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Hari Ram v. State .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Hari Ram, was tried and convicted by the Sessions Judge, Udhampur under Sections 302 and 380 of the Ranbir Penal Code (R.P.C). He was sentenced to death for the charge under Section 302 and to rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence under Section 380. The Sessions Judge also made a reference for confirmation of the death sentence. The present judgment governs the disposal of both the appeal against conviction and sentence and the confirmation reference.
The prosecution's case, in summary, was that Mst. Jamna had lived as a concubine with Lal Singh. It alleged that Jamna entered into an illicit connection with the appellant and that, in concert, they murdered Lal Singh on the night of 28/29 October 1969 by inflicting fatal injuries with a khokhari while he slept. The prosecution further alleged that Jamna then collected valuables to elope and that the appellant, suspecting her, turned and killed her with a khokhari and an axe; both bodies were found the next evening and a report (Exhibit A) was made to the police. There was no eye-witness to the killings; the prosecution relied entirely on circumstantial evidence enumerated in the record.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the conviction and death sentence under Section 302 R.P.C. against the appellant should be upheld.
- Whether the conviction and sentence under Section 380 R.P.C. (theft/possession of stolen property) should be upheld.
- Whether the confession recorded under Section 164 Cr. P.C. (Ex. 5/2) was voluntary and admissible.
- Whether the identification evidence (test identification parade and in-court identification) was reliable.
- Whether admissions recorded by the committing magistrate (tendered under Section 287 Cr. P.C.) were duly recorded and admissible as evidence.
- Whether the recoveries (weapons, blood-stained clothing, and articles allegedly belonging to the deceased) and medical evidence sufficiently connected the appellant to the murders.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant challenged his conviction under Sections 302 and 380 and the sentences imposed, including the death sentence.
- Specifically, the learned counsel for the appellant objected to the admissibility of the confession (Ex. 5/2) on two grounds: (a) that it was not recorded by a competent magistrate (argued to be recorded by an Executive Magistrate rather than a Judicial Magistrate), and (b) that it was involuntary and resulted from prolonged torture by the police.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The prosecution relied upon circumstantial evidence only (no eye-witness): (i) accused seen last residing with the deceased; (ii) accused seen en route returning home on the morning after the offence; (iii) confession under Section 164 Cr. P.C. (retracted at trial); (iv) admissions before the committing Magistrate; (v) recovery of a khokhari (Ex. 1) and a blood-stained shirt from the accused's house and a blood-stained axe from the scene; (vi) recovery of articles belonging to the deceased from the accused's house; and (vii) medical evidence (postmortems).
- Prosecution tendered the committing magistrate's examination of the accused under Section 287 Cr. P.C. as evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Budhsen v. State of U.P ((1970) 2 SCC 128 : AIR 1970 SC 1321) | Guidance on identity evidence and the role, purpose and precautions to be observed in test identification parades; relevance under Section 9, Indian Evidence Act; care required by magistrates conducting parades. | The Court relied on the observations to subject the identification evidence to close scrutiny and to conclude that the test identification parade in this case was not conducted with necessary care and caution and therefore could not be treated as reliable corroboration of in-court identifications. |
| AIR 1956 SC 56 | Principle that prolonged police custody immediately preceding a confession is sufficient, unless properly explained, to stamp the confession as involuntary. | The Court applied this principle to the fact that the accused remained in police custody for 13 days before the confession in Ex. 5/2 was recorded, concluding that the prolonged custody — unexplained by the prosecution — rendered the confession involuntary and inadmissible. |
| AIR 1956 SC 54 | Principle that the mere recovery of stolen property from a person does not safely justify an inference that the person was the murderer; possession/possession alone is insufficient to prove murder. | The Court relied on this decision to hold that where the only evidence connecting an accused to a murder is possession of stolen property, it is not safe to infer that the possessor committed the murder. This supported the Court's conclusion to acquit the accused of murder while upholding conviction for possession of stolen property. |
| Jairam v. State (AIR 1968 Orissa 97) | Rule that if there are no circumstances appearing in evidence against the accused, the magistrate should not put questions under Section 342 Cr. P.C.; answers given to improperly put questions cannot be taken into account against the accused. | The Court invoked this authority to conclude that the admissions recorded by the committing magistrate were not "duly recorded" for the purposes of Section 287 Cr. P.C. because the confessional statement (which formed part of the circumstances) was inadmissible and there was otherwise no evidence in the committing court to justify those questions. Thus the Court held the admissions inadmissible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded step-by-step through the circumstantial material relied upon by the prosecution and evaluated the legal sufficiency of each circumstance in light of statutory rules and precedents.
- Identification evidence: The Court examined evidence of witnesses (Mithu Ram P.W.2, Tara Chand P.W.3, Mst. Vidhya P.W.4, Sita Ram P.W.5, Krishan Lal P.W.6) who claimed to have seen the accused at or near the deceased's house. Their identifications were based on a test identification parade (memos Ex. O, P, Q, R1). Relying on the guidance in Budhsen, the Court found the parade defective: mixed persons did not have a bearing/appearance sufficiently resembling the accused; the accused's clothing differed markedly and the parade was held casually. Because the parade lacked the necessary safeguards and transparency, it was unreliable and did not corroborate in-court identifications. Additional facts — absence of suspicion in the first information report and contradictory or weak witness statements — further undermined the claim that the accused was last seen residing with the deceased. The Court therefore held that the first circumstance (last seen residing with the deceased) was not proved.
- Sightings on the morning after the offence: The Court reviewed evidence of Nek Ram (P.W.10) and Gurbachan Singh (P.W.15) who claimed to have seen the accused acting in the morning after the murders. Neither witness had prior acquaintance with the accused, neither was called to the identification parade, and both were identified only in court. The Court found the testimony improbable and internally divergent (for example, discrepancies over whether the accused carried a bundle). The Court concluded these casual, unimpressive identifications did not prove the second circumstance (being seen en route on the morning after).
- Confessional statement under Section 164 Cr. P.C. (Ex. 5/2): The appellant objected to admissibility on the ground that it was recorded by an Executive Magistrate and that it was involuntary due to torture. The Court found the first objection factually misplaced: the statement was recorded by Tara Chand Khajuria, Chief Judicial Magistrate (P.W.20). Turning to voluntariness, the Court applied Section 24 of the Evidence Act and the cited Supreme Court authority (AIR 1956 SC 56) holding that unexplained prolonged police custody immediately before a confession justifies excluding the confession. The accused was arrested on 21-12-1969 and remained in police custody until 4-1-1970 when an application (Ex. N) sought that he might disclose the truth; he was remanded and finally produced on 9-1-1970 when Ex. 5/2 was recorded — a period of 13 days in police custody. The accused had told the magistrate earlier (Ex. Q) that he had been subjected to torture and lacked sound mental condition. The Court found the prosecution had not explained the delay nor shown steps taken by the magistrate to dispel the accused's apprehension. Consequently the Court held the Section 164 confession to be involuntary and inadmissible.
- Admissions recorded by the committing magistrate (Section 287 Cr. P.C.): The committing magistrate had recorded answers in which the accused admitted killing both deceased persons and that his statement before the Chief Judicial Magistrate was true. Section 287 permits tendering the committing magistrate's examination if "duly" recorded. The Court analyzed Sections 209 and 342 Cr.P.C. and the Jairam decision and concluded that a magistrate's questioning is meant to enable the accused to explain circumstances appearing in the evidence — not to put improper questions or to elicit answers where no circumstances appear. Because the Section 164 confession was inadmissible, it could not constitute a circumstance against the accused that justified those questions; further, the committing court did not have evidence indicating the accused had killed the deceased on the night in question. Thus the answers were not "duly recorded" within the meaning of Section 287 and could not be read as evidence at trial.
- Recoveries (weapons and clothing): The seizure memo (Ex. P.H) recorded recovery of a khokhari, a kachha and a blood-stained shirt from the accused's house. The accused admitted ownership of the items and explained the shirt's blood stains as resulting from an earlier animal bite. The Assistant Serologist's report (Ex. X/7) was unable to confirm presence of blood on the shirt due to disintegration; contemporaneous articles had shown human blood. The Court found this supports the accused's explanation that the shirt stains related to an earlier event. The khokhari was a commonplace article and had no blood stains; the blood on the axe recovered from the scene was not confirmed by the serologist. The Court therefore held that these recoveries did not establish connection to the homicides and that the disclosure statement (Ex. P.K) leading to them could not be admitted as a statement leading to discovery of a fact under Section 27.
- Recovery of articles belonging to the deceased from the accused's house: Exhibits in Ex. P.G recorded recovery of cash, ornaments, clothes and other articles. Multiple witnesses (Bodh Raj P.W.7, Sandur Singh P.W.16, Mansa Ram P.W.17, Anantoo P.W.18, Kaka Ram P.W.1, among others) identified several of these articles as belonging to the deceased (names on a hookah and tumblers, tailor and goldsmith testimony confirming garments and ornaments). The accused did not provide evidence to rebut these identifications and his wife (Mst. Sita P.W.22) disowned the articles. The Court held that these recoveries were proved and thus constituted a circumstance established against the accused — namely possession of property of the deceased.
- Medical evidence and motive: Post-mortem reports (Ex. P.S and Ex. P.T) by Dr. Chaman Lal (P.W.23) described multiple, widespread and fatal injuries on both deceased; certain injuries alone were fatal and injuries were consistent with homicide occurring on the night intervening 28/29 October 1969. The Court observed that the prosecution story advancing a joint plan and the sequence of events (including the immediate killing of Jamna after Lal Singh and the motive given) was implausible and unsupported by direct evidence. Given the absence of trustworthy connecting circumstances placing the accused as the murderer, the Court found it difficult to hold the accused guilty of murder despite the medical confirmation of homicide.
- Synthesis and legal application: Applying the reasoning above and the authority that mere possession of stolen property does not safely permit inferring the possessor to be the murderer, the Court concluded that the only proved offence was under Section 380 R.P.C. (possession/receipt of stolen property), while conviction for murder under Section 302 could not be maintained.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appeal is allowed to the extent that the appellant is acquitted of the offence under Section 302 R.P.C.; the conviction and sentence under Section 380 R.P.C. are maintained. The reference for confirmation of the death sentence is rejected.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The appellant's conviction under Section 302 R.P.C. (murder) was set aside and he was acquitted of that offence.
- The appellant's conviction under Section 380 R.P.C. (theft/possession of stolen property) was upheld and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years imposed by the Sessions Judge was maintained.
- The death sentence imposed for the charge under Section 302 was not confirmed; the reference for confirmation was rejected.
- The Court did not purport to lay down any new legal precedent; it applied existing principles and cases (as set out in the Table of Precedents) to the facts of this matter to resolve credibility, admissibility and sufficiency issues in circumstantial evidence.
Order: Appeal accepted to the extent stated and reference rejected. (Main Jalaluddin, J. agreed.)
Mufti Baha-Ud-Din, J.:— The appellant, Hari Ram has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge. Udhamnur under Sections 302 and 380 R.P.C and sentenced to death for the first offence and to rigorous imprisonment for two years for the second offence. By this appeal the appellant challenges his conviction as also the sentence imposed on him. Alongside the learned Sessions Judge has made a reference for confirmation of the death sentence. This Judgement will govern the disposal of both the appeal and the reference.
2. Briefly stated, the prosecution story is that Mst. Jamna was the legally wedded wife of one. Jagat Ram whom she deserted in the year 1947 and ever since lived ass a concubine with one. Lal Singh, Lambardar who had no wife of his own nor any issue. So living Mst. Jamna also contacted illicit connections with the appellant and in concert with him murdered Lal Singh on the night intervening 28/29 October, 1969, by inflicting fatal injuries on him with a khokhari while he was sleeping on a cot in his house. The murder of Lal Singh having been accomplished. Mst. Jamna collected all the valuables including ornaments and cash lying in the house in a bid to elope with the appellant. Suspecting her fidelity the appellant, as the story goes, turned round and inflicted injuries on her with a khokhari and an axe which put an end to her and thereafter dumped the dead bodies under a heap of grass and left the house with the valuables, as aforesaid. The dead bodies were discovered on the next day in the evening by Kaka Ram, Sita Ram, Shanker Dass and Vijay Singh who raised an alarm which attracted the people of the village to the spot and thereafter a report EXP. A of the occurrence was made by Kaka Ram with the police concerned. Upon the investigation and committal proceedings which followed the appellant was sent up for trial under Sections 302/380 R.P.C which resulted in his conviction and sentence, as aforesaid. There is no eve witness of the occurrence. The case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are these:
i) That the accused was seen last residing with the deceased;
ii) That on the morning following the night of occurrence the accused seen en-route at Sarpo and Tarpat on his was back to his home:
iii) That a confession was made by the accused under Section 164 Cr. P.C which he retracted at the trial.
iv) Admissions made by him before the committing Magistrate regarding his involvement in the murders as also with regard to the confession made by him under Section 164 Cr. P.C
v) Recovery of a khokhari Exp. 1 and blood stained shirt belonging to the accused from the house of the accused pursuant to the disclosure statement made by him as also that of a blood-stained axe from the scene of occurrence.
vi) Recovery of the articles belonging to the deceased from the house of the accused pursuant to the disclosure statement made by him: and:
vii) Medical evidence.
3. (a) Taking the first circumstance we propose to examine the evidence of Mithu Ram. P.W 2. Tara Chand. P.W 3 Mst. Vidhya P.W 4, Sita Ram P.W 5 and Krishan lal. P.W 6. The evidence of Mithu Ram, Tara Chand, Mst. Vidhva and Sita Ram is to the effect that they saw the accused collecting paddy in the field belonging to the deceased Lal Singh about 4/5 days before the occurrence and then again on the day preceding the night of occurrence. None of them admittedly knew the accused before. Their identification of the accused is based on a test identification parade which was conducted by K.B Pallai. S.D.M Reasi. P.W 21, in the course of investigation of the case by the police. The trustworthiness or otherwise of their evidence, therefore, depends mainly on whether the test identification parade is reliable or not. Before dealing with this question it would be useful to refer to the observation made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Budhsen v. State of U.P ((1970) 2 SCC 128 : AIR 1970 SC 1321):
4. Now facts which establish the identity of an accused person are relevant under Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act. As a general rule the substantive evidence of a witness is a statement made in Court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The evidence in order to carry conviction should ordinarily clarify as to how and under which circumstances he came to pickout the particular accused person and the details of the part which the accused played in the crime in question with reasonable particularity. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, seems to be to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceeding. There may however, be exceptions to this general rule, when for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness, on whose testimony it can safely rely without such or other corroboration. The identification parades belong to the investigation stage. They are generally held during the course of investigation with the primary object of enabling the witnesses to identify persons concerned in the offence, who were not previously known to them. This serves to satisfy the investigating officers of the bona fides of the prosecution witnesses and also to furnish evidence to corroborate their testimony in Court. Identification proceedings in their legal effect amount simply to this, that certain persons are brought to jail or some other place and make statements either express or implied that certain individuals whom they point out are persons whom they recognise as having been concerned in the crime. They do not constitute substantive evidence. These parades are essentially governed by Section 162. Criminal Procedure Code. It is for this reason that the identification parades in this case seem to have been held under the supervision of Magistrate. Keeping in view the purpose of identification parades the Magistrates holding them are expected to take all possible precautions to eliminate any suspicion of unfairness and to reduce the chance of testimonial error. They must, therefore, take intelligent interest in the proceedings, bearing in mind two considerations (i) that the life and liberty of an accused may depend on their vigilance and caution and (ii) that justice should be done in the identification. Those proceedings should not make it impossible for the identifiers who after all have, as a rule, only fleeting glimpses of the person they are supposed to identify. Generally speaking, the Magistrate must make a note of every objection raised by an accused at the time of identification and the steps taken by them to ensure fairness to the accused so that the Court which is to judge the value of the identification evidence may take them into consideration in the appreciation of that evidence. The power to identify, it may be kept in view, varies according to the power of observation and memory of the person identifying and each case depends on its own facts but there are two factors which seem to be of basic importance in the evaluation of identification. The persons required to identify an accused should have had no opportunity of seeing him after the commission of the crime and before identification and secondly that no mistakes are made by them or the mistakes made are negligible. The identification to be of value should also be held without much delay. The number of persons mixed up with the accused should be reasonably large and their bearing and general appearance not glaringly dissimilar. The evidence as to identification deserves, therefore, to be subjected to a close and careful scrutiny by the Court.”
5. (b) The identification memos prepared by K.B Pallai. S.D.M Reasi are EXP. 01. EXP. P. EXP Q. 1 and EXP R1 There is nothing in these memos to indicate that any effort was made to make the bearing and general appearance of the accused resemble with those mixed with him at the identification parade. On the other hand there is a frank statement of K.B Pillai on record at the trial that the accused was wearing a white turban, a shirt resembling that worn by the military personnel and a white dhoti while those mixed with him were different garments. According to him however, those others also were turbans. Mithu Ram P.W 2, likewise says that all those mixed with the accused were having different garments and that the accused was wearing a shirt like that worn by the military personnel. Tara Chand. P.W 3, says that the accused was wearing a shirt of Badami colour, Mst. Vidhya does not remember what garments were worn by the accused or those others mixed with him. Sita Ram states that the accused had not on a khaki shirt. With the insignia of a khaki shirt on the person of the accused it could not be impossible for the witnesses to nick him out. In this state of evidence we cannot help observing that the test identification parade was not held with the amount of care and caution that its importance demanded. The casual manner in which it was held strips it of all reliability should be attached to it. It does not clearly provide any safe and trustworthy evidence on which identification of the accused by the witnesses, as aforesaid, as one who resided last with the deceased may be based. Along side it is noteworthy that Kaka Ram. P.W 1, does not mention having noticed the accused on the evening preceding the night of occurrence when, according to him, he found Laj Singh going to his house who upon enquiry, told the witness that he was collecting paddy crop. Equally note-worthy is the fact that no suspicions were raised about anybody much less the accused in the first information report. EXP. A. although it was made by Kaka Ram after the neighbours numbering about 30 or 40 including Mithu Ram had assembled at the scene of the occurrence following the alarm raised by him. There is also nothing in the evidence to suggest that any such suspicion was raised even when the police came on snot and when also the people assembled there. In this context no reliance can also be placed on Krishan Lal. P.W 6 who says that the accused met at a place known as Narha Majran on 27-10-1969 at 5 ‘O’ Clock and told him on his enquiry that he belonged to Chamb Jeorian and was going to the house of Lal Singh. Lambardar particularly so when, according to the witness himself he did not know the accused before nor is he one who was invited to identify the accused at the test identification parade. The witness is a casual witness and it is really surprising as to how the police could get in touch with him. At the top of everything it is noteworthy that there is no evidence that the accused had any relation with any one of the deceased much less illicit liaison with Mst. Jamna or that he was a frequent visitor to their house. As such the question of his visiting their house on the day prior to the night of occurrence appears simply to be a figment of imagination of those concerned with the investigation. The learned Sessions Judge has omitted to notice all these circumstances and by a mechanical reading of the evidence come to the conclusion that the accused was seen last residing with the deceased a conclusion which cannot be obviously sustained in the circumstances stated above. That being so the first circumstance relied upon by the prosecution does not stand proved.
6. This brings us to the second circumstance. To prove it the prosecution has relied upon the evidence of Nek Ram P.W 1 and Gurbachan Singh P.W 15. Nek Ram says that on the morning of 29-10-1969 while he was sleeping inside his she at Sarpo the accused knocked at his shop and after he opened the shutter, the accused obtained from him a cigarette packet and then sat in the compound adjoining the shop carrving along a bundle and a bag and then boarded a bus going to Reasi at 8 or 8-30 A.M Gurbachan Singh. P.W 15, states that he is the conductor of bus No. 7370 JKA and that on 29th October, 1969, while the vehicle was plying from Tarpart towards Reasi the accused alongwith 5 others including Tehsildar Nawshera and his peon boarded the bus at a distance of 3 kilometers away from Tarpat. There is nothing in the statements of these two witnesses to indicate that they knew the accused before. In fact Gurbachan Singh has expressly admitted that he did not know the accused before. None of them was invited to identify the accused at the identification parade. Their identification of the accused is therefore simply based on his identification in the court at the trial. This is evidence of a weak character and made still weaker by the improbabilities and the divergence in the statements of the two witnesses. It is improbable that in the state of mind in which the accused might have been, if he had committed the murders, he should have dared knock at the shop of Nek Ram and asked for cigarettes. Then again while Nek Ram states that the accused carried alone a bundle and a bag. Gurbachn Singh significantly omits to make a reference thereto. The witnesses are merely casual witnesses whose evidence has been procured simply to prop up the case against the accused. On their evidence it is difficult for us to hold that the accused was actually seen by them on the morning following the night of occurrence. The second circumstance does not therefore, also, stand proved against the accused.
(a) Then comes the confession made by the accused under Section 164 Cr. P.C It is EXP. 5/2 on the file. The learned counsel for the appellant objected to its admissibility on the twin ground that it was not recorded by a competent magistrate and that it was involuntary resulting from prolonged torture to which the accused was subjected by the police. His first objection is based on the ground that it was recorded by an Executive Magistrate as distinguished from a Judicial Magistrate who alone could do it after the Separation of Judicial and Executive Functions Act, 1966, came into force. This objection is based on misreading of facts. The confession has been recorded by Tara Chand Khajuria. Chief Judicial Magistrate. Udhampur who has appeared as P.W 20 at the trial. The only objection that survives for consideration is whether the confession was voluntary or not.
(b) Section 24 of the Evidence Act is clear that a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in criminal proceeding if the making of the confession appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of temporal nature in reference to the proceeding against him. The words, ‘appears to the court’ in the section are significant and indicate a lesser degree of “Proof” than that contemplated by Section 3 of the Evidence Act. That does not certainly imply that mere allegation by an accused about inducement, threat or promise is sufficient to exclude the confession made by him but it does imply that a suspicion regarding such inducement, threat or promise reasonably founded on the facts and surrounding circumstances would justify the exclusion of such confession. This naturally brings us to the consideration of facts and circumstances attending the confessional statement EXP. 5/2 made by the accused. In this connection it is noteworthy that the accused was admittedly arrested on 21-12-1969. He remained in police custody upto 4th January, 1970 when an application EXP. N was made by the Circle Inspector Police. Reasi to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Udhampur saving that the accused wanted to disclose the truth and that he may record his statement. The Magistrate remanded the accused to Judicial lock up till the next day when he was again produced before him. On being questioned by the Magistrate the accused told him that though no police-man was present inside the room but they were there in a room below which he described as “Courty”. He further added that he had been subjected to torture by the police and was not possessed of sound mental condition to be able to give the statement. He sought an adjournment of 4 or 5 days before he was called upon to give the statement. This statement of the accused is as EXP. Q. The accused was again remanded to judicial lock up till 9-1-1970 when his confessional statement EXP. 5/2 was recorded. That makes it clear that the accused remained in the custody of the police for a long time before he was produced for getting his confessional statement recorded by the Magistrate. The delay caused in the production of the accused before the Magistrate has nowhere been explained by the prosecution. This circumstance is sufficient to stamp the confession as involuntary, regard being had to the view taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported as AIR 1956 SC 56, that prolonged police custody immediately preceding the making of the confession is sufficient, unless it is properly explained to stamp it as involuntary. It may be remembered that in that case, the accused had remained in police custody for 13 days before the confession was made by him. Here also the accused remained in police custody for 13 days before he was produced before C.J.M Udhampur for getting his statement recorded. This prolonged custody lends support to the statement made subsequently by the accused before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 5-1-1970 even after remanding for judicial custody for one night that he was subjected to illtreatment and torture by the police to the extent that he had lost his mental outfit in this context it is not inconceivable that he was labouring under the fear of torture even on 9th when the confessional statement EXP 5/2 was made by him. There is nothing in EXP. 5/2 or in the evidence given by the Chief Judicial Magistrate at the trial to indicate that the learned Magistrate tried to dispel this apprehension from the accused before recording his statement. The observation made by the trial Judge that the accused “was given an assurance of protection against any apprehended oppression if he did not make any confession” is clearly gratuitous and based upon a misreading of the evidence. Both the committing court and the trial court failed to take note of these facts and circumstances and landed themselves into error in holding that the confession was voluntary and admissible in evidence. In the view we have taken it was involuntary and inadmissible in evidence.
7. (a) With this we come to the admission made by the accused before the Committing Magistrate that he had murdered the deceased as also a like admission made by him that the statement made by him before the Chief Judicial Magistrate was voluntary and true. The questions and answers recorded in this behalf by the committing Magistrate are as follows:—
Q) Did you stay in the house of the deceased on the night intervening 28/29 October and killed both of them with a khokhari EXP. 1 present in the court?
A) Yes. This is true I killed Lal Singh with a khokhari and killed Jamna by inflicting injuries with a khokhari and axe.
Q) Have you made a confessional statement before the Chief Judicial Magistrate and whether it is true?
A) Yes. I have made it voluntarily and it is true.
8. These admissions were tendered in evidence by the prosecution at the trial under S. 287 Cr. P.C and have been relied upon by it as evidence in the case.
9. B) Section 287 Cr P.C reads:—
“The examination of the accused, if any, recorded by or before the committing magistrate shall be tendered by the prosecutor and read as evidence”.
10. The words, ‘if any’ in the Section have been substituted for the Word ‘duly’ by Act XLII of 1956. This substitution appears to be simply consequential to the provisions of Section 207(A) and 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which require a magistrate to examine the accused only “If necessary” and does not dispense with the due recording of an examination of the accused when such examination is conducted by the committing Magistrate. The condition, therefore for the aforesaid admission being read as evidence at the trial is that they should have been duly recorded. This naturally takes us to the consideration of the provisions of sections 209 and 342 Cr. P.C which are as under:—
“209. (1) When the evidence referred to in Section 208, sub-sections (1) and (3) has been taken and he has (if necessary) examined the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him such Magistrate, shall if he finds that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for trial, record his reasons and discharge him unless it appears to the Magistrate that such person should be tried before himself or some other Magistrate, in which case he shall proceed accordingly.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless.”
“342. (1) For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him the Court may at any stage of any inquiry or trial without previously warning the accused, not such questions to him as the Court considers necessary, and shall for the purpose aforesaid, question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence.
(2) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such auestions or by giving false answers to them: but the Court and the jury (if any) may draw such inference from such refusal or answers as it thinks just.
(3) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.”
11. Both these Sections are intended to give the accused an opportunity to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and not to explain inferences deducible from such circumstances or for the purpose of cross-examining the accused or for the purpose of filling gaps in the prosecution case. Where therefore a Magistrate asks the accused an improper question or any question not iustified on the evidence in the case the answer given by the accused cannot be taken into consideration against him being one not duly recorded. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Orissa High Court reported in Jairam v. State AIR 1968 Orissa, 97, in which it was held that if there are no circumstances appearing against the accused in evidence then the judge should not put to him any question under Section 342 Cr. P.C and that if any statement is made by an accused as a result of any question improperly not to him it cannot be taken into account against him.
12. (c) The question that therefore arises is whether the admissions relied upon in the instant case were duly recorded. We have already found that the confession under Section 164 Cr. P.C was involuntary and inadmissible in evidence. Its presence, therefore did not constitute a circumstance against the accused which he could be called upon to explain. Any question not to him in that behalf by the committing Magistrate was therefore, improper. On the principles set out above, the answers given by the accused in relation thereto could not therefore, be taken into account against him. This is equally true about the other admission made by him the reason being that in the committing court no evidence was tendered in terms to say that the accused had murdered the deceased on the night intervening 28/29 October, 1969. As such there could be no justification for any question being not to him if he had killed the deceased on that night. The admissions are obviously not those duly recorded and could not therefore, be read as evidence at the trial under Section 287 Cr. P.C This is what the learned Sessions Judge has omitted to consider when he referred to this Dart of the case against the accused. The circumstance based on these admissions cannot, therefore, be held to be proved against the accused.
13. (a) Next we come to the recovery of khokhari Ex. P. 1 and a blood stained shirt belonging to the accused from his house as also that of a blood-stained axe from the scene of occurrence. Ex. P.H is the seizure memo of one khokhari one kachha and one blood stained shirt belonging to the accused. The recovery has been evidenced by Ram Dhan P.W 11. Lachhman Dass P.W 12 Sansaro P.W 13 and Mst. Sita P.W 22. The accused too has not denied this recovery. He has owned these articles and as regards blood stains on the shirt he has said that he was once bitten by a wild animal as a result of which the shirt got stained with blood. According to Kesar Mal. P.W 14. Khokhari is a common place article. Admittedly it had no blood stain on it. Its recovery cannot therefore constitute a circumstance adverse to the accused.
14. (b) Then comes the blood stained shirt. The Assistant Seriologist and Chemical Examiner to the Government of India to whom this shirt was referred for examination has been unable to confirm the prsence of blood on the shirt on the ground that it had got disintegrated. His report is EXP. X/7 on the file. Contemporaneously various other articles recovered from the spot were referred to him for examination and he has said that except for the scrappings from the axe the articles were stained with human blood. If the blood stains on the shirt of the accused were contemporaneous to those on these articles he could have very well detected it on the shirt as well. His finding to the contrary is a circumstance confirming the plea made by the accused that it related to an earlier period and was the result of the attack made on him by a wild animal. The learned Sessions Judge has omitted to notice this circumstance and led himself into error in holding that the recovery of this shirt was a circumstance against the accused. He has also misread the evidence and held that the kachha recovered from the house of the accused was blood stained. The seizure memo does not speak of the kachha having been blood-stained nor also the evidence produced in support thereof. The kachha on which blood has been detected by the Assistant Seriologist is actually the one recovered from the person of Lal Singh and entered in the seizure memo Ex. P.B The disclosure statement Ex. P.K leading ud to the recovery of these articles cannot, in these circumstances be construed as statement leading to the discovery of a fact and is therefore, inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
15. (c) Ex. P.C includes a blood stained axe as one of the articles recovered from the scene of occurrence. The presence of blood on the axe has not been confirmed by the Assistant Seriologist in his report referred to above. As such its recovery cannot be treated as the recovery of any relevant fact or as a circumstance supporting the prosecution case. The fifth circumstance cannot therefore, be held to be proved against the accused.
16. Then comes the recovery of cash, ornaments, clothes and other articles from the house of the accused. This recovery is covered by Ex. P.G and has been testified to by Ramdhan, Lachman Dass, Sansaroo and Mst. Sita. The accused too has not denied this recovery from his house. He has however added that these articles all belong to him. The only question therefore, to be determined is whether these articles belong to the deceased or are those owned by the accused. Bodh Raj P.W 7, is a gold-smith. He says that the ornaments seized in the case belonged to Mst. Jamna deceased for whom these were made by him. Sandur Singh P.W 16 states that he is a tailor who had made two of the suits seized in the case for Mst. Jamna. He also identifies the clothes and ornaments as those which he had seen being worn by Mst. Jamna, Mansa Ram, P.W 17 identifies the Hukka as one belonging to Lal Singh deceased. According to him it has the name of his father. Anantoo inscribed on it and was in fact sold by him to Lal Singh in exchange for a sum of Rs. 6/-. Mehant Ram P.W 18 identifies two sickles as those belonging to the deceased Lal Singh Kakaram P.W 1 identifies all the articles as those belonging to the deceased and says that these include a Hukka on which was inscribed the name of Anantoo and two tumblers on which was inscribed the name of Lal Singh. Ex. P.G also describes amongst articles recovered from the house of the accused two tumblers bearing the name of Lal Singh and one Hukka bearing the name of Anantoo. The accused has produced no evidence to rebut this evidence nor also explained his acquisition of these articles. On the other hand his own wife Mst. Sita. P.W 22 disowns these articles as belonging to them. That being so we must hold that these articles belonged to the deceased. In that view the circumstance regarding the recovery of the articles belonging to the deceased covered by Ex. P.G stands proved against the accused. The disclosure statement Exp. J. leading unto this discovery can therefore, be treated as one leading to the recovery of relevant fact and therefore admissible in evidence. The circumstances about recovery of cash, ornaments etc. belonging to the deceased from the house of the accused pursuance to his disclosure statement does, therefore, stand proved.
17. Finally comes the medical evidence Ex. P.S is the postmortem report conducted on the person of Mst. Jamna and Ex. PT contains a similar report regarding Lal Singh. The post-mortem was conducted by Dr. Chaman Lal. Medical Officer, who has appeared as P.W 23 at the trial. He has noticed the following injuries on the person of Mst. Jamna:—
1. A long incised wound from lower lip just inside the right angle across the angle of mandible obliquely extending to the neck. Carotid vessels on the right side were involved in the wound and the mandible near its angle was cut through whole of its thickness.
2. An incised wound about 2½″ long in temporal region placed between outer angle of the right eve and ear.
3. Incised wound about 1½″ long ¼″ deep along the lateral portion of the right eve brow.
4. 2″ long and ½″ deep incision antera-posterior on vault of the head.
5. A lacerated wound V shaped, wings of the V about 1″ lone and separated by 2″ at the maximum at the vault of the head.
6. An incised wound 4″ long 2″ deep on the outer side of right arm in its mid third.
7. Incision along the length of little finger of the left hand.
8. Incision involving all the four fingers of the right hand across the proximal phalanges.
18. Likewise he has observed following injuries on the person of Laj Singh—
1/- Incised wound 3″ long on the forehead a little to right of the middle with underlying depressed fracture of the frontal bone. The wound was anterio-posterior.
2/- Horizontal incised wound in right temporal region 4″ long with scalp separated from cranium for about 3″.
3/- A 4″ incision ½″ deep on the vault of the head anterio-posterior about 2″ to the left of middle line.
4/- Incised wound ½″ long and ½″ deep in middle just above forehead.
5/- Incised wound about 6″ long on the right shoulder parallel to clavicle. The inner 3″ are about 1½″ deep and then the wound suddenly tapers to the superficial depth in its extension towards the arm.
6/- Incised wound 4½″ long ½″ deep across the back of the neck obliquely from left to right downwards.
7/- Superficial incision 4″ long on the back of thorax region parallel to spine.
8/- Two superficial incisions 4″ and 3″ respectively on the back lumbar region on the right side parallel to spine.
9/- ½″ deep incision across the palm of the right hand.
10/- ¼″ deep incision across the left palm from little finger to wrist.
19. According to him injury No. 1 was in each case fatal and could cause death in the ordinary course of nature. All the injuries except injury No. 1 in the case of Mst. Jamna he says could be caused by a sharnedged weapon and were of 48 hours duration at the time of the examination conducted by him on 30-10-1969. His evidence therefore goes to show that the death of the deceased was homicidal and was caused on or about the night intervening 28/29 October, 1969. This takes us to the examination of the motive for murder. The prosecution case is that Mst. Jamna was a concubine and not legally wedded wife of Laj Singh. Accordingly there was nothing in law to prevent Mst. Jamna from carting company with Lal Singh and becoming attached to the accused, if she so chose. It is therefore, inconceivable that she should have found it necessary to suggest it to the accused to kill Lal Singh, leave alone the fact that there is no evidence to suggest that she had any illicit connections with the accused. Then again it is inconceivable that the accused, acting on the advice of Mst. Jamna in killing Lal Singh, should have immediately suspected her fidelity and turned round to kill her instantaneously. The story put up by the prosecution is if we may say so purely fantastic and establishes no motive for murder by the accused. Here one cannot help noticing that the injuries on the Derson of Mst. Jamna and Lal Singh are so widespread and multiple that death could not have taken place in the circumstances suggested by the prosecution when according to them. Lal Singh as lying asleep on a cot and Mst. Jamna did not apparently put up any resistence for otherwise her screams should have invited people around to the spot while there is none. From the proved circumstances, therefore, it is no doubt true that Mst. Jamna and Lal Singh have met an unnatural death by murder but it is difficult the accused with the same. The recovery of the articles belonging to the deceased from the house of the accused, which is the only circumstance established against him would only suggest that he is a thief or a receiver of stolen property particularly so because the recovery has been made about two months after the occurrence. The only offence therefore, that can be held to have been proved against the accused is that under Section 380 R.P.C and not that under S. 302 R.P.C In this., we are fortified by a decision of the Supreme Court reported as AIR 1956 SC 54 in which it was observed as under:—
“In this judgment no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from a certain circumstance. Where, however, the only evidence against the accused person is the recovery of stolen property and although the circumstances may indicate that the theft and murder have been committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw the inference that the person in possession of the stolen property was the murderer. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof.”
20. For the reasons given above, we cannot maintain the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 RPC and we therefore, acquit him of that offence. We however, maintain his conviction and sentence imposed on him under Sec. 380 R.P.C To the extent as aforesaid, the appeal is accepted while the reference is rejected.
Main Jalaluddin, J.:— I agree.
21. Order accordingly.
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