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Brij Mohan Bakhshi v. Amar Nath Bakhshi And Others

Jammu and Kashmir High Court
Jan 8, 1979
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Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion by Mian Jalal-Ud-Din, C.J. (with G.M. Mir, J. agreeing)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent challenges the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge (Dr. A.S. Anand, J.) dated 10-4-1978 in Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977 and CMP No. 143 of 1978. The Single Judge dismissed the plaintiff's petition under Order 14, Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and refused the plaintiff's request to amend and re-cast the issues.

The underlying suit is for partition of joint Hindu family property and for rendition of accounts. During the trial the plaintiff moved an application under Order 14, Rule 8 of the CPC seeking amendment of issues Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that the issues were not properly framed and the burden of proof was incorrectly placed. The defendants opposed the application, asserting that the plaintiff had admitted execution of a memo of partition and therefore must disprove that a partition was effected. The learned Single Judge refused to recast the issues and dismissed the petition.

A preliminary point raised by the respondents was that the order rejecting the application was not a "judgement" and therefore not appealable under the Letters Patent, since the application did not dispose of any part of the case or decide rights in the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an interlocutory order rejecting an application under Order 14, Rule 5 (and relatedly Order 14 procedures) is a "judgement" or "case decided" and therefore appealable under the Letters Patent (Cl. 12).
  2. Whether the plaintiff, by admitting his signature on the memo of partition, must be taken to have admitted its "execution" so as to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff for disproving partition.
  3. What is the legal meaning of "execution" of a document — whether mere admission of a signature or thumb impression constitutes execution in the sense of admitting the contents and thereby altering the onus probandi.
  4. Whether, even if execution of the memo is assumed, the defendants are thereby relieved of proving the distinct fact of an actual oral and private partition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff / Counsel for appellant)

  • The learned Single Judge erred by failing to apply the appropriate rule of evidence regarding burden of proof; the onus was misplaced.
  • The plaintiff did not admit execution of the memo of partition; he only admitted his signature with an explanation that the signature was obtained on a bank paper as a result of fraud. That admission of signature is not equivalent to admitting execution (i.e., subscribing to and understanding the contents).
  • Because the plaintiff never admitted execution, the judge should have accepted the application to recast issues and shifted the onus probandi to the defendants to prove the plea of prior partition.

Respondents' Arguments (Defendants / Shri S.P. Gupta)

  • Distinguished between "onus of proof" and "burden of proof." Shri S.P. Gupta argued that the plaintiff's admission of his signature on the document amounts to admission of execution.
  • The contention is that where a person admits signing a document but claims exceptional circumstances (e.g., signed a blank paper or was a victim of fraud), the exceptional circumstance is to be specifically pleaded and proved by that person; thus the burden of proving the exception lies on the person asserting it.
  • Counsel invited the court to consider the evidence already led (including rent deeds) which, he submitted, supported an inference that the plaintiff had admitted an oral partition by metes and bounds and had acted on it; therefore the onus was rightly placed on the plaintiff by the learned Single Judge.
  • Authorities were cited by both sides in support of their competing positions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1969 J and K 50 Held that an order rejecting an application under Order 14, Rule 5 CPC decides rights of parties and can be subject to revisional jurisdiction; "judgement" has wide amplitude and may include interlocutory orders deciding substantial questions affecting rights. The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the interlocutory order rejecting the application affected the plaintiff's rights and was therefore appealable under the Letters Patent.
AIR 1975 J and K 95; 1975 Kash LJ 262 Used to illustrate that the meaning of "judgement" is wide and includes decisions on substantial questions between parties even if passed in the course of trial. The Court cited these authorities alongside AIR 1969 J and K 50 to reinforce the proposition that an interlocutory order deciding a substantial controversy may be termed a judgement and is appealable.
AIR 1957 Pat 64 Where a defendant admitted only putting his thumb impression on a blank paper and alleged possible misuse, it was held he did not admit execution; burden of proving execution remained on the plaintiff. The Court cited this case to support the principle that mere admission of a signature or thumb impression does not amount to admission of execution of the document's contents, and therefore does not shift the burden to the plaintiff.
AIR 1931 Pat 266 Division Bench view that admission of thumb impression/signature without admitting the substantive instrument does not amount to admission of execution; onus remains on plaintiff. The Court relied on this authority to reinforce the same proposition regarding the distinction between admitting a signature and admitting execution.
1968 All LJ 480 Cited for the proposition that admission of signature alone is not conscious execution and does not amount to admitting the document's contents. The Court cited this as part of the consistent line of authorities supporting the proposition that mere signature admission is insufficient to constitute execution.
AIR 1976 All 23 Similar proposition as above — admission of signature not equivalent to admission of execution. Cited by the Court to support the view that execution involves conscious subscription to contents and mere signature admission does not prove execution.
AIR 1962 Raj 231 A contrary decision which the Court noted runs counter to the preponderance of authorities on the question whether admission of signature equals execution. The Court expressly stated that this decision did not commend itself and declined to follow it, preferring the weight of other authorities holding that mere signature admission is not execution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in two main parts: (A) whether the interlocutory order is appealable, and (B) the substantive question of burden/onus and the meaning of "execution."

A. Appealability of the Interlocutory Order

The Court surveyed prior decisions of this Court and other High Courts and found a balance of authority favouring the proposition that an interlocutory order which decides a substantial question between the parties and affects their rights can be treated as a "judgement" and is appealable under the Letters Patent. The Court relied on reported decisions (for example AIR 1969 J and K 50; AIR 1975 J and K 95; 1975 Kash LJ 262) to conclude that an order rejecting an application under Order 14, Rule 5 CPC may decide rights and therefore is appealable. Applying that principle, the Court held that the order dismissing the plaintiff's application had the effect of denying the plaintiff the right to prove an issue according to the established procedure and law of evidence, thereby adversely affecting his rights and rendering the order appealable.

B. Meaning of "Execution" and Allocation of Burden/Onus

The Court identified the principal substantive question as whether the plaintiff had admitted the "execution" of the memo of partition. The Court analyzed the meaning of "execution," asking whether it is satisfied by mere admission of signature/thumb impression or requires conscious subscription and knowledge of contents.

Relying on a series of authorities, the Court concluded that "execution" implies conscious execution and knowledge of a document's contents; mere admission of a signature or thumb impression, coupled with an explanation that the signature may have been affixed on a blank paper or obtained by fraud, does not amount to admission of execution. The Court cited a chain of decisions (including AIR 1957 Pat 64; AIR 1931 Pat 266; 1968 All LJ 480; AIR 1976 All 23) supporting this proposition and expressly rejected the contrary view taken in AIR 1962 Raj 231.

The Court further explained that circumstances appearing in evidence which might permit an inference that the plaintiff had executed or acted upon the memo are not determinative at the stage of deciding the appropriate burden of proof; such matters pertain to appreciation of evidence at the trial and can be considered later when the cumulative effect of the evidence is evaluated.

Finally, the Court noted that even if, for argument's sake, the plaintiff were taken to have admitted execution of the memo, that fact would not relieve the defendants from proving the separate and independent fact of actual oral and private partition — proof of the memo's execution does not automatically establish the occurrence of an oral partition.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct consequences of the Court's decision:

  • The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 10-4-1978 (dismissing the plaintiff's application under Order 14 and refusing to recast the issues) are set aside.
  • The Court recast Issues Nos. 1 to 3 (as formulated in the opinion) for trial. The recast issues are recorded verbatim below:
    1. Was there any oral partition of the properties in dispute effected on 1-4-1968 which was acted upon by the parties and the plaintiff executed the memo of partition dated 10-7-1968, as a sequel to the oral partition? O.P defendants Nos. 1 to 5.
    
    2. In case answer to Issue No. 1 be in the affirmative, whether the memo of partition dated 14-7-1968, was obtained by misrepresentation with a view to save taxes and was not meant to be acted upon as evidence of oral partition? O.P plaintiff.
  • G.M. Mir, J. agreed with the result (as recorded in the opinion).

The opinion explains the legal principles governing appealability of interlocutory orders and the distinction between mere admission of signature and conscious execution, and applies them to the facts before the Court. The opinion does not contain an explicit statement that it is laying down a novel precedent beyond applying and preferring the existing line of authorities cited in the text.

Disposition

The appeal is allowed and the Single Judge's order is set aside; the issues are recast as above and the case is to proceed accordingly.

Show all summary ...

Mian Jalal-Ud-Din, C.J:— This appeal under Cl. 12 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgement and order of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Dr. A.S Anand J.) dated 10-4-1978, in Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977 and in CMP No. 143 of 1978, dismissing the said petition under Order 14, Rule 5 of the CPC and disallowing the prayer of the plaintiff for amending and re-casting the issues.

2. In a suit for partition of joint Hindu family property and for rendition of accounts pending before the learned judge, the plaintiff moved an application under O. 14, R. 8 of the CPC. By this application the plaintiff sought amendment of issues Nos. 1 and 2. According to the plaintiff these issues were neither properly framed nor was the burden of proof thereof correctly placed. As the defendants had set up the plea of prior partition, they had to prove the same by adducing evidence. This application was hotly contested by the defendants Their main objection was that the plaintiff had admitted the execution of the memo of partition and, therefore, he had to prove that there was no partition effected. The learned Judge, however, refused to recast or amend the issues and dismissed the petition. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondents that the order rejecting the application is not judgement and, therefore, no appeal under the Letters Patent is maintainable. The application has not disposed of any part of the case and has not decided any rights in the suit.

3. The question whether an interlocutory judgement can be subject of appeal under Letters Patent has been the subject matter of some of the decisions of this court as also of other Indian High Courts. The balance of the authority is in favour of the proposition that where the order has the effect of deciding an issue between the parties and the order decides the rights of the parties then that judgement, even though interlocutory, is appealable. In this connection particular reference may be made to some of the decisions of this Court reported in AIR 1969 J and K 50 and AIR 1975 J and K 95 and 1975 Kash LJ 262. According to the said authorities, the meaning of the word “judgement” is of a wide amplitude and includes a decision on any substantial question in controversy between the parties affecting their rights even thou such order is passed in the course of the trial of the suit. An interlocutory order deciding a question of this kind as distinguished from purely formal and incidental order can also be termed as a judgement. Again in AIR 1969 J and K 50, the question was considered whether an order rejecting an application under O. 14, R. 5 of the CPC is a case decided so as to be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court The question was answered in the affirmative. It was held that an order rejecting an application under O. 14, R. 5 of the CPC decides the rights of the parties and is, therefore, case decided. Although the expression “case decided” and “interlocutory judgement” are not synonymous yet the ratio laid down is the same and on principle it can be said that the order rejecting the application under O. 14, R. 5 of the CPC decides some controversy between the parties or some rights in the case.

4. In the instant case, the order disposing of the application under Order 14 Rule 5 of the CPC has the effect of deciding against the plaintiff his right to prove an issue according to the established procedure and the law of evidence. The order adversely affects the right of the plaintiff and, therefore, in my opinion is appealable.

5. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the approach of the learned Single judge in disposing of the application was defective inasmuch as the learned Judge did not take into consideration the rule of evidence which governs the principle relating to the burden of proof. A party who sets up the plea of private and prior partition must prove it. But in the instant case, the learned Judge has placed the burden of proof of the plaintiff on the assumption that the plaintiff has admitted the execution of the document on which the defendants have based their case. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff never admitted the execution of the document but only admitted with the signature on the document with the explanation that the same was obtained from him on a bank paper and was the result of fraud practised upon him. By no stretch of imagination could it be said that the plaintiff had accepted the execution of the document. In that view of the matter, the only course left open to the learned Single Judge was to have accepted the application and recast the issues and to change the onus probandi by placing it on the defendants.

6. Shri S.P Gupta, has, on the other hand, enunciated the view that there is difference between the onus of proof and burden of proof. According to him as the plaintiff in his statement had admitted his signatures on the document, therefore, the execution will be deemed to have been admitted by him. The argument is that where a person having signed a document and having admitted the signatures thereon, wants to show that he signed on a blank paper or that he affixed the signatures as a result of fraud practised upon him, then this is an exceptional circumstances which he pleads and, therefore, the burden of proof of that exceptional circumstances must be on him. In this connection attention is invited to the evidence that has been led in the case. It is submitted that the court may take into consideration the circumstances appearing in evidence which will go to prove that the oral partition has been admitted by the plaintiff. There are rent deeds on the record to prove this fact. The cumulative effect of all this is that the plaintiff having admitted the partition by metes and bounds cannot now turn round and say that there had been no oral partition. It is for the plaintiff to disprove this fact. In that view of the matter, the onus has rightly been placed on the plaintiff by the learned Judge. A number of authorities have been cited on both sides in support of their respective contentions.

7. The principal question which merits the consideration is whether the plaintiff has admitted the execution of the document styled as memo of partition. For this purpose we have to find out the meaning of the word “execution”. Does the execution mean mere admission of the signature on the document without admitting the contents thereof or does it mean subscribing to the document consciously and its intelligent appreciation? In my opinion where a party only admits the signature and also explains the circumstances which led to his signing the document without knowing its contents it cannot be said that the party has admitted its execution. Execution implies conscious execution and knowledge of its contents. There is a catena of authorities for the proposition that where a party merely admits the thumb impression or his signatures on a document but does not admit that he executed the document in the sense that he subscribed to the contents thereof, it cannot be said that the party has admitted the execution.

8. In AIR 1957 Pat 64, where a suit was brought on the basis of hand note and the defendant admitted only that he put his thumb impression on a blank paper which he alleged had possibly been utilized for the hand note, it was held that he did not admit the execution of the hand note and, therefore, the onus of proving that the handnote was duly executed by the defendant was upon the plaintiff.

9. Again in AIR 1931 Pat 266, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court expressed the view that where the defendant admitted only that he had put his thumb impression and signatures on a document but did not admit the handnote, the admission of signature did not amount to admission of the execution and consequently the burden of proof of the execution of the document was on the plaintiff.

10. The same view has been enunciated in 1968 All LJ 480, and AIR 1976 All 23. It is needless to multiply authorities on the proposition. The decision given on the point by their Lordships of the Rajasthan High Court in AIR 1962 Raj 231, does not commend itself to me as that runs counter to the preponderance of the authorities in favour of the proposition that mere admission of the signature on a document without admitting its contents is not conscious execution and does not amount to execution. With great respect, I beg to differ with the view taken in that authority.

11. The argument that because there are circumstances appearing in the case which lead to the inference that the plaintiff has executed the memo of partition and has acted upon that, has got no relevance at this stage, as this argument can be advanced at an appropriate stage who the cumulative effect of the evidence led on the issue is to be considered. This circumstance appearing in evidence may us justify the court to draw a conclusion either in favour of the defendants or against them but this is only a matter relating to the appreciation of evidence and will not be helpful to determine the question of burden of proof.

12. There is yet another noticeable feature in the case, that even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the plaintiff has admitted the execution of the memo of partition, still it would not absolve the defendants from proving the fad of actual oral partition. The memo of partition may be evidence of actual partition effected already, but this would in no way relieve the defendants of their burden to prove the factum of oral and private partition. This is an independent fact disassociated from the fact of the execution of the document. For the foregoing reasons, I would therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgement of the learned single Judge, and recast issues Nos. 1 to 3 as under:

1. Was there any oral partition of the properties in dispute effected on 1-4-1968 which was acted upon by the parties and the plaintiff executed the memo of partition dated 10-7-1968, as a sequel to the oral partition? O.P defendants Nos. 1 to 5.

2. In case answer to Issue No. 1 be in the affirmative, whether the memo of partition dated 14-7-1968, was obtained by misrepresentation with a view to save taxes and was not meant to be acted upon as evidence of oral partition? O.P plaintiff.

G.M Mir, J.:— I agree.

13. Appeal allowed.