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State Of J. And K. And Another v. Ghulam Rasool And Another

Jammu and Kashmir High Court
Mar 17, 1978
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Civil Second Appeal (Srinagar)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents filed a suit on 29-12-1961 claiming possession of land comprising Khasra Nos. 192 and 626 in village Gund Roshan, Tehsil Ganderbal, alleging that the appellants were attempting to interfere with their possession and taking steps to auction trees standing on the land. The appellants contended that Khasra No. 192 was Khalsa (State) land and that trees thereon had been planted by the Dehat Sudhar Department, denying the respondents' claims; they also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable and that the respondents had no cause of action. Appellant No. 2 additionally pleaded that no notice under Section 80 of the CPC was served upon him, rendering the suit against him not maintainable.

The trial court (Sub-Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar) framed five issues and, after evidence and argument, held Issues 1 and 2 for the respondents: it found Khasra No. 626 belonged to the respondents (by purchase) and that respondents were in possession of six kanals out of the State land in Khasra No. 192; it also found the respondents had planted the willow and kikar trees on the two Khasras. The trial court granted a prohibitory injunction restraining appellants from interfering with respondents' possession, but observed that the appellants could evict the respondents from the six kanals of Khasra No. 192 only in due course of law.

The appellants appealed to the Additional District Judge, Srinagar, which court confirmed the trial court's findings and dismissed the appeal. The appellants then filed the present civil second appeal against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two lower courts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit against appellant No. 2 was maintainable in the absence of any notice served upon him as required by Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  2. Whether the courts below rightly exercised their discretion in granting a prohibitory injunction restraining the appellants from entering or evicting the respondents from six kanals of land comprised in Khasra No. 192, when those six kanals were found to belong to the State and the respondents' possession on them was found to be without right or title?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Mr. Raina)

  • No notice under Section 80 of the CPC was served on appellant No. 2; therefore the suit against him was not maintainable.
  • Because six kanals of Khasra No. 192 were held to belong to appellant No. 1 (State) and the respondents' possession there was without right or title, the courts below should not have exercised their discretion to grant an injunction preventing the appellants from evicting the respondents otherwise than by legal proceedings; the appellants should have the right to vindicate ownership and possession.

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. Kaul)

  • It was argued that appellant No. 2 did not appeal from the trial court's decree, and therefore the decree had become final against him (an argument the court reviewed against the record of the appeal memo).
  • Reliance was placed upon a Supreme Court decision (Bishen Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1570) to support the proposition that even in the case of a trespasser the owner is under a legal obligation not to eject him otherwise than in due course of law (an argument the court considered and analyzed).
  • It was also advanced that if the respondents' suit were dismissed they would be debarred from claiming compensation for improvements (trees) effected on the suit land.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Beant Singh v. Cantonment Executive Officer, Jammu, AIR 1960 J & K 83 Supports the proposition that where a licence or permission to occupy has terminated the licensor need not first obtain a court decree before treating the ex-licensee as a trespasser; the licensor may deal with the property and resist the trespasser. The court relied on this judgment to fortify its view that an owner (or licensor) is not obliged to submit to illegal possession and may eject a trespasser without awaiting a court decree, thereby supporting reversal of the injunction in respect of State land.
Bishen Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1570 Holds that where constructions were put up on State land with the State's permission, the occupiers were not trespassers and could not be removed by executive fiat; removal must follow legal procedure. The court examined this Supreme Court decision and distinguished it on the facts: it observed that Bishen Dass concerned persons who had permission from the State (and thus rights akin to an irrevocable licence or trust situations), so that the decision did not support the respondents' contention in the present case. The court considered the decision to be consistent with its own analysis and not supportive of the respondents' argument that owners must always eject only by legal process.
Thakoor Chunder Paramanick v. Ramdhone Bhuttacharjee, (1866) 6 Suth WR 228 Referenced (within the Bishen Dass discussion) as authority showing that the maxim "quod plantatur solo, solo cedit" (what is annexed to the soil goes with the soil) is not absolute; works or buildings put up with permission do not necessarily vest in the owner of the soil. Referred to by the Supreme Court in Bishen Dass (as quoted in the opinion). The present court relied on the extracted reasoning to explain why Bishen Dass did not support the respondents' position in this case.
Ram v. Kundan Lall, (1899) 26 Ind. App. 58 (PC) Also cited in Bishen Dass to show that bona fide constructions on land with the owner's permission do not automatically make the builder a trespasser nor vest the structures in the owner by the maxim alone. Referenced via Bishen Dass; used by the court to show that Bishen Dass's reasoning concerns permission-based rights and therefore is distinguishable from the present facts where respondents were not shown to have permissive rights.
Narayan Das v. Jatindranath, 54 Ind App 218 : AIR 1927 PC 135 Another precedent (cited within Bishen Dass) demonstrating limits to the maxim that structures annexed to the soil automatically vest in the landowner where permission to construct existed. Referred through the Bishen Dass quotation; the court used these authorities collectively to demonstrate that Bishen Dass was fact-specific and did not mandate the outcome urged by the respondents in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal analytical strands corresponding to the main issues.

1. Maintainability against Appellant No. 2 (Section 80 CPC)

  • The court examined the record and found no allegation or proof that any notice under Section 80 of the CPC had been served on appellant No. 2 prior to institution of the suit.
  • The court held that the mandatory requirements of Section 80 were ignored by the respondents; on that basis the suit against appellant No. 2 was not maintainable.
  • The court rejected the respondents' procedural argument that appellant No. 2 had not appealed from the trial court's decree — noting that the memorandum of appeal showed that both appellants had appealed — and therefore concluded the judgments and decrees against appellant No. 2 could not be sustained and must be set aside.

2. Discretion to Grant Injunction and Rights of the Owner vs. Trespasser

  • The court recalled the settled principle that injunction is a discretionary remedy and that a court may grant perpetual injunction under circumstances identified by Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act — namely, the applicant must have equities or rights deserving of protection (a right sought to be protected or an obligation sought to be enforced).
  • The courts below had found that six kanals of land in Khasra No. 192 belonged to the State and that the respondents were occupying it without any right or title, i.e., as trespassers.
  • The court reasoned that a trespasser has no equities in his favour and the owner (including the State) is not under an obligation to allow unlawful occupation to continue; the owner is entitled to enter upon and vindicate possession of his property without first securing a court decree, unless special circumstances (such as a permissive right or an acquired ownership by long possession) apply.
  • The court cited Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act as recognizing an exception for suits against the Government (contextualizing when suits respecting possession against the State are treated differently) and relied on the Beant Singh decision to reinforce the proposition that a licensor need not await a decree to deal with an intruder once the licence has terminated.
  • The court analyzed the Supreme Court decision in Bishen Dass and concluded that it did not support the respondents' contention; Bishen Dass addressed a different factual situation where occupiers had permission from the State (and therefore were not trespassers), and thus it did not mandate that an owner must always eject only by court process.
  • Applying these principles, the court found that the lower courts had erred in granting prohibitory injunction against the appellants with respect to the six kanals of Khasra No. 192 on the ground that the appellants could not enter upon their own land until they had ejected the respondents by legal process.
  • On the contention that respondents would be debarred from claiming compensation for improvements (planting of trees): the court stated that a trespasser who knowingly effects improvements on another's property has no right to compensation from the owner; if the respondents claim to have planted trees with the State's knowledge they may pursue a separate suit for compensation against the State.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed in part. Specifically:

  • The judgments and decrees against appellant No. 2 are set aside and the respondents' suit is dismissed against appellant No. 2 in respect of both Khasra Nos. 192 and 626.
  • The respondents' suit is also dismissed against appellant No. 1 in respect of the six kanals of land comprised in Khasra No. 192.
  • In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
  • The court declined leave to file a letters patent appeal against this judgment (the court noted the decision rests on concurrent findings of fact and is supported by a Supreme Court judgment).

Implications: The direct effects on the parties are limited and specific: the respondents lose as against appellant No. 2 for both Khasra numbers; they also lose in respect of the six kanals of Khasra No. 192 vis-à-vis appellant No. 1. The court's reasoning emphasizes that injunction is discretionary and that an owner may, in the absence of any right or title claimed by an occupant, exercise rights of entry and eviction without first securing a court decree (unless different factual circumstances — such as permissive occupation or other legal rights — exist). The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general principle of law beyond these applications and is explicitly grounded on statutory provisions (Sections 54 and 9 of the Specific Relief Act) and existing authorities cited in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This civil second appeal is directed against the decree of Additional District Judge, Srinagar confirming on appeal the decree of Sub-Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, decreeing the respondents' suit for prohibitory injunction restraining the appellants from interfering in their possession over some land and trees standing thereupon. The facts which have given rise to this appeal may be briefly stated as below.

2. The respondents brought a suit on 29-12-1961 against the appellants alleging that they were in possession of land comprising Khasra Nos. 192 and 626 situated in village Gund Roshan, Tehsil Ganderbal and that the defendants were trying to interfere with their possession over the said land and taking steps to auction the trees standing on the land which had been according to the respondents planted by them. The defence taken up by the appellants was that land comprising Khasra No. 192 was a Khalsa land belonging to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the trees standing on this land had also been planted by the Dehat Sudhar Department of the State over which the respondents did not have any claim. It was also pleaded in defence that the suit in its form was not maintainable against the appellants and the respondents had no cause of action to bring the suit against them. Appellant No. 2 herein raised a further plea that no notice as required under Section 80 of the CPC was served upon him and the suit against him was not maintainable on this score also. The triad court after perusing the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues:

1. Whether the land under survey Nos. 626 and 192 as described in para. No. 1 of the plaint situate in village Gund Roshan along with willow and Kikar trees is in possession of the plaintiff? OPP.

2. If issue No. 1 is proved whether the defendants are unauthorisedly cutting the branches of the trees and intend to auction the trees? OPP.

3. Whether the plaintiff's suit is not maintainable? OPD.

4. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD.

5. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to? OP Parties.

3. The parties joined the issues and led evidence in support of their respective cases. The learned counsel for the appellants, it appears, did not press issue Nos. 3 and 4 in the trial court. The trial court decided issues 1 and 2 in favour of the respondents holding that Khasra No. 626 belonged to the respondents who had purchased the same from one Prem Nath and that the respondents were also in possession of six kanals out of 94 kanals and 5 marlas of land comprised in Khasra No. 192 which was State land. The trial court also found that the willow and Kikar trees standing on these two Khasra numbers had been in fact planted by the respondents themselves. A decree for prohibitory injunction was therefore passed in favour of the respondents against the appellants with the observation that the appellants could exercise their right of ejecting the respondents from six kanals of land comprised in Khasra No. 192 but only in due course of law. The appellants challenged the judgement of the trial court in appeal before the Additional District Judge, Srinagar but with no success. The lower appellate court confirmed the findings arrived at by the trial court and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants. The appellants have now come up in second appeal against the judgement of the two courts below.

4. Mr. Raina learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the judgements of the courts below on the grounds. His first contention is that no notice having been served upon appellant No. 2 as required by Section 80 of the CPC the suit against him was not maintainable. His next ground is that six kanals of land comprised in Khasra No. 192 having been found as belonging to appellant No. 1 and the possession of the respondents on this land also having been found to be without any right or title, the courts below could not have exercised discretion in favour of the respondents and passed the impugned decree against the appellants restraining them from evicting the respondents from the said land except by taking recourse to legal proceedings.

5. So far as the first contention raised by Mr. Raina is concerned, I find considerable force in it. No notice under Section 80 of the CPC is either alleged to have been served upon appellant No. 2 nor otherwise wise proved to have been so served. It is, therefore, manifest that the mandatory provisions of Section 80 of the CPC had been clearly overlooked by the respondents in bringing the suit against appellant No. 2. I do not find any substance in the argument of Mr. Kaul learned advocate for the respondents that appellant No. 2 did not go in appeal against the decree of the trial court before the Additional District Judge, Srinagar and therefore the decree of the trial court had become final against him which could not be challenged for the first time in second appeal. I have perused the memo of appeal preferred before the Additional District Judge, Srinagar and I find that the appeal has been preferred by both the appellants. It is therefore obvious that no suit against appellant No. 2 was maintainable in the absence of a notice under Section 80 of the CPC having been served upon him prior to the institution of the suit. The judgements and decrees of the two courts below against appellant No. 2 cannot be therefore allowed to sustain which are hereby set aside.

6. That relief of injunction is a discretionary relief is now well settled. A party before it can ask a court to exercise discretion in its favour must show that it has some equities in its favour which would impel a court to exercise discretion in its favour. In the alternative the party seeking injunction must possess some right which the opposite party is trying to invade or there must exist an obligation in its favour whether contractual or otherwise in respect of which the opposite party is trying to commit a breach. These principles clearly emerge out of Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act which ordains in what circumstances a court may grant the discretionary relief of perpetual injunction.

7. The findings of the two courts below themselves show that six kanals of land out of Khasra No. 192 belongs to the State and the respondents have taken possession of it without any right or title. It would be therefore manifest that the respondents have taken possession and are in possession of this land as rank trespassers. A trespasser has no equities in his favour nor is the owner of the property trespassed under any legal obligation. There being no question of any contractual obligation under such circumstances to submit to the acts of trespass committed by the wrong doer. An owner has therefore every right to enter upon his property and restrain the trespasser from perpetuating his illegal occupation of the property. It is not necessary for him to take recourse to legal proceedings in order to vindicate, his rights of ownership and possession in respect of his property which has been taken into possession by another without any right or title. The position may be of course different where the trespasser has acquired ownership rights in the property by virtue of his long possession. That Govt. is not bound to honour the possession of a person over its property acquired by the latter without any right or title till it has taken recourse to eject him through legal proceedings is further borne out from Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act which makes an exception for a suit under the said Section against the Govt. I am fortified in taking this view from a judgement of this court in Beant Singh… v. Cantonment Executive Officer, Jammu…., Jammu, AIR 1960 J and K 83 where late K.V Gopalakrishnan Nair J. observed as under (at p. 87):

“The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously urged that the licenser is bound to bring a suit either for injunction or for ejectment against the licensee before he can get rid of the right of the licensee to enjoy the licence. According to him, this would be the position even if the license had been validly revoked and the licensee's right under the agreement had ceased. I have not been referred to any authority in support of this somewhat extraordinary contention.

It militates against the very concept of a license. A licence is a right “to do or continue to do in or upon the immovable property of the grantor something, which would, in the absence of such a right be unlawful”. If a license validly determines the right of a licensee to do or continue to do in or upon the immovable property of the licenser anything in enjoyment of that license would come to an end, the result of which will be to make further exercise of that right unlawful.

If an injunction in favour of such a licensee is given, it would only be permitting him to do what is unlawful for him to do. The court would thus be throwing its protection round a wrongdoer and forcing the rightful owner of property to submit to the unlawful action of the wrong-doer. I do not think any court should by any order or decree passed by it bring about such a strange and intolerable situation. The law does not permit a licenses whose license has been validly revoked to exercise his license any longer.

If he does so, he does something wrong. He will be only a trespasser after he has lost his right under the license, and the owner of the land is entitled to deal with him as a trespasser. There is neither principle nor authority to support the rather strange proposition that in spite of the valid termination of the right of the licensee, he can continue to exercise his right until the licenser obtains a decree from the court prohibiting him from doing so.

After the termination of the license, the licenser is entitled to deal with the property as he likes and to treat an intruder as sheer trespasser. This right he gets as an owner in possession of his property. He need not secure a decree of court to obtain this right. He is entitled to resist in defence of his property the attempts of a trespasser to come upon his property.

He may exert the necessary and reasonable force to expel a trespasser. Whatever be the liability that the true owner may incur under the Criminal law or even under the Civil law for use of excessive force, the trespasser will not be entitled to maintain a civil action against him so as to continue the trespass.”

8. Mr. Kaul has on the other hand invited my attention to a Supreme Court judgement in Bishen Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1570 in support of his argument that even in case of a trespasser the owner is under a legal obligation not to eject him otherwise than in due course of law. I have gone through this judgement carefully and I do not find that this, judgement really supports the principle adumbrated by Mr. Kaul. On the other hand this judgement also supports the view which I have expressed heretofore. That an owner is not bound to submit to the illegal possession of a trespasser and refrain from ejecting him otherwise than in due course of law is amply borne out from the observations of the Supreme Court which read thus (at p. 1574):

“The admitted position so far as the present proceeding is concerned, is that the land belonged to the State; with the permission of the State, Ramji Das, on behalf of the joint family firm of Fequir Chand Bhagwan Dass, built the Dharmasala, temple and shops and managed the some during his lifetime. After his death the petitioners, other members of the joint family, continued the management. On this admitted position the petitioners cannot be held to be trespassers in respect of the dharmasala, temple and shops: nor can it be held that the dharamshala, temple and shops belonged to the State, irrespective of the question whether the trust created was of a public or private nature. A trustee even of a public trust can be removed only by procedure known to law. He cannot be removed by an executive fiat. It is by now well settled that the maxim, what is annexed to the soil goes with the soil, has not been accepted as an absolute rule of law of this country, see Thakoor Chunder Paramanick v. Ramdhone Bhuttacharjee, (1866) 6 Suth WR 228, Beni, Ram v. Kundan Lall, (1899) 26 Ind. App. 58 (PC) and Narayan Das v. Jatindranath, 54 Ind App 218 : (AIR 1927 PC 135). These decisions show that a person who bona fide puts up constructions on land belonging to other with their permission would not be a trespasser, nor would the buildings so constructed vest in the owner of the land by the application of the maxim quickquid plantatur solo, solo cedit. It is, therefore, impossible to hold that in respect of the dharmasala, temples and shops, the State has acquired any rights whatsoever merely by reason of their being on the land belonging to the State. If the State thought that the constructions should be removed or that the condition as to resumption of the land should be invoked, it was open to the State to take appropriate legal action for the purpose.”

9. The facts of the case before the Supreme Court were entirely different from the facts of the present case. There the petitioners had constructed buildings on Govt. land with its permission. The petitioners had therefore acquired, if not any other right, a least a right of irrevocable license to occupy and use the property for a particular purpose. They were not as such trespassers who could be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law.

10. It is, therefore, manifest that the Courts below have committed an error of law in granting a decree for prohibitory injunction against the respondents in respect of six kanals of land comprised in Khasra No. 192 on the ground that the appellants had no right to enter upon their own land till they had ejected the respondents from the said land in due course of law.

11. Mr. Kaul has then argued that in case the respondents' suit is dismissed, they will be debarred from claiming compensation for the improvements, they have effected on the suit land by planting trees on it. I am afraid if the respondents have any such right because a trespasser who asks improvement upon the property of others with open eyes and with the knowledge that such property does not belong to him has no right to claim compensation from the owner of the property. I do not find any averment in the plaint that the respondents have planted the trees on the suit land with the knowledge of the State. Assuming that they have done so, they may be well advised to bring a suit for compensation against the State in the event of the State taking possession of the land and trees standing on it.

12. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is allowed to the extent that the respondents' suit against appellant No. 2 is dismissed in respect of both the Khasra Numbers namely 192 and 626 and it is also dismissed against appellant No. 1 in respect of six kanals of land comprised in Khasra No. 192. In the peculiar circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs. At this stage Mr. R.N Kaul made a prayer that he may be granted leave to file letters patent appeal against this judgement. As the decision in this appeal rests upon concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below and the view taken on the point of law is also supported by a Supreme Court Judgement, the leave sought for is declined.

13. Appeals allowed.