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Dalmia Cements (Bharat) Ltd., v. Regional Transport Officer, Bellary, .

Karnataka High Court
Mar 28, 1969
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Venkataswami, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging a communication dated 29/31-1-1966 from the Regional Transport Officer (R.T.O.), Bellary, which called upon the petitioner to produce four vehicles described as "Diesel Mogurt Dumpers — DR 50 Model" for registration under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the Act). The R.T.O.'s communication cautioned that using the vehicles without registration would be an offence.

The petitioner (a company holding a lease of 819 acres under the Mines Act and Regulations) uses four dumpers in its mining operations to carry earth and ore within the mining area. The company initially wrote to the Commissioner for Transport, Bangalore (2-6-1965) to enquire about registration; the Commissioner replied (26-6-1965) that registration under Chapter III of the Act was required. Subsequent correspondence culminated in an endorsement (Annexure C) directing production of the vehicles for registration and warning of penal consequences for non-registration. The petitioner seeks certiorari to quash the communication and a direction restraining the R.T.O. from insisting upon registration or visiting consequences of non-registration.

The petitioner produced a manufacturer's brochure and photographs describing the dumper (four-wheeled, 60 HP diesel engine, robust frame, dual steering, six forward speeds, two reverse, hydraulic four-wheel brakes, quick-release tipping body carrying up to six tons; maximum speed stated as 84 km/h). The petitioner asserted the mining area was a well-defined and enclosed area (trenches 4'×4'×2' all round); the respondent denied enclosure in its counter-affidavit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the "Diesel Mogurt Dumpers — DR 50 Model" fall within the exemption in the definition of "motor vehicle" (Section 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) as a "vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises" and therefore are not required to be registered under Section 22 of the Act.
  2. Whether the mining area in which the dumpers are used qualifies as an "enclosed premises" within the meaning of Section 2(18) of the Act such that the exemption would apply.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Sri H. Rangavittalachar)

  • Capability to move on roads is not sufficient to attract registration: many special-purpose machines are transported by road to the site where they are used and that transport does not make them subject to the Act.
  • The purpose and manner of use are material: so long as the dumper is not used like a public carrier or ordinary goods vehicle, it should not be treated as a "motor vehicle" requiring registration.
  • The dumper is specially adapted solely for mining operations (digging and large-scale earth transport) conducted in well-defined, demarcated areas not open to the public, and therefore falls within the exemption in Section 2(18).
  • Relied on Daley v. Hargreaves (1961-1 All ER 552) to support the contention that intention/adaptation for a special purpose is relevant.

Respondent's Position (Regional Transport Officer)

  • The respondent maintained that the dumpers must be registered under Chapter III of the Act; earlier communications from the Commissioner for Transport advised registration was required.
  • The respondent denied that the mining area was an "enclosed premises" as claimed by the petitioner.
  • The respondent relied upon statutory interpretation and authority indicating that vehicles reasonably suitable for use on roads are motor vehicles for the Act's purposes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Daley v. Hargreaves, 1961-1 All ER 552 Considered by petitioner to support relevance of "intention" or adaptation for a special purpose in determining whether a machine is a road vehicle; the UK decisions examined "mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads". The Court distinguished this authority: it rested on different UK statutory language (Road Traffic Act 1930 and Road and Rail Traffic Act 1933) and was fact-based; moreover, the UK judges expressly limited their ruling. Consequently the Court declined to adopt Daley as applicable authority under the Act's different statutory wording.
Bolain Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1968 Orissa 1 Held that the user of a vehicle determines its category and that if a vehicle is reasonably suitable for use on roads (public or private), it is a motor vehicle unless it is a special type adapted only for factories/enclosed premises. The Court accepted and agreed with the Orissa High Court's enunciation that adaptability for road use (including private roads) makes a vehicle a "motor vehicle" under Section 2(18). The Court applied that approach to conclude the dumpers were not exempt from registration.
AIR 1967 SC 1424 (Supreme Court decision cited in the Orissa judgment) Used in the Orissa Court's reasoning on the meaning of "adapted for use" — that the user of the vehicle determines the category and that capability for use as a transport vehicle triggers regulatory requirements (permits under relevant provisions). The present Court noted that the Supreme Court decision related to use-based determinations (owner liable where vehicle used for hired transport) and observed that the exemption in Section 2(18) was not the subject of that Supreme Court decision. The Court relied on the principle that "user" is determinative in deciding the vehicle's category.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded from statutory text and the factual material put before it. It summarized the relevant provisions:

  • Section 22 requires registration of motor vehicles before use in public places or other places for carrying passengers or goods.
  • Section 2(18) defines "motor vehicle" but expressly excludes "a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises".

The Court interpreted the exemption in Section 2(18) strictly. The word "only" confines the exemption to vehicles that are incapable of being used in any other place or manner (i.e., vehicles designed such that their capability is limited to factory or enclosed premises). Thus, the Court held that the exemption applies where the vehicle's design and manufacture confine it to use only in such enclosed premises; mere current use in an enclosed place does not suffice.

Applying that test to the facts, the Court found that the dumper in question — by its technical description and the brochure — is capable of carrying loads outside the mining area and is therefore not incapable of being used as a goods vehicle outside an enclosed premises. That capacity to be used beyond the mining area undermines the petitioner's reliance on the exemption.

The Court considered and rejected the petitioner's reliance on Daley v. Hargreaves because (a) the UK decision turned on different statutory wording ("intended or adapted for use on roads") and (b) the UK judges had confined their decision to the specific facts before them. The Court therefore refused to import an "intention/manufacturer's purpose" test into the Indian statutory exemption.

The Court gave weight to the Orissa High Court decision in Bolain Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa and to the Supreme Court observations cited therein, which emphasize that the user and the vehicle's suitability for roads (public or private) determine whether it falls within the definition of a motor vehicle. In particular, the Orissa decision held that if a vehicle is fit and suitable for being used on a road it must be treated as a motor vehicle unless it is shown to be of a special type adapted only for factories/enclosed premises and incapable of running on other roads; the Court respectfully agreed with this approach.

The Court also noted that, on the material before it, it could not find that the mining area was an "enclosed premises" within Section 2(18). Because the dumpers were capable of use outside an enclosed premises and because enclosure of the mining area was not established, the dumpers did not satisfy the statutory exemption. On that basis the petitioner was not entitled to relief.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.

Direct consequences on the parties:

  • The petitioner's challenge to the R.T.O.'s communication is unsuccessful; the petitioner is "clearly disentitled to relief."
  • The Court awarded costs against the petitioner (Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-).

Broader implications: The opinion applies a restrictive interpretation of the exemption in Section 2(18) — requiring that an excluded vehicle be, by design and manufacture, capable of use only in a factory or enclosed premises. The Court expressly relied on and adopted the reasoning in Bolain Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa on the determinative role of "user" and suitability for roads. The opinion does not assert the setting of any new legal precedent beyond its application of existing statutory interpretation and cited authorities.

Result in the court below: Petition dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-. (Order: "Petition dismissed.")

Show all summary ...

Venkataswami, J.:— This 4 Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is directed against a communication made by the Regional Transport Officer, Bellary, on 29/31-1-1966, calling upon the petitioner to produce vehicles commercially known as ‘Diesel Mogurt Dumpers — DR 50 Model’ for registration under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to be hereinafter referred to as the “Act”. The communication has further cautioned the petitioner that it would be an offence to use the vehicles without proper registration under the Act.

2. The prayer of the petitioner is for the issue of a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the said communication with a further direction to the R.T.O (respondent) to forbear from insisting upon the registration of the Dumpers belonging to the petitioner, under the provisions of the Act, and from visiting the consequences of non-registration on the petitioner. The few facts relevant for the disposal of this petition are as follows: The Petitioner-company is a holder of a lease in regard to 819 acres of land under the Mines Act and Regulations. The petitioner, during his mining operations, has been using 4 Dumpers which will be more fully described hereafter. According to him, the vehicles are used to carry loads of earth and ore from one place to another within the mining area. It is stated that this operation is essential for carrying on its mining operations effectively and economically. On 2-6-1965 the Company appears to have addressed a letter to the Commissioner for Transport, Bangalore, making an enquiry in regard to the registration of these Dumpers. A reply was received by the petitioner on 26-6-1965 (Annexure A) to the effect that even though the vehicles were proposed to be used within the Mining Area, they were required to be registered under Chapter III of the Act. Further correspondence seems to have ensued culminating in the issue of an endorsement (Annexure C), whereunder the Company was called upon to produce the vehicles for registration with a note of caution that it would amount to an offence to use such vehicles without registration. Aggrieved by this communication, the petitioner has approached this Court for the issue of a Writ or direction as detailed earlier.

4. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit producing a ‘Brochure’ relating to Dumper DR 50, with which we are concerned in the present petition. It is also stated that the Mining Area was a well defined area and enclosed by trench measuring 4′×4′×2′ all round. It may, however, at this stage be stated that this fact relating to the enclosing or the Area, has been denied in the counter affidavit produced by the respondent.

5. A few details regarding the dumper may conveniently be mentioned, with reference to some photographs which have been made available in addition to the ‘Brochure’ referred to: The vehicle is a four-wheeled one. It has a 60 HP Diesel Engine. It has a robust frame-work and a front axle with full-floating axle Shafts, with wheels of large dimensions suitable for the performance of work under heaviest road conditions. It has a dual steering with six forward speeds and two reverse. It has also a hydraulic four wheeled brake and a device for easy and quick release of the tipping body, so as to ensure speedy work and good exploitation of the working time. The tipping body which is intended to carry loads is provided with a locking device, which if released would easily tilt it by its own weight. It is also capable of turning round the axis of its centre of gravity. After the contents are unloaded it regains its original position once again under the effect of its own weight. This tipping body is capable of carrying loads upto six tons at a time. It is further seen from the ‘Brochure’ that the Dumper is a single purpose machine for it performs in the best possible way the transport of load on cross-country terrain and its discharge. The maximum speed of a Dumper under full load is stated to be 84 KM per hour.

6. Sri H. Rangavittalachar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that by the mere fact that a motor vehicle of this nature is capable of moving on roads would not be a sufficient ground to attract the provisions relating to registration under the Art. According to him, almost every vehicle which is adapted for use for a special purpose will have to be transported to the site on which it is intended to be operated, only by road. Such a user would not bring it within the scope of the provisions of Section 22 of the Act. It is further his contention that the purpose for which the vehicle is used is also a relevant circumstance, meaning that so long as it is not used like any other public carrier or goods vehicle, it would not be a motor vehicle within the meaning of the provisions of the Act, which require registration of such vehicles. He submits that the Mining Area is a well defined and demarcated area and as such it must be deemed to be an enclosed area under Section 2(18) of the Act. He, however, does not seriously dispute the stand taken on behalf of the respondent that it was not enclosed by a fence or trench.

7. The learned Counsel further argues that the vehicle is not at all adapted for use like other motor vehicles requiring registration under the Act, as for instance, a stage carriage, goods truck, cab or omnibus. The ‘dumper’ is specially adapted for use only in mining operations or works which involve digging and transport of earth on a large scale. Such works are always done on well defined and demarcated areas which are not open to the public at large. It is, therefore, his contention that such a vehicle falls clearly within the exemption contained in Section 2(18) of the Act. In support of these submissions he relied on a decision reported in Daley v. Hargreaves, 1961-1 All ER 552.

8. In order to appreciate the above contentions, it would be necessary to set out some of the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 22 of the Act, which refers to the requirement of registration of a motor vehicle, as defined under the Act, runs thus:

“No person shall drive any motor vehicle and no owner of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit the vehicle to be driven in any public place or in any other place for the purpose of carrying passengers or goods unless the vehicle is registered in accordance with this Chapter and the certificate of registration of the vehicle has not been suspended or cancelled and the vehicle carries a registration mark displayed in the prescribed manner.”

9. It is dear from the above provisions that a motor vehicle as defined under the Act, cannot be driven or caused to be used in any public place or any other place for any of the purposes indicated therein. It is also clear that the words “any other place” in that provision are intended to cover cases of user of a vehicle even in a private place.

10. Section 2(7) defines ‘goods’ which may be carried in a motor vehicle designed for such purpose, as follows:

“‘Goods’ includes live-stock and anything (other than equipment ordinarily used with file vehicle) carried by a vehicle except living persons, but does not include luggage or personal effects carried in a motor car or in a trailer attached to a motor car or the personal luggage of passengers travelling in the vehicle;”

11. Section 2(8) defines “goods vehicle” thus:

“‘Goods vehicle’ means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods solely or in addition to passengers;”

12. Section 2(18) defines “motor vehicle”, with which we are primarily concerned herein, thus:

“‘Motor vehicle’ means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises:’” (underlining (hereinto ‘ ’) is ours).

13. It will be seen from the definition of a “motor vehicle” that an exemption is incorporated therein relating to vehicles of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises.” The word “only” is not without significance. It confines the operation of the exemption to vehicles which are incapable of being used in any other manner and in any other place, as a goods vehicle, omnibus, stage carriage or cab (sic) such other vehicle as defined in the Act. In other words, a vehicle which is designed for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises is excluded from the definition of “motor vehicle”.

14. In the instant case, it is clear from what has been stated earlier, the “dumper” in question can be used for carrying loads even outside the Mining Area or any other enclosed premises, like any other ‘goods vehicle’ which is required to be registered under the Act. It may be that it is not as convenient or advantageous as any other public carrier or goods vehicle, which is commonly used for the transport of goods, when it is used for a similar purpose outside a factory or an enclosed premises. This circumstance in itself is not sufficient to bring the vehicle within the scope of the exemption mentioned in the definition of a “motor vehicle”.

15. But Sri Rangavittalachar submits that the purpose for which it is used or the intention of the manufacturers as regards its use would be a material circumstance to be taken into account. In elaborating on this aspect he submits that its adaptability for use for a special purpose is a critical fact to be taken into account. It is in this context that he refers to the decision mentioned earlier. We are unable to accede to this argument Firstly, the decision in question is based on a specific statutory provision in force in the United Kingdom, particularly the provision of Sections 1, 3(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1930 and Section 36 of the Road and Rail Traffic Act 1933. It is clear from the provisions which have been extracted in the said decision that the intention as manifested by the use of the words “mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads” is an element to be taken into consideration. The position is not the same with the provisions of the Act with which we are concerned, particularly the exemption referred to in the definition of “motor vehicle” in Section 2(18) of the Act.

16. Secondly, it is also clear from the said decision that their Lordships have made ample reservations indicating that the decision ought not to be treated as a precedent. This is clear from the following passages in the opinions expressed by their Lordships. Salmon, J., observes at page 556 thus:

“The view that I have reached is based strictly on the particular facts of this case and is not intended to apply to dumpers generally. My conclusion might and probably would, have been different if the findings had shown that the dumpers were reasonably suitable for being driven along the public roads in transit or for the purpose of carrying material from one site to another. Nor must it be thought that I am acceding to the appellants' submission that the intention referred to in the relevant sections is the manufacturers' intention alone. It may be that the legislature had no particular person's intention in view, whether's manufacturer's wholesaler's, retailer's, owner's or user's, “Intended …. for use on roads” may mean no more than suitable or apt for use.”

17. Lord Parker, C.J, in agreeing makes the following observations:

“I would only like to emphasise that it must not be taken as the result of this decision that dumpers of the type used in this case are not motor vehicles intended or adapted for use on the road. For my part, I have come to the same conclusion as Salmon, J., merely because that was not proved in this case. It may well be that in another case on fuller evidence the Court will be able to say that dumpers of this kind were dearly motor vehicles intended or adapted for use on the road.”

18. It is dear from the above observations that their Lordships rested the decision on the facts of that case.

19. Further, we are concerned with the statutory provisions of the Act relating to exemption or exclusion of certain types of machines from the category of motor vehicles as defined therein. Such exclusion is made subject to the condition that vehicles must be such which are of special types adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises. As explained earlier, they must be such as are incapable of use in any other place for the purpose of transport of goods or passengers. Only in this limited sense will be the test of purpose became relevant. This is not the same thing as saying that if the vehicle is not put to use elsewhere, or used for a special purpose, it must be exempted from registration under Section 22 of the Act. The test of purpose, as argued by the learned Counsel, does not also, in our view, fall clearly within the purview of the statutory exemption in Section 2(18) of the Act. On the other hand, what is enjoined is that its very design and manufacture must be such as would confine its capability for use only in a factory or enclosed premises.

20. In this connection, our attention has been invited by the learned Counsel for the respondent to a decision reported in AIR 1968 Orissa 1, Bolain Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa. Their Lordships were dealing with two appeals arising from two suits filed by the plaintiffs for a declaration that the machineries in their possession and as described in the Schedule to the plaint thereto, were not liable for registration under Section 22 of the Act and as such not liable to be taxed under Section 6 of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930. Among the items mentioned in the Schedule were ‘Euclid Dumpers’. After referring to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1967 SC 1424, in regard to the words “adapted for use” their Lordships observe thus: (at para 9 of the judgment):

“…… Thus the legal position is clear that it is the user of a particular vehicle that determines the category and not the mere fact of its adaptation or construction. Thus if a particular vehicle is capable of being used in a particular way, it must be taken to have been adapted for such use.”

21. But, it may also be noted that in the decision of the Supreme Court, above referred to, what was in question was whether the owner of a Motor Car, which was used for transporting passengers for hire was liable for prosecution under Section 42(1) of the Act The exemption under Section 2(18) did not fall for consideration in the said decision. It was in this context that the Supreme Court laid down that if a Motor Vehicle is used as a transport vehicle, the owner who so uses it or permits it to be so used is required to obtain the necessary permit. It is the use of the vehicle for carrying passengers for hire or reward which determines the application of Section 42(1) of the Act.

22. Their Lordships of the Orissa High Court further laid down the true test in such matters with particular reference to Section 2(18) of the Act thus in para 10 of the Judgment:

“The test in all these cases would be if the vehicle are reasonably suitable for being used along with the public roads, the fact that the manufacturers have made or intended a particular vehicle for one purpose or the other or the dealers have sold it for a particular purpose or that a particular vehicle is described by a particular name or description, is no criterion to decide whether the vehicle is adapted for use upon the roads within the meaning of the definition given in Section 2(18) of the Act.”

23. Further in the same decision with regard to “dumpers” employed by the plaintiffs therein, their Lordships observe thus at para 16 of the judgment:

“…. The word ‘road’ has not been defined in the Act for the purpose of Section 2(18). If a vehicle is fit and suitable for being used on a road, it is immaterial whether it runs on a private road or on a public road unless it is shown that it is for a special type adapted for use only in factories or enclosed premises and incapable of running on any other type of roads or public roads. The Rockers and Dumpers (items 5 and 7) must therefore be held to be Motor Vehicles within the meaning of the Act and are liable for registration under Section 22 of the Act and for payment of appropriate tax as provided under the Taxation Act.”

24. We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciations of their Lordships of the Orissa High Court in this view, it is unnecessary to discuss fully whether the premises in question is an “enclosed premises” within the meaning of Section 2(18) of the Act, although it may be relevant to note that on the material placed before us, we are not in a position to hold that the “mining areas” in this case is an “enclosed premises”. We are therefore clearly of the opinion that the “dumpers” in question are not such as would come within the purview of the exemption contained in Section 2(18) of the Act. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is clearly disentitled to relief.

26. In the result, this petition deserves to fail and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.

Petition dismissed.