination of all the witnesses as required under proviso to Section 202(2) Cr. P.C certainly caused prejudice to the accused. During arguments the learned Counsel for the appellant invited our attention to a wrong date mentioned in the charge alleging that the offence had taken place on 22-7-1987. In fact, it is the complainant's case that the offence had taken place on 22-7-1986. There is no doubt about this mistake in the charge which the complainant never brought to the notice of the Sessions Court. Perhaps the accused-appellant wanted to take advantage of it at a later stage if at all the accused was aware of it. But this technical error in our view does not at all vitiate the very charge for the reason that the complaint the copy of which undisputedly was delivered to the accused did make out a case of the offence having taken place on 22-7-1986. Therefore, this technical error by itself in no way vitiates the trial.

8. The next point urged is one of certain errors in the authorisation issued under Section 41(2) of the Act and the competence of P.W 1 to carry out search. It is argued that in Ex. P-1 as well as in Ex. P-2 mahazar drawn the description of the property as far as the Municipal number or house number whatever it is, is concerned, there has been alteration only to probabilise that there was no authorisation to search the premises in question. Ex. P-1 makes mention of No. 1212 of Devanahalli Subbanna Galli, Sadara Patrappa Cross Road, Kumbarpet, Bangalore and by this authorisation, the Superintendent I of Customs, Headquarters, Preventive was authorised to enter the house or premises and to carry on search etc. In the mahazar also the same No. 1212 has been written in the first instance and later corrected by scoring out 12 and making it appear that the authorisation was in respect of No. 12 premises and that No. 12 premises was searched as could be found in the mahazar. Section 41(2) of the Act requires the Officer issuing authorisation to satisfy himself that there is reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken in writing that any person has committed an offence punishable under Chapter IV or that any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance etc., in respect of which any offence punishable under Chapter IV has been committed. In the instant case, admittedly, there is no evidence to show that the Assistant Director who issued authorisation was given any information in writing. In fact P.W 1 admits that no such writing was given to him. Regarding the correction which was brought to the notice of P.W 1, he admits that he has not initialled these corrections but denies the suggestion that the original warrant Ex. P-1 was issued in respect of premises No. 1212 of Devanahalli. In our view in the absence of evidence of the Officer issuing authorisation in this behalf and when the Court is called upon to rely on Ex. P-1 to hold that there was due and lawful authorisation to search the premises, this is a serious infirmity which makes it doubtful if there was a valid authorisation in respect of present premises in question i.e, No. 12 which was searched. During arguments it was argued on behalf of the respondent that in view of a Notification empowering P.W 1 to make a search under Section 42, the infirmity if any cannot be viewed seriously. We have gone through the Notification in this behalf which was issued on 14-11-1985 and published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary and that Notification empowered Officers above the rank of S.I in the Department of Narcotic Drugs and below the rank of Inspector in the Department of Central Excise Customs Intelligence and the Central Customs Intelligence Bureau to exercise powers and to perform the duties specified under Section 42 within the area of their jurisdiction. The fact that P.W 1 proceeded to obtain an authorisation from the Assistant Director of Revenue Intelligence no doubt cannot be easily explained if he were empowered under Section 42 of the Act. However, when we look at the rank of P.W 1 as Superintendent of Customs Intelligence in the Customs Department and consider the statement made in this behalf by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the Superintendent in the Customs Department ranks above the Inspectors in that Department we find that under Section 42 of the Act P.W 1 had independent power in himself by virtue of this Notification and therefore, if there was any infirmity in the authorisation as referred to above the search itself cannot be vitiated being without any authorisation or without he being empowered to conduct it. It is also urged relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Radha Kishan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh . AIR 1963 SC 822. that where the provisions of Sections 103 and 165 Cr. P.C are contravened the search can be resisted by the person whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that, because of the illegality of the search, the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure. But beyond these two consequences no other consequence ensues and the seizure of the articles is not vitiated. In our view even though the Act itself provides that such of the provisions as are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are also applicable from the Cr. P.C and presumably even the provisions regarding the search under Sections 100 or 103 of the Cr. P.C are held to be attracted the infirmities of the nature now found in this case cannot vitiate the search itself.

9. This takes us to other material points which are mainly of fact namely the appellant having been found in exclusive conscious possession of these contraband articles, their preservation after seizure till submission for chemical analysis and want of filing a report as required under Section 57 of the Act.

10. It is in evidence that when P.W 1 tapped at the door of the house in question the accused opened the door and there were residing with her, her sons, two daughters and a son-in-law. P.W 1 admitted that there are several rooms in the said house and they searched the house together. Only half a gram of ganja was found fallen on the floor of one of the rooms which was collected in a bag and during search two bags viz., a white bag and a khaki bag weighing 2.5 kgs. and 0.5 kg. of ganja were seized. The net weight however according to P.W 1 of ganja was 2 kgs. valued at Rs. 500/-. This however may be a mistake when considered the quantity in two bags viz., 2.5 kgs. and 0.5 kg. which comes to 3 kgs. 30 gms. Opium valued at Rs. 200/- was also seized and in addition, a dagger and cash of Rs. 8,011/-. The complainant wants to attribute the proceeds of sale to this cash of Rs. 8,011/- for which there is no evidence excepting the statement said to have been made by the accused if at all believed and relied upon. Even P.W 2 the panch witness is not in a position to state from which of the rooms this quantity was seized. Therefore, if the number of occupants of the house and in particular the number of male persons and the quantity of drug now seized, it becomes doubtful if the accused can be held to be in exclusive conscious possession of it which alone makes her liable. In this behalf our attention was drawn by the respondent's Counsel to the Decision of Delhi High Court in Om Wati v. State . 1990 Crl. L.J 304. which was the case of the accused's wife living in one room tenament along with her husband and a huge quantity of opium having been recovered from the bag lying underneath the cot and the accused was held to have had been in conscious possession of opium in that bag.

11. In our view, facts are not uniform and they differ from case to case. It all depends on the quantity seized, the number of occupants, the personal knowledge and the possibility of someone or the other members of the family committing the offence. The facts of this case even apparently are distinguishable from the case of Om Wati as in that case both lived in one roomed tenement and when such a huge quantity of opium was found below the cot, accused could not deny the knowledge. In the same case, Delhi High Court relied on a Decision in The State Of Himachal Pradesh… v. Buti Nath…. . AIR 1957 H.P 37.. The facts in that case were in respect of illicit opium recovered from a motor garage belonging to the accused. In the absence of any other evidence it was held by the Judicial Commissioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish that the accused was in conscious possession of opium in question and as no evidence had been led to show that the accused was in conscious possession of it, the accused could not be held guilty. The facts of this case however were distinguished in the case of Om Wati for the reasons aforesaid. Similarly in the case of Ashiq Miyan v. State of Madhya Pradesh . AIR 1969 SC 4. referred at page 307 of the above said Decision, a house in which two maunds, 14 seers and 14 chhatacks of opium was recovered was concerned. Looking to such huge quantity of more than two maunds of opium which were kept in the courtyard of the house, the Court held that it cannot be believed that the brothers residing in the house had no knowledge of such a huge quantity. What is required to be established beyond doubt is the conscious possession of an article of this nature to make the occupier liable. Here the accused lady is said to be the owner of the house which is occupied by her son-in-law, her adult sons and two daughters. The quantity is so small that it could be easily brought into the house without the knowledge of this lady. The rooms are large in number so that it cannot be said that in all probability the accused must be deemed to have had the knowledge of the presence of these bags in one of the rooms. In our view, therefore, the complainant has failed to prove that the appellant was in conscious possession of the drug in question. Presumption under Section 54 of the Act is not attracted when it is not possible to attribute exclusive conscious possession of the contraband article to the accused.

12. In the matter of subsequently handling all these articles seized it must be said that there has been a very casual approach by P.W 1. He admitted in para-14 of this evidence that after seizure he did not forward the seized articles to the Officer who issued Ex. P-1. He did not produce the same before Court. The properties were produced to the Court on 11-2-1988 i.e, more than one-and-half years of their seizure. Till then they were lying in the godown of the Department. He had not sent the samples to the Forensic Laboratory. Therefore, he is not aware when it was sent and what was sent to FSL. He also does not remember when he handed over the seized articles to the godown as Narcotic Cell was formed by that time. He transferred the entire file to the Narcotic Cell but he had not taken any acknowledgement on it. In para-21 he deposed that he did not remember as to who carried the seized articles from the residence of the accused to his Office. If it was put to him whether he packed the seized articles securely, he would rather say that the said articles were already in bags securely and there was no need to pack. The bags were tied with gunny twines. The bags were untied for the purpose of the examination of the articles found therein. He does not remember whether the bags were tied again after inspection. He did not put any seal on the seized articles before the panchas. He did not remember whether any slip of paper containing the signature of the panchas was affixed on the seized articles. He further admitted that the seized articles were not at any time packed and sealed by him. He did not produce the seized articles before the Magistrate. Again with regard to the despatching of articles for chemical analysis at para-23 he states that he does not remember even the year during which the samples were sent to FSL for analysis. While drawing the samples no panchas were present. After drawing samples they were given to his subordinates. He did not ask any subordinate as to when the sample was sent to the FSL for analysis. He also does not know as to what he did with the same samples. P.W 2's evidence is also to the same effect viz., he did not witness as to what particular article was seized from which particular room and from which particular person. Even he does not know how much quantity were seized from the house and what were all the articles that were seized from the house. He did not accompany the Officer from the house of the accused to their Office and his signatures were not obtained to affix on the seized articles. The report of the Assistant Director of Forensic Science Laboratory, Bangalore which has been relied upon under Section 293 of the Cr. P.C, could be found at Exs. P-5 and P-6. It makes reference to letters dated 27-4-1987 and 1-4-1987. Ex. P-5 states that the sample found in the bags sent was opium and the other relates to ganja Referring to these two Reports it was urged by the learned Counsel for the respondent that because two Reports make mention that they correspond with the sample sent and the description tallied it should be held that the property was properly seeded and preserved securely. In our view in the face of the admissions given by P.W 1 referred to above it is not possible to hold that immediately after seizure steps were taken to seal the seized articles and samples were also taken in the manner required leaving no scope for suspecting that the safeguards required in the matter of sealing and preserving the property were not followed. It may be that while sending for chemical analysis the Officer sending the samples might have sealed. But there is no guarantee that articles were preserved in the same condition they were when they were seized till the stage of sending of the samples for the chemical analysis. There is absolutely no link between the seizure with all safeguards against tampering of the articles and till the samples were sent for chemical analysis. There is sufficient force in the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the evidence of such of the Officers or Officer who handled these articles after they were delivered by P.W 1 to them is necessary. It was absolutely necessary to establish that there was no suspicion with regard to the taking of samples and sending for the chemical analysis. It is pertinent to note that even according to P.W 1 after Narcotic Cell was established perhaps he washed off his hands from this case. He filed complaint even before perhaps samples were sent to the FSL. Therefore it was incumbent upon him to examine those witnesses who handled these articles after he seized them till they were produced in Court only during trial. In this behalf the Decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vasant Shanker Gawade v. State of Maharashtra . 1989 3 Crimes 450. has been relied upon by the appellant's Counsel. In that case the High Court considered the argument that it had not been established that the Chemical Analyser's Report pertains to the very contraband which was seized from the accused. In other words the necessary link between the contraband attached and the Report of the Chemical Analyser was missing and the Officer who had furnished the Report was not so empowered under the Rules framed by the Maharashtra Government. In our view the first ground considered by the learned Judges of Bombay High Court is analogous to the ground now urged in this case viz., that it has not been established that the Chemical Analyser's Report relates to the very contraband which was seized from the house of the accused. Secondly, in the case of State Of Rajasthan v. Daulat Ram. . 1980 3 SCC 303 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed on the facts of that case that it was the admitted case of the prosecution that the samples changed several hands before reaching the Public Analyst. In other words, samples remained in the custody of the Officer referred to in the Report and the inevitable effect of this omission to examine any of the witnesses who handled the samples was that the prosecution failed to rule out the possibility of the samples being changed or tampered with during that period - a fact which had to be proved affirmatively by the prosecution. That was the main infirmity which was relied upon by the High Court in holding that the prosecution had not proved that right from the stage of the seizure of the Opium upto the time when the samples were handed over to the Public Analyst the seals remained intact. The prosecution according to their Lordships had not taken the Court into confidence in disclosing as to the reason why the office of the Superintendent of Police refused to take the samples. Even though the labels were not in order it was for the prosecution affirmatively to prove that the seals were still intact. In our view it is apparently clear that it was not P.W 1 who sent the samples for chemical analysis. He does not know who handled them and how these articles were preserved. They were lying unattended for more than one and half years in the Customs godown. None of the Officers even in a serious case of this nature has come forward to state what were the steps taken to preserve them in tact in the same manner in which they were seized. In our view therefore there is sufficient force in the contention of the appellant's Counsel that the complainant has not led any evidence to show how these articles were preserved, what were the samples taken and who took them for chemical analysis. Simply because there is mention in the Reports of the Chemical Analyst that the seals were in tact it does not follow that the seals put at the time of the seizure remained in tact when they were sent for chemical analysis. In that view of the matter, we are constrained to observe that the minimum requirement with regard to the preservation of all these articles and sending of the samples to the Chemical Analyser without any suspicion with regard to the tampering or meddling with the articles has not been established.

13. This takes us to the next mandatory requirement of Section 57 of the Act. Under Section 57 of the Act it is clearly laid down that whenever any person makes any arrest or seizure under this Act he shall within 48 hours next after such arrest or seizure, make a full report of all the particulars of such arrest or seizure to his immediate official superior. In the instant case, there is material enough in the evidence of P.W 1 to show that no such report was made by him. He admits that even warrant was not returned to the Officer who had issued it. A Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sudarshan Kumar . 1989 2 Crl. L.J 1412. observed that the provisions which stand incorporated in Sections 52(1) and 57 to be followed after the search and arrest of the accused or seizure are mandatory in character, but the remaining provisions are merely directory. In the opinion of the learned Judges the reason is that the right to be informed about the grounds of arrest contained in Section 52(1) and the requirement of Section 57 to the effect that any person making arrest or seizure shall make full report to his immediate superior officer within 48 hours, confer valuable right on the accused. When informed about the grounds of arrest at the earliest opportunity, the accused becomes aware of, at the very outset, what he has to meet in the long run. Failure to do so would certainly prejudice his defence. Similarly the provision requiring the person making arrest or seizure to make a full report to his immediate superior officer within 48 hours, brings into existence a document which can be used for purposes of cross-examination in defence. The making of such a report within 48 hours will also bring to an end the possibility of improving the prosecution version after that time. If these provisions are not strictly complied with, the prosecution must fail, but the same cannot be said with respect to the remaining provisions incorporated in Sections 52(2), 52(3) and 55. In their case, the defence will have to show that failure of justice has resulted due to non-compliance thereof. This Decision only highlights that even though there are certain provisions under the Act the violation of which may not go to the root of the prosecution case or prejudice the case of the defence when a right has been created under Section 57 for the accused to know what exactly is the case as presented to the immediate superior of the Officer after making search, the Legislature must have intended that these valuable rights should not be infringed. In our view, failure to comply with mandatory provisions of Section 57 has certainly resulted in prejudice to the accused-appellant and we are in respectful agreement with the learned Judges of the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

14. This takes us to the next material point viz., the statement said to have been made by the accused as per Ex. P-3 before P.W 1. In this behalf, certain admissions made by P.W 1 are material. He stated in para-18 of his evidence that the accused was making statement in Kannada which was recorded in English and there was one Zammerulla Khan who had translated the same to the accused in Urdu. This Zammerulla Khan had made an endorsement in Urdu but he did not make any endorsement to that effect. Many of his staff members knew reading and writing in Kannada and in fact his Inspector Vittal Rao who wrote the mahazar and also the statement knew Kannada. We got translated in Open Court from one of the Urdu knowing staff of this Court of the endorsement in Urdu below the English Ex. P-3. It transpired that the endorsement reveals that what was translated to her contained the facts stated by her. The word however used is ‘kuch’ thereby giving an impression that something of the report was read. Even if we do not attach much importance to this qualifying word in this Urdu endorsement what is necessary to be borne in mind is that the accused did not know English. Though the endorsement has been made in Urdu and P.W 1 states that it was translated in Urdu she is said to have made the statement in Kannada. In our view there is absolutely no reason for not having recorded the statement in Kannada when the scribe Vittal Rao knew Kannada fully well. Non-examination of Zammerulla Khan cannot be viewed lightly for the reason that P.W 1 himself could not be attributed with the personal knowledge of what all the accused is said to have stated. Though Section 67 empowers the Officers enumerated in that Section to examine any person and such a statement cannot be said to be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act, what is necessary is that it must be proved like any other admission and in the absence of evidence of Zameerulla Khan and in view of clear suggestions made to P.W 1 that the accused did not make such statement and that something was written which was not known to her, his evidence that what was stated by her was written and there was honest translation of the same was absolutely necessary. Even the evidence of the scribe Vittal Rao would have thrown some light as to the manner in which it was recorded. The learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that because Ex. P-3 contains all the admissions against the accused whatever infirmities are there even with regard to the contraband articles can be taken to have been overcome by these admissions. It is not possible to make such a sweeping presumption when it is the duty of the prosecution to prove in the first instance that there was conscious possession of the contraband articles and secondly that the articles seized were in fact falling within the definition of one of the drugs which are prohibited under the Act. An admission no doubt can be used as corroborative material but in the face of this infirmity in the manner of recording the same, in our view complete and conclusive reliance cannot be placed on Ex. P-3 to hold that the complainant's case stands proved by these admissions alone inspite of the basic infirmities referred to above going to the root of the case.

15. A fervent appeal was made by the learned Counsel for the respondent that looking to the object of the Act which is to prevent the drug abuse and protect the Society from its menace we should not rely on technicalities and evidence now adduced is sufficient to bring home guilt to the accused. We do find that the object of the Act is salutary inasmuch as it is to protect the Society from drug menace. This object alone does not in any way dilute the mandatory requirements under the Act towards proof that in a given case accused is guilty of the offence punishable under the Act. Even the Act itself provides certain safeguards against the abuse of the powers and if these safeguards which go to the root of the case are not adhered to then the Court cannot only from the object of the enactment find the accused guilty despite there being no material to prove the guilt of the accused. The punishment provided is extremely severe viz., the minimum being 10 years of imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,00,000/. The authorities enforcing the provisions of the Act would only do well to bear in mind the minimum requirement towards proof of guilt of an accused person without which however avowed and laudable the object of the Law be, the Society would be compelled to live with such menace. Society in general and our youth in particular can be saved and protected from the hazards of drug not by passing rigorous Laws alone but also by the effective, sincere and honest implementation by taking all legal steps with due regard to the procedure established by Law and placing before Courts of Law the requisite adequate and acceptable material to punish the guilty. For lapses in effective implementation of Social Legislation people in general who have no means of knowing such lapses are likely to lose faith in the very Judicial system while those who are responsible to render the judicial machinery ineffective by their acts and omissions sit pretty with impunity and undeterred by serious concerns voiced by Law Courts. When Courts of Law exist to do Justice, it should be Justice to all involved according to Law.

16. In our view for the reasons discussed the Sessions Court was not justified in finding the accused guilty of the offences for which it convicted her.

The accused-appellant is entitled to an acquittal and allowing this appeal we acquit the accused-appellant. We are told that she is on bail. Her bail bonds stand cancelled.