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New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lachhmi Devi And Others

Himachal Pradesh High Court
Sep 8, 1995
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Factual and Procedural Background

The matters were consolidated to be decided by a common judgment because they raised the same question. On 2 March 1987 at about 3:15 p.m., truck HPM 698 (owned by Manjit Singh Rathore and driven by Bhikham Ram) met with an accident on Sarkaghat–Baroti Road, near village Ropari. Claimants alleged the accident resulted from rash and negligent driving by the driver; the truck had been carrying members of a marriage party who had boarded at village Chamoh. As a result of the truck falling about 100 feet below the road, some persons died and others were injured.

The owner, Manjit Singh Rathore, admitted ownership but stated the truck had been hired by the parents of the newly wedded couple to carry dowry articles, that he had directed the driver to carry only dowry articles, and that the driver had no authority to give lifts to passengers; thus, he contended the loss was due to the driver's unauthorised and negligent act. The insurance company contended that the deceased/injured were gratuitous passengers and therefore not covered by the policy (invoking sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act), and further alleged various statutory deficiencies (no valid driving licence, permits, fitness, registration).

The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal found the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving by the driver, held the truck insured with New India Assurance Co. Ltd., held it was being run validly, rejected the insurance company's gratuitous-passenger plea for lack of evidence, and awarded compensation to the claimants against the insurer. The appeals addressed those findings and legal questions about the insurer's and owner's liability.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deceased/injured were gratuitous passengers (and consequently whether the insurance company was liable under the policy).
  2. Whether the owner (Manjit Singh Rathore) was vicariously liable for the negligent act of his driver, including where the driver allegedly exceeded his authority or acted contrary to instructions or statutory rules.
  3. What is the effect of the insurance company's failure to lead evidence on its pleaded defence (burden of proof in respect of breach of insurance contract or exceptions such as gratuitous passengers).

Arguments of the Parties

Owner's (Manjit Singh Rathore) Arguments

  • Admitted ownership of the truck but stated it had been hired by the parents of the newly wedded couple for carriage of dowry articles against payment of hire charges.
  • Asserted he had directed the driver to carry only dowry articles and that the driver had no authority to give lifts to passengers; if passengers boarded, the driver exceeded his authority and was negligent, making the owner not responsible for the consequences to unauthorised passengers.

Insurance Company's Arguments

  • Asserted the deceased/injured were gratuitous passengers and hence excluded from insurance coverage under sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Alleged the driver lacked a valid driving licence and the vehicle lacked valid route permit, fitness certificate, and registration certificate—facts relied upon to challenge insurance liability.
  • Maintained that if negligence was attributable to the driver/owner, the insurer would nonetheless not be liable because the passengers were gratuitous and not covered by the policy.

Claimants' Contentions

  • Claimants alleged the accident resulted from rash and negligent driving by the driver and sought compensation for death and injuries.
  • Implicitly, the claimants asserted they were entitled to compensation from the insurer because the vehicle was being used in the context of the hired engagement for the marriage party.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shingara Ram v. Balak Ram Walia, 1988 ACJ 176 (HP) Burden is on the insurance company to prove breach of a term of the insurance contract; if insurer alleges gratuitous passengers, it must lead evidence. The court relied on this principle to hold that the insurance company had not led evidence to substantiate its plea that the persons were gratuitous passengers; the insurer's plea failed on that ground.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satyanath Hazarika, 1989 ACJ 685 (Gauhati) Five-Judge Bench: gratuitous passengers are entitled to get compensation from the insurance company in view of statutory instructions of the Tariff Advisory Committee (dated 25.3.1977). The court noted this decision and observed that it (and similar views) had been accepted by various High Courts and approved by the Apex Court; the court took the same view in principle.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhajnoo, 1996 ACJ 367 (HP) The court indicated it had taken the same view in this recent decision (i.e., consistent approach on passenger coverage). Mentioned to show consistent local authority supporting the position that such passengers could be covered; used as supporting authority.
Oriental Fire & General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Gurdev Kaur, 1967 ACJ 158 (P&H) The case was relied upon by the appellant (no specific rule or principle summarized in the opinion text). Cited by appellant; the court did not find it necessary to rely on it given the factual finding that appellant failed to lead evidence on gratuitous passengers.
Ambaben v. Usmanbhai Amirmiya Sheikh, 1979 ACJ 292 (Gujarat) Listed among cases relied upon by appellant; no specific principle summarized in the opinion text. Cited by appellant; the court did not consider it necessary to examine these judgments in detail for reasons stated in the judgment.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nathibai Chaturabhuj, 1982 ACJ 153 (Gujarat) Cited by parties; the opinion lists it among authorities relied upon (no specific rule restated in the excerpt). The case was listed among citations by both sides; the court did not treat it as determinative on the facts here and proceeded on other precedent and evidentiary grounds.
Pirthi Singh v. Binda Ram, 1987 ACJ 167 (P&H) Full Bench decision supporting the view that owner is vicariously liable for acts of driver carried out in course of employment, even when passengers are carried contrary to statutory rules. The court referred to paras 2 and 3 of this Full Bench decision and treated it as supporting the line taken—that owner is responsible for the act of the driver in the course of employment.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kanchan Bewa, 1994 ACJ 138 (Orissa) Listed among cases relied upon by appellant; specific rule not summarized in the opinion text. Cited by appellant; the court did not find it necessary to examine it specifically given findings on evidence and law applied regarding vicarious liability.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamalabai, 1994 ACJ 519 (Bombay) Listed among appellant's authorities; no particular principle summarized in the text excerpt. Mentioned by appellant; court proceeded on the basis of evidentiary findings and other binding precedents.
Madhya Pradesh State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Praveer Kumar Bhatnagar, 1994 ACJ 579 (MP) Listed among appellant's authorities; not summarized in the opinion excerpt. Cited by appellant; court did not treat it as requiring displacement of the Tribunal's factual finding on evidence.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Tarawati, 1994 ACJ 822 (P&H) Listed by appellant; no specific principle summarized in the excerpt. Cited by appellant; court found no cogent reason in the authorities cited to disturb the Tribunal's finding given lack of evidence from the appellant.
Ramadoss Motor Transport v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 1993 ACJ 1060 (Madras) Listed among appellant's authorities; the opinion excerpt does not state the principle. Cited by appellant; court did not rely on it for reversal of the Tribunal's factual findings.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Milkhi Ram, 1994 ACJ 380 (HP) Listed among appellant's authorities; no specific rule summarized in the text excerpt. Cited by appellant; court considered the broader body of authority but upheld the Tribunal's conclusion on evidence and vicarious liability.
New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani, 1958-65 ACJ 559 (SC) Listed among authorities relied upon by respondents; no detailed principle re-stated in the excerpt. Part of respondents' cited authorities; the court discussed other leading authorities more fully in its reasoning on vicarious liability.
Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co., 1977 ACJ 343 (SC) Principal Supreme Court authority discussed: manager/driver acting in course of employment can make employer vicariously liable; extension of scope of 'course of employment' (Lord Denning's reasoning was cited and approved in relevant aspects). The court relied substantially on the principles discussed in this Supreme Court decision to conclude that the owner is vicariously liable even where the servant/driver may have acted beyond actual authority or contrary to instructions.
Narcinva V. Kamat v. Alfredo Antonio Doe Martins, 1985 ACJ 397 (SC) Listed among respondents' authorities; the opinion text does not restate a specific principle for this case. Cited by respondents; the judgment's specific application was not elaborated in the opinion excerpt.
Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, 1987 ACJ 411 (SC) Listed among respondents' authorities; no specific rule summarized in the excerpt. Included in respondents' list; the court focused on central authorities concerning vicarious liability and evidentiary burden.
Bhagwandas v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 1990 ACJ 495 (MP) / Bhagwan Das v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 1991 ACJ 1137 (MP) Listed among authorities relied upon by respondents; the opinion excerpt does not set out their rules. Part of the respondents' citations; the court analysed the matter on broader precedent and facts rather than relying specifically on these entries in the excerpt.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Puni Devi, 1995 ACJ 486 (HP) Listed among respondents' authorities; no detailed principle set out in the excerpt. Referred to as part of the jurisprudential context; the court grounded its decision in the more fully-discussed authorities and the evidentiary record.
Young v. Edward Box & Co. Ltd., (1951) 1 TLR 789 (Eng) English authority (Lord Denning): even if passenger is a trespasser vis-à-vis employer, the driver acting in course of employment can make the employer liable. Quoted within discussion of Pushpabai; used to illustrate the approach that liability can attach where driver acts in course of employment even if passenger is not authorised by employer.
Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Service Ltd., (1953) 2 All ER 753 (Eng) English authority cited (via Sitaram Motilal Kalal) expanding liability when driver with owner's consent drives on owner's business. Noted in the survey of law; used as part of the chain of authorities supporting extension of employer liability where the servant was driving on the employer's business.
Staveley Iron & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Jones, (1956) AC 627 (HL) House of Lords authority referenced in relation to vicarious liability principles. Cited in support of the general legal framework on vicarious liability discussed in the judgment.
I.C.I. Ltd. v. Shatwell, (1965) AC 656 (HL) House of Lords authority referenced for the accepted tests of vicarious liability. Referred to as part of the authorities that underpin the law on when employers are liable for servants' acts.
Navarro v. Moregrand Ltd., (1951) 2 TLR 674 (Eng) English case extending scope of 'course of employment' to include illegal acts done in the course of conducting employer's business. Used in the exposition of the principle that acting illegally does not automatically remove an act from the course of employment in certain circumstances.
Barker v. Levinson, 66 TLR (Pt. 2) 717 (Eng) English authority discussed (Lord Goddard's broader view) but noted that Lord Denning did not fully accept that extension. The judgment discussed the differing approaches and observed that Lord Goddard's view went further than accepted by other authorities; the court expressed agreement with a more moderated approach.
Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt, 1966 ACJ 89 (SC) Supreme Court case accepting extension of employer liability where driver, with owner's consent, drives on the owner's business. Referenced to support the proposition that employers may be liable even when the driver acts with the owner's consent while driving on the owner's business.
State Bank of India v. Shyama Devi, 1979 ACJ 22 (SC) Supreme Court authority enlarging vicarious liability; a master is liable for servant's fraud if committed in course of the master's business. Cited as authority showing the extension of vicarious liability principles to wrongful acts including fraud, reinforcing that the nature (lawful or unlawful) does not preclude liability if done in course of employment.
United Africa Co. Ltd. v. Saka Owoade, (1955) AC 130 (PC) Privy Council decision approving liability of a master for conversion committed by servants in the course of employment. Referred to in support of the conclusion that liability for servants' wrongs depends on whether the act was committed in the course of employment.
Narayanlal v. Rukhmanibai, 1919 ACJ 261 (MP) Full Bench decision (Madhya Pradesh) aligning with Pushpabai on vicarious liability where driver gives lift contrary to statutory prohibition; overruled earlier contrary MP authority. Cited as following the Pushpabai approach and supporting the view that carrying persons in contravention of statutory rule does not necessarily take the act outside course of employment.
Bhaiyalal Godre v. Rajrani, 1958-65 ACJ 37 (MP) Earlier MP authority said to be inconsistent with later Full Bench; mentioned in discussion of MP jurisprudence on the point. The court noted the Full Bench view that Bhaiyalal Godre did not lay down the correct law and treated the later Full Bench authority as decisive.
Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal, 1980 ACJ 445 (P&H) Earlier P&H decision holding that contravention of statutory provision could not easily be treated as in the normal course of employment; the present judgment states this view cannot be sustained. The court stated that the view in Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal had to be overruled insofar as it held that acting in direct contravention of statutory provision cannot be conceived as in the course of employment.
Krishna Ramayya Gouda v. C.P.C Motor Co., 1983 ACJ 283 (Karnataka) Held owner not vicariously liable because deceased was carried in truck in direct contravention of rule 161; cited and discussed. The court considered Krishna Ramayya Gouda and expressed inability to accept its interpretation of Pushpabai; the present court declined to follow Krishna Ramayya Gouda's conclusion that the owner would not be liable in such circumstances.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Munaf Majur Hussain Momin, 1984 ACJ 653 (Bombay) Bombay High Court held on facts that driver had been expressly prohibited from taking passengers and thus owner absolved; cited in discussion. The present court respectfully disagreed with that proposition and held that express prohibition by the master does not absolve the owner if the act was committed in the course of employment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages, anchoring its analysis on both the factual record and established legal principles as discussed in precedents:

  1. Factual findings: The Tribunal had found, on evidence, that the accident resulted from rash and negligent driving by driver Bhikham Ram, that the truck was insured with New India Assurance Co. Ltd., and that it was being run validly. The Tribunal also rejected the insurance company's plea that the deceased were gratuitous passengers because the insurer did not lead evidence to prove that fact.
  2. Burden of proof on insurer: The court reiterated the principle (drawing on Shingara Ram) that if the insurer pleads a breach of contract (e.g., that passengers were gratuitous and therefore excluded), it is the insurer's burden to prove that breach. The Tribunal's rejection of the gratuitous-passenger plea was appropriate because the insurer produced no evidence.
  3. Nature of the hiring and passenger status: The court examined the owner's assertion that the truck was hired only for dowry articles and that passengers were unauthorised. The court found this assertion unsupported by corroborative evidence and noted that the truck had in fact been hired for the marriage and it was obvious members of the marriage party would use it for transport. Thus, on the evidence, the deceased could not be treated as gratuitous passengers.
  4. Vicarious liability of the owner: The court engaged in detailed legal exposition, surveying domestic and English authorities (including Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi, Sitaram Motilal Kalal and related decisions) that expand the scope of employer/owner liability. The court accepted the approach that an owner may be vicariously liable for wrongful acts of the driver committed in the course of employment, including acts done without actual authority or in contravention of instructions, provided they occur in the course of conducting the owner's business or with ostensible authority.
  5. Treatment of contrary authorities: The court considered judgments that would limit owner liability where statutory rules were contravened or where the driver was expressly prohibited from carrying passengers (e.g., Krishna Ramayya Gouda; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Munaf). The court explained that such decisions either misinterpreted Pushpabai or were distinguishable on facts; it rejected the submission that an express prohibition by the owner automatically absolves the owner of liability when the driver acts in the course of employment.
  6. Final synthesis: Given (a) the Tribunal's factual findings, (b) the insurer's failure to discharge its evidentiary burden to show the passengers were gratuitous, and (c) the legal position that owner liability can extend to acts of the driver done in the course of employment (even if unauthorised), the court concluded there was no substance in the appellant's plea seeking to escape liability. The court therefore affirmed the Tribunal's award in favour of the claimants.

Holding and Implications

Holding: All appeals are dismissed.

Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):

  • The Tribunal's findings that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving by the driver and that the claimants were entitled to compensation from New India Assurance Co. Ltd. are upheld.
  • The insurance company's plea that the deceased were gratuitous passengers failed because the insurer did not lead evidence to substantiate that plea; accordingly the insurer remains liable to satisfy the award.
  • The owner (Manjit Singh Rathore) is held vicariously responsible for the acts of his driver that were committed in the course of employment and/or with ostensible authority, including acts that involved carrying passengers in the context of the hiring for the marriage, even assuming for argument that the owner had instructed otherwise.
  • No novel precedent was established; the court applied and reaffirmed established lines of authority on burden of proof for insurers and on the scope of vicarious liability (including the extensions discussed in Pushpabai and related decisions). The decision upholds the direct effect on the parties (award in favour of claimants against the insurer and owner); the opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal rule beyond the authorities discussed.

Costs: The appeals were dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs (as stated in the opinion).

Show all summary ...

Bhawani Singh, J.:— All these cases are proposed to be decided by a common judgment since the question for determination in all of them is the same. Material facts are being mentioned for the purpose of dealing with the question.

2. On 2.3.1987 at about 3.15 p.m, truck HPM 698, owned by Manjit Singh Rathore, driven by driver Bhikham Ram and insured with the New India Assurance Co. Ltd., met with an accident. According to the claimants, the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving by the driver. The accident took place at village Ropari on Sarkaghat-Baroti Road. There was a marriage function at the house of some of the claimants' relation at village Chamoh, Tehsil Bhoranj, where the deceased had gone to attend the marriage ceremony on 1.3.1987 The marriage party boarded the truck from village Chamoh to village Ropari. Since the truck was being driven rashly and negligently, it fell about 100 feet below the road as a result of which some persons died while others sustained injuries. Manjit Singh Rathore has admitted the ownership of the truck but states that the truck was hired by the parents of the newly wedded couple for the carriage of dowry articles. He had directed driver Bhikham Ram to carry only the dowry articles. He had not been instructed or empowered to give lift to any passenger and in case he did so, he not only exceeded his authority but also acted negligently in allowing the passengers to board it. Therefore, loss of lives or injuries to the unauthorised claimants was due to the negligent act of the driver for which he was not responsible.

3. On behalf of the insurance company, it has been stated that the deceased/injured were gratuitous passengers, therefore, by virtue of sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurance company was not liable. Further, the driver did not possess a valid driving licence nor had a valid route permit, fitness certificate and registration certificate for driving the truck. In case it is found that the accident took place due to the negligence of the owner and driver, the insurance company was not liable to pay the compensation since they were gratuitous passengers and were not covered by the insurance policy. Driver Bhikham Ram has not filed any reply.

4. The issues framed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal are almost common. After hearing the parties, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal found that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving by driver Bhikham Ram. The truck was held insured with the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and was being run validly and the claimants were entitled to compensation from the New India Assurance Co. Ltd.

5. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dealt with the plea of the insurance company that the deceased were gratuitous passengers. It was rejected since the insurance company did not lead any evidence to establish it. On the other hand, Manjit Singh Rathore has stated that the truck was hired for carrying dowry articles against payment of hire charges. The fact remains that the truck was hired for the marriage and it was obvious that the members of the marriage party would use it for transport. This feature is quite well-known and it is difficult to accept the statement of Manjit Singh Rathore that it was to be used only for dowry articles and driver Bhikham Ram allowed the members of the marriage party to use it unauthorisedly. Driver Bhikham Ram has not filed any reply.

6. In Shingara Ram v. Balak Ram Walia, 1988 ACJ 176 (HP), the truck had been requisitioned and utilised for carrying persons to attend an election meeting. It was held that insurance company was liable to satisfy the award. It was observed that:

“The law is well settled that if a breach of a term of contract permits a party to the contract not to perform the contract, the burden is squarely on that party which complains of breach to prove that the breach has been committed by the other party to the contract. The test in such a situation would be who would fail if no evidence is led. The claimant or the insured is under no obligation to furnish evidence so as to enable the insurance company to wriggle out of its liability under the contract of insurance. It is the insurance company which must lead evidence to substantiate its allegation that there has been a breach of the terms of the contract of insurance. The only statutory defence purported to be pleaded herein was that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger. No evidence has, however, been led in support of the case.”

7. The Tribunal has very appropriately held that the insurance company has not led any evidence to prove that the persons were gratuitous passengers except raising a frail plea. Consequently, raising of this plea again at this level hardly tilts the scales in its favour. Apart from this conclusion, we find from evidence that the truck had been hired for the marriage against payment of charges. This way, the deceased could not be called gratuitous passengers. It has been held by five Judge Bench of the High Court of Gauhati that gratuitous passengers are entitled to get compensation from the insurance company in view of statutory instructions of the Tariff Advisory Committee, dated 25.3.1977, to cover such passengers. [See New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satyanath Hazarika, 1989 ACJ 685 (Gauhati)]. This view has been accepted by various High Courts and also approved by the Apex Court. We have taken the same view in the latest decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhajnoo, 1996 ACJ 367 (HP).

8. Now, we turn to the question whether the owner is liable for the act of the driver, if so, to what extent? The appellant has placed reliance on Oriental Fire & General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Gurdev Kaur, 1967 ACJ 158 (P&H); Ambaben v. Usmanbhai Amirmiya Sheikh, 1979 ACJ 292 (Gujarat); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nathibai Chaturabhuj, 1982 ACJ 153 (Gujarat); Pirthi Singh v. Binda Ram, 1987 ACJ 167 (P&H); New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kanchan Bewa, 1994 ACJ 138 (Orissa); New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamalabai, 1994 ACJ 519 (Bombay); Madhya Pradesh State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Praveer Kumar Bhatnagar, 1994 ACJ 579 (MP); New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Tarawati, 1994 ACJ 822 (P&H); Ramadoss Motor Transport v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 1993 ACJ 1060 (Madras); Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Milkhi Ram, 1994 ACJ 380 (HP).

9. The respondents drew assistance from New Asiatic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pessumal Dhanamal Aswani, 1958-65 ACJ 559 (SC); Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co., 1977 ACJ 343 (SC); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nathibai Chaturabhuj, 1982 ACJ 153 (Gujarat); Narcinva V. Kamat v. Alfredo Antonio Doe Martins, 1985 ACJ 397 (SC); Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, 1987 ACJ 411 (SC); Shingara Ram v. Balak Ram Walia, 1988 ACJ 176 (HP); Bhagwandas v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 1990 ACJ 495 (MP); Bhagwan Das v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 1991 ACJ 1137 (MP); and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Puni Devi, 1995 ACJ 486 (HP).

10. Except for the bare statement of Manjit Singh Rathore that the driver had no authority to allow the members of the marriage party to board the truck and the driver had been instructed not to allow anyone to board it, there is no other evidence. It can, therefore, be legitimately concluded that the truck had been hired for the marriage party and was to be used for transport of not only dowry articles but also the members of the marriage party. Had the driver been instructed as stated by Manjit Singh Rathore, the driver would not have carried members of the marriage party in the truck. It is not necessary to refer to the judgments relied upon by the appellant for two reasons, namely, (i) it did not lead any evidence to substantiate the plea that the persons were gratuitous passengers and the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has rejected the case of the appellant on this point; (ii) no cogent reason was brought to our notice for setting aside this finding and we are taking the line that the owner is responsible for the act of the driver who was not only acting in the course of his employment for owner's business but had also his ostensible authority to conduct the business and it included even the unauthorised act assuming that the owner had instructed him not to allow the passengers to board the truck. We may refer to some of the paras of Full Bench decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Pirthi Singh v. Binda Ram, 1987 ACJ 167 (P&H), since it supports the line we are taking in this case (paras 2 and 3):

“In Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi's case, 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), Purshottam Tulsidas met with his death in a motor car accident when he was travelling in the car which was driven by Madhavjibhai, manager of the opponent company, Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Private Limited, in a rash and negligent manner. The heirs of the deceased claimed compensation from the owner as well as the insurance company. One of the pleas raised in defence was that the deceased was travelling in the said vehicle on his own responsibility, for his own purpose and absolutely gratis and not on behalf of or at the instance of the owner or the driver of the vehicle and, therefore, the respondents could not be made vicariously liable for any negligence on the part of the driver. The High Court found that the car was going on the business of the company and so was Madhavjibhai but further held that there being no pleading or the material on the record to establish that Purshottam Tulsidas was travelling in the vehicle either for some business of the owner or under any ostensible authority from them, the accident could not be said to have taken place in the course of the employment of Madhavjibhai or under the authority of the company. Relying on the statement of law expressed by Lord Justice Denning in Young v. Edward Box & Co. Ltd., (1951) 1 TLR 789, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court observing thus:

‘Lord Justice Denning concluded by observing that the passenger was, therefore, a trespasser, so far as the employers were concerned; but nevertheless the driver was acting in the course of his employment, and that is sufficient to make the employers liable. It will thus be seen that while two of the learned Judges held that the right to give the plaintiff leave to ride on the lorry was within the ostensible authority of the foreman and the plaintiff was entitled to rely on that authority as a licensee, Lord Denning based it on the ground that even though the plaintiff was a trespasser so far as the defendants were concerned, as the driver was acting in the course of his employment in giving the plaintiff a lift it was sufficient to make the defendants liable. Applying the test laid down there can be no difficulty in concluding that the right to give leave to Purshottam to ride in the car was within the ostensible authority of the manager of the company who was driving the car and that the manager was acting in the course of his employment in giving leave to Purshottam. Under both the tests the respondents would be liable’.

After discussing the case-law, Kailasam, J. who spoke for the Bench in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi's case, 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), summed up the law concerning the vicarious liability of the master for the acts of the servant as under:

‘Before we conclude we would like to point out that the recent trend in law is to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall within the term ‘in the course of the employment’ as ordinarily understood. We have referred to Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt , 1966 ACJ 89 (SC), where this court accepted the law laid down by Lord Denning in Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Service Ltd., (1953) 2 All ER 753, that the owner is not only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment but also when the driver is, with the owner's consent, driving the car on the owner's business or for the owner's purposes. This extension has been accepted by this court. The law as laid down by Lord Denning in Young v. Edward Box & Co. Ltd., (1951) 1 TLR 789, already referred to, i.e, the first question is to see whether the servant is liable and if the answer is yes, the second question is to see whether the employer must shoulder the servant's liability, has been uniformly accepted as stated in Salmond: Law of Torts, 15th Edn., p. 606 in Crown Proceeding Act, 1947 and approved by the House of Lords in Staveley Iron & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Jones, (1956) AC 627 and I.C.I Ltd. v. Shatwell, (1965) AC 656. The scope of the course of employment has been extended in Navarro v. Moregrand Ltd., (1951) 2 TLR 674, where the plaintiff who wanted to acquire the tenancy of a certain flat, applied to the second defendant, a person with ostensible authority to conduct the business of letting the particular flat for the first defendant, the landlord. The second defendant demanded from the plaintiff a payment of £ 225 if he wanted the flat and the plaintiff paid the amount. The plaintiff sought to recover the sum from the landlord under the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949. The Court of Appeal held that the mere fact that the second defendant was making an illegal request did not constitute notice to the plaintiff that he was exceeding his authority and that, though the second defendant was not acting within his actual or ostensible authority in asking for the premium as the landlord had entrusted him with the letting of the flat and as it was in the very course of conducting that business that he committed the wrong complained of; he was acting in the course of his employment. Lord Denning took the view that though the second defendant was acting illegally in asking for and receiving a premium and held no actual or ostensible authority to do an illegal act, nevertheless he was plainly acting in the course of his employment, because his employers, the landlords, had entrusted him with the full business of letting the property, and it was in the very course of conducting that business that he did the wrong of which complaint is made. This decision has extended the scope of acting in the course of employment to include an illegal act of asking for and receiving a premium though receiving a premium was not authorised. We do not feel called upon to consider whether this extended meaning should be accepted by this court. It appears Lord Goddard, C.J, had gone further in Barker v. Levinson, 66 TLR (Pt. 2) 717 and stated that the master is responsible for a criminal act of the servant if the act is done within the general scope of the servant's employment. Lord Justice Denning would not go to this extent and felt relieved to find that in the authorised Law Reports (1951) 1 KB 342, the passage quoted above was struck out. We respectfully agree with the view of Lord Denning that the passage attributed to Lord Chief Justice Goddard went a bit too far’.

The ambit of the vicarious liability of the owner for the acts of the servant committed in the course of the employment was further enlarged by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Shyama Devi, 1979 ACJ 22 (SC) and the law laid down by the Privy Council in United Africa Co. Ltd. v. Saka Owoade, (1955) AC 130, that a master is liable for his servant's fraud perpetrated in the course of master's business, whether the fraud was for the master's benefit or not, if it was committed by the servant in the course of his employment, approved. There is no difference in the liability of a master for wrongs whether for fraud or any other committed by a servant in the course of his employment, and it is a question of fact in each case whether it was committed in the course of his employment. In the case before the Privy Council the appellant company had expressly committed to servants of the respondent, a transport contractor, at his request goods for carriage by road, and the servants stole the goods. From the evidence it was established that the conversion took place in the course of their employment. The respondent on these facts was held liable to the appellant for the value of the goods. From the principle enunciated in the above-noted two decisions of the Supreme Court on the question of vicarious liability of the master, it is evident that it does not depend on the lawful or unlawful nature of the acts of the servant and the master would be liable for the alleged act of the servant which had taken place in the course of his employment even though the servant may have acted in contravention of some of the provisions of the statute or the Rules made thereunder. Relying on Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi's case, 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Narayanlal v. Rukhmanibai, 1919 ACJ 261 (MP), took a similar view and overruled the previous Division Bench decision of that court holding thus:

‘Now, a statutory rule providing that no person should be carried in a goods vehicle other than a bona fide employee of the owner or hirer of the vehicle deals with the conduct of the driver within the sphere of employment. The sphere of employment of appellant No. 2 is to drive the vehicle in execution of the master's business from Udaigarh to Indore. That sphere is not in any manner limited by the prohibition contained in the statutory rule in question.

For all these reasons, it must be held that the proposition enunciated in Bhaiyalal Godre v. Rajrani, 1958-65 ACJ 37 (MP), does not lay down correct law and, in our opinion, the answer to the question referred to us is that the act of a servant employed to drive a vehicle, in giving lift to a person in disregard of a statutory rule or prohibition while driving the vehicle in execution of the owner's business is an act for which the owner is vicariously liable’.

The view expressed in Jiwan Dass Roshan Lal's case, 1980 ACJ 445 (P&H), that acting in direct contravention of a statutory provision which is made an offence by an employee cannot be easily conceived as in the normal course of employment because no employer can be deemed or assumed to authorise the contravention of law or the commission of an offence, therefore, cannot be sustained and has to be overruled. Moreover, though the contravention of the Rules framed under the Act is punishable with fine but such a contravention cannot be termed a criminal offence. Under a large number of statutes the contravention of the Rules of the provisions of the statute is punishable with fine but such a contravention has never strictly been taken to be a criminal act or offence. Again, suppose a driver of the vehicle disobeys the driving regulations contained in the Tenth Schedule and thereby causes an accident resulting in the death of some person lawfully travelling in the truck, can in such a case it be said that the owner of the vehicle would not be liable vicariously because the accident was caused by disobeying the traffic regulation which is punishable under section 112 of the Act? The answer obviously has to be in the negative.

(3) Now, we may notice the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents. In Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt , 1966 ACJ 89 (SC), the Supreme Court referred to the English case, Britt v. Galmore and Nevill, (1927-1928) 44 TLR 294, in para 27 and pointed out that the owner of the car will not be liable for the accident caused by his employee if it was caused outside the master's employment. What happened there was that the owner lent the van to his driver after day's work was over to take his friends to a theatre and the driver by his negligent driving injured the plaintiff. On these facts it was held that the journey was not on the master's business and, therefore, he was not liable for the servant's act. The rule laid down in this case, obviously, is of no help to the respondents. In Krishna Ramayya Gouda v. C.P.C Motor Co., 1983 ACJ 283 (Karnataka), the Bench relying on observations quoted above from the Supreme Court judgment in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co., 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), held that the owner was not vicariously liable because the deceased was carried in the truck in direct contravention of rule 161. The Supreme Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi's case (supra) only disapproved the observation of Lord Goddard, C.J, in Barker v. Levinson, 66 TLR (Pt. 2) 717, to the effect that the master is responsible for the criminal act of the servant if the act is done within the general scope of the servant's employment. The disapproval of the said observation cannot be interpreted to mean that the master would not be liable for the civil consequences of the act of his employee done in the course of his employment because in doing so, he has contravened some rule or the provision of the Act. Causing the death by rash and negligent driving by an employee of the master is also a criminal act punishable under the law of crimes. Even though the act of the employee amounts to a criminal act still the master is liable for the civil consequences of the act of his employee. With due respect to the learned Judges, we feel that the observations of the Supreme Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi's case (supra) were not correctly interpreted in Krishna Ramayya Gouda's case (supra) and are, therefore, unable to subscribe to the rule laid down therein. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Abdul Munaf Majur Hussain Momin, 1984 ACJ 653 (Bombay), the Bombay High Court on appreciation of the evidence took the view that the driver was expressly prohibited from taking the passengers in the vehicle and as such it was held that the conveyance of the passengers by the driver was not during the course of his employment. With due respect to the learned Judges we are unable to accept the proposition that if the driver had been expressly prohibited not to take passengers in the truck, the owner would be absolved of this liability. The express prohibition by the master cannot have better sanction than the provisions of the rule framed under the Act which prohibits the carrying of passengers in a truck. The determining fact as already stated above so far as the liability of the owner is concerned is whether the act was committed by the driver in the course of his employment or not. If the driver was acting in the course of his employment then the owner would be liable even though he acted against the express instructions of the owner or in violation of the Rules framed under the statute.”

11. No other point was urged by the learned counsel for the parties. Consequently, we do not find any substance in the plea of the appellant and proceed to reject it. All these appeals are dismissed, however, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

12. Appeals dismissed.