Ansari, C.J:— The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Amritsar Bench (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”), has referred the following three questions to this court under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”):

“1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was legally competent to set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make the assessment de novo?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that there was no link between the amounts declared by Teja Begum Nazir Ahmad and Javeed Ahmad on January 25, 1966, under section 24(1) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965, and the amount of Rs. 85,000 alleged to have been advanced by them to the assessee on September 6, 1965?

3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has rightly upheld the impugned order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner?”

2. The assessment year under reference is the year 1966-67, the relevant accounting year being the year ending 31st March, 1966. The original assessment for this year was completed on a total income of Rs. 68,539. The original assessment was reopened and a notice under section 148 of the Act was issued and in response to the said notice the assessee filed a return of income declaring a loss of Rs. 59,519. During the previous assessment proceedings, the assessee was called upon to explain the source of a fixed deposit receipt of Rs. 75,000 which had been purchased by him from the National & Grindlay's Bank Ltd. on September 6, 1965, and also of Rs. 5,000 which was shown to have been paid by him to one of his wives, Shrimati Zaina Begum. The assessee explained that he had taken loans from his other wife and minor sons as follows:

Rs. 1. Shrimati Teja Begum 20,000 2. Nazir Ahmad (minor son) 35,000 3. Javeed Ahmad (minor son) 25,000 Total 80,000

3. It was further explained by the assessee that the above three creditors had declared the respective amounts shown against them on January 25, 1966, under section 24 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 (Act 15 of 1965) (hereinafter referred to as “as the Finance Act”). The Income-tax Officer did not accept the explanation of the assessee as in his view one of the alleged creditors was a pardanashin lady and the other two were minors who had no independent source of income. The Income-tax Officer, therefore, treated the amount of Rs. 80,000 as income of the assessee himself from undisclosed sources.

4. The assessee was also a financing partner in the firm of Mohd. Ahsan Wani & Co., Srinagar. On a scrutiny of the accounts of his firm, it was found that on November 20, 1965, the assessee was in possession of Rs. 99,926 in the imprest account. The assessee had purchased a fixed deposit of Rs. 1,00,934 on May 26, 1964, and the cash balance as on November 20, 1965, was nil. On December 26, 1965, the assessee was shown as being in possession of Rs. 53,432. The expenditure was, however, shown at Rs. 69,278. It was thus found that on December 21, 1965, the assessee had spent Rs. 53,218 against the available cash of Rs. 23,754. It was, therefore, found that the assessee had spent Rs. 29,464 in excess of the receipts. The Income-tax Officer did not accept the explanation offered by the assessee and he treated this amount of Rs. 29,464 as the income of the assessee from undisclosed sources. The reassessment for the year 1966-67 was completed on a total income of Rs. 2,01,485.

5. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax against the reassessment made by the Income-tax Officer. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner set aside the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer and directed the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed the said order on the following grounds:

(1) The assessment was made under section 143(3) without the issue of a notice under section 143(2) of the Act.

(2) It was necessary to give the assessee an opportunity to prove the contention regarding the loan from Teja Begum independent of his account books.

(3) The income from the property was determined at Rs. 1,200 adopting the property income as disclosed in the previous year. It was necessary to redetermine the property income in the light of the complete net wealth statements and capital accretion of the assessee.

(4) The statements filed by the assessee take into account agricultural income to the extent of Rs. 11,000 per year. In the year 1954-55, the assessee had denied the ownership of orchards. The record did not indicate the date of purchase of the orchard in 1956-57 during which year the ownership of the orchards had been shown. Since the statement filed by the assessee started with the capital declared on February 28, 1956, it was necessary to know the actual date of purchase of the orchard in 1956-57.

(5) In order to make a proper appreciation of the statements filed by the assessee, it was necessary for the Income-tax Officer to bring on record the extent and nature of agricultural holdings and agricultural operations for each year to which the statements related and the income which is taken into account for the purpose of explaining the capital accretion on March 31, 1966.

6. Against this order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal and urged two main contentions, namely: (1) that it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to investigate into the source of the amounts which had been declared under section 24 of the Finance Act; and (2) that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had acted in excess of his powers in directing the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment, in respect of the sources of income which had not been considered by the Income-tax Officer in the reassessment proceedings or which related to the assessment years other than the year 1966-67. The Tribunal did not accept these contentions and upheld the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but at the instance of the assessee the Tribunal has referred the three questions (supra) to this court.

7. We shall first proceed to consider whether the Income-tax Officer was right in treating the amount of Rs. 80,000 as income of the assessee from undisclosed sources. It is not disputed that Teja Begum, Nazir Ahmed and Javeed Ahmad had made declarations on January 25, 1966, of the amounts of Rs. 20,000, 35,000 and 25,000, respectively, under section 24(1) of the Finance Act, and that they were assessed on the amounts declared by them in accordance with the provisions of the Finance Act. According to the declarations made by these persons, the amounts declared by them represented the income which had been earned by them before March 31, 1964. According to the assessee these amounts were borrowed by him on September 6, 1965. Neither the Income-tax Officer nor the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had required the assessee to have these loans confirmed by the creditors. Both of them obviously did not think it necessary to have these cash credits confirmed by the creditors in view of the fact that the creditors were no other than the wife and the minor sons of the assessee. Both the Income-tax Officer as well as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were, however, of the view that the amount of Rs. 80,000 did not represent the income of the creditors as they had no independent source of income and that the amount represented the assessee's own income. In other words, they disregarded the declarations made by the creditors under the Finance Act and reinvestigated the source of income of the declarants and on such reinvestigation came to the conclusion that the amount declared by the declarants was really the income of the assessee. The contention of the assessee before the Tribunal was that it was not open to the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to disregard the declarations made by the declarant's under the Finance Act and to reinvestigate the source of the declared income. The real controversy between the assessee and the revenue was whether it was open to the department to investigate into the source of the declared amounts, when the declared amounts were shown as having been borrowed by the assessee from the declarants.

8. Having regard to the real controversy between the assessee and the revenue on this point, we feel that question No. 2 (supra) has not been properly framed by the Tribunal, as it does not bring out the real controversy between the parties. We, therefore, reframe the question as follows:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with regard to the addition of Rs. 80,000 as the undisclosed income of the assessee?”

9. The answer to the above question involves the interpretation of the provisions of section 24(1) of the Finance Act, the relevant provision being as follows:

“24. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where any person makes, on or after the 19th day of August, 1965, and before the 1st day of April, 1966, a declaration in accordance with sub-section (2) in respect of the amount representing income chargeable to tax under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or the Income-tax Act, 1961, for any assessment year commencing on or before the 1st day of April, 1964—

(a) for which he has failed to furnish a return within the time allowed under section 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or section 139 of the Income tax Act, 1961, or

(b) which he has failed to disclose in a return of income filed by him on or before the 19th day of August, 1965, under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or the Income-tax Act, 1961, or

(c) which has escaped assessment by reason of the omission or failure on the part of such person to make a return under either of the said Acts to the Income-tax Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment,

he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Acts, be charged income-tax in accordance with sub-section (3) in respect of the amount so declared or if more than one declaration has been made by a person the aggregate of the amounts declared therein as reduced by any amount specified in any order made under sub-section (4) or if such amount is altered by an order of the Board under sub-section (6), then, such altered amount (hereafter in this section referred to as the voluntarily disclosed income)……

(3) Income-tax shall be charged on the amount of the voluntarily disclosed income—

(a) where the declarant is a person other than a company, at the rates specified in paragraph A, and

(b) where the declarant is a company, at the rates specified in paragraph F,

of Part I of the First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1965, as if such amount were the total income of the declarant, so, however, that,—

(i) the proviso to the said paragraph A or, as the case may be, the second proviso to the said paragraph F, shall not apply;

(ii) where the declarant is a person other than a company, the voluntarily disclosed income shall be deemed to be earned income;

(iii) where the declarant is a company, the voluntarily disclosed income shall be deemed to consist of income other than income by way of royalties or fees for rendering technical services or profits and gains derived from the business of generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power or of construction, manufacture or production of any article or thing or of processing of goods or mining; and

(iv) where the declarant is a firm, it shall be deemed to be an unregistered firm………

(9) Any amount of income-tax paid in pursuance of a declaration made under this section shall not be refundable in any circumstances and no person who has made the declaration shall be entitled, in respect of the voluntarily disclosed income or any amount of tax paid thereon, to reopen any assessment or reassessment made under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or the Income-tax Act, 1961, or the Excess Profits Act, 1940, or the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947, or the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963, or the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964, or claim any set-off or relief in any appeal, reference, revision or other proceeding in relation to any such assessment or reassessment.

(10)(a) The amount of the voluntarily disclosed income shall not be included in the total income of the declarant for any assessment year under any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (9) if he has credited such amount in the books of account, if any, maintained by him for any source of income or in any other record.

(b) The credit made shall be intimated by the declarant to the Income-tax Officer.

(11) Notwithstanding anything contained hereinabove or in any other law for the time being in force, nothing contained in any declaration made under this section shall be admissible as evidence against the declarant for the purpose of any assessment proceeding or any proceeding relating to imposition of penalty or for the purpose of prosecution under any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (9) or the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, in respect of any amount specified in an order made by the Commissioner under sub section (4) or, if such amount is altered by an order of the Board under sub-section (6), then, such altered amount………

(15) The Commissioner shall on an application by the declarant grant a certificate to him setting forth the particulars of the voluntarily disclosed income and the amount of income-tax paid in respect of the same and the date of payment:…”

10. Section 24 of the Finance Act is commonly known as the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme of 1965. The main features of this scheme are that it enables persons who had not disclosed their income in the earlier years and had thus escaped assessment on such income to declare such income and pay tax on such income according to the special concessional rate prescribed under the scheme. The amounts so declared are accepted by the department without any investigation regarding the source and these amounts are treated as the income of the declarant for the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1965. The tax which is paid by the declarant is not refundable under any circumstance. The amount declared cannot be included in the income of the declarant for any other assessment year, nor can it be added to the total income of the declarant for the same assessment year so as to subject such total income to a higher rate of tax. The amount declared is treated under a separate head and taxed at the rate prescribed under the scheme.

11. It, therefore, follows that it really makes no difference whether the amount declared by a person really represents his income or represents the income of any other person. A person would not gain anything by declaring his income in the name of any other person. It makes no difference whether he brings the declared amount into his own books in the next year in his own name or whether he brings it into his books as cash credits in the name of the declarants.

12. In the present case the assessee could have declared the amount of Rs. 80,000 in his own name and brought it into his books in the assessment year under reference. In such an event, it would not be open to the revenue to treat this income as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources; the voluntary disclosure scheme would operate as a bar. We do not see why the position should be different when the amount in question was declared in the name of the assessee's wife and minor sons and brought into his books as cash credits.

13. There is a difference of opinion between some of the High Courts on the interpretation of section 24 of the Finance Act, In Manilal Gafoorbhai Shah v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Gujarat, [1974] 95 ITR 624 (Guj), the Gujarat High Court held that the immunity against the investigation of the source of the declared income was given to the declarant and not to another person and that it was open to the department while making assessment of that person to investigate into the source of the declared amount.

14. A similar view was expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Badri Pd. & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1975] 98 ITR 657 (All) and that High Court observed that the Finance Act of 1965 neither intended nor had the effect of converting the income belonging to the person behind the screen into the income of the declarant.

15. The Delhi High Court, however, took a different view in Rattan Lal & Others…Petitioners v. Income Tax Officer Etc.…S, [1975] 98 ITR 681 (Delhi). (It may be stated that one of us, namely, Ansari C.J, was a party to that judgment while he was a judge of the Delhi High Court). The Delhi High Court observed that by the use of a legal fiction introduced in sub-section (3) by the use of the words “as if such amount was the total income of the declarant” the amount so declared is turned into his total income and such income is charged to income-tax at the prescribed rates. The High Court then referred to the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh , [1959] 35 ITR 408, 413 (SC), viz.:

“It is a rule of interpretation well-settled that in construing the scope of a legal fiction it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate.”

16. Following this principle the High Court observed as follows [1975] 98 ITR 681, 690-91 (Delhi):

“If, therefore, the declared amount becomes under the Finance Act the total income of the declarant for the purpose of charging income-tax on it, it cannot be the income of someone else also for the same purpose of again charging income-tax on it. The legal fiction created by sub-section (3), therefore, finally imprints on the sum declared the character of ‘total income’ of the declarant and the finality is achieved by enacting that the income-tax paid as a result of the declaration shall not be refunded in any circumstances.”

17. With respect we agree with the reasoning of the Delhi High Court and we, therefore, hold that it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to investigate into the source of the cash credits amounting to Rs. 80,000 standing in the books of the assessee in the names of his wife and two minor sons. We, therefore, answer question No. 2, as reframed by us, in the negative, i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

18. The first question referred to us relates to the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner are defined in section 251 of the Act (corresponding to section 31(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922). Section 251(1)(a) is the relevant provision and it reads as follows:

“In disposing of an appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall have the following powers-—

(a) in an appeal against an order of assessment, he may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; or he may set aide the assessment and refer the case back to the Income-tax Officer for making a fresh assessment in accordance with the directions given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and after making such further inquiry as may be necessary, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh assessment and determine, where necessary, the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment……

Explanation.— In disposing of an appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may consider and decide any matter arising out of the proceedings in which the order appealed against was passed, notwithstanding that such matter was not raised before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by the appellant.”

19. The scope of the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has been explained by the Supreme Court in a number of cases and it would be sufficient to refer only to some of them. In Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Mcmillan & Co, [1958] 33 ITR 182, 193 (SC) the Supreme Court gave its approval to the following observations of Chagla C.J in Narrondas Manor class v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1957] 31 ITR 909 (Bom):

“‘It is clear that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has been constituted a revising authority against the decisions of the Income-tax Officer; a revising authority not in the narrow sense of revising what is the subject-matter of the appeal, not in the sense of revising those matters about which the assessee makes a grievance, but a revising authority in the sense that once the appeal is before him he can revise not only the ultimate computation arrived at by the Income-tax Officer but he can revise every process which led to the ultimate computation or assessment. In other words, what he can revise is not merely the ultimate amount which is liable to tax, but he is entitled to revise the various decisions given by the Income-tax Officer in the course of the assessment and also the various incomes or deductions which came in for consideration of the Income-tax Officer.”

20. The above observations of Chagla C.J in Narrondas's case, [1957] 31 ITR 909 (Bom), which were quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in McMillan's case, [1958] 33 ITR 182 (SC) emphasized the wide powers conferred upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but they did not emphasize the limitations placed upon such powers. These limitations were considered by the Supreme Court in a later case, namely, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shapoorji Pallonji Mistry, [1962] 44 ITR 891, 895 (SC). After referring to the observations of Chagla C.J and the approval given by the Supreme Court in McMillan's case, [1958] 33 ITR 182 (SC), Hidayatullah J. proceeded to observe as follows:

“In our opinion, this court must be held not to have expressed its final opinion on the point arising here, in view of what was stated at pages 709 and 710 of the report. This court, however, gave approval to the opinion of the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court that section 31 of the Income-tax Act confers not only appellate powers upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in so far as he is moved by an assessee but also a revisional jurisdiction to revise the assessment with a power to enhance the assessment. So much, of course, follows from the language of the section itself. The only question is whether in enhancing the assessment for any year he can travel outside the record, that is to say, the return made by the assessee and the assessment order passed by the Income-tax Officer with a view to finding out new sources of income, not disclosed in either. It is contended by the Commissioner of Income-tax that the word ‘assessment’ here means the ultimate amount which an assessee must pay, regard being had to the charging section and his total income. In this view, it is said that the words, ‘enhance the assessment’ are not confined to the assessment reached through a particular process but the amount which ought to have been computed if the true total income had been found. There is no doubt that this view is also possible. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that there are other provisions like sections 34 and 33B, which enable escaped incoome from new sources to be brought to tax after following a special procedure. The assessee contends that the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner extend to matters considered by the Income-tax Officer, and if a new source is to be considered, then the power of remand should be exercised. By the exercise of the power to assess fresh sources of income, the assessee is deprived of a finding by two Tribunals and one right of appeal.

The question is whether we should accept the interpretation suggested by the Commissioner in preference to the one, which has held the field for for nearly 37 years. In view of the provisions of sections 34 and 33B by which escaped income can be brought to tax, there is reason to think that the view expressed uniformly about the limits of the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to enhance the assessment has been accepted by the legislature as the true exposition of the words of the section. If it were not, one would expect that the legislature would have amended section 31 and specified the other intention in express words. The Income-tax Act was amended several times in the last 37 years, but no amendment of section 31(3) was undertaken to nullify the rulings, to which we have referred. In view of this, we do not think that we should interpret section 31 differently from what has been accepted in India as its true import, particularly as that view is also reasonably possible.”

21. The limitations placed upon the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were again explained by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria, [1967] 66 ITR 443, 450, 451 (SC) in the following words:

“The principle that emerges as a result of the authorities of this court is that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction, under section 31(3) of the Act, to assess a source of income which has not been processed by the Income-tax Officer and which is not disclosed either in the returns filed by the assessee or in the assessment order, and, therefore, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cannot travel beyond the subject-matter of the assessment. In other words, the power of enhancement under section 31(3) of the Act is restricted to the subject-matter of assessment or the source of income which have been considered expressly or by clear implication by the Income-tax Officer from the point of view of the taxability of the assessees………… As we have already stated, it is not open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to travel outside the record, i.e, the return made by the assessee or the assessment order of the Income-tax Officer with a view to find out new sources of income and the power of enhancement under section 31(3) of the Act is restricted to the sources of income which have been the subject-matter of consideration by the Income-tax Officer from the point of view of taxability. In this context ‘consideration’ does not mean ‘incidental’ or ‘collateral’ examination of any matter by the Income-tax Officer in the process of assessment. There must be something in the assessment order to show that the Income-tax Officer applied his mind to the particular subject-matter or the particular source of income with a view to its taxability or to its non-taxability and not to any incidental connection.”

22. It is the contention of the assessee that when the Appellate Assistant Commissioner directed the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment with regard to certain items of income, he had acted in excess of the powers conferred on him under section 251(1) of the Act. It is pointed out that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had directed the Income-tax Officer to redetermine the property income of the assessee on the basis of the entire wealth statements and the capital accretion of the assessee. It is then pointed out that the addition of Rs. 29,464 by the Income-tax Officer as the income of the assessee from undisclosed sources had not been challenged by the assessee in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and that despite that fact the Appellate Assistant Commissioner directed the Income-tax Officer to redetermine the amount which may be added to the income of the assessee from other sources. It is further pointed out that while directing the Income-tax Officer to redetermine the agricultural income of the assessee for the assessment year 1966-67, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had directed the Income-tax Officer to bring on record the extent and nature of agricultural holdings and agricultural operations for the earlier years also. These directions, according to the assessee, were beyond the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.

23. A perusal of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner leaves one in doubt whether it is an order passed in favour of the assessee or against him. According to the grounds of appeal filed by the assessee before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, which is annexure “J” to the statements of the case, the only contention raised by the assessee before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was that the addition of Rs. 80,000 to the income of the assessee as income from undisclosed sources was not justified in view of the declarations made by the creditors under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme of 1965. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, while upholding the action of the Income-tax Officer in principle, however, directed the Income-tax Officer to give the assessee an opportunity to prove the loan from Teja Begum independent of the books. In view of our answer to the second question as reframed by us, this direction by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner becomes unnecessary. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has set aside the order of the Income-tax Officer primarily under a misconception that the assessment was made without issue of a notice under section 143(2) of the Act. The assessment order of the Income-tax Officer would clearly show that a notice under section 143(2) was served on the assessee and the latter had appeared before the Income-tax Officer along with his books of account, etc., and that it was only after hearing the assessee that the assessment was completed. As a matter of fact, the assessee had not made a grievance in his grounds of appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that no notice under section 143(2) was served upon him or that he was not given an opportunity of being heard by the Income-tax Officer. Therefore, the direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the assessment should be made again after giving notice under section 143(2) was not justified.

24. As regards the objection of the assessee against the direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for redetermining the addition of Rs. 29,464 under other sources, we do not find anything in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner specifically directing the Income-tax Officer to redetermine this amount. Therefore, the apprehension of the assessee that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has given a direction to the Income-tax Officer to redetermine the income of the assessee under other sources appears to be unfounded.

25. As regards the direction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for redetermining the income from the property, it is certainly open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to give such a direction, because, this is not a new source of income which had not been considered by the Income-tax Officer. But, to the extent that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has directed the Income-tax Officer to redetermine the income from property on the basis of material which was not considered by the Income-tax Officer like the net wealth statement and the capital accretion of the assessee or the income from agricultural property for the earlier assessment years, it is clearly outside the scope of the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the direction given by him in this behaif should be ignored by the Income-tax Officer. We answer question No. 1 in the following manner:

While the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was legally competent to set aside the assessment and direct the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment with regard to income from the sources which had been considered by the Income-tax Officer, he was not legally competent to direct the Income-tax Officer to make assessment in respect of sources which were not considered by the Income-tax Officer nor on the basis of material which had not been considered by the Income-tax Officer.

26. Our answer to question No. 3 is covered by our answers to questions Nos. 1 and 2. We do not propose to give a separate answer to question No. 3.

27. We make no order as to costs.

Mian Jalaluddin, J.:— I agree.