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Budhu v. Nahru And Others

Himachal Pradesh High Court
May 12, 1956
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Judgment Summary — Two Revision Petitions (Civil Revision Nos. 38/55 and 53/54)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two revision petitions involving common points were decided together. The principal disputes concern the evidentiary value of entries in the Khewat Abadi of Nagar Mandi (mutations recorded by a Patwari reflecting orders sanctioned by the former Ruler of Mandi), questions of possession and limitation, and whether one of the suits (leading to Civil Revision No. 53 of 1954) was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

The learned District Judge had made factual findings: (a) entries in the Khewat Abadi were made by the Patwari but there was nothing on record establishing those entries as within the Patwari's official duty; (b) the Ruler of Mandi had sanctioned mutation orders in favour of the plaintiff but such sanctions did not ipso facto prove sale or title; (c) Mt. Kubjan had asserted ownership and remained in possession until her death in 1949; (d) in one suit (related to CR 53/54) the defendants had been in possession of the entire area comprised in two khasra numbers since an earlier period, giving rise to a limitation/Order 2 Rule 2 objection to a subsequent suit.

The two revision petitions challenged the District Judge's conclusions; they were heard and dismissed by the court with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the evidentiary value of an entry in the Khewat Abadi (mutations recorded by a Patwari) and whether such entries, or the Ruler's mutation orders, by themselves constitute proof of ownership or title?
  2. Whether the Ruler of Mandi's sanction of mutations amounted to sovereign acts (analogous to a firman) that were final and unchallengeable, thereby establishing title?
  3. Whether possession by certain persons (notably Mt. Kubjan and the defendants) matured into ownership by adverse possession or extinguished the plaintiffs' rights, with attendant implications under limitation law.
  4. Whether the suit underlying Civil Revision No. 53 of 1954 was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC because the defendants were in possession of the entire area at the time of the first suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Plaintiffs') Arguments — as advanced by Mr. D.N. Vaidya

  • The mutation orders passed by the Ruler of Mandi were final and unchallengeable because the Ruler acted as the supreme Executive, Judicial and Legislative Head of the State — analogous to sovereign firmans which bind rights.
  • Entries in the Khewat Abadi and prior mutation orders raised a presumption in favour of correctness (relying on precedent authorities to that effect).
  • Non-payment of rent by Mt. Kubjan could not alter her status as tenant; the plaintiff claimed to be in possession through Mt. Kubjan and therefore her possession could not be adverse to the plaintiff.
  • In relation to the second suit (CR 53/54), there were two distinct causes of action and therefore the later suit was not barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC.

Contestant Respondents' Arguments — as noted in the opinion

  • The facts differ from the authorities cited by petitioners; a mutation order sanctioned by the Ruler does not by itself constitute proof of ownership or title.
  • Prior to merger (15-4-1948), Mandi law (the Mandi Land Revenue Regulation and the Transfer of Immovable Property Regulation) established that the Darbar/Raja was the supreme owner and that no land could be alienated without Ruler's sanction — the Ruler's sanction under those Regulations amounted to approval of a change in the record, not conferral of title.
  • The plaintiff failed to prove that Mt. Kubjan was his tenant (no evidence of rent paid or recognition), so the plaintiff could not claim possession through her.
  • As to the barred suit point, the defendants were in possession of the entire area comprised in the two khasra numbers at the time of the earlier suit, meaning there was one cause of action and the later suit was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC (counsel Mr. D.R. Chaudhary relied on the principle that possession of open sites goes with possession of the property to which they adjoin).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamakhya Narain Singh v. Abhiman Singh, AIR 1934 PC 182 Presumption in favour of correctness of an entry in the survey Khewat (entry raises a presumption unless rebutted). The court noted the authority but found the present facts different and that the precedent did not help the petitioners because the issue was whether a mutation order by the Ruler alone proved ownership.
Kondavitti Brahmayya v. Rajeswaraswami Temple, AIR 1953 Mad 580 Recital in an Inam Register has great evidentiary value in absence of the original grant. Cited by petitioners; court did not adopt it as controlling because the present case involved Ruler's sanction under different regulatory background and did not establish title per se.
Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 139 Recital of ekrarnama/terms in ancient public documents furnishes strong evidence of existence and genuineness of such documents. Noted by petitioners; court distinguished it as not directly applicable to a mutation approval by a Ruler under Mandi Regulations.
Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum, AIR 1955 SC 352 Firmans of a sovereign (Nizam) were expressions of sovereign will, binding as law and could override other laws while they remained in force. Petitioners relied on analogy; the court held the analogy did not help because the present case concerned an approval required by Regulation, not a sovereign firman conferring or creating title.
Wali Mahomed v. Mahomed Baksh, AIR 1930 PC 91 Entries in Record-of-Rights are not foundations of title but mere items of evidence for a vendee to prove sale. Adopted by the court to support the proposition that Khewat entries and revenue records are evidentiary and do not themselves create title.
Mehar Singh v. Hukmf, AIR 1949 Him Pra 22 Entries in revenue records do not confer title. Relied upon by the learned District Judge and endorsed by the court to assert that mutation/record entries do not automatically confer title.
Bhagtu & Others v. Wazir Moti Ram & Others, AIR 1951 J & K 14 It is a question of fact which particular jurisdiction the Ruler was exercising; the nature of the Ruler's act (judicial/executive/other) must be ascertained in each case. Cited to show that whether a Ruler's order amounts to an act of sovereign authority depends on facts; court used it to reject the general proposition that Ruler's sanction is necessarily an unchallengeable sovereign act.
Firm Pariteshah Sadashiv v. Asst. Custodian of Evacuee Property, 54 Pun LR 468 / AIR 1953 Punj 21 Relationship of landlord and tenant arises from agreement, express or implied; possession and acts of ownership matter. Used to support the District Judge's finding that no agreement or acts establishing tenancy (or rent payment) were proved, so plaintiff could not rely on title alone for ejectment.
Mahomed Ibrahim v. Shaida Mahomed, AIR 1930 Lah 297 In ejectment suits, plaintiff cannot rest on title alone; under limitation law a plaintiff must prove acts of ownership within twelve years. Applied to hold that declaratory relief does not prevent limitation from running and that plaintiffs failed to show requisite acts of ownership during limitation period.
Chenchu Rama Reddy v. Ademma, AIR 1949 Mad 673 Similar principle: in ejectment suits plaintiff must show acts of ownership within limitation period; title alone insufficient. Applied alongside Mahomed Ibrahim to support the court's conclusion about limitation and necessity of proving acts of ownership.
Bhalla Singh v. Jagat Singh, AIR 1929 Lah 669 Authority relied upon to assert that possession follows title. The court found the case inapplicable on facts and rejected the petitioners' reliance on it, accepting the District Judge's contrary finding about actual possession.
Mahamedsaheb Ibrahimsaheb v. Tilokchand Abherchand, AIR 1922 Bom 243 Possession of open sites goes naturally with the possession of the property to which they adjoin. Adopted by respondent's counsel and accepted by the court to support the conclusion that possession of the whole area (including open site) belonged to the defendants at the time of the first suit, making the subsequent suit barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise analysis, confined to the facts and legal materials in the record:

  1. Value of Khewat Abadi entries: The District Judge had observed no material showing under what law the Khewat Abadi was prepared or that making such entries was within the Patwari's official duty. Although Section 35 of the Evidence Act makes certain official entries relevant, the court agreed that mere entries by a Patwari, without evidence they were made in discharge of official duty, do not conclusively establish title.
  2. Distinction from cited authorities: Petitioners relied on cases (e.g., Kamakhya Narain Singh, Kondavitti Brahmayya, Biswambhar Singh) that treat certain public entries or recitals as raising presumptions of correctness. The court distinguished those authorities on the basis that the present issue was whether a mutation order sanctioned by the Ruler of Mandi alone constituted proof of ownership — a different question.
  3. Nature of the Ruler's sanction: Petitioners argued by analogy to sovereign firmans (Ameer-un-Nissa Begum) that the Ruler's mutations were final. The court analyzed the regulatory background (Mandi Land Revenue Regulation and Transfer of Immovable Property Regulation) and concluded that the Ruler's sanction in this context meant approval of a substitution of names in the mutation register, not conferral or perfection of title where title was lacking.
  4. Need for sale-deed and Nazrana: The court agreed with the District Judge that the Ruler's approval did not ipso facto prove a sale. It was necessary for parties to execute a sale-deed, register it and pay Nazrana (as required under the Regulations) for alienation to be effective.
  5. Possession and limitation: On facts the District Judge had found that Mt. Kubjan asserted ownership of the house in 1934 and remained in possession until her death in 1949. The court applied authorities on ejectment and limitation (Mahomed Ibrahim, Chenchu Rama Reddy) to hold that a plaintiff cannot win ejectment on title alone and must show acts of ownership within the statutory period. Because plaintiff failed to show Mt. Kubjan was his tenant or that requisite acts of ownership were done, plaintiffs' rights were held to be extinguished during Mt. Kubjan's lifetime; the plaintiff therefore lacked locus to eject successors in possession (e.g., Zalam).
  6. Possession in Civil Revision 53/54: The District Judge found on facts that the defendants (Nahru, etc.) had been in possession since 1921 and in possession of the entire area comprised in Khasra Nos. 2526 and 2527 when the earlier suit was filed. The court accepted the reasoning (endorsing the principle that possession of open sites normally goes with possession of adjoining property) and concluded there was only one cause of action; therefore the later suit was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC.
  7. Conclusion on relief sought: Because the lower appellate court's factual findings and legal conclusions were supported by the record and applicable principles, there was no ground to interfere with the District Judge's decisions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The two revision petitions (Nos. 38/55 and 53/54) are dismissed / rejected. The petitions were dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 30 for each revision petition, payable to the respective contesting respondents.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The District Judge's determinations (that entries in Khewat Abadi and Ruler's mutation sanctions do not, by themselves, establish title; that the plaintiff failed to prove tenancy or acts of ownership within the requisite period; and that the suit underlying Civil Revision 53/54 was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC) are affirmed and the petitions are dismissed with costs.
  • No broader precedent announced: The opinion distinguishes earlier authorities on the specific facts and regulatory background at issue and does not purport to lay down any novel or sweeping rule beyond the conclusions reached; it reaffirmed the established principles that revenue or record entries are evidentiary (not conclusive of title) and that acts of ownership and factual possession govern limitation and ejectment claims.

Final disposition: Petitions dismissed. Costs: Rs. 30 each (payable to respective contesting respondents).

Source: Opinion text provided for summary. This summary reflects only information explicitly contained in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. These two revision petitions can be disposed of conveniently by means of one judgment, as they involve common points for determination. In the case of Civil Revision No. 53 of 1954, a further point for determination arises, as to whether the suit giving rise to it was barred by the provisions of O. 2, R. 2 of the CPC. I shall refer to that point also in due course. The first point to be considered in both the revision petitions is the value of an entry in the Khewat Abadi of Nagar Mandi. The learned District Judge has remarked that there was nothing on the record to show under what law the Khewat Abadi was prepared and what evidentiary value should be attached to the entries therein. He has further remarked that under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, an entry in any public or other official book, register or record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person, in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country, is itself a relevant fact.

2. Entries in question were made by the Patwari, but in the opinion of the learned District Judge, there was nothing to indicate that it was a part of his official duties to make such entries. The entries in the Khewat Abadi, followed certain mutations ordered by the former Ruler of Mandi State, in favour of the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the petitioner (Mr. D.N Vaidya) argued that the mutation orders were passed by the Ruler in his capacity as the supreme Executive, Judicial and Legislative Head of the State, and consequently were final and unchallengeable.

3. In support of his argument, Mr. Vaidya cited, inter alia,

(1) — ‘Kamakhya Narain Singh v. Abhiman Singh’, AIR 1934 PC 182 (A), wherein, their Lordships of the Privy Council expressed their opinion that an entry in the survey Khewat raised a presumption in favour of its correctness which continued unless it was rebutted.

(2) ‘Kondavitti Brahmayya v. Rajeswaraswami Temple’, AIR 1953 Mad 580 (B), where a Division Bench of that High Court observed that in the absence of the original grant, the recital in the Inam Register was of great evidentiary value.

(3) ‘Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa’, AIR 1954 SC 139 (C). There the Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that:

“Recital of ekrarnama and its terms in ancient public document like Rubakari, whose authority has not been doubted, furnishes a strong evidence of the existence and genuineness of the ekrarnama and its terms.”

4. As the learned counsel for the contesting respondent rightly pointed out the facts of the present case are different. Here, we have to see whether a mutation order sanctioned by the Ruler of Mandi by itself, would constitute proof of ownership. The above-rulings, therefore, would not help the petitioners.

5. In support of his argument that the orders of the Ruler of Mandi were final and unchallengeable, Mr. Vaidya cited, — ‘Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum’, AIR 1955 SC 352 (D), where dealing with the force of Finnans, issued by the Nizam of Hyderabad, their Lordships observed as follows:

“Prior to the integration of Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed uncontrolled sovereign powers. He was the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive, and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities.

The finnans were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were binding in the same way as any other law; nay, they would override all other laws, which were in conflict with them. So long as a particular firman held the field, that alone would govern or regulate the rights of the parties concerned, though it could be annulled or modified by a later firman, at any time that the Nizam willed.”

6. On the same analogy, Mr. Vaidya urged that the mutations sanctioned by the Ruler of Mandi in favour of the petitioners were the acts of the sovereign and therefore were final and conclusive. We have to consider the value of the mutation orders. In — ‘Wali Mahomed v. Mahomed Baksh’, AIR 1930 PC 91 (E), their Lordships of the Privy Council indicated that:

“The entries in the Record-of-Rights are not the foundations of the title but are mere items of evidence to be adduced by a vendee to prove the sale.”

7. The learned District Judge has also referred to an earlier decision of this Court, reported in — ‘Mehar Singh v. Hukmf’, AIR 1949 Him Pra 22 (F), wherein my learned predecessor had pointed out that entries in revenue records do not confer any title. As regards the claim that the mutation orders were acts of the Sovereign and, therefore, could not be challenged, the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has rightly remarked that the orders sanctioning the mutations do not amount to acts of a sovereign. He has referred to — ‘Bhagtu & Others…Applts; v. Wazir Moti Ram & Others…Resps.’, AIR 1951 J & K 14 (G), wherein their Lordships of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir observed that it is a question of fact in each case which particular jurisdiction the Ruler was exercising.

8. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent pointed out that prior to the merger of the Mandi State in the Union of India, which took place on 15-4-1948, the law applicable to Mandi is to be found in Mandi Land Revenue Regulation, 1975, and the Transfer of Immovable Property Regulation also of 1975 S. Under S. 15 of the former Regulation, the Darbar was the supreme owner and sole proprietor of all land in the State.

9. Section 2 of the latter Regulation lays down that all land within Mandi State belonged absolutely to the Raja as sole proprietor, whether such land be used for agriculture or for any other purpose. Further, no land could be alienated without the sanction of the Ruler. It is in this back-ground we have to judge the value of the mutation orders which were sanctioned by the Ruler. In my view, the true purport of the sanctions is that the Ruler agreed to the substitution of the names in the mutation register and not that he conferred or perfected title where it was lacking or deficient.

10. The learned District Judge has rightly pointed out that the Ruler's approval did not, ipso facto, prove the sale. It was necessary for the parties to execute a sale-deed and get it registered, after payment of Nazrana. In Civil Revision No. 38 of 1955, it may be pointed out, that the mere direction that Mt. Kubjan be recorded as tenant of the plaintiff would not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.

11. As was pointed out in — ‘Firm Pariteshah Sadashiv v. Asst. Custodian of Evacuee Property’, 54 Pun LR 468 : (AIR 1953 Punj 21) (H), referred to by the learned District Judge, the relationship of the landlord and tenant comes into existence as the result of an agreement, express or implied. On the facts, the lower appellate Court has rightly found that there was no evidence to show that Mt. Kubjan had ever paid any rent to the plaintiff or recognized him as her landlord.

12. Thus, I concur with the view of the lower appellate Court that the order of the Ruler of Mandi sanctioning mutation in favour of the plaintiff and directing that the name of Mt. Kubjan be recorded as a tenant of the plaintiff would not relieve the plaintiff of the burden to establish his case affirmatively, by cogent and convincing evidence.

13. This principle would hold good in the case of both the revision petitions. The decision contained in the AIR 1955 SC 352 (D), (referred to earlier) would not help the plaintiffs-petitioners because, here, we are not concerned with any Firman but only an approval given by a Ruler to the alienation of land as required by the Regulations then in force.

14. In the second place, Mr. Vaidya contended that the learned District Judge has erred in holding that Mt. Kubjan's possession matured into ownership before her death (in Civil Revision 38 of 55) and that the defendants had been in possession of the land in dispute openly and notoriously for more than 30 years and accordingly became owners thereof (in C.R 53 of 54).

15. As far as Mt. Kubjan is concerned, it was urged by Mr. Vaidya that non-payment of rent could not change her status. It was further contended that the plaintiff was in possession through Mt. Kubjan and her possession could never be adverse as against the plaintiff. I have already pointed out that the plaintiff failed to show that Mt. Kubjan was his tenant. Therefore, it is not open to mm to say that he was in possession through Mt. Kubjan. On the facts, the District Judge has found that in 1534 Mt. Kubjan asserted her right of ownership in the house and she remained in possession till her death in 1949.

16. As was pointed out in — ‘Mahomed Ibrahim v. Shaida Mahomed’, AIR 1930 Lah 297 (I) and — ‘Chenchu Rama Reddy v. Ademma’, AIR 1949 Mad 673 (J), in suits for ejectment against a person in occupation of immovable property the plaintiff cannot rest his case on title alone. Under Article 142, it is incumbent upon him to prove that he has exercised acts of ownership within 12 years of suit. The mere fact that the plaintiff obtained a declaratory decree would not prevent the statute of limitation from running against him. Mt. Kubjan has died. Mr. Vaidya argued that since Zalam is not proved ta be her heir, he is liable to be ejected, unless his possession matures into ownership. The learned District Judge has rightly pointed out that the plaintiffs' rights, if any, were extinguished during the life time of Mt. Kubjan and, therefore, he has no locus standi to eject Zalam. I concur with that view.

17. In Civil Revision 53 of 1954, the learned District Judge has found on facts that Nahru defendant had been in possession of the land and the house since 1921 A.D There is considerable force in the observation of the District Judge that it was hardly probable that the defendants remained in possession only in the house and allowed the plaintiff to occupy the open site around it, i.e the compound, backyard and Swaru. I am unable, therefore, to accept Mr. Vaidya's argument that in possession follows title. ‘Bhalla Singh v. Jagat Singh’, AIR 1929 Lah 669 (K), cited by him, is, therefore, not applicable to the present case. In my opinion, the learned District Judge's finding on the point of possession and limitation is correct and cannot be interfered with.

18. In Civil Revision 53 of 1954, there is a lurther point to be considered (as already stated in the opening portion of this judgment) namely, that the suit giving rise to that revision petition was barred by the provisions of O. 2, R. 2 of the CPC, the learned District Judge has found that when the plaintiff filed suit No. 43 of 52 against the defendants in the Court of Sri Karam Singh, they (the defendants) were in possession of the entire area of Khasra Nos. 2526 and 2527.

19. It was, therefore, incumbent upon him to sue for the ejectment of the defendants from the entire area comprised in these two khasra numbers. The allegation made by the plaintiff that the defendants had encroached upon the remaining area only 4 months before the second suit was filed, was rejected by the District Judge as obviously wrong. Mr. Vaidya for the petitioner argued that there were two distinct causes of action giving rise to the two suits.

20. Therefore, it was contended that the second suit was not barred by the provisions of O. 2, R. 2. Mr. D.R Chaudhary for the respondents rightly pointed out that there was only one cause of action because the defendants were in possession over the entire area. Mr. Chaudhary cited — ‘Mahamedsaheb Ibrahimsaheb v. Tilokchand Abherchand’, AIR 1922 Bom 243 (L), where a Division Bench of that High Court remarked that:

“Possession of open sites goes naturally with the possession of the property to which they adjoin.”

21. Under these circumstances, I concur with the view of the District Judge that the suit leading to Civil Revision 53/54, was barred by the provisions of O. 2, R. 2. In view of all that has been said above, I see no ground for interfering with the decisions of the learned District judge.

22. The two revision petitions Nos. 38/55 and 53/54 are, accordingly, rejected, with costs assessed at Rs. 30/- (for each revision petition), payable to the respective contesting respondents. This order will be read in both the petitions.

V.R.B

23. Petitions dismissed.