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Sada Ram And Another v. Chhotu Ram .
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was instituted by two employers against an order of the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Bilaspur, which awarded compensation to a workman (the respondent). The Commissioner’s order was dated 16-3-1955. Under S.30(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act the period of limitation for an appeal to this Court is sixty days. The memorandum of appeal was presented on 7-5-1955 (within the sixty-day period), but it was not accompanied by the certificate of the Commissioner evidencing deposit of the compensation amount, as required by proviso (3) to S.30(1) of the Act.
The Deputy Registrar granted the appellants 10 days (on 20-5-1955) to produce the necessary certificate. The appellants' counsel received the papers on 27-5-1955 and on 7-6-1955 applied for further time, explaining that his clients were in the interior and had not received his letter. The papers were returned on the Registrar's order dated 16-6-1955. The compensation amount was ultimately deposited with the Commissioner on 5-7-1955 — which was after the expiry of the period of limitation (calculated to have expired on 21-6-1955, even leaving aside the time taken to obtain a copy of the Commissioner's order). An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, with affidavit(s), was filed on behalf of the appellants seeking condonation of the delay; the respondent filed a reply opposing condonation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal by an employer, presented within the statutory period but not accompanied by the Commissioner’s certificate of deposit required by proviso (3) to S.30(1), is competent or whether the omission is fatal to the appeal's limitation/competency.
- Whether the delay in depositing the compensation amount (and in producing the Commissioner’s certificate) — i.e., deposit made after the expiry of the statutory period — can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground of a bona fide mistake.
- Whether the appellants' conduct (including alleged negligence or inaction) permits invocation of Section 5 to extend time for compliance with the statutory condition.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants argued that because the memorandum of appeal was presented within the period of limitation, the subsequent delay in furnishing the Commissioner’s certificate should not affect the limitation or the competency of the appeal.
- In support of condonation under Section 5, the appellants relied on authorities asserting a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" and argued that the omission resulted from a bona fide mistake or a lack of awareness of procedural requirements.
- Counsel for the appellants (Mr. Sud) explained that communications to the appellants were delayed because the clients were in the interior, and sought further time when the defect was pointed out.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended the appeal was incompetent because the deposit was made after the expiry of the period of limitation, and therefore the appellate forum lacked jurisdiction given the statutory condition in proviso (3) to S.30(1).
- On the Section 5 application, the respondent maintained that the omission was mala fide or, at least, the result of negligence or inaction; consequently, the delay should not be condoned.
- The respondent pointed out that the defect was brought to the appellants' counsel’s attention by the Deputy Registrar well within the limitation period (on 27-5-1955), yet no timely steps were taken to comply.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ohene Moore v. Akesseh Tayee, AIR 1935 PC 5 | Statutory conditions that deny jurisdiction must be respected; if statute provides no jurisdiction in certain events, courts cannot assume jurisdiction even to do substantial justice. | The Court used the principle to support that failure to comply with a statutory requirement (deposit/certificate) is jurisdictional and cannot be overlooked as a mere technicality. |
| Kishen Lal L.R. of Mohan Lal v. Sohan Lal, AIR 1954 Raj 138 (Full Bench) | The right of appeal is a creature of statute and may be circumscribed by statutory restrictions; courts must look to the statute to determine if a right of appeal exists. | The Court cited this authority to reinforce that statutory conditions can lawfully restrict the right of appeal and that such restrictions must be enforced. |
| Ramnivas Khandelwal v. Mt. Mariam, AIR 1951 Pat 260 | Consideration of whether non-production of a statutory certificate within the period of limitation renders an appeal time-barred; in that case delay was condoned under S.5 because counsel was unfamiliar with procedure. | The Court distinguished that case: because in the present matter the defect was pointed out well within the limitation period yet not remedied, the Patna ruling did not assist the appellants. |
| Karali Charan v. Apurba Krishna, AIR 1931 Cal 298 | The language of S.5 permits extension of time if sufficient cause is shown; when an appeal is presented after limitation, only the period of delay must be explained and antecedent inaction or negligence need not always be considered. | The appellants relied on this for condonation; the Court acknowledged the principle but concluded that the appellants' antecedent negligence was present and therefore the principle did not favour them. |
| Kayambu Pillai v. Court of Wards, AIR 1942 Mad 170 | "Sufficient cause" in S.5 should be liberally construed to advance substantial justice, particularly where no negligence or want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant. | The appellants cited this for liberality; the Court found, however, that negligence and lack of due care were imputable to the appellants, so the principle did not result in condonation here. |
| Ashutosh Bhadra v. Jatindra Mohan, AIR 1954 Cal 238 | "Sufficient cause" must be beyond the control of the party; delay due to negligence which could have been avoided by care and attention is not sufficient cause for condonation under S.5. | The Court relied on the reasoning that negligence will not constitute sufficient cause; finding the appellants negligent, it declined to condone the delay under S.5. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by first establishing the relevant statutory timeline and requirements. The Commissioner’s order was dated 16-3-1955. Under S.30(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act the appeal period is sixty days; thus the period expired on 21-6-1955 (even if the time to obtain the copy of the order is excluded). Although the memorandum of appeal was filed on 7-5-1955 (within the statutory period), it lacked the certificate from the Commissioner certifying that the compensation amount had been deposited — a certificate required by proviso (3) to S.30(1).
The Court treated the certificate requirement as a condition precedent to the institution of an appeal by an employer to this Court: non-compliance goes to the competency of the appeal. The Court relied on authorities which establish that statutory conditions restricting a right of appeal must be observed and that courts cannot assume jurisdiction where statute denies it (citing Ohene Moore and Kishen Lal). The Court considered but distinguished Ramnivas Khandelwal (where condonation had been granted) on the facts: in Ramnivas the counsel was unfamiliar with the procedure and the certificate was not produced in time, whereas here the omission was pointed out to appellants' counsel within the limitation period (27-5-1955), yet no timely compliance followed.
Turning to the Section 5 application, the appellants' sole ground was a "bona fide mistake" or lack of awareness of the legal requirement. The Court reviewed authorities on "sufficient cause" under S.5 that advocate liberal construction in appropriate cases (Karali Charan; Kayambu Pillai) but balanced those against decisions holding that negligence or inaction that could have been avoided is not sufficient (Ashutosh Bhadra). Applying these principles to the instant facts, the Court found that the appellants (represented by experienced counsel and informed in the appeal heading of S.30) had been negligent and had not acted with due care even after the defect was specifically pointed out by the Deputy Registrar well within the limitation period. Because the appellants were culpably negligent and the delay was avoidable, the Court concluded that no sufficient cause existed to extend time under S.5.
Consequently, the Court held that a memorandum of appeal presented within the period of limitation but not accompanied by the Commissioner’s certificate of deposit does not preserve the appeal from being time-barred; the Section 5 application did not furnish a sufficient cause for condonation on these facts.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court's final decision was to reject the appeal. The operative ruling is emphasized as follows:
APPEAL DISMISSED (rejected with costs).
Implications:
- Direct effect: The appeal was held to be incompetent because the statutory condition (certificate of deposit by the Commissioner required by proviso (3) to S.30(1)) was not satisfied within the period of limitation, and the deposit occurred after the expiry of the limitation period. The Court refused to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and dismissed the appeal with costs.
- Broader implications: The opinion enforces the view that certain statutory conditions for appeal are jurisdictional and that condonation under S.5 will not be granted where the delay arises from negligence or inaction that could have been avoided. The opinion did not state that it was laying down a new precedent beyond applying existing authorities and distinguishing facts where appropriate.
Signature block in the opinion: "V.S.B" and the order concludes: "Appeal dismissed."
1. In this appeal by two employers against an order awarding compensation by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Bilaspur, learned counsel for the workman-respondent urged, at the hearing on 20-12-55 that the appeal was incompetent, because the amount of compensation was deposited with the Commissioner, after the expiry of the period of limitation for filing an appeal. In answer to that objection, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, accompanied by an affidavit, was put in on behalf of the appellants soon afterwards. A further affidavit was filed on the 21st instant by Bhagat Ram, appellant. A reply to the application was filed by the respondent yesterday.
2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and, in my opinion, for reasons to be stated shortly, no case is made out for condoning the delay in depositing the amount of compensation with the Commissioner and since the deposit was made after the expiry of the period of limitation for appeal, the appeal cannot be entertained.
3. The following dates are significant. The order under appeal was passed by the Commissioner Workmen's Compensation, Bilaspur, on 16-3-1955. Under S. 30(2), Workmen's Compensation Act, the period of limitation for an appeal to this Court is sixty days. Even if we leave out of consideration the time spent by the appellants in obtaining a copy of the Commissioner's order (18-3-1955 to 23-4-1955 i.e 37 days), the period of limitation expired on 21-6-1955. It is true that the memorandum of appeal was presented on 7-5-1955, i.e, within the period of limitation. But it was not accompanied by a certificate of the Commissioner to the effect that the compensation amount had been deposited with him, as required by proviso (3) to S. 30(1) of the Act.
4. On 20-5-1955, the Deputy Registrar of this Court granted the appellants 10 days time to produce the necessary certificate, i.e, to the effect that the amount, in question, had been deposited with the Commissioner. The papers were handed over to Mr. M.L Sud, Advocate for the appellants, on 27-5-1955, vide serial no. 1432 of the Dak Bahi of the Senior Sub-ordinate Judge's Court, Bilaspur. On 7-6-1955, i.e, after the expiry of the said period of 10 days' learned counsel for the appellants put in an application, which is to be found at page 3 of the appellate record, wherein he-stated that he had sent intimation to his clients, but they were in the interior of the district and 1 it appeared they had not received his letter.
5. Consequently, he asked for three weeks further time. The papers were again returned to the appellants' counsel by the order of the Registrar dated 16-6-1955. The amount was finally deposited with the Commissioner on 5-7-1955, i.e, 14 days after the expiry of the period of limitation, (leaving, out of account, time spent in obtaining copy of the Commissioner's order).
6. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties may be divided into two portions.
7. (A) In the first place, learned counsel for the appellants argued that since the appeal had been presented within the period of limitation, the-delay in furnishing, the certificate could not affect limitation, nor the competency of the appeal. I am unable to accept this argument. As learned counsel for the respondent rightly pointed out, proviso (3) to S. 30(1) of the Act makes it clear that no appeal by an employer lies to this Court against the order of the Commissioner, unless the-memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the compensation amount has been deposited with him.
8. In this connection, Mr. Anand cited the following rulings (1) Ohene Moore v. Akesseh Tayee, AIR 1935 PC 5 (A). That was an appeal from the judgment of the West African Court of appeal, Gold Coast Session, reversing an appellate decision of the Provincial Commissioner of the West ern Province, by whom the judgment of the Native Tribunal of the Omanhene of Beyin had been reversed. Under the rules regulating appeals from Native Tribunals to the Provincial Commissioner, leave to appeal from Tribunal could not be granted unless and until the appellant had deposited a sum of money sufficient to defray the costs before the Tribunal. In the particular case, such deposit was not made. This was pointed out to the Provincial Commissioner, who brushed it aside-as a technicality. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that:
“The objection lies in limine, in that the Provincial Commissioner had no jurisdiction at all; and therefore, the reference to these powers, unfortunately, is irrelevant to the question of the Provincial Commissioner being able to give relief. It is quite true that their Lordships, as every other Court, attempt to do substantial justice and to avoid technicalities; but their Lordships, like any other Court, are bound by the statute law, and if the statute law says there shall be no jurisdiction in a certain event, and that event has occurred, then it is impossible for their Lordships or for any other Court to have jurisdiction.”
9. Under those circumstances, their Lordships held that the decision of the Provincial Commissioner was rightly reversed by the West African Court of appeal.
2. Kishen Lal L.R of Mohan Lal v. Sohan Lal, AIR 1954 Raj 138 (B). There, a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, while considering the rules applicable to appeals to the Ijlas-i-khas of Jodhpur State, observed that:
“Learned counsel next urged that the interpretation favoured by us would restrict the right of appeal to a very large degree in cases involving disputes as to jagir lands which in spite of their value being less than Rs. 5,000/- the ordinary appealable limit, were of considerable importance in the times to which these Ijlas-i-khas rules relate. To this, our short answer is and must be, that a right of appeal is a creation of statute, and it is to the statute alone, that we must look to determine whether such a right exists in a particular instance or not. Further, we see nothing unreasonable or wrong that a right of appeal to the highest Tribunal in the State was circumscribed by certain well defined restrictions.”
3. Ramnivas Khandelwal v. Mt. Mariam, AIR 1951 Pat 260 (C). There, the facts were that an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act was filed in time, but it was not accompanied by the certificate of the Commissioner. By the time the certificate was furnished, limitation had expired. Sarjoo Prasad J., doubted whether the non-production of the certificate, within the period of limitation, would result in the appeal becoming time-barred. He was pleased, however, to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground that appeals under the Workmen's Compensation Act were not very common and the procedure of filing a certificate was not known to the counsel.
10. The facts of the present case are, how-ever, different. Here, as already pointed out, the omission was pointed out to the appellants' counsel well within the period of limitation (i.e 25 days before limitation was due to expire), but still the certificate was not produced within time. Therefore, the Patna ruling would not help the appellants.
11. In view of what has been said above, I am of the opinion, having regard to Proviso (3) to S. 30(1) of the Act, that a memorandum of appeal by an employer presented within the period of limitation, but unaccompanied by a certificate of deposit issued by the Commissioner, will not save limitation.
12. B. We now come to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The only ground given in the application and in the accompanying affidavit is that the appellants were not aware of the legal requirements and it was due to a ‘bona fide mistake’ that the deposit was not made within the period of limitation. The respondent, in his reply, maintains that the omission to make the deposit was mala fide and deliberate. In this connection. Mr. Anand pointed out that the defect was brought to the notice of the appellants' counsel by the Deputy Registrar of this Court on 27-5-1955, i.e, within the period of limitation, but no steps were taken to make the deposit within time. Mr. Sud cited, firstly, Karali Charan v. Apurba Krishna, AIR 1931 Cal 298 (D), where a Division Bench of that High Court indicated that:
“The language of S. 5, as it stands, is capable of only one construction, namely that the right to present an appeal extends upto the very last day and, if on account of sufficient cause, it could not be presented on the last date and if the Court, is satisfied with the existence of such a cause the time may be extended.”
“Where therefore an appeal is presented some days after the period of limitation has run out, it is only the delay of those days that must be explained in making out a sufficient cause for the extension of time. The antecedent in-action or negligence of the appellant should not be taken into consideration.”
13. Secondly, Kayambu Pillai v. Court of Wards, AIR 1942 Mad 170 (E), where a learned Judge of that High Court observed that:
“The words ‘sufficient cause’ in S. 5 must be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice, particularly when no negligence, nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant.”
14. Mr. Anand for the respondent contended that these rulings, if anything, go against the appellants, because delay can be condoned under S. 5, only when the appellants can show that they have not been guilty of negligence or inaction or want of bona fides. Mr. Anand pointed out that the appeal was filed by a senior advocate of this Court. In the heading of the appeal, reference is made clearly to S. 30 to the Act.
15. A bare perusal of the section would have shown to anyone, even a layman, that no appeal by an employer lay unless the amount in question was first deposited with the Commissioner. It was urged that the delay could have been easily avoided if the appellants had taken care to consult their lawyer as to what steps were to be taken in connection with the appeal. Reference was made, in this connection to Ashutosh Bhadra v. Jatindra Mohan, AIR 1954 Cal 238 (P), where Sinha, J. observed that:
“The existence of ‘sufficient cause’ is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion under S. 5. ‘Sufficient cause’ must mean a cause beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the section. A cause for delay which a party could have avoided by the exercise of the care and attention cannot be a sufficient cause. In other words, the Court must be able to say, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, that the delay was reasonable. A cause arising from the negligence of the party cannot be a ‘sufficient cause’ within the meaning of S. 5.”
16. In this state of affairs, I am contained to remark that the appellants have been very negligent and acted without due care and attention. They did not wake up even after being asked to furnish the certificate. Consequently, no indulgence can be shown to them, nor can delay be condoned under S. 5. The result is the appeal cannot be entertained. It is, accordingly, rejected with costs.
V.S.B
17. Appeal dismissed.
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