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Bali Ram v. Smt. Sunehru And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff-appellant, Beli Ram, filed a suit for possession in respect of 4 biswas of land shown as khasra number 898/1 (a portion carved out of khasra number 898 measuring 15 bighas 6 biswas) in Amerpur, Teoni, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had taken illegal possession of that portion in 1974 and constructed a house thereon during the plaintiff's absence. The plaintiff claimed sole ownership of khasra number 898 and sought demolition/possession.
The defendants contested the suit, asserting that the plaintiff and Smt. Ghogan (widow of Sukh Ram) were co-owners in equal shares of khasra number 898, that Smt. Ghogan had transferred 2 bighas to the defendants for a house, and that Smt. Ghogan remained in possession of the disputed land; they also pleaded that Smt. Ghogan was a necessary party. The plaintiff, in replication, denied that Smt. Ghogan had title, ownership or possession.
Five issues were framed by the trial court, including whether Smt. Ghogan is a necessary party (Issue No. 1) and whether the plaintiff is owner and in possession (Issue No. 2), among others. The Sub Judge, Ghumarwin, by judgment and decree dated 5 August 1976, held that Smt. Ghogan was not a necessary party, that the plaintiff was sole owner, and decreed the plaintiff's suit.
The defendants appealed. The District Judge, Simla Division (Camp at Bilaspur), by order dated 22 May 1979, set aside the Sub Judge's judgment and remanded the case to the Sub Judge with a direction to implead Smt. Ghogan as a party, holding that she was a necessary party and that no effective decree could be passed in her absence. The plaintiff has appealed from that remand order, challenging the District Judge's finding on Issue No. 1.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Smt. Ghogan is a necessary party to the suit (Issue No. 1).
- Whether the land in khasra No. 898 measuring 15 bighas 6 biswas is in the ownership and possession of the plaintiff, as alleged (Issue No. 2).
- Whether the defendants forcibly constructed a house in the portion shown as khasra number 898/1 belonging to the plaintiff, and, if so, to what effect (Issue No. 3).
- Whether the suit is properly valued for court fee (Issue No. 4).
- Reliefs claimed by the plaintiff (Issue No. 5).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The suit is a simple possessory suit against trespassers; the plaintiff has alleged sole ownership and it is for the defendants to prove any title adverse to the plaintiff.
- Smt. Ghogan is not a necessary party because the defendants were sued as trespassers and an effective decree can be passed without her impleading.
- The plaintiff cannot be compelled to join a party against his wish; reliance placed on Order 1, Rule 3 and Order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code and various authorities (listed in the record).
- Documentary entries (Exhibit PB and Exhibit PD) allegedly show that Smt. Ghogan had no title in khasra number 898.
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- The defendants contended that the plaintiff and Smt. Ghogan were co-owners in equal shares of khasra number 898 and that Smt. Ghogan had transferred only 2 bighas to the defendants; she therefore continued to have an interest in the remaining land.
- Because the disputed khasra 898/1 is part of khasra 898, every co-owner (including Smt. Ghogan) would be deemed to have title to the disputed portion; consequently, Smt. Ghogan has a direct interest and must be impleaded.
- The plaintiff had denied Smt. Ghogan's title and even her status as widow of Sukh Ram in replication; thus her title and status are directly in controversy and no effective decree can be passed without her.
- They placed reliance on documentary evidence (Exhibits DW1.A, DW2.A, DB, DC, DD, DE) which, according to them, supported Smt. Ghogan's co-ownership and widowhood status.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum (AIR 1958 SC 886) | Cited (by appellant) in connection with parties and joinder principles under Civil Procedure rules. | The opinion records it among authorities relied upon by the appellant; the court considered the aggregate authorities as confirming the general legal test for necessary parties. |
| Bindeshwari Chaudhary v. Dr. Sheo Nandan Upadhya (AIR 1973 Pat 347) | Cited (by appellant) concerning party joinder principles. | Included among appellant's authorities; the court reviewed all authorities bearing on when a person is a necessary party. |
| Benares Bank Ltd., Benares v. Bhagwan Das (AIR 1947 All 18) (FB) | Cited (by appellant) in support of joinder/necessary party arguments. | One of the authorities considered in assessing the contention whether an effective decree can be passed in absence of a person. |
| Hardeva v. Ismail (AIR 1970 Raj 167) (FB) | Cited (by appellant) on the joinder/necessary-party topic. | Counted among authorities on necessary parties that the court considered before reaching its conclusion. |
| Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand (AIR 1974 Punj & Har 7) | Cited (by appellant) on party joinder principles. | Reviewed with other authorities on the legal test for when absence of a person prevents an effective decree. |
| Banarasi Dass Durga Prashad v. Panna Lal Ram Richhpal Oswal (AIR 1969 Punj & Har 57) | Cited (by appellant) regarding joinder/necessary party principles. | Treated as part of the body of authority about necessary parties; used in the court's assessment of the competing contentions. |
| Fateh Raj v. Suraj Roop (AIR 1969 Raj 252) | Cited (by appellant) on party-joinder principles. | Considered among the precedents informing the court's understanding of necessary-party doctrine. |
| Sayid Kadir Ahmad v. Abdul Khaliq (AIR 1943 Oudh 315) | Cited (by respondents) on the necessity of joinder where interests are directly involved. | Included among respondent authorities; the court treated these decisions collectively as laying down that a person is necessary if in his/her absence an effective decree cannot be passed. |
| Pasumarthi Subaraya Sastri v. Mukkamala Seetha Ramaswami (AIR 1933 Mad 664) | Cited (by respondents) regarding necessary-party principles. | Considered as supporting the proposition that absence of a directly interested person prevents an effective decree. |
| Yadavendra Bhatta v. Shrinivasa Babu (AIR 1925 Mad 62) | Cited (by respondents) concerning co-ownership and necessary parties. | Part of the body of authorities the court relied on in applying the legal test for necessary parties. |
| Allam Gangadhara Rao v. Gollapalli Gangarao (AIR 1968 Andh Pra 291) | Cited (by respondents) on the issue of necessary parties when title/ownership is in dispute. | Counted by the court among the precedents supporting the conclusion that a person whose title/status is directly in dispute must be impleaded. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court heard counsel for both parties and reviewed the record and the documentary evidence. The analysis proceeded by examining whether, on the pleadings and evidence, Smt. Ghogan's absence from the suit would prevent the court from passing an effective decree.
The court noted that:
- There was direct dispute in the pleadings: the plaintiff denied Smt. Ghogan's title to khasra number 898 and even challenged her status as the widow of Sukh Ram; the defendants maintained that she was a co-owner and had transferred only part of her interest to them.
- Documentary records were inconsistent: Exhibit DW1.A (jamabandi copy for 1972-1973 filed on 7-6-1974) showed Smt. Ghogan entered as co-owner to the extent of one-half, while Exhibit PB (also 1972-1973 but filed on 20-1-1976) did not record her as owner. The court observed that it was not explained which entry was correct.
- The defendants claimed title through Smt. Ghogan and asserted that only 2 bighas were transferred to them; even if that transfer were accepted, Smt. Ghogan would remain a co-owner in respect of the remainder.
- It is an established proposition (as reflected in the authorities relied upon by counsel) that a person is a necessary party where, in the person's absence, no effective decree can be passed. The court treated the cited authorities as laying down that legal test.
- Because the plaintiff had denied Smt. Ghogan's title and status, the question of her ownership and widowhood were directly involved in the controversy. A co-owner can sue a trespasser only if he sues on behalf of or for the benefit of all co-sharers and does not deny the title of other co-sharers; here the plaintiff denied Ghogan's title, so that condition was not satisfied.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that Smt. Ghogan's ownership and status were directly in dispute and that no final adjudication on those points could be made in her absence; therefore she was a necessary party and an effective decree could not be passed without impleading her. The District Judge's remand order to implead Smt. Ghogan was thus upheld.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Appeal dismissed. The appellate court specifically upheld the order of remand passed by the District Judge (dated 22 May 1979) which set aside the Sub Judge's judgment and directed that Smt. Ghogan be impleaded as a party because she was a necessary party to the litigation.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The remand order stands: the case is to be returned to the Sub Judge, Ghumarwin, for fresh adjudication after Smt. Ghogan is impleaded as a party.
- The appeal challenging the District Judge's finding on Issue No. 1 (necessity of impleading Smt. Ghogan) fails and is dismissed.
- The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
The opinion did not articulate any broader novel precedent beyond applying established authorities on necessary-party doctrine; it addressed the direct effect on the parties (remand and impleading of Smt. Ghogan) rather than establishing a new rule of law.
1. This appeal has been filed against the order, dated 22nd May, 1979 passed by the District Judge, Simla Division, Camp at Bilaspur, by which he has set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Sub Judge, Ghumarwin, on 5th August, 1976, and has remanded the case to the court of Sub Judge, Ghumarwin, with the direction that Smt. Ghogan be impleaded as a party in the case, as she was a necessary party for the adjudication of the controversy between the parties to the suit.
2. The brief facts are that Beli Ram (Plaintiff) appellant filed a suit for possession with respect to 4 biswas of land which is shown as khasra number 898/1 in the Tatima attached with the plaint and which is a part of khasra number 898 measuring 15 bighas 6 biswas of Amerpur, Pargana Teoni, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur. The possession was claimed by demolition of the house illegally built by the (defendants) respondents.
3. The allegations in the plaint are that khasra No. 898, measuring 15 bighas 6 biswas is the sole ownership of the plaintiff and that during the absence of the plaintiff the defendants took illegal possession of a portion of the above said khasra number in the year 1974 and thereafter the defendants started construction of a house in this land. On this illegal act of the defendants the plaintiff applied for demarcation of khasra number 898 along with other khasra numbers and during the demarcation it was found that the defendants have taken illegal possession of 4 biswas of land which is the land in dispute and is shown as khasra number 898/1 in the Tatima attached with the plaint.
4. The defendants contested the suit of the plaintiff and pleaded that they are not in illegal possession of any portion of the plaintiff's land. According to them, the plaintiff along with Smt. Ghogan widow of Sukh Ram was the owner of the whole of khasra number 898 measuring 15 bighas 6 biswas and that they were owners in equal shares. Smt. Ghogan transferred her ownership to the extent of 2 bighas in favour of the defendants out of khasra number 898 for construction of a house to be built by the defendants, and that Smt. Ghogan was in possession of the disputed land and the hissedari kashat of which was handed over to the defendants. It was further asserted that the defendants have constructed a house on the land. All other allegations of the plaintiff were denied and it was pleaded that Smt. Ghogan is a necessary party to the suit.
5. The plaintiff filed a replication to the written statement and while reiterating the averments of the plaint he pleaded that Smt. Ghogan was not an owner in khasra number 898 or in short the plaintiff denied the title/ownership/possession of Smt. Ghogan.
6. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:
“1. Whether Smt. Ghogan is a necessary party to the suit? O.P.D
2. Whether the land situated in khasra No. 898 measuring 15 bighas 6 biswas is in the ownership and possession of the plaintiff, as alleged? O.P.P
3. Whether the defendants forcibly constructed a house in the portion of khasra number shown as khasra number 898/1 belonging to the plaintiff, if so, to what effect? O.P.P
4. Whether the suit is properly valued for court fee? O.P.D
5. Relief.”
7. The Sub Judge, Ghumarwin, vide his judgment and decree, dated 5th August, 1976, held that Smt. Ghogan is not a necessary party to the suit, she was not the owner of khasra number 898 and was not in possession of the same and that the plaintiff is the sole owner of khasra number 898, and further that the defendants have illegally taken possession of the suit land which is a part of the plaintiff's ownership and on these findings the suit of the plaintiff was decreed.
8. Feeling aggrieved from this Judgment and decree the defendants filed an appeal in the court of District Judge, Simla Sessions Division, who vide his judgment, dated 22nd May, 1979 held that Smt. Ghogan was a necessary party to the litigation because her title was involved in this suit. It was further held by him that no effective decree could be passed in the absence of Smt. Ghogan. On these findings the judgment and decree of the Sub Judge was set aside and the case was remanded to the court of Sub Judge for fresh decision after impleading Smt. Ghogan as a party.
9. Aggrieved from this decision of remand by the District Judge, the plaintiff-appellant now assails the finding of the District Judge on issue No. 1.
10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case carefully. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the suit of the plaintiff is a simple suit for possession against the trespassers. The plaintiff has clearly alleged in his plaint that he is the sole owner of khasra number 898 and that it is now for the defendants to prove that they have a valid title to the disputed land, measuring 4 biswas which is carved out from kkhasra number 898. According to the learned counsel for the appellant if the defendants can show that the plaintiff is not the owner of disputed land then in that case the suit of the plaintiff will fail. He has further argued that Smt. Ghogan is not at all a necessary party for deciding the matters in controversy of the present suit because the defendants-respondents have been sued as trespassers. It was further contended by the appellant's learned counsel that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to join a party against his wish and he has referred to the provisions of Order 1, Rule 3 and Order 1. Rule 10 of the Civil P.C, and also to Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum (AIR 1958 SC 886), Bindeshwari Chaudhary v. Dr. Sheo Nandan Upadhya (AIR 1973 Pat 347). Benares Bank Ltd., Benares v. Bhagwan Das (AIR 1947 All 18) (FB), Hardeva v. Ismail (AIR 1970 Raj 167) (FB), Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand (AIR 1974 Punj & Har 7), Banarasi Dass Durga Prashad v. Panna Lal Ram Richhpal Oswal (AIR 1969 Punj & Har 57) and Fateh Raj v. Suraj Roop (AIR 1969 Raj 252).
11. On the basis of the above authorities the learned counsel for the appellant contended, firstly, that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to join any person as a party against whom be does not claim any relief or against whom he does not want to fight, and, secondly, that in the present dispute the joining of Smt. Ghogan as a party is not at all necessary to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit and, thirdly, that an effective decree can be passed between the parties to the suit without the presence of Smt. Ghogan. It was further contended that the questions regarding title of Smt. Ghogan in the suit property is not involved directly and if it is incidentally involved then she is not at all a necessary party, because in that case at the most it can be said that Smt. Ghogan is indirectly or remotely interested in the matters in dispute. The learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the entries of jamabandi for the year 1972-1973, Exhibit PB, and the copy of the order, dated 4-9-1971, Exhibit PD, and contended that the documents Exhibit PB and PD clearly show that Smt. Ghogan had no title in khasra number 898.
12. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that Smt. Ghogan and Bali Ram were owners in equal shares of khasra number 898 and that Smt. Ghogan had only transferred her rights to the extent of 2 bighas in favour of the defendants and qua the remaining land she was the owner. It was, therefore, contended that Smt. Ghogan has still an existing interest as a co-owner in khasra number 898 and that the disputed land measuring 4 biswas is a part and parcel of the main Khasra number 898 and every co-owner will be deemed to have title to this land. It was further contended that in order to get possession from the defendants treating them as trespassers it was necessary that Smt. Ghogan be impleaded as a party especially in view of the fact that the plaintiff had denied her title to the land entered in khasra number 898 in his replication. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that without impleading Smt. Ghogan no effective decree can at all be passed and that the title of Smt. Ghogan in the suit land is involved directly because even the judgment of the lower court while discussing various issues has held that Smt. Ghogan had no title in khasra number 898 and even the status of Smt. Ghogan as a widow of Sukh Ram had been challenged and discussed. It was thus on these facts contended that no adjudication can be effectively made without impleading Smt. Ghogan as a party to the litigation because her interests are directly involved in the controversy arising in the suit. To support his contentions the learned counsel has relied upon Sayid Kadir Ahmad v. Abdul Khaliq (AIR 1943 Oudh 315), (Pasumarthi) Subaraya Sastri v. Mukkamala Seetha Ramaswami (AIR 1933 Mad 664), Yadavendra Bhatta v. Shrinivasa Babu (AIR 1925 Mad 62) and Allam Gangadhara Rao…Plaintiff- v. Gollapalli Gangarao…Defendant-. (AIR 1968 Andh Pra 291).
13. The learned counsel for the respondents further referred to the documents, Exhibits DW1.A (copy of jamabandi 1972-1973), DW2.A (the writing dated 18-11-1973), Exhibit DB (copy of order of Nautor, dated 29-12-1970), Exhibit DC (entries from voters' list), Exhibit DD (copy of application dated 2-5-1973) and Exhibit DE (order, dated 24-10-1975). From these documents the learned counsel for the respondents tried to prove that Smt. Ghogan was the owner of khasra number 898 and that she is widow of Sukh Ram.
14. After considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and after perusal of the record I am of the view that in the present dispute Smt. Ghogan is a necessary party and that no effective decree can be passed without impleading her. The different authorities which have been relied upon by the parties learned counsel clearly lay down that a person is a necessary party if in his or her Absence an effective decree cannot be passed at all. The pleadings of the parties clearly show that the plaintiffs deny the title of Smt. Ghogan in khasra number 898 from which the present disputed khasra number 898/1 has been carved out. It is also clear that the plaintiff has also denied the status of Smt. Ghogan as the widow of Sukh Ram because the judgment of the trial court has clearly discussed this controversy while deciding the title/ownership of Smt. Ghogan in khasra number 898. Besides, these, the entries of Jamabandi for the year 1972-1973, Exhibit DW1.A clearly show that Smt. Ghogan was entered as the co-owner in khasra number 898 to the extent of one-half share along with the plaintiff. The jamabandi, Exhibit PB, is also for the year 1972-1973 but in that Smt. Ghogan is not recorded as owner. It has not been explained which of the two entries in the jamabandi, are correct as both the documents pertain to the same year of 1972-1973. The jamabandi, copy of which is Exhibit DW1.A, seems to have been filed on 7-6-1974, while copy of the jamabandi, Exhibit PB, seems to have been filed on 20-1-1976. The suit was filed in April, 1974. The defendants claim their title from Smt. Ghogan but at the same time their assertion is that only 2 bighas of land has been transferred in their favour. If this contention of the defendants is accepted then too Smt. Ghogan remains a co-owner in khasra number 898 and she is not divested of her title absolutely. In view of the facts which have been placed on the record it is manifestly clear that the ownership of Smt. Ghogan with respect to khasra number 898 is directly in dispute and her status as widow of Sukh Ram is also in dispute. It is an established proposition of law that a co-owner can sue a trespasser for possession and can successfully get a decree for possession against the trespasser provided he sues on behalf of all the co-sharers or for the benefit of all the co-sharers and does not deny the title of other co-sharers. In this case the plaintiff does not accept Smt. Ghogan as a co-owner and on the other hand denies her title. Therefore, the matter of deciding the title of Smt. Ghogan in the property in dispute is directly involved and if it is finally held that Smt. Ghogan had any title to this property then in that case it is just possible that the suit may not be maintainable. In any event no final adjudication can be given regarding the title of Smt. Ghogan to the suit property or her status as a widow of Sukh Ram in the absence of Smt. Ghogan. In these circumstances, I hold that Smt. Ghogan is a necessary party for passing an effective decree.
15. In view of the above discussion, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed and the order of remand passed by the District Judge is upheld.
16. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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