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Sohan Singh And Anothef v. Gulzari .
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs purchased a parcel of land (1 kanal 4 marlas comprising Khasra Nos. 1099/842 and 1542/843, village Changar, Mauza Thahra, Tehsil Bangana, District Una) from the previous owner, Shri Charan Dass, by a registered sale deed dated 21-10-1982. After the purchase the plaintiffs came into possession as owners. The defendant, alleged to have no right, title or interest in the land in dispute, is said to have interfered with the plaintiffs' possession and threatened to raise construction thereon. The plaintiffs filed a suit for injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their possession and in the alternative sought possession by demolition of any superstructure.
The defendant contested the suit, stating that he was in possession of 13 marlas (khasra No. 1572/843) pursuant to an agreement to sell dated 23-12-1976 executed by Charan Dass for Rs. 500/-, and that he had raised constructions spending about Rs. 15,000/-. He denied the validity of the subsequent sale to the plaintiffs and alleged the sale in their favour was fraudulent or collusive.
The trial court (Senior Sub Judge) framed issues and found all issues against the defendant, decreeing the plaintiffs' suit on 17-8-1985 and granting permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. On appeal the District Judge reversed the trial court by judgment and decree dated 22-8-1988, allowing the defendant the protection of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The present regular second appeal was filed by the plaintiffs challenging that appellate decision. The highest court in this opinion ultimately allowed the appeal, set aside the lower appellate Court's judgment and decree, and passed a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiffs by demolition of any superstructure, leaving parties to bear their own costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendant is entitled to the protection of the doctrine of part-performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' (Appellants') Arguments
- The protection under Section 53A could not be given to the defendant because the defendant never pleaded entitlement to protection under Section 53A in his written statement; hence the lower appellate court was not justified in applying that provision.
- In support of the contention regarding the necessity of pleading, counsel for the plaintiffs relied on Sadhob Alia Jhitru Bhotra… v. Hori Bhotra… (AIR 1973 On 21).
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendant pleaded that Charan Dass had agreed to sell 13 marlas (khasra No. 1572/843) to him by agreement dated 23-12-1976, for Rs. 500/-, and that Charan Dass had delivered possession to him.
- The defendant asserted that he had raised a residential house and cattle-shed on the said land, having spent about Rs. 15,000/-, and that the sale deed by Charan Dass to the plaintiffs was fraudulent/collusive and not binding on the defendant's rights.
- The defendant contended that being shown and proved to be in possession he could resist an injunction; possession, he argued, made the injunction claim not maintainable (the Court addressed and rejected this argument based on the plaint's alternative prayer for possession).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sadhob Alia Jhitru Bhotra… v. Hori Bhotra…., AIR 1973 On 21 | Relied upon by plaintiffs' counsel to support the proposition that relief under Section 53A cannot be granted in the absence of appropriate pleadings. | The Court records that the plaintiffs' counsel relied on this case for the contention that Section 53A protection could not have been given to the defendant without pleadings; the citation was accepted as supporting that procedural point. |
| Sita Ram v. Smt. Kanta Devi, 1981 Sim LC 239 : (AIR 1981 NOC 113) | Holds that a person seeking protection under Section 53A must plead and prove inter alia possession/acts in furtherance and performance or willingness to perform his part of the contract; such pleas involve questions of fact and cannot be raised for the first time in a second appeal. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that where the defendant had not pleaded the necessary ingredients of Section 53A, it would be improper to allow the plea for the first time in this second appeal and that the plea therefore could not be allowed at this stage. |
| Hiralal Agarwala v. Bhagirathi Gore, AIR 1975 Cal 445 | States that the plea under Section 53A, being a mixed question of law and fact, cannot be raised for the first time in appeal if it was not raised earlier. | The Court cited this decision to reinforce the proposition that Section 53A cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal when it was not pled at trial. |
| Kuldip Singh Sawhney v. Mrs. Parkash Chand, AIR 1985 Punj & Har 222 | Affirms that one of the salient conditions for part-performance is that the transferee must be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. | The Court cited this case for the principle that readiness and willingness to perform is essential for invoking Section 53A and observed that the defendant had not pleaded or proved such readiness or willingness. |
| Sardar Govindrao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai, AIR 1982 SC 989 | Also supports the requirement that the claimant under Section 53A must be shown to be willing and able to perform his contractual obligations. | The Court relied on this authority together with others to emphasise that absence of proof of willingness to perform defeats a claim to part-performance protection. |
| Om Prakash v. Sharma Electric Company, (1985) 87 Punj LR 198 | States that unless the defendant pleads that he has performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract, the provisions of Section 53A would not be attracted. | The Court invoked this decision to support its conclusion that the defendant's failure to plead performance or willingness to perform meant Section 53A could not be applied in his favour. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court identified the sole question as whether the defendant was entitled to protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (the doctrine of part-performance). It set out the statutory ingredients required for Section 53A (as stated in the opinion):
- A written agreement of transfer signed by the transferor or on his behalf specifying terms necessary to constitute the transfer;
- That the transferee, in part-performance, has taken possession of the property (or being already in possession continues in possession in part performance and has done some act in furtherance of the contract); and
- That the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.
The Court proceeded in two main strands of analysis:
1. Pleading and Proof
The Court examined the defendant's written statement and concluded that the necessary ingredients of Section 53A were not pleaded. The opinion emphasized established authority (including Sita Ram and Hiralal Agarwala) that a plea under Section 53A involves mixed questions of fact and law and must be specifically pleaded at the trial stage; it cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in a higher forum such as a second appeal. The Court therefore held that the first appellate Court erred in allowing the benefit of Section 53A to the defendant in the absence of such pleadings.
2. Evaluation of Evidence on the Merits
Even assuming arguendo that the Section 53A plea could be raised, the Court analyzed the evidence and found it insufficient to support the defendant's claim:
- The agreement to sell Ex. DW-1.A (23-12-1976) between Charan Dass and the defendant related to 13 marlas (khasra No. 1572/843) for Rs. 500/-. There was no recital in the agreement that the defendant was placed into possession pursuant to it.
- Charan Dass (PW-4) admitted execution of the agreement but the marginal witness D.W. Jeet Ram did not state the defendant was placed into possession at the time of the agreement; he only stated that he had been seeing the defendant in possession since after the agreement.
- Ex. P-2 (jamabandi for 1979-80) records the 13 marlas (khasra No. 1572/843) to be in the self-possession of Charan Dass; the jamabandi carries a presumption of truth and thus contradicted the defendant's claim of delivery of possession at the time of the agreement.
- The first appellate Court had placed reliance on a khasra girdawari copy Ex. DX (kharif 1980 to kharif 1983) which contained a "pencil entry" showing the defendant in possession for kharif 1980. The Court found that:
- The pencil entry on Ex. DX was not verified or attested by any revenue officer (note on the document), undermining its evidentiary value.
- Another copy of khasra girdawari Ex. P-3 for kharif 1980 to ravi 1982 attested by the halka patwari on 23-10-1982 contained no such pencil entry in favour of the defendant, suggesting the possibility that the pencil entry in Ex. DX might have been made or incorporated later (Ex. DX itself was obtained by the defendant on 17-1-1984).
- The Court concluded that Ex. DX could not be relied upon to hold that the defendant had been delivered possession in pursuance of the agreement.
- Crucially, the defendant had neither pleaded nor proved that he had performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract — a mandatory condition under Section 53A — and the authorities (Kuldip Singh Sawhney, Sardar Govindrao Mahadik, Om Prakash) were cited to reinforce this requirement.
On the basis of the above, the Court concluded that (a) the plea under Section 53A was not properly pleaded at trial and could not be allowed at this stage; and (b) even on the facts as proved, the defendant was not entitled to protection under Section 53A because possession/delivery at the relevant time was not established and there was no proof of willingness to perform the contract.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The Court set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and passed a decree for possession of the land in dispute in favour of the plaintiffs by way of demolition of super-structure, if any. The parties were directed to bear their own costs. The Court recorded the result as:
APPEAL ALLOWED.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The plaintiffs obtain a decree for possession of the land in dispute (with demolition of any superstructure, if existing) and the lower appellate Court's order granting the defendant protection under Section 53A is set aside.
- Procedural/legal consequence emphasized by the Court: A claim to protection under Section 53A must be specifically pleaded and proved (including proof of possession in part performance and that the claimant is ready and willing to perform his part). A plea under Section 53A that was not raised at trial cannot properly be allowed for the first time in a second appeal.
- Broader precedent: The opinion applies and reiterates established principles from earlier decisions concerning the necessity of pleading and proving the statutory ingredients of Section 53A; the Court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying these authorities to the facts of the case.
Appeal allowed.
1. This regular second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 22-8-1988 of the District Judge, Una allowing the appeal of the defendant and reversing the judgment and decree dated 17-8-1985 of the Senior Sub Judge, Una thereby dismissing the suit of the plaintiff.
2. The subject matter of the dispute between the parties is the land measuring 1 kanal 4 marlas comprising of Khasra Number 1099/842 and 1542/843 of village Changar, Mauza Thahra, Tehsil Bangana, District Una specifically described in the plaint and the jamabandi for the year 1979-1980 and hereinafter to be referred as ‘the land in dispute’.
3. The plaintiffs purchased the land in dispute for the previous owner Shri Charan Dass vide registered sale deed dated 21-10-1982. Since after such purchase the plaintiffs are coming in possession thereof as owners. The defendant, who is a head strong person, without any right, title or interest in the land in dispute has started interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs with threats to raise construction therein forcibly. The plaintiffs accordingly filed a suit for injunction against the defendant for restraining him from interfering in any manner with the possession of the plaintiffs over the land in dispute as owners thereof. In the alternative, it was pleaded that in case the defendant is found to be in possession of the land in dispute or he succeeds in raising any consideration over the land in dispute, a decree for possession may be passed in favour of the plaintiffs by way of demolition of superstructure, if any.
4. The defendant resisted the suit. It was averred that the land measuring 13 marlas comprising of khasra number 1572/843 is in his possession whereon he has raised a residential house and cattle-shed. The case of the defendant is that Charan Dass, previous owner had agreed to sell the said 13 marlas of land for a consideration of Rs. 500/- on 23-12-1976. The said Charan Dass after having received the entire sale consideration of Rs. 500/- had delivered the possession of the land in dispute to the defendant. A residential house and a danga was raised by the defendant over the said land by spending about Rs. 15,000/- to the knowledge of the previous owner Charan Dass and the plaintiffs. The sale made by Charan Dass in favour of the plaintiffs was denied. It was averred that Charan Dass had no right to sell the land in dispute in favour of the plaintiffs. The alleged sale, if any, in favour of the plaintiffs is fraudulent, collusive and not binding on the rights of the defendant.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the trial court:—
1. Whether the defendant was put in possession of the suit land by the previsous owner as a consequence of an agreement to sell in his favour and he is in possession of the suit land in that capacity, if so to what effect? …..OPD
2. If issue No. 1 is proved, whether the defendant has raised construction over the suit land? OPD
3. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing this suit by their act and conduct? ….OPD
4. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? …..OPD
5. Relief.
6. The trial Court found all the issues against the defendant. It was held that the defendant was not put into possession of the land in dispute by the previous owner Charan Dass in pursuance of the agreement to sell. The defendant was held to be not in possession of the land in dispute. The suit of the plaintiffs was accordingly decreed by the trial Court on 17-8-1985 and a decree for permanent injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant thereby restraining the latter from interfering in any manner with the possession of the plaintiffs over the land in dispute.
7. On appeal, the learned District Judge vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 22-8-1988 reversed the findings of the trial Court. The appeal was, therefore, allowed and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the defendant was placed into possession of the land in dispute under the agreement to sell dated 23-12-1976 and that the possession of the defendant was liable to be protected under Section 53A, Transfer of Property Act.
8. The sole question for determination in the present case is whether the defendant is entitled to protection under Section 53A, Transfer of Property Act. Before a person can be held to be entitled to the protection of doctrine of part-performance in an action brought against him by the owner for possession of the land in question, the following conditions are necessary to be established:—
(i) that the transferor has agreed to transfer some immoveable property for consideration by means of a writing signed by him or on his behalf and such writing mentioned the terms necessary to constitute the transfer with reasonable clarity and certainty;
(ii) that the transferee has, in part performance of such contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or, that the transferee being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and
(iii) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.
9. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants at the very out set while challenging findings of the first appellate Court has contended that the protection under Section 53A, Transfer of Property Act could not have been given to the defendant in the absence of the pleadings. According to the learned counsel, the defendant never pleaded in his written statement that he was entitled to protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the lower appellate Court was not justified in applying the provisions of that section. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon Sadhob Alia Jhitru Bhotra… v. Hori Bhotra…., AIR 1973 On 21.
10. A bare perusal of the written statement of the defendant shows that all the necessary ingredients under Section 53A, Transfer of Property Act have not been pleaded. Apart from the absence of the pleadings, such necessary ingredients for the application of Section 53A, Transfer of Property Act have also not been proved.
11. This Court in Sita Ram v. Smt. Kanta Devi, 1981 Sim LC 239 : (AIR 1981 NOC 113) has held:—
“A person seeking protection of doctrine of part performance as enunciated in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act has thus to plead and prove inter alia that he has in part performance of the contract taken possession of the property or any part thereof and in case he was already in possession, he continues to be in such possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract. In addition he has also to allege and prove that he has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. Now these pleas do involve questions of fact and if they had been raised by the defendant before the trial Court, it was open to the plaintiff to counteract them by pleading and proving that the defendant had not taken possession of the property in part performance of the contract or if he was already in possession, he had done no act in furtherance of the contract and that the defendant had neither performed nor was willing to perform his part of the contract. In the absence of such pleas having been raised by the defendant, the plaintiff had been allowed no opportunity to counteract such pleas and under the circumstances if the defendant-appellant is now allowed for the first time in this second appeal to raise such pleas it would certainly amount to providing a handicap to the opposite party. The plea that the defendant is protected by the doctrine of part performance, therefore, cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage.”
12. In Hiralal Agarwala v. Bhagirathi Gore, AIR 1975 Cal 445, it has been held that the plea under Section 53A being a mixed question of law and fact cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal to support the plea under Section 53A, Transfer of Property Act which was never raised at the earlier stage.
13. One of the salient condition to be fulfilled by the transferee for invoking the principle of part perfomance is that he has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. Section 53A, Transfer of the Property Act requires that the person claiming the benefit of part performance must always be shown to be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and if it is shown that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract, he will not qualify for the principle of doctrine of part performance. (See Kuldip Singh Sawhney v. Mrs. Parkash Chand, AIR 1985 Punj & Har 222 and Sardar Govindrao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai, AIR 1982 SC 989).
14. In the present case, the defendant has nowhere pleaded that he had performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract. High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Om Prakash v. Sharma Electric Company, (1985) 87 Punj LR 198 has held that unless the defendant pleads that he has performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract, provisions of Section 53A, Transfer of Property Act would not be attracted. The defendant in the present case has nowhere pleaded and proved that he had performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract.
15. In the absence of specific pleadings, the first appellate Court has therefore, erred in allowing the benefit and protection of Section 53A in favour of the defendant.
16. Even if it be assumed for the sake of arguments that it is open to the defendant to raise the plea of doctrine of part-performance, the facts coming on the record as established from the evidence would not entitle him to such a protection. Admittedly, the agreement to sell Ex. DW-1.A was entered into between the previous owner Charan Dass and the defendant on 23-12-1976. The previous owner Charan Dass while appearing as PW. 4 has categorically admitted the execution of this agreement. By virtue of this agreement, land measuring 13 marlas comprising of khasra No. 1572/843 was agreed to be sold to the defendant for a consideration of Rs. 500/-. There is no recital in the said agreement showing that the defendant was placed into possesion of the land agreed to be sold in pursuance of the said agreement. It is not disputed that the defendant was not in possession of the land in question prior to the execution of the agreement Ex. DW-1.A. D.W Jeet Ram one of the marginal witnesses of agreement Ex. DW-1.A has not stated that the defendant was placed into possession of the land in dispute by the previous owner Charan Dass. He has merely stated that he has been seeing the possession of the defendant since after the agreement. Ex. P-2 is the copy of jamabandi for the year 1979-1980. A perusal of the same shows that the land measuring 13 marlas comprising of khasra number 1572/843 is recorded to be in self possession of the previous owner Charan Dass. This jamabandi, to which a presumption of truth is attached, belies the version of the defendant that he was placed into possession of the land agreed to be sold to him at the time of execution of the agreement to sell Ex. DW-1.A on 23-12-1976.
17. The learned District Judge while coming to the conclusion that the defendant was delivered the possession of the land in dispute in pursuance of the agreement to sell Ex. DW-1.A has placed great reliance on the copy of khasra girdawari Ex. DX for the period kharif 1980 to kharif 1983. A perusal of the same shows that in Kharif 1980 “pencil entry” has been shown to have been showing the defendant to be in possession of the land measuring 13 marlas comprising of khasra number 1572/843. There is a note appended on Ex. DX to the effect that the pencil entry has not been verified/attested by any revenue officer. In the absence of verification/attestation of such pencily entry in favour of the defendant, the learned first appellate Court committed a great error in placing reliance thereon while holding the defendant to be in possession of the said land under the agreement to sell Ex. DW-1.A.
18. There is yet another significant aspect of the case which belies the correctness of the said pencil entry made in favour of the defendant in kharif 1980. Ex. P3 is another copy of khasra girdawari pertaining to the period kharif 1980 to ravi 1982. This copy was attested by the halka patwari on 23-10-1982. There is no pencil entry in favour of the defendant in Ex. P-3. The copy of khasra girdawari Ex. DX was obtained by the defendant 17-1-1984 showing the existence of pencil entry. In view of the fact that there is no mention of pencil entry in the copy of the khasra girdawari Ex. P-3 issued in favour of the plaintiff on 23-10-1982, the possibility of the same having been got incorporated by the defendant subsequent thereto cannot be ruled out. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on Ex. DX for holding the defendant to be in possession of the land in question in pursuance of the agreement to sell.
19. The learned counsel for the defendant has contended that in view of the fact that the defendant has been shown and proved to be in possession of the land in dispute, the suit having been filed for injunction was not maintainable. This argument raised on behalf of the defendant has no force. A perusal of the prayer clause of the plaint shows that the plaintiffs in the alternative have claimed for a decree for possession of the land in dispute. Therefore, even if the plaintiffs may not be entitled to permanent injunction, they are entitled to a decree for possession on the basis of a valid title in their favour by virtue of the sale deed Ex. PY. It appears that after coming to know regarding the sale having been made in favour of the plaintiffs by the previous owner Charan Dass, the defendant took forcible possession of the land in dispute and tried to raise some construction thereon, which was resisted by the present plaintiffs leading to a registration of criminal case against the plaintiffs vide F.I.R Ex. DW-4.A. It is in the evidence of D.W 4 that a counter report was also made by the plaintiff Sohan Singh, though no case came to be registered on the basis of such report.
20. Considering the entire evidence coming on the record, I hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the land in dispute by way of demolition of super structure, if any, existing on the spot.
21. As a result, the present appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and a decree for possession of the land in dispute by way of demolition of super-structure, if any, existing on the spot is passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Appeal allowed.
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