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Mehar Chand And Others v. Twarsoo And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenges an order of the Sub-Divisional Judge, Mandl, which rejected an application for revision filed by the petitioners under Section 53 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act (the Himachal Act). Respondent No. 1 had lodged a complaint against the petitioners in the Nyaya Panchayat, Jitpur, which convicted the petitioners and sentenced them to pay a fine. Petitioner No. 2 had filed a cross-complaint in the same Nyaya Panchayat that remained pending. The petitioners filed a revision application before the Sub-Divisional Judge seeking to revise the Nyaya Panchayat's conviction. The Sub-Divisional Judge dismissed that application as time-barred, holding it was filed beyond the sixty-day period prescribed by Section 93 of the Himachal Act. The petitioners had argued before the Sub-Divisional Judge that the time spent obtaining a copy of the Nyaya Panchayat order should be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act; the Sub-Divisional Judge rejected this, relying on Section 85(4) of the Himachal Act to hold the Limitation Act inapplicable to the revision. The petitioners then filed the present writ petition seeking to quash the Sub-Divisional Judge's order and to have their revision application decided on merits.
Legal Issues Presented
- whether the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (in force at the relevant time), are applicable to an application for revision filed under Section 93 of the Himachal Act;
- whether the time spent in obtaining a copy of the Nyaya Panchayat order can be excluded in computing the sixty-day limitation period prescribed by Section 93 of the Himachal Act;
- whether sub-section (4) of Section 85 of the Himachal Act operates to exclude the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act to a revision before the Sub-Divisional Judge;
- whether Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act applies to a special or local law (here, the Himachal Act) and thereby permits application of certain provisions of the Limitation Act, including Section 12(2, as appropriate).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners contended that the period consumed in obtaining a copy of the Nyaya Panchayat order should be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, and that once that time was excluded their revision application fell within the sixty-day period prescribed by Section 93 of the Himachal Act.
- Implicitly, the petitioners relied on the applicability of the Limitation Act provisions (via Section 29(2) where necessary) to revision proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Judge.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents argued that sub-section (4) of Section 85 of the Himachal Act excludes the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act to any suit, case or proceeding in a Nyaya Panchayat and, by necessary implication, to revision proceedings which are only a stage of such a suit, case or proceeding; therefore, Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act was not applicable and the time spent obtaining the copy could not be excluded.
- The respondents further contended that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act did not apply because (a) the Himachal Act was not a "special or local law" but a general law, and (b) Section 29(2) applied only to suits, appeals or applications which lie in Courts and not to proceedings before a persona designata such as the Sub-Divisional Judge.
- They also argued that the Indian Limitation Act did not prescribe any limitation period for an application for revision under Section 93, so there was no difference between the two laws for purposes of Section 29(2).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1964 SC 260 | Definition and meaning of "special law" (enacted for special cases/circumstances as opposed to a general law). | Used to characterise the Himachal Act as a special law because it deals with a specific subject (constitution, functions and powers of Panchayats), supporting application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. |
| Canara Bank Ltd. v. Warden Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1353 Bom 35 | Where the First Schedule to the Limitation Act omits any period for a particular appeal/application but a special Act prescribes a period, that special Act's period is different from the Limitation Act. | Relied on to hold that Section 93 of the Himachal Act (prescribing sixty days) is different from the Limitation Act for purposes of Section 29(2). |
| Vidyaaharan Shukla v. Khubehand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099 | Approval of the principle that Section 29(2) applies even when a difference arises by omission in the Limitation Act (i.e., special law provides a period omitted in the First Schedule). | Applied to conclude that Section 29(2) applies to the Himachal Act's provision, so that certain Limitation Act provisions (including Section 12(2)) apply unless expressly excluded. |
| Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 954 | Preamble cannot override clear statutory language; express provisions must be given full effect even if they go beyond the preamble. | Invoked to reject the respondents' reliance on the Limitation Act preamble to restrict the scope of Section 29(2); held that the express words of Section 29(2) govern. |
| Imperial Bucket Co., A Firm… v. Sm. Bhagwati Basak…, AIR 1954 Cal 520 | The words "suit, appeal or application" in Section 29(2) include proceedings before a persona designata, not only in Courts. | Used to determine that "application" in Section 29(2) includes an application to the Sub-Divisional Judge (a persona designata), so Section 29(2) applies to the revision in question. |
| Standard Type Foundry v. C. Venkataramaniah, AIR 1941 Mad 589 | The word "appeal" may be given a liberal interpretation to include an application for revision. | Relied upon to treat the petitioners' revision application as falling within the scope of "appeal" for purposes of applying Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. |
| Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S Chettyar, AIR 1928 PC 103 | Time spent in obtaining a copy of an order is to be excluded in computing limitation even if rules do not require filing the copy with the application. | Applied directly to hold that time spent obtaining the Nyaya Panchayat order must be excluded when computing the sixty-day period under Section 93. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the matter in a stepwise manner, confined to the materials and authorities referenced in the opinion:
- Interpretation of Section 85(4) of the Himachal Act: The court held that sub-section (4) is confined in operation to suits, cases or proceedings when pending before the Nyaya Panchayat itself. It does not expressly or by necessary implication extend to a revision before the Sub-Divisional Judge. Therefore Section 85(4) does not, on its face, exclude the applicability of provisions of the Indian Limitation Act to a revision under Section 93 of the Himachal Act.
- Applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act: The court turned to Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act to determine whether provisions of the Limitation Act (notably Section 12(2)) could apply when a special or local law prescribes a different period. Section 29(2) provides that where a special or local law prescribes a different period, certain provisions of the Limitation Act (including Sections 9 to 18, Sec. 4 and Sec. 22) apply only to the extent not expressly excluded by that special or local law; the other provisions do not apply unless so saved.
- Characterisation of the Himachal Act as special/local: The court rejected the respondents' submission that the Himachal Act is a general law. It held that the Himachal Act is a local law (applicable only to Himachal Pradesh) and a special law because it deals with the specific subject of Panchayat constitution, functions and powers. Even if the Himachal Act were treated as general, Section 93's specific prescription of a sixty-day limitation would nonetheless be a special provision for purposes of comparison with the Limitation Act.
- Difference in limitation periods: The court accepted the reasoning (from Canara Bank and subsequent approval in Vidyaaharan Shukla) that where the First Schedule to the Limitation Act omits a period for a particular proceeding but a special law prescribes one, the periods are "different" for the purpose of Section 29(2). Therefore Section 93's sixty days is a different period from the Limitation Act's scheme, bringing Section 29(2) into play.
- Scope of "application" and "appeal": Addressing the respondents' contention that Section 29(2) applies only to Courts, the court relied on authority holding that the words "suit, appeal or application" are not limited to Courts and include proceedings before a persona designata. Consequently, an application for revision before the Sub-Divisional Judge falls within Section 29(2)'s scope. Further, the court accepted authorities that treat the word "appeal" liberally to include an application for revision, bringing Section 12(2) within reach.
- Application of Section 12(2): By virtue of Section 29(2) and the liberal construction of "appeal" and "application," the court concluded that Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable to the petitioners' revision application. The court further held (relying on Jijibhoy N. Surty) that the time spent in obtaining a copy of the Nyaya Panchayat order must be excluded when computing the sixty-day limitation period under Section 93, even if filing that copy was not required by the rules.
- Conclusion on timeliness and jurisdiction: After excluding the time spent obtaining the copy, the petitioners' revision application was within the sixty-day period. Therefore the Sub-Divisional Judge erred in dismissing the application as time-barred and ought to have decided it on merits. The court characterised the Sub-Divisional Judge's dismissal as a failure to exercise vested jurisdiction and held the order to be without jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The petition is allowed. The order of the Sub-Divisional Judge, which held that the petitioners' application for revision under Section 93 of the Himachal Act was time-barred, is QUASHED by a writ of certiorari. The Sub-Divisional Judge is directed to dispose of the application for revision on merits in accordance with law.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The immediate consequence is that the petitioners' revision application is to be reconsidered on merits by the Sub-Divisional Judge because, after excluding the time spent obtaining the Nyaya Panchayat order under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act (as made applicable by Section 29(2)), the application was within the sixty-day period prescribed by Section 93 of the Himachal Act.
- Scope of law applied: The court clarified that Section 85(4) of the Himachal Act does not, by its terms, exclude applicability of Limitation Act provisions to revision proceedings before a Sub-Divisional Judge; Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act can operate to make certain Limitation Act provisions applicable to proceedings under special or local laws. The court applied established authorities on interpretation and application of the Limitation Act's provisions.
- Precedential impact: The opinion resolves the particular dispute between the parties and directs reconsideration on merits. The judgment does not state that it establishes any broader new legal principle beyond its application of existing statutory interpretation and precedent; its reasoning is rooted in applying existing authorities to the facts at hand.
Result: Petition allowed.
1. This petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against an order of the Sub-Divisional Judge, Mandl. The facts, in brief, leading to the filing of the petition, are as follows: Respondent No. 1 had lodged a complaint, for various offences, against the petitioners, in the Nyaya Panchayat, Jitpur. Petitioner No. 2 had, also, lodged a cross-complaint in the same Nyaya Panchayat. The Nyaya Panchayat decided the complaint of respondent No. 1 and convicted the petitioners, sentencing them to pay fine. The cross-complaint, filed by petitioner No. 2, was still pending. The petitioners filed an application, for revision, under Section 53 of the Himachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act (hereinafter referred to as the Himachal Act) before the Sub-Divisional Judge, against their conviction, by the Nyaya Panchayat. The Sub-Divisional Judge rejected the application, as barred by time, having been filed beyond the period of sixty days, prescribed, under Sec. 93. It was contended, before the Sub-Divisional Judge, on behalf of the petitioners, that the time, spent, in obtaining the copy of the order of the Nyaya Panchayat, should be excluded, under Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, and that if that time be deducted, the application was within time. The Sub-Divisional Judge did not accept this contention. He held that, in view of the provisions of Section 85(4) of the Himachal Act, the Indian Limitation Act was not applicable to an application for revision, against the order of a Nyaya Panchayat, and that the time, spent, in obtaining the copy of the order of the Nyaya Panchayat could not be excluded. The petitioners have filed the present petition, questioning the validity of the order of the Sub-Divisional Judge, dismissing their application for revision, as time-barred.
2. It is not disputed, that if the time, spent in obtaining the copy of the order of the Nyaya Panchayat, be excluded, the application for revision, filed by the petitioners, was within time. The crucial point, which requires decision, in the petition, is whether the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which was in force at the relevant time, were applicable to the application for revision, filed by the petitioners, and the time, spent in obtaining the copy of the order of the Nyaya Panchayat could be excluded, in computing the period of limitation of sixty days, prescribed by Section 93 of the Himachal Act, The contention, on behalf of the respondents, is that those provisions were not applicable and that time, spent in obtaining the copy of the order of the Nyaya Panchayat, could not be excluded. Reliance has been placed, in support of this contention, on sub-sec. (4) of Section 85 of the Himachal Act, That sub-section reads as follows:
“The Nyaya Panchayat shall follow the procedure prescribed by or under this Act, The Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Indian Evidence Act 1872, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall not apply to any suit, case or proceeding in a Nyaya Panchayat except as provided in this Act or as may be prescribed.”
3. The Himachal Act does not provide for the applicability of any of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act to an application for revision, filed, under Sec. 93. The argument, on behalf of the respondents, is that sub-sec. (4), afore-said, excludes the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act to a suit, case or proceeding in a Nyaya Panchayat, at whatever stage, that suit, case or proceeding may be, and that as revision, before the Sub-Divisional Judge, is only a stage of such a suit, case or proceeding, sub-section (4) will exclude the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act to such a revision. This argument does not appear to be sound. A perusal of sub-sec. (4; makes it clear that its operation is confined to a suit, case, or proceeding, when it is pending before the Nyaya Panchayat. The sub-section does not either in terms, or by necessary implication, cover the case of a revision before the Sub-Divisional Judge. I am of the view that sub-sec. (4) does not exclude the applicability of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act to an application for revision, under Section 93 of the Himachal Act, if those provisions be otherwise applicable.
4. The next question is whether, in particular, the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act are applicable to an application-for revision, under Section 93 of the Himachal Act, For deciding this question resort is to he had to sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, That sub-section reads:
“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law
(a) the provisions contained in Sec. 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Sec. 22 shall apply only in so-far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law;, and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shale not apply.”
5. According to the provisions of the above sub-section, section 12(2) will be applicable to an-application for revision, filed under Section 93 of the Himachal Act, provided the application comes within the ambit of that section.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act were not at all applicable to the case, in hand. His contention, in this connection, was that the Himachal Act was a-general law and was not a special or local law. This contention is without any substance. The Himachal Act is a local law as it is applicable to Himachal Pradesh only and not to the whole of India. It is also a special law. “Speeial Law” has been defined In, Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh , AIR 1964 SC 260 to mean a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contradistinction to the general rule of the law laid down, as applicable generally to all cases with which the-general law deals. The Himachal Act deals with-a special subject, namely, the constitution, functions and powers of the Panchayats. The Himachal Act la, therefore, a special law. But even if it be assumed that the Himachal Act is a general law, the special provision, contained in Sec. 93, prescribing period of limitation, for an application for revision, will constitute a special law, as against the general law of limitation, contained in the Indian Limitation Act, In AIR 1964 SC 260, supra, the rule of limitation, laid down in sub-sec. (4) of Section 417 of the Cr PC was held to be a special law, though, the whole Code is a general law, regulating the procedure in criminal trials, generally.
7. Another contention of the learned counsel, for the respondents, was that the Indian Limitation Act did not prescribe any period of limitation for an application for revision, filed under Section 93 of the Himachal Act, and that, therefore, there was no difference between the periods of limitation, prescribed by the Indian Limitation Art. and the Himachal Act and the provisions of Sec. 29(2) did not apply. It was held in Canara Bank, Ltd. v. Warden Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1353 Bom 35 that where the first schedule of the Indian Limitation Act does not prescribe any period, for an appeal or an application but a ??? Act prescribes a period of limitation for that appeal or application, it shall be deemed that the prescribed by the special Act, is different the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, Ehagla, C.J had observed:
“The period of limitation may be different under two different circumstances. It may be different if it modifies or alters a period of limitation fixed by the first schedule to the Limitation, Act it may also be different in the sense that it departs from the period of limitation fixed for various appeals under the Limitation Act, If the first schedule to the Limitation Act omits lay Jag down any period of limitation for a period appeal and the special law provides a period if limitation, then to that extent the special law different from the Limitation Act.” Page 36.
8. The aforesaid observations of Chagla, C.J were approved by the Supreme Court in Vidyaaharan Shukla v. Khubehand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099, wherein it was laid down that Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, would apply even to, a case where a difference between the special law and the Limitation Act arose by the comission I to provide for a limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act, It must, therefore, be held that the period of limitation, prescribed by Section 93 of the Himachal Act, is different from the period, prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, on this point, is to be rejected.
9. It was also, contended, by the learned counsel for, the respondents, that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 applies to suits, appeals or applications which lie in Courts and that as the Sub-Divisional Judge was only a persona designata and not a Court, the provisions of the aforesaid sub-section will not apply to an application for revision, filed before him. In this connection, the learned counsel referred to the preamble of the Indian Limitation Act that preamble speaks of consolidating and, amending the law relating to the limitation at, suits, appeals and certain applications to Courts. But the word “Courts” is not mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29. The words “any suit, appeal application”, in that sub-section, are not followed by the word “Courts” as in preamble of the Act, There appears to be a conflict between the preamble and sub-sec. (2) of Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, It is well-settled that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble is to be disregarded and full effect is to be given to the express provisions of the Act, even though they appear to go beyond the terms of the preamble, vide Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 954. The preamble of the Indian Limitation Act cannot override the express provisions of sub-sec. (2) of Section 29 of the Act and the operation of the word “application” in that sub-section cannot be limited to applications, which are made in a Court only. The word “application” will include applications made to a persona designata. It was held in Imperial Bucket Co., A Firm… v. Sm. Bhagwati Basak…Opposite Party., AIR 1954 Cal 520 that in their plain meaning, the words “suit, appeal or application” in Sec. 29(2), referred to any suit or appeal, be it filed in a Court or before a persona designata.
10. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the provisions of Section 28(2) of the Indian Limitation Act are not applicable to the case, in hand, has got no force and is rejected.
11. By virtue of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, Section 12(2) of that Act will apply to the present case, if an application for revision falls within the ambit of that section. Section 12(2) does not specifically cover an application for revision. But the word, “appeal” used, therein, has been given a liberal interpretation and construed to include an application for revision, vide Standard Type Foundry v. C. Venkataramaniah, AIR 1941 Mad 589. The provisions of Sec. 12(2) will therefore apply to an application for revision. It will not be out of place to point out that the 1963 Limitation Act specifically mentions an application for revision Id Sec. 12(2).
12. It follows, from the above discussion, that the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act were applicable to the application for revision, filed by the petitioners, before the Sub-Divisional Judge, and that the time spent in obtaining the copy of the order of the Nyaya Panchayat, was to be excluded, in computing the period of sixty days, prescribed by Section 93 of the Himachal Act, That time was to be excluded, even if under the rules, it was not necessary to file the copy of the order with the application for revision, vide Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S Chettyar AIR 1928 PC 103. After deducting the time, spent in obtaining the copy of the order of the Nyaya Panchayat, the application for revision, was, admittedly, within time. The Sub-Divisional Judge should have decided the application for revision on merits and should not have dismissed it as time-barred. By refusing to so decide the application, on merits, he failed to exercise jurisdiction, vested in him by law. His order is without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The petition is allowed. The order of the Sub-Divisional Judge, holding that the application for revision was barred by time, is quashed by a writ of certiorari. The Sub-Divisional Judge is directed to dispose of the application for revision on merits in accordance with law.
BI/D.H.Z
13. Petition allowed.
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