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Roop Singh v. Nirmoo .
Factual and Procedural Background
Roop Singh (plaintiff/appellant) filed a suit for declaration of ownership and possession of landed property in several khewats and khasra numbers in Tehsil Chopal, District Mahasu, asserting he was the adopted son of the deceased Ram Singh and was in physical possession. Respondents Shrimati Nirmu (daughter of Ram Singh) and Shri Karam Singh (brother of Ram Singh) claimed title and obtained mutation in the revenue record. Roop Singh applied for interim injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 CPC alleging threatened interference and likely alienation by the respondents. The District Judge, Mahasu, after hearing, rejected the interim injunction application. Roop Singh appealed under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC to this Court challenging that rejection.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant established a prima facie case for grant of interim injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 CPC.
- Whether the appellant would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were refused, and whether the balance of convenience favored grant of injunction.
- Whether the appellant's claim of customary adoption (affecting his title) survives the operation of Section 4 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, for the purposes of interim relief.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Roop Singh claimed he was the adopted son of Ram Singh and the full owner in possession of the disputed property.
- He alleged respondents were likely to interfere with his possession and likely to alienate the property, justifying an interim injunction to protect his interests.
- Impliedly relied on support from the written statement filed by Karam Singh.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondents claimed possession and title, supported by mutation in revenue records (jamabandi entry showing khud kasht for 1966–67).
- Respondents' counsel contended the appellant's claim based on customary adoption was vulnerable because Section 4 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 affects pre-existing customs on matters covered by the Act.
- It was alleged Karam Singh's written statement was collusive and filed to prejudice the case of Nirmu; the statement did not establish appellant's prima facie title against Nirmu.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analysed the requirements for an interim injunction (quia timet): the applicant must show a prima facie case, that irreparable injury will follow if injunction is refused, and that the balance of convenience favors the applicant. The Court noted the jamabandi entry of 1966–67 indicated the respondents' khud kasht possession, supporting a prima facie finding of respondents' possession. The Court found the appellant did not establish a prima facie title; Section 4 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 raised serious objections to the appellant's claim of customary adoption. The written statement of Karam Singh did not strengthen the appellant's case or establish prima facie title against Nirmu. Given lack of prima facie case, the Court concluded the appellant would not suffer irreparable injury and the balance of convenience favored the respondents. Accordingly, the District Judge's rejection of the injunction application was upheld.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Direct effect: The rejection of the appellant's application for interim injunction is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall abide the event and be costs in the suit. No broader precedent or novel legal principle was announced beyond the application of established injunction principles to the facts.
D.B Lal, J.:— This is an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 of the CPC and is directed against the decision of the District Judge, Mahasu, whereby he has rejected the application of the appellant, Roop Singh, for grant of interim injunction under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC.
2. The facts of the case are, that Roop Singh, plaintiff, filed a suit for declaration in respect of landed property situate in various ‘Khewats’ belonging to Chak Mau and some Khasra numbers of Chak Kiri, Pargana Shak as well as Chak Pojarli in Tehsil Chopal of the District of Mahasu. The allegation was, that Roop Singh is adopted son of one Ram Singh who was admittedly the owner of this landed property. It was stated that Roop Singh is in physical possession over the property, but Shrimati Nirmu and Shri Karam Singh, defendants, who are respondents before us, claim to possess title for the property, the former being daughter and the latter being brother of the deceased Ram Singh.
3. They also got mutation in the revenue record in their favour. In this manner some cloud was cast upon the title of Roop Singh and he appeared before the Court for the relief of declaration that he was the full owner of the property and was also in possession over the same.
4. Roop Singh further filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, alleging that his possession was likely to be interfered with by the respondents and that the latter were also likely to alienate this property and therefore interim injunction was required to safeguard his interests.
5. The learned District Judge, Mahasu, after hearing both the parties, found that there was no substance in the application for the relief of interim injunction and he rejected the application. Roop Singh has come up in appeal before this Court against that decision.
6. The relief of interim injunction is in the nature of a preventive relief granted to a litigant quia timet, that is to say, the applicant fears future possible injury. It is then required of him to show before the Court that his claim is founded on a prima facie case and further that irreparable injury will accrue to him if the injunction is not granted to him. The cumulative effect would be that the balance of convenience is in his favour so that the injunction prayed for is a sine qua non to protect his rights. It was, therefore, required of the Court to weigh, if any substantial mischief was likely to be done to the applicant in case the injunction was refused and naturally the Court had to compare the substantial mischief thus claimed to be suffered by the applicant with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. This is important in the present context, because according to the prima facie evidence, which I shall presently discuss, the possession appeared to be with the respondents and a substantial mischief would be caused to them if the injunction is granted to the appellant, because then the latter would be in a position to dislodge the possession of the former and thereby get a relief which he has not even claimed in the suit. We have to safeguard against this mischief which the injunction, if granted, is likely to cause to the respondents.
7. As to the prima facie case, the ‘jamabandi’ entry of 1966-1967 clearly depicts that the disputed property is in the ‘khud kasht’ of the respondents. It could thus be held, at any rate, prima facie, that the respondents are in possession over the property. The appellant cannot be stated to possess a prima facie case as has already been held by the learned District Judge. That being so, he would not suffer any irreparable loss if the injunction is not granted. It naturally follows that the balance of convenience is also in favour of the respondents and the amount of mischief likely to be caused to them is much more than what is expected to be caused to the appellant.
8. It is stated that by virtue of Section 4 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, any custom or usage in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act. In other words, the adoption by custom alleged by the appellant would be seriously affected by the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondents rather asserted vehemently that the very title of the appellant on the basis of customary adoption was open to serious objections. This would naturally affect the prima facie case which could be established in favour of the appellant.
9. It was also contended that Karam Singh, respondent, filed a written statement supporting the case of the appellant. To this, the reply was given that he was in collusion with the appellant and although he was not called upon to file any written statement at that stage of the suit yet he filed it to prejudice the case of Nirmu, respondent. The written statement of Karam Singh, to my mind, does not fortify the case of the appellant nor does it go to establish a prima facie title in his favour and against the interest of Nirmu.
10. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned District Judge rightly held that a prima facie case was not made out in favour of the appellant. It could neither be stated that he would suffer an irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, nor can it be stated that the balance of convenience justifies the grant of the interim relief of injunction. In the result, I do not find any substance in the appeal and the same is dismissed. The costs in this appeal shall abide the event and shall be costs in the suit itself.
11. Appeal dismissed.
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