- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Indian Iron And Steel Company Ltd. ... v. Indian Iron And Steel Company Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
Ramanand Tiwary (petitioner-appellant) was an employee of Indian Iron & Steel Company Ltd. He was appointed as a General Mazdoor on 20.2.1970 and later promoted to Attendant Clerk on 23.5.1980. The petitioner produced a Matriculation Certificate and other documents stating his date of birth as 31.12.1950. On 29.9.1989 a Medical Board assessed his age and recorded a date of birth of 29.9.1949. A Form B register entry produced (prepared in 1980) showed a different date of birth (14.2.1951).
On 20.12.2005 the respondent-company served letter No. 260 indicating that the petitioner would retire effective 31.1.2006 on attaining the age of 60. The petitioner represented on 23.12.2005 that his Matriculation Certificate and School Leaving Certificate established his DOB as 31.12.1950 (which would make his superannuation date 31.12.2010); that representation was not considered. He filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of the retirement letter and a direction to treat his DOB as 31.12.1950 and to permit him to continue in service.
The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by order dated 23.8.2006, holding that the date of superannuation was correctly fixed by respondent authorities based on the Form B Register entry (a self-declaration that he was about 25 years old at joining in 1970). Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present Letters Patent Appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Instruction No. 76 of N.C.W.A. - III and the respondents' bye-laws, the date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate (31.12.1950) must be treated as the correct and immutable date of birth for the petitioner.
- Whether the entries in the Form B Register (self-declaration) or the Medical Board report can legitimately override the Matriculation Certificate for the purpose of fixing date of superannuation.
- Whether the impugned retirement letter dated 20.12.2005 (fixing superannuation as 31.1.2006) was illegal and should be quashed, with consequential directions to correct records and reinstate/permit continuation in service until superannuation as per the Matriculation Certificate.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Matriculation Certificate (showing DOB 31.12.1950) was produced in 1980 and was the basis for promotion; the petitioner had furnished that DOB even at the time of appointment (20.2.1970).
- Instruction No. 76 of the National Coal Wage Agreement - III (N.C.W.A. - III) treats the date of birth recorded in a Matriculation Certificate as correct and not alterable; therefore the Matriculation Certificate has higher evidentiary value and its date of birth must be accepted by the respondents.
- Consequently, the respondents' fixation of the date of superannuation (31.1.2006) is wrong and should be set aside; the petitioner should be permitted to continue until the date indicated by his Matriculation Certificate.
Respondent's Arguments
- The petitioner had made a self-declaration in the Form B Register at the time of joining (1970) that he was about 25 years of age; on that basis the respondent fixed the date of birth leading to superannuation in January 2006.
- Respondents relied on the Single Judge's conclusion that the Form B self-declaration justified the fixation of his date of superannuation as 31.1.2006.
- The respondents also placed reliance on certain precedents (listed below) in support of their position; however, the Court later found those authorities not to address the precise question before it.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Awadh Singh v. The Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Ors., 2005 (2) JCR 474 | Cited to show that where a Matriculation Certificate has been verified, the employer should accept the date of birth recorded therein and should not require further medical re-assessment; supports Instruction No. 76's application. | The Court relied on and applied the observations in Awadh Singh, holding that those observations apply "with all fours" to the present case and that the respondents should have accepted the petitioner's Matriculation Certificate. |
| Siyaram Singh v. The State of Bihar and Ors., 1995 (1) PLJR 691 | Cited by the appellant to substantiate submissions regarding age evidence (as listed by appellant's counsel). | The opinion records that this authority was cited by the appellant; the Court's reasons do not specifically rest upon this decision in its analysis. |
| Murli Manohar Tiwary v. The State of Bihar and Ors., 1986 PLJR 1180 | Cited by the appellant (as listed in submissions). | The opinion records citation but does not specifically apply this decision in the Court's reasoning. |
| State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, 2005 (2) JLJR 129 (SC) | Cited by the appellant in support of his submissions. | The opinion notes the citation; the Court does not indicate specific reliance on this authority in reaching its decision. |
| State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Vali Mohmed Dosabhai | Cited by the respondents in support of their reply (as listed by respondents' counsel). | The Court found that the decisions cited by respondents do not deal with the specific question and were of no use in this case. |
| Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. S.M. Jadhav and Anr. | Cited by the respondents in support of their reply. | The Court observed this authority was cited but concluded it did not address the core issue here and therefore was not helpful. |
| G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal v. Shib Kumar Dushad and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 72 | Cited by the respondents (listed among respondent authorities). | The Court recorded the citation but indicated those authorities did not deal with the particular question and hence were not applied. |
| State of Orissa and Ors. v. Ramanath Patnaik | Cited by the respondents in support of their argument. | The Court noted the citation but expressly stated that the other decisions cited by respondents did not deal with the relevant question and were not useful for deciding the appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court’s reasoning proceeded in several steps based on the respondents' bye-laws and the documentary record produced:
- Applicability of Instruction No. 76: The Court first confirmed that Instruction No. 76 of N.C.W.A. - III (also referred to as Instruction No. 70 in one place) is applicable to the respondent company and the appellant. It reproduced Instruction No. 76(A)(i): where an appointee has passed Matriculation, the date of birth recorded in that certificate shall be treated as the correct date of birth and shall not be altered under any circumstances.
- Scheme for existing employees: The Court highlighted Clause 76(B)(i)(a) which provides that for existing employees, Matriculation Certificates (if issued prior to employment) should be treated as correct.
- Evaluation of documentary inconsistencies: The Court noted the presence of multiple, inconsistent entries:
- The Matriculation Certificate shows DOB 31.12.1950 (produced in 1980 and used for promotion).
- The Medical Board report (29.9.1989) recorded DOB 29.9.1949.
- The Form B Register produced (prepared in 1980) showed DOB 14.2.1951; the original Form B register as recorded on 20.2.1970 was not produced.
- On what to rely upon: Although the Court noted the inconsistencies among the documents (Matriculation Certificate, Medical Board report, Form B entry), it expressly stated it would not delve into correcting the Form B or medical report entries; instead it focused on the Matriculation Certificate, because Instruction No. 76 binds the respondent to treat the date of birth recorded in a Matriculation Certificate as final.
- Precedential support: The Court relied on the Division Bench decision in Awadh Singh v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (2005 (2) JCR 474), which held that once a Matriculation Certificate had been verified by the appropriate board, the employer should accept the age in that certificate and should not re-check bona fides by, for example, sending the person to a medical board. The Court found that decision applicable "with all fours" to the present facts.
- Rejection of respondent authorities: The Court observed that other decisions cited by respondents did not deal with the precise issue (i.e., the binding effect of a verified Matriculation Certificate under Instruction No. 76) and therefore were of no assistance.
- Conclusion of illegality: Because the respondents were bound by Instruction No. 76 to accept the petitioner's Matriculation Certificate and because the respondents did not accept it (having issued the impugned superannuation letter), the Court concluded that the issuance of the retirement letter fixing superannuation as 31.1.2006 was a grave illegality.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The impugned retirement letter dated 20.12.2005 (fixing superannuation as 31.1.2006) is quashed and the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition is set aside.
Immediate consequences and directions:
- The respondents are directed to correct the petitioner's date of birth in their records in terms of the Matriculation Certificate (31.12.1950).
- The respondents are directed to pass consequential orders, including reinduction into service with all benefits and to allow the petitioner to continue in service until he attains superannuation in accordance with the Matriculation Certificate.
- There will be no order as to costs.
Broader implication emphasized by the Court: The opinion reaffirms the binding nature of Instruction No. 76 of N.C.W.A. - III (as applied by the respondents' bye-laws) that where a Matriculation Certificate exists and is relevant, the date of birth recorded therein must be treated as correct and not altered by the employer. The Court applied an earlier Division Bench decision (Awadh Singh) to reinforce this proposition. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying the bye-law and the cited authority to the facts.
Page 2069
1. Ramanand Tiwary, the petitioner-appellant, an employee under Indian Iron & Steel Company Ltd., the respondent herein, was informed through letter No. 260 dated 20.12.2005 that he would retire with effect from 31.1.2006 on attaining the age of 60 years. Challenging this letter, the petitioner filed the writ petition seeking for quashing the said letter and for granting a direction to the respondents to treat his date of birth to be 31.12.1950 as contained in his Matriculation Certificate and to permit him to continue in service. The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the order dated 23.8.2006 holding that as the date of his superannuation fixed by the authorities to be on 31.1.2006 was in accordance with the declaration of the petitioner of his age as 25 years in the Statutory B Form, the impugned letter was justified. Aggrieved by this order of the learned Single Judge, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed.
2. The relevant facts for disposal of this appeal are as follows:
The petitioner-appellant was appointed as a General Mazdoor in the company of the respondents on 20.2.1970. After 10 years, on the basis of his Matriculation Certificate containing his date of birth as 31.12.1950, he was promoted to the post of Attendant Clerk on 23.5.1980. Though the appellant submitted his Matriculation Certificate and other Certificates containing his date of birth to be 31.12.1950, the respondents asked him to appear before the Medical Board. Accordingly, he was subjected to the medical test. The Medical Board, on 29.9.1989, on physical assessment of the appellant, found him to be 40 years of age. As per the report of the Medical Board, his date of birth was 29.9.1949.
On 11.3.2004, the appellant was asked by the respondents to appear before the Selection Committee for suitability for promotion to the post of Senior Despatch Clerk/Typist and Senior Store Keeper. At that time also, he produced all the records with reference to educational and technical certificates containing his date of birth as 31.12.1950.
Page 2070 Suddenly on 20.12.2005, the appellant was served the impugned letter intimating that he would be going to retire and superannuate from the service with effect from 31.1.2006. Immediately after receipt of the impugned letter, the appellant, on 23.12.2005, made representation before the respondent authorities stating that as his date of birth was 31.12.1950 as per the Matriculation Certificate and School Leaving Certificate and since he would attain the age of 60 years only on 31.12.2010, he could not be superannuated with effect from 31.1.2006.
This representation was not considered by the respondent authorities. Therefore, the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court under Article 226 seeking for quashing of the aforesaid letter and for consequential direction.
The learned Single Judge, mainly on the ground that the date of superannuation of the petitioner was correctly fixed by the respondent authorities on the basis of the Form B Register containing his age as 25 years at the time of appointment, dismissed the writ petition. Hence this appeal.
3. According to the counsel for the appellant, the Matriculation Certificate containing the correct date of birth as 31.12.1950 was produced by the petitioner-appellant even in the year 1980 and only on that basis, promotion was given and even on the date of appointment, i.e. on 20.2.1970, he furnished his date of birth only as 31.12.1950 and according to Instruction No. 76 of National Coal Wage Agreement - III (hereinafter as N.C.W.A - III), the Matriculation Certificate showing the date of birth is admissible and has got more evidentiary value than the other documents and as such, Instruction No. 76 is binding upon the respondents and applicable to the appellant as such. Therefore, the date of birth as fixed by the respondent authorities is wrong.
4. Arguing contra, counsel for the respondents would submit that as decided by the learned Single Judge that in the Form B Register the petitioner himself made self-declaration that he was aged about 25 years at the time of joining in the year 1970 and therefore, the date of birth as claimed by the petitioner-appellant cannot be correct.
5. Counsel for the appellant would cite the following authorities to substantiate his submission:
Awadh Singh v. The Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Ors. 2005 (2) JCR 474 Siyaram Singh v. The State of Bihar and Ors. 1995 (1) PLJR 691 Murli Manohar Tiwary v. The State of Bihar and Ors. 1986 PLJR 1180 State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh 2005 (2) JLJR 129 (SC)
6. Similarly counsel for the respondents also cited the following authorities in support of his reply:
State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Vali Mohmed Dosabhai Sindhi Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. S.M. Jadhav and Anr.
G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal v. Shib Kumar Dushad and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 72 State of Orissa and Ors. v. Ramanath Patnaik
7. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the respective parties and gone through the records.
Page 2071
8. At the outset, it shall be stated that the Instruction No. 70 of N.C.W.A -III is applicable to the respondent company as well as to the appellant. As a matter of fact, there is no dispute over the applicability of the provision of the Instruction No. 76 of N.C.W.A - III as the same has been admitted by the counsel for the respondents. Instruction No. 76 (A)(i), being apposite in the present context, is reproduced below:
76(A) Determination of the age at the time of appointment
(i) Matriculates In case of appointees who have passed Matriculation or equivalent examinations, the date of birth recorded in the said certificate shall be treated as correct date of birth and same will not be altered under any circumstances.
9. As correctly pointed out by the counsel for the appellant, learned Single Judge failed to consider the scheme provided for implementation of the Instruction No. 76 of the bye-laws of the respondents. Clause 76(B)(i)(a) provides for determination of date of birth in respect of the existing employees, which is reproduced below:
76(B) Review/Determination of Date of Birth in respect of existing employees:
(i)(a) In the case of the existing employees Matriculation Certificate or Higher Secondary Certificate issued by the recognized Universities or Board or Middle Pass Certificate issued by the Board of Education and/or Department of Public Instruction and Admit Cards issued by the aforesaid bodies should be treated as correct provided they were issued by the said Universities/Boardg/Institutions prior to the date of employment.
The above instruction, which is binding upon the respondent company would clearly indicate that the date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate shall be treated as correct date of birth and the same cannot be altered under any circumstances. This aspect has been well considered in the decision rendered in the case of Awadh Singh v. The Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Ors. 2005 (2) JCR 474.
10. However, it is contended by the counsel appearing for the respondents that Form B Register would indicate that the petitioner-appellant made self-declaration that he was 25 years of age at the time of joining in the year 1970, i.e. on 20.2.1970. As correctly pointed out by the counsel for the appellant, it is noticed that the original Form B Register has not been produced before the learned Single Judge; on the other hand, Form B Register, which was prepared in the year 1980, was produced. Admittedly, the original old Form B Register, which was recorded on 20.2.1970, was not made available to the Court for perusal. Even as per the Form B Register, which was recorded in the year 1980, the petitioner-appellant's date of birth was shown to be 14.2.1951. If this is taken into consideration, as per this entry, the petitioner-appellant must be 19 years of age. Even otherwise this Form B Register, which has been produced before the Court, was only prepared in 1980 has not been disputed. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondents has taken a strange stand that the date of birth as 14.2.1951 was entered due to inadvertent mistake. Thus, the stand of the respondents is not consistent.
11. Apart from that, admittedly the appellant was subjected to medical test on 29.9.1989. As indicated above, the Matriculation Certificate, which shows Page 2072 his date of birth as 31.12.1950, was already in possession of the respondent authorities. There was no reason as to why the petitioner-appellant was again subjected to medical test on 29.9.1989. In the medical examination, as per the report of the Medical Board, it was found that his date of birth was 29.9.1949. Thus, it is clear that the Matriculation Certificate shows his date of birth as 31.12.1950, which was produced before the authorities in the year 1980 for the purpose of promotion. The Medical Certificate issued after medical examination at the instance of the respondents shows his date of birth as 29.9.1949. Similarly the Form B Register produced by the respondent authorities would show that the date of birth entered in the Register was 14.2.1951. When these documents would indicate that his date of birth must be between 1949 and 1951, it cannot be stated by the respondent company that he attained the age of superannuation on 31.1.2006 itself. Even if for the sake of argument, assuming that the appellant's Matriculation Certificate could not be considered, then also the respondents are bound by their own medical assessment of the appellant made in the year 1989, showing the appellant's year of birth as 1949. In other words, even the report of the Medical Board is taken as the basis for deciding the date of birth of the appellant, he will reach the age of superannuation in the year 2009 and if not in 2010 on the basis of the date of birth as mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate. Even if the date mentioned in the B Register is taken as basis namely 1951, then he will retire in the year 2011.
12. However, we are not inclined to go into the correctness of the entries made in Form B Register, which contains his date of birth as 14.2.1951, nor the report of Medical Board containing his date of birth as 29.9.1949, as we are very much concerned with the Matriculation Certificate showing his date of birth as 31.12.1950.
13. The respondents, as indicated above, are bound by the Instruction No. 76 of N.C.W.A - III to treat the date of birth of the appellant on the basis of the Matriculation Certificate under any circumstances. In this context, it would be relevant to refer to a Division Bench Judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Awadh Singh v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Ors. reported in 2005 (2) JCR 474 (Jhr.), the relevant observations are as follows:
We are unable to convince ourselves that the respondents acted bona fide in asking the writ petitioner-appellant to appear before a medical board, when the matter had been decided earlier and a settlement had been arrived at between the parties that the age of the writ petitioner/appellant would be recorded in terms of his matriculation certificate upon proper verification. Admittedly, the certificate was duly verified from the Bihar School Examination Board and there could have been no further doubt in the matter and having particular regard to the Instruction No. 76, the respondents should have accepted the petitioner's age in terms of his Matriculation Certificate.
This observation, in our view, would apply to this case with all fours.
14. The other decisions cited by the counsel for the respondents do not deal with the above question and as such they would be of no use in this case.
15. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the respondent authorities committed grave illegality in issuing the letter impugned Page 2073 treating his date of superannuation as 31.1.2006, since as per the Matriculation Certificate he is to retire on 31.12.2010. Accordingly, the impugned letter is quashed, the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the respondents are directed to correct the petitioner-appellant's age in their records in terms of the Matriculation Certificate and pass consequential orders, like reinduction into service with all the benefits and allow him to continue till he attains superannuation. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
Alert