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Rajesh Gupta v. State Of J And K And Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, an Executive Engineer in the Rural Engineering Wing, Kathua, challenged Government Order No. 471-GAD of 2005 dated 26 April 2005 which prematurely retired him from service. The petition seeks writs in the nature of certiorari to quash that order and mandamus to direct the respondents to allow him to continue in service until superannuation and to grant service benefits.
Facts given in the opinion: the petitioner was served a charge sheet on 11 March 2005 (received by him on 11 April 2005) and submitted a reply on 16 April 2005. Despite that reply, the impugned premature retirement order was issued on 26 April 2005.
Respondents filed a counter-claiming that the State constituted a Committee of senior officers (headed by the Chief Secretary) to identify "deadwood" officers and that the Committee, after considering departmental reports, agency inputs and public opinion, recommended the petitioner's premature retirement on grounds of unsatisfactory performance and doubtful integrity. The petitioner was said to have attained 48 years of age.
Procedurally, the matter was heard by the court which examined the record, the constitution and workings of the Committee, the material brought before it (including CID and departmental reports), the precedents cited by parties, and ultimately dismissed the petition as without merit. The State's record produced in court was returned to State Counsel at the end of proceedings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Government Order No. 471-GAD of 2005 (26 April 2005) prematurely retiring the petitioner can be quashed on grounds of procedural unfairness or lack of material justification.
- Whether the respondents failed to afford the petitioner a proper opportunity of hearing and/or improperly proceeded despite the petitioner's reply to the charge sheet.
- Whether the order of compulsory or premature retirement was based on sufficient material and not arbitrary, mala fide or perverse such as to warrant judicial interference.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner argued that his reply to the charge sheet (submitted on 16 April 2005) was not considered and that he was removed from service without being afforded any opportunity of being heard; consequently, the disciplinary proceedings should be deemed dropped.
- He asserted that during his service career he had no question about his integrity and therefore could not be categorized as "deadwood" or an officer of doubtful integrity.
- Counsel contended that the Committee should have considered the petitioner's entire service record (including confidential records and character rolls), not just selective periods, before recommending premature retirement.
- Reliance was placed on several judgments (named in the petition) supporting judicial review where the State has not provided sufficient material to justify compulsory retirement or where the order is arbitrary or mala fide.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents explained that, for public interest and effective administration, the State constituted a senior-officers Committee (chaired by the Chief Secretary) that reviewed cases of officers deemed to be "deadwood" or having unsatisfactory performance.
- The Committee met on multiple dates and considered reports from departments, agencies, and public opinion. It specifically considered a CID report that the petitioner had property disproportionate to known income and departmental reports of improper conduct.
- The respondents asserted that the petitioner's performance was unsatisfactory and retaining him would be a liability on the State exchequer; therefore the Committee's recommendation for premature retirement was taken in public interest.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Anoop Jaisivnl v. Government of India and Anr. | Placed with other authorities relied upon by petitioner as supporting judicial review where the State lacks sufficient material or acts arbitrarily/mala fide in compulsory retirement cases. | The court held the group of cases relied upon by petitioner were not applicable because in the present case material existed and no mala fide was alleged. |
| State of Orissa v. Ramchandra Das | Included among cases cited by petitioner concerning limits of judicial review of compulsory retirement orders when material is insufficient or orders are arbitrary. | Court treated this case as part of the cluster of authorities which, on their facts, did not assist the petitioner given the material before the Committee here. |
| Union of India v. G. Ganayutham | Cited by petitioner as authority on judicial review of compulsory retirement decisions. | Not applied in petitioner's favour; court found material existed and no allegation of mala fide as would be central to such precedents. |
| M.S. Bindra v. Union of India (1999 (1) SCC 529) | Relied on by petitioner as part of authorities addressing judicial scrutiny of compulsory retirement and requirements for State to have adequate material. | Court concluded this line of authority did not mandate interference in present case because the Committee had considered material indicating doubtful integrity and unsatisfactory performance. |
| State of Gujarat v. Swyakant Chuni Lal Shah | One of the cases relied upon by petitioner on judicial review in compulsory retirement matters. | Court found it distinguishable and inapplicable on the facts before it where material justified the Committee's decision. |
| Jugal Chander Saikia v. State of Assam and Anr. (2004 (7) Supreme 94) | Relied upon by petitioner as supporting interference where State fails to place sufficient material before court or acts arbitrarily. | Court considered it not applicable and declined to disturb the order based on the existing material and absence of mala fide allegations. |
| Pritam Singh v. Union of India (1993 KLJ 352) | Part of authorities cited by petitioner concerning review of compulsory retirement orders. | Court did not regard this authority as controlling here in light of the Committee's material and findings. |
| Ghulam Rasool Azad v. State and Ors. | Listed among the precedents relied upon by petitioner for judicial review principles in compulsory retirement contexts. | Found by court to be inapposite to the facts at hand where substantial material was considered by the Committee. |
| Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer | The court quoted this authority at length. Principal points in the opinion include: (i) compulsory retirement is not punishment; (ii) it is to be passed on subjective satisfaction that it is in public interest; (iii) natural justice principles have no place but judicial review is available where order is mala fide, based on no evidence or is arbitrary/perverse; (iv) authorities should consider entire service record; (v) uncommunicated adverse remarks alone do not automatically invalidate retirement. | The court applied these principles: it examined whether the Committee had material (it had CID and departmental reports, including alleged disproportionate assets and misappropriation) and whether there was mala fide or perversity (no mala fide was alleged). The court concluded the Committee had adequate material and the order did not warrant interference. |
| Allahabad Banks Officers Association v. Allahabad Bank | The opinion emphasises: compulsory retirement is part of the doctrine of pleasure (Article 310); objective is to weed out deadwood and preserve integrity; for retirement the inquiry is for authority's satisfaction and there is no duty to hold an inquiry as in dismissal/removal. | The court relied on this principle to confirm that compulsory retirement is a prerogative aimed at maintaining efficiency and integrity, and that the matters before the Committee sufficed to form its subjective satisfaction. |
| Union of India v. Dulal Dutt | Held (as cited) that compulsory retirement is not punishment, is a government prerogative, but should be based on material; the Government may disclose material when court inquires. | The court invoked this principle to justify that the Committee's decision, based on material provided (CID report, departmental inputs), fell within permissible executive action and did not call for judicial interference. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeded in a sequence tied to the material and institutional process described in the record:
- Composition and procedure of the decision-making body: The State Government had constituted a Committee of senior officers under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to consider cases of officers for potential premature retirement in terms of Article 226 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations. The Committee met on multiple specified dates and included relevant departmental secretaries.
- Material before the Committee: The court noted that the Committee considered a CID report (submitted by the Additional Director General, CID) which stated that the petitioner possessed property disproportionate to his known sources of income. The opinion lists the properties and financial holdings identified by the CID report (various houses, shops, parcels of land in Kathua and Jammu, and bank accounts/lockers).
- Departmental information: The Committee also relied on information from the petitioner's administrative department, which stated that the petitioner had been attached to the head office by Government Order No. 112-RD of 2004 (dated 9 May 2003) for issuing back-dated sanctions and for matters relating to execution of departmental works, passing of bills and estimates, and that a departmental enquiry had been ordered by Government Order No. 125-RD of 2004 (dated 22 May 2003). The departmental report also alleged the petitioner had a bad reputation.
- Synthesis and conclusion by Committee: On the basis of the CID report and departmental information, the Committee recommended the petitioner's premature retirement. The court treated these items as constituting material upon which the Committee could form its subjective satisfaction that the petitioner was of doubtful integrity and that his performance was unsatisfactory.
- Addressing petitioner's reliance on precedent: The court observed that the cases cited by the petitioner stand for the proposition that judicial review is appropriate where the State has not provided sufficient material, or where the order is arbitrary or mala fide. The court found those circumstances absent here: no mala fide was alleged, and the Committee had considered relevant material.
- Application of binding principles: The court quoted and applied the principles from Baikuntha Nath Das and other authorities emphasizing that (i) compulsory retirement is not a punitive order but a subjective executive satisfaction exercised in public interest; (ii) judicial interference is confined to circumstances of mala fides, absence of any evidence, or perversity/arbitrariness; and (iii) authorities should consider the entire service record, especially later years, including confidential entries where relevant.
- Final evaluative conclusion: Considering the Committee's constitution, the material (CID and departmental reports) and absence of an allegation of mala fide, the court concluded that the Committee's subjective satisfaction was based on material and thus the impugned order did not invite judicial interference. The petition was found without merit and dismissed.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The petition is dismissed.
Implications:
- The direct legal effect is that Government Order No. 471-GAD of 2005 dated 26 April 2005 prematurely retiring the petitioner remains operative and is not quashed; the petitioner is not entitled to an order allowing him to continue in service until superannuation or to the service benefits sought by the writ petition.
- The court concluded that the Committee's action was taken in public interest and was based on material bearing on the petitioner's integrity and performance; therefore, judicial intervention was not warranted on the facts of this case.
- The opinion does not purport to establish any new or broader precedent beyond applying existing principles (as stated in Baikuntha Nath Das, Allahabad Banks Officers Association, Union of India v. Dulal Dutt and the body of authorities discussed). The decision's effect is confined to the disposition of the present petition and the parties before the court.
Additional procedural note from the opinion: The record produced by State Counsel was returned to him in open court upon conclusion of the hearing.
1. Through the medium of present writ petition, the petitioner seeks a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing Government Order No. 471-GAD of 2005 dt. 26th of April'05 whereby the petitioner has been prematurely retired from service. Writ is also sought in the nature of mandamus commanding upon respondents to allow the petitioner to continue in service till he attains the age of superannuation and to grant him all the service benefits.
2. The case of the petitioner who was working as Executive Engineer, Rural Engineering Wing, Kathua, is that he was served a charge sheet on 11th of March'05 which was received by him on 11th of April'05. He submitted reply to the charge sheet on 16th of April'05. It is stated that the respondents instead of dropping the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner removed him from service vide order impugned date 26th of April'05. It is this order, which as indicated above, is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition.
3. On notice, respondents have filed counter stating therein that in order to have a proper administration and functioning of the various departments of the State, the Government has taken effective measures to remove such officers/officials who have become deadwood and whose performance has become dissatisfactory. It is stated that a Committee of Senior Officers headed by the Chief Secretary was constituted and the said Committee after considering the reports from the concerned departments and various agencies as well as the opinion of the public in general held series of meetings and after scrutinizing the record of such officers/officials including the petitioner came to the conclusion that it is in public interest to remove such like officers from service and it was on this basis the petitioner who had attained 48 years of age and whose performance was not found satisfactory, was prematurely retired from service vide order impugned. It is stated that retaining such like officers in service is nothing but a liability on State exchequer. It is thus stated that the respondents have taken the said action in public interest, and therefore, the petitioner cannot have any grievance in this regard.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that when the respondents have not taken into consideration the reply furnished by the petitioner to the charge sheet and he has been removed from service without affording any opportunity of being heard, then the proceedings initiated by the respondents would be deemed to have been dropped. It is stated that the petitioner throughout his service career was not having any doubtful integrity, and therefore, cannot be declared as a deadwood. It is stated that the Committee constituted for the purpose should have taken into consideration the service record of the petitioner before recommending the case of the petitioner for premature retirement. It is stated that the Government, no doubt, has the power to retire a Government servant from service prematurely but this should be done only when the said official is having dis-satisfactory performance and is proved to be an officer/official of doubtful integrity and this should be done taking into consideration the entire service record of the said officer and not the record of a particular period. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments reported as Anoop Jaisivnl v. Government of India and Anr. , State of Orissa v. Ramchandra Das , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham , M.S. Bindra v. UOI 1999 (1) SCC 529, State of Gujrat v. Swyakant Chuni Lal Shah , Jugal Chander Saikia v. State of Assam and Anr. 2004 (7) Supreme 94, Pritam Singh v. UOI and 1993 KLJ 352, Ghulam Rasool Azad v. State and Ors.
5. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. In the present case, before passing the order impugned, the State Government constituted a Committee of officers under the chairmanship of Chief Secretary for considering the cases of various officers/officials in terms of Article 226 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations. The said Committee held meetings on 8th of Oct 04, 2nd of Dec 04, 4th of Jan'05, 21st of Feb'05, 24th of March'05, 28th of March'05, 1st of April'05 and 11th of April'05 and these meetings were attended by the Commissioner/Secretary, R & B, Secretary PHE, Irrigation and FC, Secretary, Power Development Department, Secretary School Education, Secretary Rural Development Department and Additional Secretary, Education Department. The case of the petitioner was also considered by the said Committee on the basis of the report submitted by the Additional DG, CID that the petitioner was having the property disproportionate to his known source of income. The said property included a house at Krishna Colony, Kathua built over 3 kanals of land, two shops in Kathua, six kanals of land in Kathua town, one kanal of land at Trikuta Nagar, Jammu, two kanals of land at Trikuta Nagar (Extension), three kanals of land at Greater Kailash Colony, Jammu, 10 marlas of plot at Bhatindi, Jammu, besides having bank accounts and lockers in United Commercial Bank, Raghunath Bazar, Jammu and Vijay Bank, Purani Mandi, Jammu. In addition to the above, the Committee concerned also took into consideration the information provided by the administrative department in which the petitioner was working and as per this report, the petitioner was attached in the head office vide Government Order No. 112-RD of 2004 dated 9th May'03 for issuing back dated sanctions relating to the execution of departmental works, passing of bills and estimates in Jammu district and other matter related thereto. A departmental enquiry was also ordered against the petitioner vide Government Order No. 125-RD of 2004 dated 22nd of May'03. It was further provided in the report of the department concerned that the petitioner is having a bad reputation.
6. On the basis of the aforesaid material, the Committee scrutinizing the cases of different officials of the various departments of the State, recommended the case of the petitioner for premature retirement. Therefore, taking into consideration the above facts and circumstances, it can be said that the respondents have rightly passed the order impugned and this has been done in public interest after taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner's performance was dis-satisfactory and his integrity was doubtful.
7. The judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the aforesaid cases, it has been held that judicial review is permissible in a case of compulsory retirement when the State has not provided sufficient material before the court to justify its action in passing such an order and the order is either arbitrary or malafide. In the present case, however, the petitioner has not alleged any malafide against any of the officer of his department, rather, the decision to remove the petitioner from service prematurely has been taken by the Committee constituted for the purpose by the State and the said Committee before taking the decision has considered the material placed before it which, as noticed above, clearly speaks of doubtful integrity of the petitioner.
8. In Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer , the Apex Court has held as under:
...(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.
(ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government.
(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of any order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary-in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order.
(iv) the Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter-of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. The circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.
9. In Allahabad Banks Officers Association v. Allahabad Bank , it has been held as under:
The power to compulsorily retire a government servant is one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure incorporation in Article 310 of the Constitution. The object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain efficiency and initiative in the service and also to dispense with the services of those whose integrity is doubtful so as to preserve purity in the administration While misconduct and inefficiency are factors that enter into the account where the order is one of dismissal or removal or of retirement, there is this difference that while in the case of retirement they merely furnish the background and the enquiry, if heldand there is no duty to hold an enquiry-is only for the satisfaction of the authorities who have to take action, in the case of dismissal or removal they form the very basis on which the order is made.
10. Again in Union of India v. Dulal Dutt , the Apex Court has held that an order of compulsory retirement is not an order of punishment. It is actually a prerogative of the Government but it should be based on material and has to be passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. On inquiry by the covirt, the Government, however, may disclose the material on the basis of which the decision is taken to compulsorily retire a government servant.
11. In the present case, as noticed above, a Committee was constituted by the State Government to consider the cases of various officers/officials of the various departments of the State in terms of article 226 of the j & k civil service regulations on the basis of their performance. The case of the petitioner was also considered by the said Committee on the basis of the reports furnished by the Additional Director General, CID. The petitioner was found to have possessed the property disproportionate to his known sources of income. The information provided by the concerned Department was also taken into consideration by the said Committee. As per this information, as noticed above, the petitioner was found to have misappropriated the funds by issuing back dated sanctions relating to the execution of various departmental works and passing of bills fraudulently. It was also found that the petitioner is having a bad reputation. All this material available with the authorities concerned resulted in their subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is an officer of doubtful integrity and it was on the basis of this satisfaction, the order impugned has been passed and rightly so and in my opinion, no interference is called for. For the reasons mentioned above, this petition is found to be without merit and is dismissed. Record produced by the State Counsel is returned to him in the open court.
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