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Hari Krishan v. Shri Narotam Dutt Shastri .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.S. Pathak, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
On September 26, 1973 at Bilaspur the respondent, Shri Narotam Datt Shastri, allegedly made derogatory observations about a learned Judge of the Court. A criminal contempt petition was filed seeking punishment for this conduct. The petition bears an endorsement showing that the Advocate General gave his consent to institution of the petition on the same date. The petition is signed by Shri Hari Krishan and is described as having been made through the Advocate General. The next day the Advocate General filed a memorandum of appearance stating that he had been engaged by Shri Hari Krishan. There was no power of attorney (Vakalatnama) filed. The respondent challenged the Advocate General's participation, contending that the Advocate General acted without authority by examining the petitioner's witnesses and cross-examining the respondent's witnesses and that the proceedings should therefore be struck off the record.
Procedural posture: This is a miscellaneous petition raising the question of the Advocate General's authority to participate in a criminal contempt petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the present criminal contempt petition can be said to have been initiated by the Advocate General under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether the present criminal contempt petition is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and if so, whether the Advocate General is entitled to prosecute it as a Public Prosecutor under the Code.
- Whether the Advocate General has authority to prosecute the criminal contempt petition by virtue of duties assigned to him by the Governor under Article 165(2) of the Constitution.
- Whether the Advocate General requires a Vakalatnama executed by the petitioner to enable him to participate (including examining and cross-examining witnesses) in the criminal contempt petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments (Shri Narotam Datt Shastri)
- The Advocate General acted without authority in the contempt petition by examining the petitioner's witnesses and cross-examining the respondent's witnesses.
- Consequently, the respondent sought that the proceedings be struck off the record.
- It was contended (by Shri Inder Singh on behalf of the respondent) that the Advocate General is not entitled to appear for the petitioner without a Vakalatnama and that the petitioner has no statutory right to be represented by the Advocate General.
Advocate General / Petitioner (as represented in the record) — Principal Submissions
- The Advocate General asserted he was entitled to pursue the proceeding.
- He contended that, by virtue of holding the office of Advocate General, he is entitled under the Code of Criminal Procedure to function as a Public Prosecutor and thus to prosecute the contempt petition (the Advocate General relied on the criminal character of contempt proceedings).
- He argued that he had been authorised by the Governor under Article 165(2) of the Constitution (relying on a notification dated May 25, 1971 and Rule 3(b) therein) to represent the State in criminal/quasi-criminal matters and thereby in the contempt proceeding.
- He further submitted that the memorandum of appearance filed by him was sufficient to enable him to appear and act in the case and that no Vakalatnama was necessary to examine or cross-examine witnesses.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Thorburn v. K. Venkata Rao (1900) 10 Mad LJ 316 | One judicial view that High Courts possess power to punish contempt of Subordinate Courts. | Noted as part of historical divergence of opinion; Court records it among authorities adopting view that High Courts possess that power prior to statutory clarification. |
| In re M.K. Gandhi (22 Bom LR 368; 21 Cri LJ 835 (FB)) | Bombay High Court's opinion that High Courts possess power to punish contempt of Subordinate Courts. | Noted historically among decisions supporting High Courts' authority before statutory consolidation. |
| Abdul Hasan Jauhu (ILR 48 All 711; AIR 1926 All 623 (FB)) | Allahabad High Court's view supporting High Courts' power to punish contempt of Subordinate Courts. | Recorded as part of the historical debate resolved by subsequent legislation. |
| Legal Remembrancer v. Mati Lal Ghose (ILR 41 Cal 173; 14 Cri LJ 321) (SB) | Calcutta High Court's contrary view that High Courts could not punish contempt of Subordinate Courts. | Noted to illustrate conflicting authorities that led to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. |
| Har Kishen Lal v. Crown (ILR (1937) 18 Lah 69; 38 Cri LJ 883) (SB) | Held the inherent powers of High Court were unlimited in respect of punishment. | Mentioned as prompting the 1937 amendment to limit High Courts' sentencing power under the 1926 Act. |
| Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 | Statutory provision clarifying High Courts' jurisdiction over contempt of subordinate courts and prescribing punishments. | Cited as resolving the earlier doubt and providing statutory sentencing limits later clarified by amendment. |
| State of Bombay v. Mr. P. (AIR 1959 Bom 182) | Support for the proposition that High Courts are courts of record and possess contempt powers after the Constitution. | Used to show Article 215 makes recourse to Letters Patent unnecessary; High Court contempt power rests on Article 215. |
| Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 | Successor to the 1926 Act; more comprehensive and empowered High Courts to try some offences even outside jurisdiction. | Cited in the historical development of contempt law in India. |
| Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 | Latest comprehensive legislation defining criminal contempt and related procedure; uses terms like “offences”, “offenders”, “accused”. | Court examined whether its language altered the settled position that CrPC does not apply to contempt proceedings and concluded it did not. |
| Emperor v. B.G. Homiman (AIR 1945 All 1; 46 Cri LJ 272) | Allahabad High Court view that the Code of Criminal Procedure applied to contempt (by virtue of s.5(2) CrPC). | Noted as part of pre-Supreme Court division of opinion; ultimately superseded by later Supreme Court authority. |
| Sukhdev Singh v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice, S. Teja Singh & Ors. (AIR 1954 SC 186; 1954 Cri LJ 460) | Supreme Court holding that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to contempts triable by High Courts. | Relied upon by the Court as decisive precedent establishing that CrPC does not apply to such contempt proceedings. |
| C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta (1971) 1 SCC 626; AIR 1971 SC 1132 | Affirmation by the Supreme Court of the position that CrPC does not apply to contempt matters triable by High Courts. | Cited as further confirmation of the settled law that CrPC is not applicable to the present contempt petition. |
| Mange Nanafe v. Addl. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab Rohtak (AIR 1968 Punj 216) (FB) | Statement that an act constituting contempt is directed against the administration of justice (an offence against the Court). | Relied upon by the Court to support the conclusion that contempt is an offence against the Court and not properly described as an offence against the State. |
| Thakur Ram v. State of Bihar (AIR 1966 SC 911; 1966 Cri LJ 700) | Describes the State as custodian of social interest and empowered to take steps against persons acting against social interest. | Referred to by the Advocate General; Court held that the observation about the State's custodial role is not applicable to contempt proceedings. |
| Govind Narain v. Smt. Chhoti Devi (AIR 1966 Raj 170) | Held by a single Judge that examination and cross-examination of witnesses constitute “acting” and require a Vakalatnama. | Noted as one side of the judicial debate on whether examining witnesses requires filing a Vakalatnama; the Court considered it but rejected the restrictive view. |
| Thunnudeo Raghvi v. Baldeo Raghvi (1942 Nag LJ 449) | Authority relied on supporting the proposition that examination/cross-examination constitute acting. | Noted as part of authorities supporting the restrictive view (cited in Govind Narain), but the Court preferred the contrary authorities. |
| Governor-General in Council v. Bhagwan Sahai (AIR 1948 EP 61) | Authority cited for the view that examination/cross-examination constitute acting. | Recorded among historical authorities but the Court aligned with decisions treating examination as part of pleading. |
| Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel v. National Rayon Corporation Ltd. (AIR 1955 Bom 262) | Chagla, C.J.'s view that the right to examine or cross-examine witnesses is included within the function of “pleading”. | The Court agreed with Chagla, C.J.'s approach and held that examination/cross-examination are part of pleading and may be performed after filing a memorandum of appearance. |
| Smt. Saraswati v. Tulsi Ram Seth Etc. (AIR 1971 Delhi 110) | Division Bench of Delhi High Court held that the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses was not covered in the expression “acting”. | Cited as a contrary decision; Court considered it but ultimately followed the view that examination/cross-examination form part of pleading and may be done on a memorandum of appearance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court structured its analysis around the four specific points identified on the parties' submissions:
-
Who initiated the petition?
The act charged was clearly criminal contempt as defined by Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Section 15(1) of that Act allows a High Court to act on its own motion or on a motion made by (a) the Advocate General or (b) any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The petition filed by Shri Hari Krishan showed it was filed with the Advocate General's written consent. Therefore the Court concluded the petition was instituted under Section 15(1)(b) (i.e. by a person with the Advocate General's written consent) and not under Section 15(1)(a) (i.e. directly by the Advocate General). The Advocate General's claim that he initiated the proceeding was rejected as without merit.
-
Application of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)
The Court reviewed the historical development of contempt jurisdiction (common law, Letters Patent, Contempt of Courts Acts of 1926 and 1952) and the settled Supreme Court authority that the CrPC does not apply to contempts triable by High Courts. The Court relied on Sukhdev Singh (1954) and the subsequent affirmation in C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta (1971) to hold that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to the present contempt petition despite the use of words like “offences”, “offenders” or “accused” in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Consequently, the Advocate General could not claim the right to prosecute the petition as a Public Prosecutor under the CrPC.
-
Authority derived from Article 165(2) and State representation
The Advocate General relied on duties assigned under Article 165(2) and a state notification (May 25, 1971, Rule 3(b)) that purported to entitle the Advocate General to represent the State in criminal/quasi-criminal cases. The Court examined whether the State has a right to be represented in a contempt proceeding and concluded it does not: contempt is an offence against the Court (i.e., directed at administration of justice) and not an offence against the State in the ordinary sense. The Court explained that Section 15(1)'s requirement of the Advocate General's consent is intended as a filter for frivolous motions and does not render the State a party to contempt proceedings. Therefore, nothing in the cited notification empowered the Advocate General to represent the State in the contempt proceeding in this Court. The Court further held that while the court may seek assistance from the Advocate General, that does not convert the State into a party to the proceedings.
-
Need for a Vakalatnama and the meaning of “acting”
The Court acknowledged a dispute in earlier authorities on whether examination and cross-examination of witnesses amount to “acting” (and therefore require a Vakalatnama). It set out authorities on both sides: some decisions (including Govind Narain v. Smt. Chhoti Devi and older authorities) took the view that such conduct is “acting” and requires a Vakalatnama; other authorities (notably Chagla, C.J.'s view in Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel and a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Smt. Saraswati) treated examination and cross-examination as part of “pleading” and thus within the ambit of the functions a counsel may perform on filing a memorandum of appearance. The Court expressly aligned with Chagla, C.J.'s view: the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses is part of pleading (a method by which counsel pleads the client's case), and by filing a memorandum of appearance counsel may perform those functions. Applying that conclusion, the Court held that the Advocate General, having filed a memorandum of appearance, was entitled to examine and cross-examine witnesses notwithstanding that no Vakalatnama had been filed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The miscellaneous petition was dismissed. The Court reached the following specific conclusions, emphasized below:
- The petition was instituted under Section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (i.e., by a person with the Advocate General's written consent) and not directly by the Advocate General under Section 15(1)(a).
- The Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to contempt proceedings of the kind before the High Court; therefore the Advocate General cannot prosecute the contempt petition as a Public Prosecutor under the CrPC.
- The Advocate General is not entitled, by virtue of the cited notification under Article 165(2), to represent the State in the contempt proceeding because contempt is an offence against the Court rather than an offence against the State in the ordinary sense; the Advocate General's function under Section 15(1) does not make the State a party to the proceeding.
- The Advocate General, having filed a memorandum of appearance, was entitled to examine and cross-examine witnesses (the Court held that examination/cross-examination form part of pleading and can be carried out on a memorandum of appearance without a separate Vakalatnama).
Direct consequences for the parties: The respondent's contention that the proceedings should be struck off the record for lack of authority of the Advocate General was rejected; the Advocate General may participate in examining and cross-examining witnesses after filing a memorandum of appearance. The miscellaneous petition was dismissed with no order as to costs. D.B. Lal, J. agreed with the judgment.
Broader implications: The opinion reaffirms the settled position (as declared by the Supreme Court) that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to contempt proceedings triable by High Courts and clarifies the limited role of the Advocate General in instituting or consenting to motions under Section 15(1). The opinion does not purport to establish a new, broader precedent beyond the conclusions reached in the case; it applies existing statutory provisions and authorities to the facts before the Court.
R.S Pathak, C.J:— By this miscellaneous petition the respondent, Shri Narotam Datt Shastri, contends that the Advocate General of this State has acted without authority in the present criminal contempt petition by examining the petitioner's witnesses and cross-examining the respondent's witnesses, and he claims that therefore the said proceedings should be struck off the record.
2. On September 26, 1973 at Bilaspur the respondent made certain derogatory observations in respect of a learned Judge of this Court and that, therefore, he should be punished for committing criminal contempt of this court. By an endorsement of the same date made on the petition, it is apparent that the Advocate General accorded his consent to the institution of the petition. It may be mentioned that while the petition is signed by Shri Hari Krishan, it has been described as having been made through the Advocate General. On the next day, the Advocate General filed a memorandum of appearance which recites that he has been engaged by Shri Hari Krishan to appear for him in the case. The learned Advocate General has throughout appeared on behalf of the petitioner and participated in the proceeding in that capacity. He has not filed any power of attorney. It is contended by Shri Inder Singh, on behalf of the respondent, that the Advocate General is not entitled to appear for the petitioner without a Vakalatnama, and in any event, the petitioner has no statutory right to be represented by him. The Advocate General seeks to sustain his position in the proceeding on the basis of a number of submissions. In the first place, he says, he is entitled to pursue that proceeding. In the second place, he urges, by virtue of holding the office of Advocate General he is entitled under the Code of Criminal Procedure to function as a Public Prosecutor and prosecute the case, the proceeding being a proceeding governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the third place, he contends, he has been authorised by the Governor under Art. 165(2) of the Constitution to represent the State in a contempt proceeding. Fourthly, he urges, the memorandum of appearance is sufficient to enable him to appear in the case and no Vakalatnama is necessary.
3. On the submissions of the parties the following questions arise for consideration:
1. Can the present criminal contempt petition be said to have been initiated by the Advocate General under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971?
2. Is the present criminal contempt petition governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is the Advocate General entitled to prosecute it as a Public Prosecutor under the Code?
3. Has the Advocate General authority to prosecute the criminal contempt petition by virtue of the duties assigned to him by the Governor under Article 165 of the Constitution?
4. Does the Advocate General require a Vakalatnama executed by the petitioner to enable him to prosecute the criminal contempt petition?
4. Point No. 1
5. It is beyond doubt that the act charged against the respondent is an act of “criminal contempt” as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Section 15(1) of the Act declares that in the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by (a) the Advocate General or (b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The petition filed by Shri Hari Krishan clearly shows that it has been filed with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The submission of the Advocate General that the proceeding was initiated by him is without merit. He has drawn our attention to the circumstance that Shri Hari Krishan is his Assistant, but that, it seems to me, is of no moment. Plainly the case falls under Section 15(1)(b) and not under Section 15(1)(a).
6. Point No. 2
7. The question is whether the Code of Criminal Procedure applies tb contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act,???71. The Advocate General urges that content proceedings are of a criminal nature. It is necessary to be clear about this.
8. Under the common law of England a court of record has inherent power of summarily punishing for contempt This rule was applied to the Chartered High Courts in India. Subsequently when the High Courts were constituted by Letters Patent they were expressly constituted Courts of Record, so that thereby they were empowered to punish for contempt of themselves.
9. There was a cleavage of opinion on whether the High Courts could also punish for contempt of the Subordinate Courts. The Madras High Court in Thorburn v. K. Venkata Rao, (1900) 10 Mad LJ 316 the Bombay High Court in In re M.K Gandhi, 22 Bom LR 368 : 21 Cri LJ 835 (FB) and the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Hasan Jauhu, ILR 48 All 711 : (AIR 1926 All 623 (FB)) took the view that the High Courts possess that power. The Calcutta High Court in Legal Remembrancer v. Mati Lal Ghose, ILR 41 Cal 173 : (14 Cri LJ 321) (SB) took a contrary view. This doubt was resolved by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. That Act provided, by Section 2(i) that the High Courts established by Letters Patent would “have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with, the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt of Courts subordinate to them as they have and exercise in respect of contempt of themselves.” It was also provided, by Section 3, that a contempt of court could be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which could extend to six months or with fine extending to two thousand rupees or with both. Subsequently when the Lahore High Court held in Har Kishen Lal v. Crown, ILR (1937) 18 Lah 69 : (38 Cri LJ 883) (SB) that the inherent powers of the High Court were unlimited in respect of punishment, the Act was amended in 1937 by inserting a proviso limiting the power of the High Court in imposing a sentence to that specified in the substantive provision of Section 3.
10. When the Constitution came into force in 1950, it provided by Article 214 for a High Court for each State. Article 215 declared:—
“215. Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the powers to punish for contempt of itself.”
11. It is apparent that the High Courts contemplated by the Constitution were constituted as courts of record. In order-to remove any doubt, it was affirmed in Article 215 that as courts of record the High Courts would have all the powers of such courts including the power to punish for contempt of themselves. The High Courts' power to commit for contempt is now based on Article 215 and it is not necessary to refer to the Letters Patent to determine the ambit of such power. See State of Bombay v. Mr. P., AIR 1959 Bom 182 : (1959 Cri LJ 567).
12. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 was replaced by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 which was some what more comprehensive. That Act empowered the High Court to try offences committed by offenders even outside its jurisdiction.
13. In its turn, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 has been replaced by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which is a far more comprehensive legislation and lays down the law in respect of several matters which hitherto had been the subject of judicial exposition. It has also brought the law into line with modern trends of thinking in other countries respecting the powers of courts to punish for contempt.
14. There was at one time a difference between the courts in India on whether contempt proceedings were governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. While the Allahabad High Court held in Emperor v. B.G Homiman, AIR 1945 All 1 : (46 Cri LJ 272) that the Code applied by virtue of Section 5(2) thereof, the remaining High Courts adopted the contrary view. The law was settled by the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice, S. Teja Singh and the Hon'ble Judges of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala, AIR 1954 SC 186 : (1954 Cri LJ 460) where Bose, J., speaking for the Court, in a judgment noted for its erudition and its exhaustive treatment of the subject, traced the origin and historical development of the law in relation to contempt in India, and came to the conclusion that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to matters of contempt triable by the High Courts. The statement of the law was affirmed by the Supreme Court in C.K Daphtary v. O.P Gupta, (1971) 1 SCC 626 : AIR 1971 SC 1132 : (1971 Cri LJ 844).
15. The learned Advocate General states that while that may be true of the position obtaining before the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it is not true respecting the position under that Act. He has referred us to the use of the words “offences”, “offenders” and “accused.” In my opinion, the mere use of these words does not alter the position. The scope of the Act of 1971 is comparable with that of the Act of 1926 and the Act of 1952. The preamble of the three Acts sufficiently indicates that the three Acts differ only in that each succeeding Act is more comprehensive than the previous one. There is nothing in the Act of 1971 which indicates, either expressly or by necessary implication, that a departure has been made from the previous state of the law in that the Code of Criminal Procedure has been applied now. I am of opinion that the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be applied to the present contempt petition. For that reason, the claim of the Advocate General to prosecute the contempt petition as a Public Prosecutor by virtue of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be rejected.
Point No. 3:
16. The Advocate General relies on the duties assigned to him by the Governor under Article 165(2) of the Constitution. He relies upon notification No. 19-19/71 (Home) dated May 25, 1971 (published in the Himachal Pradesh Gazette dated June 5, 1971, page 599), Rule 3(b) of which entitles the Advocate-General to represent the State in criminal cases and cases of a quasi-criminal nature. Before the learned Advocate-General can avail of Rule 3(b), it needs to be examined whether the State has a right to be represented in a contempt proceeding. An act constituting contempt of court is directed against the administration of justice. It is an offence against the Court. See Mange Nanafe v. Addl. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab Rohtak, AIR 1968 Punj 216 (FB). It cannot be described as an offence against the State, in the sense which that concept generally implies. It is for this reason that the power to punish for contempt resides in the High Court itself and has not been conferred on the State. In this connection, it may be pointed out that when Section 15(1) of the Act requires that the motion should be made by the Advocate-General, or a person with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, it is for the mere purpose of ensuring that the High Court is not flooded with frivolous motions but receives only motions of substance. The Advocate-General has been entrusted with that function by virtue of his legal training and experience and the responsibility presumed in the holder of that office. It would be incorrect to say that because this function has been vested in the Advocate-General the State which he represents is thereby made a party to the proceeding. At the same time it may be made clear that there is nothing to prevent the court from seeking the assistance of the Advocate-General or any other law officer of the State in the conduct and decision of a contempt proceeding Reliance has been placed by the Advocate-General on Thakur Ram v. State of Bihar. AIR 1966 SC 911 : (1966 Cri LJ 700), where the State has been described as the custodian of the social interest of the community, and it has been said that for that reason the State is empowered to take all steps necessary for bringing a person to book who has acted against the social interest of the community. Upon the considerations adverted to earlier that observation, in my opinion, cannot be applied in respect of contempt proceedings. In my opinion, nothing contained in the notification D/-May 25, 1971. issued under Article 165(2) of the ???tution entitles the Advocate General to represent the State in a contend Proceeding in this Court.
Point No. 4:
17. The last point rai??? the question whether the Advocate General can participate on behalf of the petitioner in the present proceeding and examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Advocate General has filed a memorandum of appearance on behalf of the petitioner. He has not filed a Vakalatnama. There is no dispute that without a Vakalatnama it is not possible for the Advocate-General to “act”. Does the examination and cross-examination of witnesses amount to “acting” ? In Govind Narain v. Smt. Chhoti Devi. AIR 1966 Raj 170 a learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court held that the examination and cross-examination of witnesses would constitute “acting”, and that no pleader can be allowed to examine and cross-examine witnesses unless he has filed his Vakalatnama. In that view he proceeded on the basis of Thunnudeo Raghvi v. Baldeo Raghvi, 1942 Nag LJ 449 and Governor-General in Council v. Bhagwan Sahai, AIR 1948 EP 61. On the other hand, Chagla, C.J, observed in Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel v. National Rayon Corporation Ltd., AIR 1955 Bom 262. that the right to examine or cross-examine witnesses was included in the function of “pleading”, and he differed from the view taken in Bhagwan Sahai, AIR 1948 EP 61 (supra). Recently, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has held in Smt. Saraswati… v. Tulsi Ram Seth Etc.…, AIR 1971 Delhi 110 that the fight to examine and cross-examine witnesses was not covered in the expression “acting”. It seems to me, with great respect, that Chagla, C.J is right. The right to examine and cross-examine witnesses is, like that right to address the Court, a part of “pleading.” It is one of the ways in which counsel pleads the case of his client. It is open to counsel, by filing a memorandum of appearance on behalf of the party, to perform the function of acting and cross-examining witnesses. Accordingly, I hold that the Advocate General is entitled to examine and cross-examine the witnesses. In view of the opinion expressed by me on the last point, this miscellaneous petition is dismissed. There is, however, no order as to costs.
D.B LAL, J.:— I agree.
19. Petition dismissed.
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