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Darshan Kumar Mahajan And Etc. v. Station Master, Rly. Station And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Three writ petitions raising identical questions and relating to similar facts were heard together and disposed of by a single judgment.
The petitioner is described as a local merchant who imported coal within the State of Jammu and Kashmir for transhipment from Railway Station Jogi Gopha to North-East Frontier Railways in Assam. Wagons were allotted to the petitioner with directions specifying an area of 42.6 square metres, capacity 53 tonnes and height up to 1.35 metres (memo dated 19-5-1983). The wagons were dispatched to Bari Brahmana Railway Station under a Railway Receipt (RR) executed and signed by the petitioner. The RR contained a notice printed on its reverse which formed part of the contract.
The respondents, by a letter dated May 31, 1983 (Annexure A), demanded payment at a rate of Rs. 615.50 per metric tonne instead of Rs. 296.30 per metric tonne stated in the RR, on the ground that the coal was found to be in excess weight and a penalty was therefore payable. The petitioner challenged the demand on multiple grounds, including that the wagons were reweighed in route in the petitioner’s absence, no opportunity was given to rebut the allegation, R.161 of the General Rules (Goods Tariff No.36 Part-I (Volume I)) was said to be invalid or inapplicable, the action violated principles of natural justice, and there was an alleged invasion of rights under the Railways Act and the Constitution of India.
The respondents opposed the writ petitions, contending that the dispute arose from the private contract of consignment containing the rules and notice, that the petitioner had an efficacious remedy by way of civil suit, that the reweighment in route (performed at Ludhiana) was lawful and conducted by responsible railway officials, and that no fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution of India was infringed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondents were entitled to impose a penalty (and demand a higher rate) under R.161 of the Goods Tariff when the wagons were found to be in excess weight on reweighment in route.
- Whether the rules (including R.161) incorporated in the Railway Receipt and Goods Tariff formed part of the private contract and thereby bound the consignor.
- Whether the petitioner was denied principles of natural justice by reason of reweighment carried out in the petitioner’s absence and lack of an opportunity to rebut the respondents' findings.
- Whether the writ petitions were maintainable or whether the petitioner’s proper remedy lay in a civil suit (including relief under S.78-B of the Railways Act).
- Whether sub-rule (3) (the “goods in bulk” provision) relied on by the petitioner exempted the petitioner's shipment from the application of the cited rules.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner asserted that the wagons were allotted without weighment at the starting station and that reweighment conducted in route in the petitioner’s absence was arbitrary and violated natural justice because no opportunity was given to rebut the excess-weight finding.
- The petitioner contended that the respondents should have specified the excess weight clearly and charged only the excess at the agreed rate of Rs. 296.30 per metric tonne rather than the penal rate of Rs. 615.50 per metric tonne.
- It was argued that R.161 and related rules were inapplicable where goods are booked in bulk, invoking sub-rule (3) of R.121 of the Goods Tariff No.36 Part-I (Volume I) which provides: “Goods in bulk. — These rules do not apply to goods in bulk.”
- The petitioner challenged the legality and vires of R.161, alleging that it was framed without authority and violated the Railways Act and the Constitution. He also relied on a Delhi High Court authority (AIR 1975 Delhi 27, Marwar Tent Factory v. Union of India) concerning the bar of alternative remedies after admission in cases of infringement of fundamental rights.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents maintained that the dispute arose from the contract of consignment and the Railway Receipt which incorporated the Goods Tariff and its rules (including the right to reweigh in route or at destination), and therefore the petitioner was bound by those terms.
- They asserted that reweighment was lawfully performed at Ludhiana by responsible railway officials, and that the petitioner could have had the goods reweighed at destination at his own cost but did not do so.
- The respondents argued that the matter involved contractual questions and disputed facts arising from a private contract (not a statutory contract) and thus the writ petitions were not the appropriate remedy; the petitioner had a more efficacious civil remedy.
- They relied on Supreme Court authority (Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 238 : AIR 1981 SC 1368) for the proposition that statutory provisions incorporated into a contract become part of the contract and lose their statutory character.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 238 : AIR 1981 SC 1368 | That a statutory provision, if incorporated into a contract, becomes part of the terms of the contract and loses its statutory character. | The court relied on this authority to hold that rules incorporated into the Railway Receipt and Goods Tariff became part of the private contract binding the petitioner, and thus the petitioner could be held to the contractual obligations arising from those rules. |
| Woodcrafts Assam v. The Chief Conservator of Forests, Assam, Shillong, AIR 1971 Assam 92 | The opinion cites this authority in support of the respondents' contention (specific rule not detailed in the text). | Relied upon by the respondents; the court noted the respondents' reliance but did not elaborate a distinct application beyond treating it as supportive authority. |
| Marwar Tent Factory v. Union of India, AIR 1975 Delhi 27 | Authority cited by the petitioner concerning the bar of alternative remedy after admission in cases alleging infringement of fundamental rights. | The court distinguished this authority on the facts and found it not applicable to the present case, concluding that no fundamental right was involved requiring departure from the normal rule favouring the alternative remedy (civil suit). |
| R.D. Brothers v. Chief Commercial Superintendent, Writ Petns. Nos. 216 & 218 of 1984 (decided Nov. 21, 1984) | Earlier view by the same court on similar issues (as cited in the opinion). | The court noted that it had already taken a similar view in that earlier decision and relied on that consistency in concluding that the petition should be dismissed on the ground that the matter involved disputed contractual facts appropriate for a civil suit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by observing that the controversy arises from the private contract of consignment (the Railway Receipt and the incorporated Goods Tariff), not from a statutory contract. The Railway Receipt expressly contained a notice making the Goods Tariff a part of the contract; accordingly, the court found it was incumbent on the petitioner to observe the contractual terms and permissible loading limits.
The court examined R.161, quoted its text (penalty for loading beyond carrying capacity) and noted the two-tier penal scheme in sub-rules (1) and (2): small excess charged at the "Smalls" rate for the distance carried, and if overweight exceeds prescribed small limits, the entire overweight is charged at double the highest class rate. The court concluded that R.161 constituted a clear warning to consignors and established liability in the event overweight is discovered in route or at destination.
The court addressed the petitioner's contention that the “goods in bulk” proviso (sub-rule (3) of R.121) rendered the rules inapplicable. It held that the sub-rule cited is restricted to R.121 only and not to the general application of R.161, thus rejecting the petitioner’s contention on that ground.
The court also considered the procedural and factual circumstances surrounding the reweighment: respondents stated the wagons were reweighed at Ludhiana by railway staff and that the petitioner could have had reweighment at destination at his cost but did not. The court emphasised that while the notice (Annexure A) demanded payment as per small rate applicable to the commodity, the Railways ought to specify the amount of overweight they claim in order to avoid confusion. The court found that the controversy raised complicated questions of fact—such as the actual weight and the amount of overweight—that require examination of evidence, which can properly be undertaken in a civil suit.
On the maintainability issue, the court found force in the respondents' submission that the dispute flows from a private contract and that the proper remedy for the petitioner would be a civil suit (including relief under S.78-B of the Railways Act). The court noted that availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ relief, but in the facts of this case there were no grounds to grant relief by way of writ.
The court also rejected the petitioner’s challenge to the vires of the rules on the ground that the parties had contractually bound themselves to follow the Goods Tariff; thereby, the question of going into the validity of the provisions did not arise. The court further rejected the contention that principles of natural justice were violated, finding that the case concerned discharge of contractual obligations and disputed factual questions.
The court observed that the petitioner, as an experienced businessman, had a duty to abide by the rules and not to overload wagons. It also directed that when reweighment is done in the absence of the consignor, the Railways should inform the consignor of the actual weight and the overweight to avoid confusion and to enable proper liability to be fixed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The three writ petitions are DISMISSED. The court expressly ordered that the petitions be dismissed and that connected miscellaneous petitions (C.M.Ps) be disposed of.
Direct consequences and practical implications:
- All three petitions were dismissed; parties were directed to bear their own costs.
- The court held that the dispute arises from a private contract and involves disputed questions of fact (actual weight, how excess is calculated), which are matters more appropriately determined in a civil suit. The petitioner was advised that he may pursue a civil suit, including relief under S.78-B of the Railways Act, and the court observed that the bar of limitation would not be an impediment to the petitioner given his diligent prosecution of the writ petitions.
- The court required the Railways, when reweighment is done in the absence of the consignor, to inform the consignor of the actual weight and the excess weight claimed to avoid confusion.
Broader legal implications: The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle; it applies existing principles (including the principle that statutory provisions incorporated into a contract become contractual terms) to conclude that the petitioner is bound by the rules incorporated into the Railway Receipt. The court indicated that it had taken a similar approach in a prior decision (R.D. Brothers v. Chief Commercial Superintendent).
Petitions dismissed.
1. The above said three writ petitions raises identical question and the controversy also relates to the similar facts, which are heard together and are hereby disposed of by a single judgment.
2. The case in brief of the petitioner is, that he is a local merchant, who imports coal within the State of Jammu and Kashmir from various States in the country for the purpose of loading coal from Railway Station Jogi Gopha to North-east Frontier Railways located in Assam. The Wagons were allotted to the petitioner with the directions to load the same with an area of 42.6 square meter cc 53 tonnes up to the height of 1.35 meter, vide memo dt. 19-5-1983. The wagon was despatched to Bari Brahmana Railway Station in the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the transhipment of the above said local under a valid Railway receipt duly executed and signed by the petitioner in token of despatch of consignment. This is an admitted fact that the railway receipt, which is issued to the petitioners contains overleaf a notice, which forms part of the contract. The petitioner further contends that the respondents vide their letter (Annexure A) to the petition dt. May 31, 1983 demanded the rate of Rs. 615.50 per metric tonne instead of Rs. 296.30 per metric tonne as quoted in the RR, the reason given by the respondents that the coal has been found to be excess in weight and the petitioner is liable to pay a penalty on the excess weight of coal. The said action is attacked on several grounds inter alia that the Wagons were not weighed in presence of the petitioner, no opportunity was provided to the petitioner to rebut the allegations of the respondents, that the action of the respondents is illegal and against the provisions of law, there is no provision in the Railways Act for imposing penalty on the excess weight, R. 161 of the General Rules for Goods Tarrif No. 36-Part-I (Volume I) is illegal, void and inoperative on the ground that the same has been framed without any authority of law, the rule is discriminatory and violative of the Railways Act and the Constitution of India and above all that the principles of natural justice are violated inasmuch as the petitioner was never afforded an opportunity to show cause regarding excess weight in the Wagons.
3. The respondents in their counter contested the claim of the petitioners with preliminary objections also raising the objection regarding entertainability of the present writ petition alleging that the disputes raised in the present petition flow from the contract of consignment of coal handed over to the Railways for transhipment from one Station to the other under the terms of the contract containing conditions overleaf with a specific notice to the consignor by which he is bound, the petitioner has more efficacious and effective remedy of filing a civil suit and also that the present writ petition involves disputed question of facts and law arising out of the private contract as distinguished from the statutory contract, hence the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the above said grounds. In their counter, it is further submitted that under the Railway Receipt, the Railway weight found in route or on the destination and the rate prescribed under R. 161 of the General Rules contains Goods Tarrif No. 36 Part-I (Volume I), which forms part of the contract, thus the respondents were within their right to reweigh the Wagons in route which were in fact reweighed at Ludhiana by the Railways Staff, which consists of responsible high Railway Officials within the four corners of their right. It is also submitted that if there was any doubt to the petitioner, he could have got the same reweighed at the destination at his own cost, which was never done by the petitioners. No fundamental right under Art. 19 of the Constitution of India is infringed, hence the petition is liable to be dismissed.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that in the present case, the respondents cannot rely back on the rules in face of the allotment of Wagons to the petitioner without weighment at the starting station, since the reweighment took place in route in the absence of the petitioner, it was incumbent on the respondents to show the excess weight clearly distinguishing from the permissible weight and then only the respondents were entitled only to the excess amount of payment according to the agreed rate, which was quoted in the present case as Rs. 296.30 paise per metric tonne and not the penal rate of Rs. 615.50 paise per metric tonne demanded by them. Such an action runs contrary to the letter of the respondent dt. 19-5-1983 (Annexure-B) with the petition, wherein only the area is specified and the permissible height, which was fully complied with by the petitioner and hence in imposing the penalty the respondents acted in violation of their own contractual obligation as well as the action of reweighment being arbitrary, the principles of natural justice are also violated and consequentially affected the right of the petitioner with respect to freedom of trade guaranteed under Art. 19 of the Constitution of India. He further submits that in view of the fact that wherever the goods are booked in bulk, the rules referred to by the respondents are not applicable in the case of the petitioners as provided in sub-rule (3) of R. 121 of the Goods Tarrif No. 36 Part-I (Volume I) quoted above, which is in the following words:—
“Goods in bulk. — These rules do not apply to goods in bulk.”
Thus the action of the respondents being violative of the contractual obligation as well as of the rules, the notice issued vide (Annexure A) demanding penal charges under R. 161 of the abovequoted rules is illegal and ultra vires the powers conferred on the respondents. In so far as the preliminary objection is concerned, learned counsel relying on the authority of the Delhi High Court reported in AIR 1975 Delhi 27 (Marwar Tent Factory v. Union of India), submitted that the bar of alternative remedy specially after the admission of the petition cannot be claimed in the case of infringement to fundamental rights.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents in reply reiterating the points raised in their counter submitted that while the goods were booked from the starting station, the wagons were provided to the petitioner under the specific conditions contained in the Railway Receipt on the back of which a notice is printed, whereby the Goods Tarrif is made a part of the contract and also the right of the Railways with respect to which weighment in route or at the destination is reserved, therefore, there is no force in the contention of the petitioner that R. 161 is not applicable in the case of the petitioner. The contract entered into by the petitioner being binding on him, the rules become part and parcel of the private contract, which is not a statutory contract so as to attract the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India or S. 103 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. In support of his contention, learned counsel relies on an authority of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported in (1981) 3 SCC 238 : (AIR 1981 SC 1368) (Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd.), wherein it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, that if a statutory provision, if incorporated in a contract, it will become a part of the terms of the contract and the corporated provision will lose its statutory character. Thus the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case was bound in case of infringement to comply with the directions issued vide (Annexure A) demanding the higher rate than prescribed at the starting station due to his own fault. Reliance is also placed on AIR 1971 Assam 92 (Woodcrafts Assam v. The Chief Conservator of Forests, Assam, Shillong).
6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I find force in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that the controversy raised in the present petition flows from the private contract and not a statutory contract and even going through the documents produced before me and referred in the arguments, it is manifest that the terms of the rules having been incorporated in the contract of consignment as well as in the Railway receipt, it was incumbent duty of the petitioner, who is an experienced businessman to utilize the Wagons within the permissible limits and not beyond that. He can only enforce the rate prescribed in the Railway Receipt or by (Annexure B) with the petition, when he fulfils the requisite conditions. Under R. 161 quoted above, it is specifically provided in the following terms:—
“161. Penalty for loading beyond carrying capacity.—
Consignors, in loading, are required not to exceed the permissible carrying capacity of the wagon used or any reduced carrying capacity that may be required in the circumstances referred to in R. 163, Should overweight be discovered, in route or at the destination, charges therefor will be levied as under:—
(1) If the overweight above the permissible carrying capacity of the wagon is one tonne or less in a 4-wheeled/6 wheeled wagon and two tonnes less in a S(sic)-wheeled wagon, such overweight will be charged at the “Smalls” rate applicable to the same commodity for the distance such overweight is carried.
(2) If the overweight exceeds the limit mentioned in (1) above, entire overweight will be charged at double the highest class rate (Viz. Class 150) for the distance such overweight is carried.”
It leaves no doubt that it is a warning to the consignor, who cannot escape his liability to pay the penal rate if in route, it is found on reweighment that the Wagon contains overweight. Under sub-rule (2) above, it is further provided that if the overweight exceeds the limit entire overweight will be charged at double the highest class whereas in the present petition notice (Annexure A) contains a demand as per small rate applicable to the commodity, but the fact remains that it becomes all the more duty of the Railways to specify and mention the overweight which they demand. Thus under the circumstances it is pertinent that the present controversy involves complicated questions of fact for which an enquiry is necessary, which can be done only by going through the evidence and it can only be determined after the respective parties prove their respective contentions in a civil suit that the grievance can be redressed.
7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the rules are not applicable in the present case is not well founded. That sub-rule (3) referred above is restricted to R. 121 only and not in general. The authority cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner of the Delhi High Court AIR 1975 Delhi 27 (Supra) is distinguishable on the facts. In the present case, I do not find that any fundamental right of the petitioner is involved, it is a simple case of discharge of contractual obligation, which is a private contract and cannot be termed as a statutory contract for which the proper remedy for the petitioner lies in a regular civil suit, which he may choose to file under S. 78-B of the Railways Act. However, since the petitioner diligently prosecuted the present petition bar of limitation provided therein shall not come in his way in filing the civil suit as may be advised. It is no doubt true that availability of the alternative remedy is not an absolute bar in granting relief to the petitioner, but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not find any ground to give relief to the petitioner in the present petition. I have already held a similar view in Writ Petns. Nos. 216 and 218 of 1984 (R.D Brothers v. Chief Commercial Superintendent) decided on Nov. 21, 1984, thus the petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone, as the matters relating to overweight and the right of the petitioner to know the actual weight as well as the right of the respondents to weigh the commodity in route are all the questions based on disputed facts flowing from the contract of consignment it is expected from the Railways also that while the re weighment is done in the absence of the consignor, he should be informed of the actual weight and the overweight so as to avoid confusion and to make the petitioner liable for the payment as demanded on over weight. It is equally the duty of the experienced businessman to abide by the rules and the contractual obligations not to overweight the Wagons, which is always expected from a reasonable citizen. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the validity of the rules referred to above loses its force on the very ground that the parties may bind themselves under a private contract to follow the Goods Tariff thereby it becomes part and parcel of the contract, hence the question of going into the vires of the provisions does not arise and thus the argument of the violation of principles of natural justice also fails.
8. For the foregoing reasons and with the observations made above with respect to the duty of the Railways to inform the petitioner about the actual weight and overweight done by them and also to avail the period of limitation, all the three petitions stand dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Accordingly C.M.Ps connected therewith also stand disposed of. Copy of the order be placed in all the three files.
Petitions dismissed.
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