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Ram Lal v. State Of H.P

Himachal Pradesh High Court
May 12, 2005
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Factual and Procedural Background

On 20-2-1999 a telephonic report was made to Police Station Rampur Bushahr that the wife of the chowkidar (named Ram Lal, the appellant) had caught fire in her quarter. Police recorded the statement of the injured woman under Section 154 CrPC; she said she had married the appellant about two years earlier, had quarrels with him, and on the day in question she sprinkled kerosene on herself; she stated that the husband then got angry and set her ablaze with intent to kill. The injured woman was examined medically (the doctor recorded severe burns) and later referred to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla, where she died on 1-3-1999.

Investigation included forensic examination of the victim's clothes (traces of kerosene found) and seizure of a can containing a blue liquid from the accused's quarter, which the State Forensic Laboratory opined was kerosene. FIR No. 29 of 1999 was registered on the basis of the statements. After investigation a challan was filed and, following committal under Section 207 CrPC, the appellant was tried for the offence under Section 302 IPC. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, with two years' simple imprisonment in default. The appellant appealed against the conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant's act of lighting the deceased after she had poured kerosene on herself amounted to murder within the meaning of Section 300 IPC (particularly clause 4thly), thereby attracting conviction under Section 302 IPC.
  2. Whether, on the facts, the offence is instead culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 IPC (i.e., whether the case falls within any exception to Section 300 IPC or otherwise lacks the requisite mens rea for murder).
  3. Whether Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC (grave and sudden provocation) or the doctrine of heat of passion/sudden quarrel applies so as to reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defence) Arguments

  • The defence initially pleaded fabrication and contradictions in the prosecution case, alleging that the evidence was self-contradictory and self-destructive so no case was made out against the appellant.
  • In argument, defence counsel conceded that the statements made by the deceased (Ex. P.W.7.B and Ex. P.W.7.C) qualified as dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and that the evidence established that the incident had taken place as described in those statements.
  • Despite that concession, the defence argued that the offence was not murder under Section 302 IPC but culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC — relying on the four clauses of Section 300 IPC and authorities that, in similar circumstances, reduced convictions to Section 304.
  • The defence relied specifically on several precedents (listed below) to contend that this was not a case falling under any of the four clauses of Section 300 IPC amounting to murder, and that the facts preferred conviction under Section 304 IPC.
  • The defence also argued that Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC (grave and sudden provocation) or the doctrine of heat of passion/sudden quarrel applied to attract culpable homicide and not murder.

Prosecution / State (as reflected in the opinion)

The opinion does not set out formal, detailed argumentation by the prosecution counsel in adversarial terms. However, the record as described by the Court shows that the prosecution relied upon the injured/deceased's statements (recorded under Section 154 CrPC and by the Sub Divisional Magistrate), medical evidence, forensic findings (kerosene on clothes and kerosene in a can seized from the accused's quarter) and post-mortem findings to establish that the appellant had set the deceased on fire with knowledge that it was imminently dangerous and likely to cause death.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kishore Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 4 SCC 524 : AIR 1977 SC 2267 Held that culpable homicide is not murder when the case falls within any of the exceptions to Section 300 IPC; prosecution is required to bring the case under one of the four clauses of Section 300 IPC to sustain a charge of murder. The Court cited this authority to stress the necessity of bringing a case under one of the clauses of Section 300 to sustain murder; used as background on the legal test when distinguishing murder from culpable homicide.
Hari Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, (1998) 8 SCC 355 : AIR 1999 SC 2629 Where accused knowingly performed an act (threw a burning kerosene-wick stove) that was likely to cause burns resulting in death, conviction was changed from Section 302 to Section 304 IPC as the accused "knew" the act was likely to cause death. Defence relied on this case to argue for conviction under Section 304 IPC. The Court discussed the facts of Hari Shankar as analogous in some respects but ultimately distinguished the present case on the ground that the present facts fit clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC (imminently dangerous act committed with knowledge of its probable fatality).
Mavila Thamban Nambiar v. State of Kerala, 1997 Cri LJ 831 (SC) Even if the accused had knowledge that an injury to a vital part might cause death, the appellant might not have intended to commit murder; conviction was altered from Section 302 to Section 304 IPC where intention to kill was not established. The defence relied on this authority to urge reduction to Section 304 IPC. The Court noted the precedent but found the facts of the present case different and therefore did not accept the submission to reduce the charge.
Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 SCC (Cri) 459 : 1983 Cri LJ 852 Single blow by accused to chest injuring the heart in a sudden quarrel held to be culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 IPC), not Section 302 IPC. Defence relied on this decision to contend for Section 304. The Court observed the precedent but found the instant facts distinguishable and maintained that clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC applied in the present case.
Hari Ram v. State of Haryana, 1983 SCC (Cri) 159 : 1983 Cri LJ 346 Where a single blow preceded by a remark (and no sustained fight) caused death, the Supreme Court held the offence to be culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 IPC). The defence cited it to support a reduction to Section 304. The Court treated the authority as one of the two-Judge bench precedents but found the present case's facts different and therefore not applicable to reduce the conviction.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad, AIR 1968 SC 881 : 1968 Cri LJ 1025 (Three-Judge Bench) Three-Judge Bench decision where a man, after quarrel with his wife, sprinkled kerosene on her and set her on fire; used as authority on acts of setting a person on fire and applicability of clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC. The Court found direct support from this three-Judge Bench authority and relied upon it as analogous despite a factual difference (in Ram Prasad the husband sprinkled kerosene; in the present case the deceased did so herself). The Court held that this difference did not remove the case from clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first summarising the material evidence: the injured woman's recorded statements (Ex. P.W.7.B and Ex. P.W.7.C), medical examination showing severe burns (90% of body), the post-mortem confirming ante-mortem burns, forensic report detecting kerosene on the clothes, and the seizure of a can from the accused's quarter whose contents were found to be kerosene.

The defence conceded that the dying declarations were relevant and, together with other evidence, proved that the incident occurred as narrated. The central legal controversy was whether the appellant's conduct constituted murder under Section 302 IPC (i.e., culpable homicide falling under one of the four clauses of Section 300 IPC) or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC.

The Court analysed the four clauses of Section 300 IPC and focussed on clause fourthly, which applies when the actor "knows that [the act] is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death… and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk." The Court found these elements present on the admitted facts:

  • The deceased had poured kerosene on herself within the view of the appellant during a quarrel.
  • As husband and person responsible for her safety, the appellant had an obligation to take steps to prevent her self-immolation.
  • Instead, the appellant lit a match and set her on fire. The Court held that this act was "so imminently dangerous" that it was bound, in all probability, to cause death or such bodily injury likely to cause death.
  • The Court reasoned that the appellant must be presumed to have been aware of the high probability of fatality because he saw the deceased covered with kerosene; thus clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC was satisfied.

The Court considered and rejected the defence's reliance on various two-Judge bench precedents that resulted in convictions being altered to Section 304 IPC, finding the present facts materially different from those authorities.

The Court also examined the contention that Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC (grave and sudden provocation) or the doctrine of heat of passion would apply. It rejected this contention because quarrels between the parties were frequent and habitual, so the quarrel on the day in question was not a grave and sudden provocation depriving the accused of self-control. The Court further observed that to attract the "sudden fight" exception there must be an actual fight (use of criminal force by both sides), which was not the case here.

Finally, the Court expressly relied on (and found support in) the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad, where a husband who set his wife on fire after a quarrel was dealt with under clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC; the Court held that the factual difference (who poured the kerosene) did not mitigate the appellant's act or remove it from clause fourthly.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The Court held that the appellant's act falls under clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC and accordingly sustained the conviction under Section 302, Indian Penal Code.

Consequences and Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Court — rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, with two years' simple imprisonment in default — are upheld by this appellate court.
  • The Court expressly rejected reduction of the charge to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 IPC) and did not accept the applicability of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC or heat-of-passion mitigation on these facts.
  • The opinion relies on existing precedent (including a three-Judge Bench decision) to support its application of clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC; the judgment does not assert the creation of any new legal principle beyond the application of established authorities to the facts of the case.
Show all summary ...

Surjit Singh, J.:— Appellant Ram Lal has preferred this appeal against the judgment dated 20-4-2000 of learned Sessions Judge, Kinnaur Sessions Division at Rampur Bushahr in Sessions Trial No. 8 of 1999, whereby he has been convicted of the offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of which he has been ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for two years.

2. Facts relevant for the disposal of the appeal may be noticed. On 20-2-1999 a telephonic call was received at Police Station, Rampur Bushahr from Sh. G.S Guleria, Executive Engineer, I.P.H, Rampur. The caller informed that the wife of the Chowkidar, namely Ram Lal (appellant), employed in his office had caught fire in the quarter of the said chowkidar and they (the caller & some others) had extinguished the fire and sent the lady to the Referral Hospital, Rampur and that the matter may be enquired into. The report was entered in the Rojnamcha. Sh. Jeet Ram, Inspector/SHO, Police Station, Rampur Bushahr, accompanied by some police officials, went to Referral Hospital, Rampur. He made an application to the Medical Officer concerned, for conducting the medico legal examination of the lady and also for intimating whether the lady was fit to make statement. The Medical Officer gave in writing that the lady was fit to make statement. Thereafter the said Inspector, Sh. Jeet Ram, recorded the statement of the lady, under Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure. The lady stated that she had married the appellant about two years back and that at the time of her marriage with the appellant she had a son, which she conceived from one Guddu, who had kidnapped her about 7-8 years back. She further told the appellant was already married at the time of contracting marriage with her and this fact was not disclosed to her by him. It was further stated by her that because of this often they used to quarrel and that on the day of her making the statement, i.e 20-2-1999 also, they had a quarrel and that in a fit of rage she sprinkled kerosene on herself feeling that there was no sense in living such a miserable life and that her husband got angry and set her ablaze due to which she had been badly burnt. She also reported that she had been brought to the hospital by the people of her husband's department. Further she stated that she had been set on fire with the intention of being killed. On the basis of the aforesaid state ment case was formally registered against the appellant vide FIR No. 29 of 1999. The deceased was got medically examined on the same day. The doctor noticed that the lady had 90% second degree burns all over her body, except the back. She was referred to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla.

3. When the complainant was still in the hospital at Rampur, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur Bushahr, on being approached by the police recorded her state ment. In that statement she reiterated the same version as she gave to the Inspector/SHO of Police Station, Rampur Bushahr in the statement under Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure. On 1-3-1999 the lady died of burn injuries at Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla. Inquest was conducted. Thereafter on the request of the police, post mortem examination was conducted by the Professor and Head of the Department of Forensic Science, Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla. He found 90% first degree ante mortem burns on the dead body, the detail of which is as follow:—

1. Head or face — 5% (Note: Front of face involved, but scalp Portion spared). 2. Upper Extremities Rt. Upper-9% Lt. upper- 9% 3. Front of trunk—18% Diagrammetrically Represented on Page No. 4-A. 4. Back of trunk — 12% 5. Ext. genitalia — 1% 6. Rt. Lower Ext. — 18% 7. Lt.„„ — 18% 90%

4. The clothes which the lady was wearing at the time of incident were sent to the State Forensic Laboratory, Junga. The expert doctor found that the same were having traces of kerosene. The police inspected the quarter of the accused and found a can of ten litres capacity, in which there was about 3 litres blue colour liquid substance, which looked like kerosene. This can along with its contents was sealed and was also later on sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory to seek opinion about its contents. The incharge of the Laboratory reported that the contents of the can were of kerosene.

5. On the completion of investigation, challan was filed in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur Bushahr, who after complying with the requirement of Section 207, Code of Criminal Procedure committed the case to the learned Sessions Judge and the latter, after putting him on trial the offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code convicted and sentenced him, as aforesaid.

6. Though in the grounds of appeal it is alleged that the case is fabricated, concocted and the evidence led by the prosecution is self contradictory and self destructive and as such no case against the appellant is made out, the learned defence counsel (Sh. Anup Chitkara) when addressing the arguments conceded that the evidence on record viz the statement under Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure Ex. P.W 7.B made by the deceased to inspector/SHO, Sh. Jeet Ram P.W 11 and another statement Ex. PW/7.C made by the deceased to Sh. Rakesh Kanwar, Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rampur P.W 10, which are relevant as dying declaration, under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, read with other evidence on record prove that the incident, as alleged in the statements Ex. P.W 7.B and Ex. P.W 7.C, has taken place. He, however, urged that from the facts and the circumstances of the case, it is clear that this is not a case of murder, punishable under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, but a one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under Section 304, Indian Penal Code. He took us through all the four clauses of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, which specify the situations where a culpable homicide would amount to murder. The same are reproduced, for ready reference:—

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—

2ndly.— If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or

3rdly,— If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or

4thly.— If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

7. He argued that the case is not Covered by any of the four clauses and hence it has to be treated as one under Section 304, Indian Penal Code. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon the following precedents:—

1. Kishore Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 4 SCC 524 : AIR 1977 SC 2267 : (1977 Cri LJ 1937).

2. Hari Shankar v. State Of Rajasthan, (1998) 8 SCC 355 : AIR 1999 SC 2629 : (1999 Cri LJ 2902).

3. Mavila Thamban Nambiar v. State Of Kerala, 1997 Cri LJ 831 (SC).

4. Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983 SCC (Cri) 459 : (1983 Cri LJ 852).

5. Hari Ram v. State of Haryana (1983 SCC (Cri) 159 : (1983 Cri LJ 346).

8. In Kishore Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 4 SCC 524 : AIR 1977 SC 2267 : (1977 Cri LJ 1937), it has been held that culpable homicide is not murder when the case falls within any of the five exceptions to Section 300, Indian Penal Code. It has further been held that even though none of the said exceptions may be pleaded or prima facie established, the prosecution is still required to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, to sustain the charge of murder.

9. Further it has been held that while considering whether a case falls or does not fall under clause 3rdly, viz whether the bodily injury is sufficient to cause death, the Court's enquiry is not confined to the intention of the accused at that stage of judicial evaluation, once the intention of the accused to cause the injuries has already been established and that the Court will have to judge objectively from the nature of the injuries and other evidence, including medical opinion, as to whether the injuries intentionally inflicted by the appellants were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

10. In Hari Shankar v. State Of Rajasthan, (1998) 8 SCC 355 : AIR 1999 SC 2629 : (1999 Cri LJ 2902) (another precedent relied upon by the learned defence counsel) the accused had a sudden quarrel with the deceased on account of the accused making a demand for Rs. 50,000/- advanced by him to the deceased and the accused picked up a burning kerosene wick-stove which was lying nearby and threw it on the deceased. Kerosene spilled over the clothes of the deceased and with the burning wicks the clothes of the deceased caught fire due to which he sustained burn injuries and died. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the appellant-accused knew that his act was likely to cause burns resulting in death and changed the conviction of the accused from Section 302, Indian Penal Code to Section 304, Indian Penal Code.

11. In Mavila Thamban Nambiar v. State Of Kerala, 1997 Cri LJ 831 a quarrel took place between the accused and the deceased when the accused went to the deceased shop to borrow a lighted petromax. The accused picked up a pair of scissors lying on the table in front of him and stabbed the deceased on the right side of his chest. The injury resulted in death. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that though it could reasonably be inferred that the appellant had the knowledge that the injury with a pair of scissors on the vital part would cause death, he could not be said to have intended to commit the murder and accordingly the conviction was changed from Section 302, Indian Penal Code to one under Section 304, Indian Penal Code.

12. The facts of the case reported in Hari Ram v. State of Haryana, 1983 SCC (Cri) 159 : (1983 Cri LJ 346) were that a blow with a jelli was given by the accused to the deceased in the chest as a result of which the deceased died. Before hitting the deceased the appellant had remarked that the deceased be beaten to make him behave. In view of this remark which preceded the infliction of in jury and the fact that only one blow had been struck, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the accused could not be said to have in tended to kill the deceased and the conviction was, therefore, changed from Section 302, Indian Penal Code to Section 304, Indian Penal Code.

13. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 SCC (Cri) 459 : (1983 Cri LJ 852) ac cused gave a single blow of knife to the de ceased in the chest which injured the heart of the deceased. The incident took place on the spur of the moment and in a sudden and chance quarrel. It was under these cir cumstances that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that this was a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304, Indian Penal Code and not the one under Section 302, Indian Penal Code.

14. The facts and the circumstances of the case in hand are different from the facts and circumstances of the aforesaid cases relied upon by the learned defence counsel as precedents. In the cases relied upon by the learned defence counsel clauses firstly, 2ndly or 3rdly of Section 302, Indian Penal Code were the subject-matter of consideration. The case on hand, in our considered view, is covered by clause fourthly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code, which is reproduced at the cost of repetition, for ready reference:—

4thly.— If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

15. The admitted facts are that the appellant and the deceased were not having good relations and they often quarrelled with each other. On the fateful day also they had a quarrel. The deceased, fed up with the tense atmosphere at home, because of almost daily quarrel, got so upset that she sprinkled kerosene on her person with a view to putting an end to her life. This she did within the view of the appellant because she and the appellant were quarrelling at that time. Now when the deceased had sprinked kerosene on her person, the accused, being her husband and as such responsible for her safety, should have immediately taken some steps to ensure that she did not set herself on fire. Instead of taking any steps to prevent her from setting herself ablaze, he himself lighted a match stick and set her on fire. His act was so imminently dangerous that in all probability it was bound to cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death and he can legitimately be presumed to have been in the know of this fact because the deceased had poured kerosene on her person within his view. Thus we are of view that this is a case covered by clause fourthly, as reproduced herein-above.

16. For holding such a view we find support from a three Judges' Bench authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. All the precedents relied upon by the appellant's counsel are by two Judges' Benches. The citation is, AIR 1968 SC 881 : (1968 Cri LJ 1025) (State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad). The facts of the case were that a man after having quarrelled with his second wife sprinkled kerosene on her and set her on fire. The only difference in the facts of the aforesaid case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the facts of the case before us is that while in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court the kerosene was sprinkled upon the deceased by her husband before setting her ablaze, in the case in hand the deceased herself sprinkled the kerosene on her person. This difference should not be of any consequence, because the sprinkling of kerosene by the deceased herself does not in any way mitigate the act of the appellant, so as to take it out of the purview of clause fourthly of Section 300, Indian Penal Code.

17. The learned defence counsel then argued that the case is covered by Exception-1 to Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Exception-1 reads as follows:—

Exception 1.— When culpable homicide is not murder.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

18. The argument has been noticed only to be rejected. As already stated the quarrels between the appellant and the deceased was a regular feature and, therefore, the quarrel that had taken place on the fateful day cannot be said to an act of grave and sudden provocation on the part of the deceased, which deprived the accused of the power of self-control.

19. The learned defence counsel further argued that this was a case of the commission of the act in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. This argument can also not be accepted in view of the fact that this was also not a case of sudden quarrel. The appellant and the deceased had been having strained relations ever since the marriage took place, as is clear from the dying declaration of the deceased, which are Ex. P.W 7.B and Ex. P.W 7.C, Moreover for attraction of this exception, which is listed as exception fourthly in Section 302, Indian Penal Code, there has to be not only a sudden quarrel, but also a fight, which means use of criminal force by both the sides, i.e the accused and the deceased. In this case admittedly no fight had taken place.

20. No other point was urged. As a result of the above discussion, we find no merit in the submission of the learned defence counsel that this is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304, Indian Penal Code and not one of murder, punishable under Section 302, Indian Penal Code. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

21. Appeal dismissed.