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Dhariyal Chemicals v. Union Of India

Gujarat High Court
Jul 11, 2008
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — D.A. Mehta, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition was filed by Yogesh Dhariyal, sole proprietor of M/s. Dhariyal Chemicals, challenging administrative action under Rule 12CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and Notification No. 32/2006-C.E.(N.T.) dated 30-12-2006. The petitioner sought multiple writs including striking down Rule 12CC and the Notification, quashing Order No. 6/2008-M(CX)/DA dated 22-2-2008, production of seized documents, and interim relief to permit continued utilisation of CENVAT credit.

On 29-8-2007 preventive Central Excise officers visited the petitioner's factory and seized documents and records (including records of M/s. Ganesh Enterprises, a concern of Shri Ganesh Dutt Joshi). The petitioner alleges he and Shri Joshi were called on various dates and pressured to sign statements; the petitioner filed several affidavits in September 2007. A hearing before the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise (CCCE) was scheduled by letter dated 16-10-2007 (later postponed to 30-10-2007), at which the CCCE personally heard the petitioner, Shri Joshi and Dr. C.D. Dhariyal.

The CCCE forwarded a proposal to the Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBEC). On 22-2-2008 a Member of the CBEC issued Order No. 6/08-M(CX)/DA directing: (i) withdrawal of facility of monthly payment of excise duty under rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, effective 27-2-2008 to 26-5-2008; and (ii) stopping payment of excise duty by utilization of CENVAT credit under rule 3(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, for the same period, while permitting accumulation of CENVAT credit to be utilized after 27-5-2008.

The petitioner challenged the impugned order as violative of principles of natural justice and contended Rule 12CC and the Notification were ultra vires Article 14. The respondents defended the validity of the Rule and Notification and submitted that an opportunity of hearing had been provided (pointing to the letter and written submissions dated 30-10-2007).

The High Court examined the statutory scheme in paragraph 4 of the Notification, found procedural defects in how the CCCE handled the hearing-stage requirements, but ultimately refused to quash the impugned order on equitable grounds. The interim stay that had been in place in respect of paragraph 5(ii) of the impugned order (granted on 3-4-2008) was vacated and that restriction was ordered to be revived from 12-7-2008 for the remainder of the 90-day period after deducting the period from 27-2-2008 to 3-4-2008. The petition was rejected; notice discharged and no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Rule 12CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and Notification No. 32/2006-C.E.(N.T.) are constitutionally valid, in particular whether they are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether Order No. 6/2008-M(CX)/DA dated 22-2-2008 (the impugned order) is liable to be quashed for being passed ex parte and in violation of principles of natural justice (i.e., lack of meaningful opportunity of hearing to the petitioner), particularly in light of paragraph 4(2) of the Notification.
  3. What relief, if any, should be granted to the petitioner given the procedural defects alleged and the factual circumstances (including prior interim orders/stays)?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The impugned order dated 22-2-2008 was ex parte and violated principles of natural justice because the petitioner was not given a proper opportunity of hearing before the CCCE forwarded recommendations to the Board.
  • Rule 12CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and Notification No. 32/2006-C.E.(N.T.) are ultra vires Article 14 because (as contended) the scheme lacks nexus with its objective, violates natural justice, and deprives the assessee of the legitimate right to utilize CENVAT credit.
  • The notice dated 16-10-2007 merely invited the petitioner to a hearing without specifying the purpose or the gravamen of the charge, so the hearing could not have been meaningful.
  • The petitioner relied on his affidavits (filed in September 2007) and the contention that he and Shri Joshi were pressured to sign statements by preventive officers.

Respondents' Arguments

  • No valid case was made out that Rule 12CC or the Notification were ultra vires; the petitioner did not show how they offended the Constitution.
  • An opportunity of hearing had been granted (letter dated 16-10-2007 and the written submissions of 30-10-2007), and given the object and purpose of the Notification (a summary deterrent scheme) a full- fledged full-form hearing like in regular assessment proceedings was not necessary.
  • Not every procedural defect requires court interference unless prejudice to the person complaining is established; the petitioner had not established prejudice in the facts of the case.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner. It first set out undisputed facts (relationship between petitioner and Shri Ganesh Dutt Joshi, co-location and similar manufacture of goods, the facilities the petitioner enjoyed: monthly payment under rule 8(1) Central Excise Rules, 2002 and payment by utilization of CENVAT credit under Rule 3(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004). The Court then addressed the two main strands of challenge: (i) constitutional validity of Rule 12CC and the Notification; and (ii) procedural fairness / natural justice in the making of the impugned order.

On validity: The Court found Rule 12CC to confer power on the Central Government to issue Notifications placing specific restrictions on a specified category of persons, having regard to factors such as extent of evasion of duty and nature/type of offence. The impugned Notification (No. 32/2006) implements a summary scheme intended as a deterrent against tax evaders. The Court concluded that the Rule and the Notification were framed for a specified class of persons and that paragraph 3 of the Notification (monetary limits) established a reasonable nexus with the object. Consequently, the constitutional attack under Article 14 was rejected.

On procedure and natural justice: The Court examined paragraph 4 of the Notification (sub-paragraphs (1)–(3)) and parsed the three-stage scheme:

  1. Stage 1 (para 4(1)): subordinate authority (Commissioner of Central Excise or Additional Director General of CEI) examines records and may forward a proposal to CCCE/Director General within 30 days of detection of the case.
  2. Stage 2 (para 4(2)): CCCE/Director General examines the proposal and, after satisfying himself that records/evidence suffice to form a reasonable belief that the person knowingly committed the offence, may forward the proposal with recommendations to the Board—but before forwarding he must give an opportunity of being heard to the person and consider any representation.
  3. Stage 3 (para 4(3)): an officer authorised by the Board examines recommendations and issues the order specifying facilities/ restrictions and the period of operation (no hearing provision at this final stage is provided in the Notification).

The Court observed that because the subordinate authority’s proposal stage (Stage 1) and the Board’s final order stage (Stage 3) do not require a hearing, the only meaningful stage to provide a hearing is Stage 2 (when CCCE considers the proposal and forms recommendations). The use of the word “may” in para 4(2) indicates a discretion in the CCCE to forward, refuse or modify proposals, and thus the hearing that the Notification requires the CCCE to grant cannot be a mere formality.

The Court explicated what a meaningful hearing entails under para 4(2): the notice calling the person to be heard must briefly indicate the gravamen of the charge and the nature of evidence relied upon so the person can make an effective representation — to reject, or seek modification of, the proposal, and present mitigating circumstances or material perhaps absent from the proposal record.

Applying these principles, the Court held that while a hearing had been held before the CCCE (and written submissions by the petitioner existed), the CCCE had not complied with the statutory requirements in a manner sufficient to render the procedure lawful; the procedure adopted by the CCCE before forwarding the proposal was therefore bad in law.

Despite this procedural illegality, the Court exercised equitable discretion under Article 226 and declined to quash the impugned order because, on the facts and circumstances appearing on record, the petitioner was not entitled to such relief. The Court noted that paragraph 5(i) of the impugned order (withdrawal of monthly payment facility) had already expired (period 27-2-2008 to 26-5-2008). Paragraph 5(ii) (restriction on utilisation of CENVAT credit) had been subject to an ad interim stay granted on 3-4-2008.

Considering that the restriction under paragraph 5(ii) was for a 90-day period, the Court ordered that the earlier ad interim stay of paragraph 5(ii) (operating from 3-4-2008) be vacated and the restriction revived from 12-7-2008 to operate for the remainder of the original 90-day period after deducting the period from 27-2-2008 to 3-4-2008. The petition was therefore rejected; notice discharged; and there was no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is rejected. The Court held that Rule 12CC and Notification No. 32/2006-C.E.(N.T.) are constitutionally valid. Although the procedure adopted by the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise (CCCE) before forwarding recommendations under paragraph 4(2) of the Notification was procedurally defective (the statutory hearing requirement was not complied with in a manner that the Court regarded as sufficient), the Court declined to quash the impugned order on equitable grounds.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • Paragraph 5(i) of the impugned order (withdrawal of facility of monthly payment of excise duty for the period 27-2-2008 to 26-5-2008) has exhausted itself and requires no further action by the parties.
  • The ad interim stay that had been granted on 3-4-2008 in respect of paragraph 5(ii) (restriction on payment by utilization of CENVAT credit) is vacated; paragraph 5(ii) is ordered to be revived from 12-7-2008 and to operate for the remainder of the original 90-day period after deducting the period 27-2-2008 to 3-4-2008.
  • The petition is dismissed; notice discharged; and there shall be no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The Court emphasized that summary deterrent schemes under the Notification are permissible and that where a statute or rule itself provides for a hearing at a particular stage, that hearing must be meaningful (not a mere formality). The Court, however, did not set aside the administrative order despite procedural failings because it exercised equitable discretion on the facts. The opinion does not indicate that it intended to lay down a new legal precedent beyond the application of these principles in the instant facts.

Show all summary ...

D.A Mehta, J. (Oral):— This petition has been preferred by one Yogesh Dhariyal, sole proprietor of Messrs Dhariyal Chemicals. The following prayers have been made in the petition:

“(A) That Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus or a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, striking down as ultra vires Rule 12CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and Notification No. 32/2006-C.E. (N.T) dated 30-12-2006;

(B) That Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a Writ of mandamus or a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, quashing and setting aside Order No. 6/2008-M (CX)/DA dated 22-2-2008 (Annexure-‘N’) issued by the second respondent thereby directing the respondents, their servants and agents to permit the petitioner to utilize cenvat credit for paying excise duties on the goods cleared for home consumption during the period from 27-2-2008 to 26-5-2008 and even thereafter;

(C) That Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of Mandamus or a Writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, directing the respondents, their servants and agents to forthwith give to the petitioner copies of all the seized documents and also the statements on which signatures of the petitioner as well as Shri Ganesh Dutt Joshi are taken by the Preventive Officers functioning under respondent no. 4 herein;

(D) Pending hearing and final disposal of the present petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay implementation and execution of Order No. 6/2008-M (CX)/DA dated 22-2-2008 (Annexure-‘N’) issued by the second respondent thereby allowing the petitioner to utilize cenvat credit for discharing duty liabilities on the goods cleared by the petitioner for home consumption;

(E) An ex parte ad interim relief in terms of Para 9(C) above may kindly be granted;

(F) Any other further relief as may be deemed fit in the facts and cir cumstances of the case may also please be granted”.

2. On 29-8-2007 the officers of the preventive wing of Central Excise Department visited the factory premises of the petitioner and seized certain documents, and records. A panchnama had been duly drawn up. The said documents and records also included certain records of another manufacturing unit named M/s. Ganesh Enterprises, a proprietary concern of one Shri Ganesh Dutt Joshi, cousin of the present petitioner. It is the say of the petitioner that on 31-8-2007 both the petitioner and Shri Ganesh Dutt Joshi were called by the officers of the preventive wing and pressurised to sign certain documents and statements prepared by the said officers. Therefore, regarding the aforesaid events, the petitioner swore an affidavit on 5-9-2007 and filed the same in the office of the Additional Commissioner (Preventive) under certificate of posting. It appears that similar exercise took place on 6-9-2007 and 11-9-2007 followed by affidavits dated 10-9-2007 and 13-9-2007 by the petitioner. On 16-10-2007 the petitioner was addressed a letter from the office of the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise which reads as under:

“OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, 7th floor:

CENTRAL EXCISE BHAVAN, AMBAWADI, AHMEDABAD 380 015

BY SPEED POST

Date: 16-10-2007

F. No. IV/30-88/CCO/Tech/2007

Shri Yogesh Chandradutt Dharaiyal,

M/s. Dhariyal Chemicals

4. Prabhudas Estate, Nr. Sabar Tiles,

Danilimda, Ahmedabad.

Gentleman,

Sub: Central Excise Case against M/s. Ganesh Enterprises, Plot No. 2, Prabhudas Patel Estate, Nr. Sabar Tiles, Danilimda, Ahmedabad.

The Chief Commissioner, Central Excise, Ahmedabad has fixed the personal hearing on 29-10-07 at 3.00 P.M in the Office of the Chief Commissioner. 7th Floor, Central Excise Bhavan, Ambawadi, Ahmedabad. It is therefore requested to attend the same on the date and time mentioned above.

Yours faithfully,

Additional Commissioner”

3. The said appointment was postponed to 30-10-2007 vide letter dated 26-10-2007. Thereafter, the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise (CCCE) personally heard the petitioner as well as Mr. Ganesh Dutt Joshi and one Dr. CD. Dhariyal, the father of the petitioner on 30-10-2007. At the said hearing the pur pose of the hearing was disclosed by the CCCE and the said fact has been re corded in the following words by the CCCE:

“On being asked to tender their submissions on the issue relating to withdraw of facility of monthly payment of excise duty and also the payment of Central Excise duly by utilization of CENVAT credit, Shri Yogesh Dhariyal submitted that the facility extended to them under Central Excise Law should not be withdrawn as the same would put them under financial constraint, and since they had not done any wrong”

4. Thereafter, it appears that CCCE forwarded a proposal to the Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBEC). On 22-8-2008 Order No. 6/08-M(CX)/DA came to be made by Member of CBEC whereunder following directions were issued:

“ORDER

5. In view of the above, I hereby pass the following order:—

(i) The facility of monthly payment of excise duty by M/s. Dhariyal Chemicals, as provided under rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, is ordered to be withdrawn and they are required to pay excise duly for each consignment at the time of removal of the goods with effect from 27-2-2008 to 26-5-2008.

(ii) Payment of excise duty by utilisation of CENVAT credit as provided under rule 3(4) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, is ordered to be stopped with effect from 27-2-2008 to 26-5-2008. During this period, they are required to pay excise duty without utilising CENVAT credit. However, they are permitted to take CENVAT credit during this period which can be utilised for payment of duty with effect from 27-5-2008”.

5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has assailed the aforesaid order dated 22-2-2008 (hereinafter referred to as impugned order) by reiterating the facts narrated in the petition and also challenged the validity of Rule 12CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (the Rules) and Notification No. 32/2006-C.E. (N.T), dated 30-12-2006 (the Notification). It was contended that respondent No. 2 has made an order which is ex parte and hence, it is required to be struck down as being in violation of principles of natural justice. That Rule 12CC of the Rules and the aforesaid Notification are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India because:(1) the scheme envisaged by the Notification has no nexus with the objective sought to be achieved: (2) is in utter violation of principles of natural justice; (3) deprives assessee of its legitimate right of utilising CENVAT credit.

6. According to the learned Advocate the impugned order is required to be struck down because the same has been made without granting an opportunity of hearing. Not only this, it was submitted, even the CCCE had formulated reasonable belief that the facilities available to the petitioner were required to be withdrawn without proper opportunity. In this connection, attention was invited to paragraph No. 4(2) of the Notification to submit that the Notification itself provides for granting an opportunity of hearing to the person against whom the proceedings have been initiated but no such opportunity was granted. That the notice in the form of letter dated 16-10-2007 merely invited the petitioner for hearing without specifying as to why and for what purpose the hearing was granted. It was therefore urged that in light of the aforesaid fact situation the impugned order was required to be struck down.

7. On behalf of the respondent authorities learned Counsel submitted that in so far as the challenge to validity of Rule 12CC of the Rules and the Notification is concerned no case was made out by the petitioner as to how and in what manner the said Rule and the Notification are ultra vires the Constitution.

8. In relation to the requirement of paragraph No. 4(2) of the Notification granting an opportunity of hearing, it was submitted that such an opportunity was granted as could be seen from communication dated 16-10-2007 and bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Notification no case was made out for conducting a full-fledged proceeding as in case of regular assessment by issuing Show Cause Notice etc. That in the facts of the present case, in fact, the petitioner was aware about the purpose for which the petitioner was called and this was apparent from written submissions dated 30-10-2007 filed by the petitioner before CCCE. That the said written submissions referred to the Notification in question and therefore it was apparent that the procedure adopted by CCCE was in accordance with the requirement of Notification and there can be no violation of provisions of paragraph No. 4(2) of the Notification as contended.

9. It was further submitted that the principles of natural justice did not warrant that in each and every case a person is required to be granted a full-fledged hearing accompanied by documents etc., especially when the person concerned is aware about the purpose for which the hearing is granted. That every violation complained of, need not be entertained by the Court unless and until the person complaining of the violation establishes prejudice caused to the person. It was further submitted that in the present case the petitioner cannot complain of being prejudiced by the procedure adopted by CCCE when one considers the record and therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to any relief whatsoever.

10. Before adverting to relevant paragraphs of the Notification, it is necessary to note certain undisputed facts. The petitioner and Mr. Ganesh Dutt Joshi are cousins. The units of the petitioner and Shri Joshi are respectively located at (1) 4 Prabhudas Estate. Nr. Sabar Tiles. Dani Limbda, Ahmedabad and (2) 2 Prabhudas Estate, Nr. Sabar Tiles, Dani Limbda, Ahmedabad. Both the units manufacture the same goods viz. Cellulose and its derivatives which are substitutes to such imported products. The petitioner was enjoying (1) facility of monthly payment of excise duty as provided under rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, and (2) facility of payment of excise duty by utilization of CENVAT credit as provided under Rule 3(4) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. Mr. Ganesh Dutt Joshi has gone on record to state that the activities of M/s. Ganesh Enterprises were looked after by Mr. Yogesh Dhariyal since more than five years, including opening and operating the Bank Account of M/s. Ganesh Enterprises in Bank of Baroda and other bank. At one stage Mr. Joshi has stated that a power of attorney has been executed in favour of Mr. Yogesh Dhariyal and at another place Mr. Joshi has denied having executed such power of attorney. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts CCCE moved a proposal upon which the impugned order came to be made by Member, CBEC on 22-2-2008.

11. In so far as challenge to validity of Rule 12CC of the Rules and the Notification is concerned, it is not possible to accept the contention raised on be half of the petitioner. Rule 12CC of the Rules grants power to the Central Government to issue a Notification whereunder specific restrictions may be placed on the specified category of persons having regard to the extent of evasion of duty, nature and type of offence or such other factors as may be relevant in order to prevent such evasion, default in payment of excise duty etc. In exercise of these powers Notification No. 32 of 2006-C.E. (N.T), dated 30-12-2006 has been issued. The Notification provides for a summary scheme which is to act as a deterrent against tax evaders by withdrawal of facilities from such persons.

12. On a plain reading of Rule 12CC of the Rules and the impugned Notification it becomes apparent that the Rule and the Notification have been framed for a specified class of persons having reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved, and this becomes abundantly clear when one considers paragraph No. 3 of the Notification which lays down the monetary limit in which class of cases the Notification shall be made applicable. Therefore, there is no merit in the challenge to constitutional validity of the Rule and the Notification.

13. In so far as the grievance ventilated regarding lack of opportunity before passing of the impugned order by Member, CBEC, it is necessary to consider the procedure prescribed by paragraph No. 4 of the Notification. The relevant part of the Notification reads as under:

“4. Procedure.- (1) The Commissioner of Central Excise or Additional Director General of Central Excise Intelligence, as the case may be, after examination of records and other evidence, and after satisfying himself that the person has knowingly committed the offence as specified in para 1, may forward a proposal to the Chief Commissioner or Director General of Central Excise Intelligence, as the case may be, specifying the facilities to be withdrawn and restriction to be imposed and the period of such withdrawal or restrictions, within 30 days of the detection of the case, as far as possible.

(2) The Chief Commissioner of Central Excise or Director General of Central Excise Intelligence, as the case may be, shall examine the said proposal and after satisfying himself that the records and evidence relied upon in the said proposal are sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person has knowingly committed the offences specified in para 1, may forward the proposal along with his recommendations to the Board. However, the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise or Director General of Central Excise Intelligence, before forwarding his recommendations, shall give an opportunity of being heard to the person against whom the proceedings have been initiated and shall take into account any representation made by such person before he forwards his recommendations to the Board.

(3) An officer authorized by the Board shall examine the recommendations received from the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise or Director General of Central Excise Intelligence and issue an order specifying the type of facilities to be withdrawn or type of restrictions imposed, along with the period for which said facilities will not be available or the period for which the restrictions shall he operative.”

14. Paragraph No. 4(1) provides for either CCE or Additional Director General to forward a proposal to CCCE or Director General as to the nature of offence committed by the person in whose case a satisfaction is arrived at after examination of records and other evidence that specified facilities be withdrawn for a specified period and such proposal has to be made within 30 days of the detection of the case, as far as possible. In sub-paragraph No. (2) of paragraph No. 4 of the Notification CCCE is required to examine the proposal placed before him, and after satisfying himself that the records and the evidence relied upon in the proposal are sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person has knowingly committed the offence specified in paragraph No. 1 of the Notification, may forward the proposal along with his recommendations to the Board. The latter part of the said sub-paragraph states that however, before the CCCE forwards his recommendations he shall give an opportunity of being heard to the person against whom the proceedings had been initiated and shall take into account any representation made by such person before forwarding the recommendations. Sub-paragraph No. (3) of paragraph No. 4 of the Notification provides for an officer, authorised by the Board, to examine the recommendations received from CCCE and issue an order specifying the type of facilities to be withdrawn or the type of restrictions to be imposed, along with the period for which such facilities will not be available or the period for which the restrictions shall be operative.

15. The scheme that unfolds, therefore, is that the stage at which a proposal is made by the authority subordinate to CCCE, it is not necessary to grant any opportunity to the person concerned. However, CCCE is not bound by the proposal and if after considering the records and the evidence in support of the proposal CCCE finds that the evidence and the record are not sufficient to form a reasonable belief that the person has knowingly committed the offence, he has the discretion not to forward the proposal. Similarly even after forming a reasonable belief, if after hearing the person concerned and after considering the representation made by the person concerned, if the CCCE comes to the conclusion that the records and evidence are not sufficient in light of the representation and the hearing to form a reasonable belief the proposal may not be forwarded by the CCCE. This becomes abundantly clear when one reads the last portion of the first part of sub-paragraph No. (2) of paragraph No. 4 of the Notification which stipulates: “may forward the proposal along with his recommendations to the Board”. The use of the term “may” itself indicates that the CCCE is not expected to act mechanically and approve the proposal placed before him. Thus a discretion is vested in the CCCE: either to forward the proposal, or refuse to forward the proposal, or forward the proposal with modification as to the withdrawal of facilities and restrictions to be imposed or the period during which there may be withdrawal of facilities or imposition of restrictions.

16. In the circumstances, an opportunity of hearing which is granted to the person concerned cannot be termed to be an idle formality once the provisions of the Notification itself have provided for this situation, viz. vesting CCCE with a discretion, with or without hearing. It cannot be stated that the hearing that is required to be granted to the person concerned is only for a limited purpose. If such opportunity of hearing is to be meaningful the notice calling upon the person concerned to represent his case must indicate briefly the gravamen of the charge which the person is to meet with and the nature of evidence on the basis of which the proposal is moved so as to enable the person concerned to make an effective representation either to reject the proposal, or modify the proposal considering the offence committed, the period of offence, etc., including any special circumstances that might be within the knowledge of the person concerned and may not have come on record of the proceedings of proposal. The respondent authority cannot be heard to state, in such circumstances, that because the person concerned was aware of the proceedings taken prior to making of the proposal by CCE no further opportunity is required and it would suffice if only the person concerned is invited for hearing.

17. The aforesaid view is fortified by language of sub-paragraph No. (3) of paragraph No. 4 of the Notification which does not provide for any hearing by the authorised officer before issuing order specifying type of facilities to be withdrawn or type of restrictions to be imposed along with the period for which such facilities will not be available or the restrictions shall operate. Therefore, when at the first stage, viz. making of a proposal the person concerned has no voice, and at the final stage, when the order is issued the person concerned has no voice, the second stage, viz. when CCCE makes his recommendations the opportunity of hearing which is granted to the person concerned has to be a meaningful opportunity, and cannot be treated as a mere formality. Because that is the only stage at which the opportunity of hearing is granted.

18. Even if one accepts the fact that the scheme provided under the impugned Notification is a summary scheme in relation to class of persons who may be treated as tax evaders, once the Notification itself provides for an opportunity of hearing the same cannot be taken away on the specious plea, as canvassed by revenue, that the object and purpose of the Notification is to act as a deterrent. By merely referring to the object and purpose of the Notification, the respondent authorities cannot be permitted to wish away the procedure prescribed under the very Notification. One part of the Notification cannot be so read as to make another part thereof redundant.

19. In these circumstances, the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order made by respondent No. 2 authority without granting an opportunity of hearing is bad in law cannot be accepted, but at the same time it has to be recorded that before forwarding the proposal with recommendations CCCE had not complied with the statutory requirements and the procedure adopted was bad in law. In the normal circumstances, the Court would have, at this stage, quashed and set aside the order made on the basis of such a proposal with recommendations, but in light of the facts and circumstances which have come on record the petitioner is not entitled to such an equitable relief in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The question, that would then survive is, as to what should be the final relief, if any, that should be made available to the petitioner in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. As noted hereinbefore, the final order made by respondent No. 2 authority has withdrawn the facility of monthly payment of excise duty and restricted payment of excise duty by utilization of CENVAT credit for the period 27-2-2008 to 26-5-2008. In so far as the first part of the order is concerned viz. paragraph No. 5(i) of the impugned order, suffice it to state that the said order has been permitted to operate and has exhausted itself considering the period was from 27-2-2008 to 26-5-2008.

20. In so far as the restriction imposed vide paragraph No. 5(ii) of the impugned order, vide order dated 3-4-2008 the High Court had granted ad interim stay of operation and implementation of the said direction.

21. In the circumstances, considering the fact that on facts the petitioner does not deserve to be granted any relief the operation of paragraph No. 5(ii) of the impugned order which was stayed with effect from 3-4-2008 till date shall stand revived from tomorrow i.e 12-7-2008 and shall continue to operate for the remainder of the period after deducting the period from 27-2-2008 to 3-4-2008, bearing in mind that the restriction was for a period of 90 days in the impugned order. Accordingly, ad interim stay of operation and implementation of paragraph No. 5(ii) of the impugned order dated 22-2-2008 made by respondent No. 2 authority stands vacated. The petition is accordingly rejected. Notice discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.

22. Advocate for the petitioner prays for staying operation of the order of vacation of ad interim relief which is operating since 3-4-2008 for a period of three weeks from today. Request is rejected in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.