R. Vora, J.

Page 1844

1. Misc. Civil Application No. 1250 of 1998 to Misc. Civil Application No. 1257 of 1998 in Spl. Civil Applications No. 4910 to 4917 of 1997 are preferred by the applicants to review the common orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court, on 13th of January, 1998, in Special Civil Applications No. 4910 to 4917 of 1997 and since those Review Applications were time barred by 139 days, an application i.e. Misc. Civil Application No. 1233 of 1998 is Page 1845 also filed for condonation of delay caused in preferring above Review Applications by the group of applicants who were original petitioners in above mentioned Special Civil Applications.

2. The facts leading to filing this group of Applications can briefly be stated that in Special Civil Applications mentioned above, group of petitioners preferred those Special Civil Applications for challenging the action of respondent Kapadvanj Nagarpalika, opponent herein, in respect of assessments made by Kapadvanj Nagarpalika, for the levy of property tax for the premises, which were rented to the petitioners, and it was prayed that a declaration be issued that levy and to collect the house tax from the petitioners of Kapadvanj Nagarpalika was bad, illegal and ultra vires. It was also prayed that the petitioners either were exempted from the house tax or assessment made during the time when their factories were closed and that no assessment list had been prepared, and if prepared , were illegal and void. It was also prayed that issuance of bills, demand notices and attachment notices by Kapadvanj Nagarpalika, were illegal and void, and a writ of certiorari and/or any appropriate writ, direction or order for quashing of such bills, demand notices and attachment notices be granted. A writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ was also sought for directing the respondent Kapadvanj Nagarpalika to act according to law and not to enforce coercive methods for the recovery of such house tax from the petitioners or from the owner Shri Hasmukhlal Nathalal Patel, as per demand notices and attachment notices. The petitions came to be filed on the premise that the petitioners were new industries within the meaning of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 and the Rules framed thereunder and they were not liable to pay any house tax, even then Kapadvanj Nagarpalika attempted to recover the house tax from the petitioners of the said Special Civil Applications. At admission stage, receiving notices of said Special Civil Applications, Kapadvanj Nagarpalika, filed affidavit-in-reply stating that the bills in questions were sent to the owner and the petitioners - tenants. That objections were not filed against the bills or the assessment either by the owner or the petitioners tenants. It was contended and replied that since the objections were not filed, the question of giving an opportunity to be heard to the petitioners did not arise. The petitioners were not exempted from the house tax as no such rules were framed nor such policy decision was taken. After following due procedure under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, bills were prepared, assessment notices were sent not only to the owner but to the petitioners tenants as well, and both of them kept silent and when recovery was effected as per law, the petitions came to be filed. It was highly contested that petitioners - industries, on the ground of new industries, were exempted from the property tax.

3. The above group of petitions came to he heard by the Division Bench of this Court on 13th of January, 1998. Learned Counsel for the petitioners in the group of that petitions Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala was not present. This Court constrained to observe that in the absence of any sick note or any leave note and also the fact that the group of petitions came to be adjourned for Page 1846 ten times earlier, the petitions were examined on merits and thread-bare and careful examination of record was undertaken and the group of matters were disposed of rejecting the petitions on the ground that it was a question of fact whether the petitioners had lodged objections against the assessments and issuance of bills, which categorically denied by the respondent. This Court further observed that the disputed question of fact could not be examined with the circumscribed jurisdictional scope of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and more so when alternative remedy of filing objections and appeal under the statutory mechanism of Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, was available to the petitioners and petitioner did not exhaust the same, the proposition of law expounded by this Court in the matter of Gujarat Vidya Sabha v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad as reported in 1995 (1) GLR 419, covered the group of petitions and, therefore, this Court rejected above group of petitions and against that order of Division Bench of this Court, these Review Petitions, as aforesaid, are preferred with an Application for condonation of delay.

4. So far as the ground of review is concerned, mainly, it is stated that in the absence of Advocate, the real point could not be urged before the Hon'ble Court that the petitioners were exempted from the payment of house tax, and that, in fact, the petitioners did lodge objections for assessment and issuance of bills. So, that was the apparent mistake on record calling for review of the decision. There was total misconception of facts, which could not be cleared in the absence of Advocate. It was submitted that since the assessment itself was ultra vires, as per the settled law, there was no question of filing alternative remedy by way of an Appeal and thus the error of law had arisen , which could not be clarified in the absence of learned Advocate for the applicants. In the absence of the applicants, the matters could have been dismissed for default and could not be decided on merits. Therefore also there was mistake apparent on the face of record.

5. For the condonation of delay, it is stated that the order which is sought to be reviewed is dated 13.1.1998, but since the Advocate was absent, the petitioners came to know about the said order only on 17.1.1998 and a copy was received by the petitioners on 12th of March, 1998. Thereafter, the main Director of the Company, who was handling the matter, had gone to pilgrimage for three months and could not return till 5th of July, 1998 and thereafter the Review Applications were preferred with the delay of 139 days.

6. To the Review Applications, the opponent preferred affidavit-in-reply through one Manojbhai Ramjibhai Solanki, Chief officer of respondent Nagarpalika and reiterated the stand taken in the affidavit-in-reply preferred in group of Special Civil Applications stating that firstly no exemption from house tax was available to the petitioners, and that after following due procedure of law, the bills, notices and attachment notices came to be issued by the respondent Nagarpalika. It was highly disputed that the absence of Advocate can be a ground for review, that too, considering the same to be the mistake apparent on the face of record and as well as for the condonation Page 1847 of delay. It was submitted that, in fact, there was delay of 145 days and no cause, let alone, sufficient cause could be shown to condone this delay as merely a vague statement came to be made by the Director of the Company that main Director was on pilgrimage. No case is made out for condonation of delay by the petitioners nor for review.

7. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Sanjanwala reiterated what is stated in the Review Petitions and delay condonation application. He relied upon an unreported decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1687 of 1974 with Special C.A. Nos. 2082, 2083, 2084, 2090, 2091, 2120, 2134, 2135, 2138 and 2139 of 1971, delivered on 25th of April, 1978 (Coram: N.H. Bhatt, J.) wherein this Court interpreted Rule 7(3) of the Gujarat Gram and Nagar Panchayat Taxes and Fees Rules, 1964 and came to the conclusion that so far as the levy of the house tax on new industries was concerned, rented premises were also included in view of the said Rules. Rule 36 was also considered in context of the above said Rule. Learned Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala submitted that in view of this, since the absence of learned Advocate for the applicants, this fact could not be brought to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court and consequently the petitions came to be dismissed, and that is the mistake apparent on the face of record. Learned Counsel relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab as reported in AIR 1963 SC 1909, wherein the Apex Court settled the principles of reviewing the orders by the Court under Section 151 and under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It is submitted that this Court has inherent power to review its own order and in the case before the Supreme Court when one writ petition came to be decided, on filing separate writ petition by a third party, who was affecting party, the High Court was held justified in reviewing its previous order at the instance of third party, who was not a party to the previous writ proceedings. It is submitted that inherent powers be exercised in plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by the court. The next decision which the learned Counsel relied upon is in the matter of Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque as , wherein the Apex Court in para-23 observed that error ceased to be mere error and becomes an error apparent on the face of the record is not self-evident, but requires an examination or argument and depends upon the fact of each case. Learned Counsel submitted that in this case the absence of the learned Advocate for the petitioners, the true point could not be urged and, therefore, palpable error was committed by court. Relying upon a decision in the mater of Board of Control For Cricket, India v. Netaji Cricket Club as and relying upon the observations made by the Apex Court in paras 82-90, it was submitted that in reviewing the order, law has not provided any limitation on the powers of the Court Page 1848 except those which are expressly provided under Section 114 and under Order 47 Rule -1 of the Civil Procedure Code and for the reasons stated therein, review was held maintainable. In this particular case, the Supreme Court observed that mistake on the part of the court in the nature of undertaking may also call for a review of the order. It is therefore submitted by learned Senior Counsel for the applicants that Order 47 R.1 of the Code is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court or even an Advocate. It is submitted that in the absence of learned Advocate of the applicants, misconception of fact as well as law had arisen, which actuated filing of the Review Petitions. Learned Counsel then relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Haribabu Dagdu Tandale v. Industrial Cooperative Association Ltd. as reported in AIR 1997 SC 1474 and relying on para-15 of the observations, it was submitted that even error of law could also be rectified in review jurisdiction. Therefore, it was vehemently submitted that in view of the decision in Spl. Civil Application No. 1687 of 1994 of this Court, not only mistake of law has been crept through in the judgment and order, which is sought to be reviewed, but since the matters are decided on merits, error apparent in the face of the record has also arisen. It is, therefore, submitted that after setting aside the above said decision, the petitioners may be given an opportunity to agitate their case on merits. It is submitted by learned Counsel for the applicants that for the condonation of delay, the law is well settled that the phrase sufficient cause must be liberally construed to do substantial justice. It was ultimately urged that after condoning delay, the Review Petitions filed in the group of Special Civil Applications be allowed.

8. As against that learned Counsel Mr. V.C. Desai for the opponents vehemently urged that, firstly, in fact, no sufficient cause is shown for enormous delay except too vague statement is made by one of the Director in respect of main Director about he being on pilgrimage. Even in rejoinder of affidavit-in-reply, this position is not made clear by the petitioners. It was urged that these applications are required to be dismissed on this ground alone, for which learned Advocate for the Opponent relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of P. Mani Moopanar v. K. Rajammal and Ors. as reported in (2005) 11 SCC, 800, wherein in para-4, the Apex Court observed that the High Court was required to go into the question of sufficiency of cause shown to condone the inordinate delay of 2598 days which it did not do and, instead, proceeded to allow the revision petitions on taking an overall view of the matter on merits. In relying upon a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Binod Bihari Singh v. Union Of India. as , in para-10, the Apex Court observed that the applicants seeking condonation of delay having taken a false stand to get rid of the bar of limitation, should not be encouraged to get any premium on the Page 1849 falsehood on his part by rejecting the plea of limitation raised by the opposite party. This is submitted in respect of the statements made in the application that the certified copy of the judgment was obtained on 12th of March, 1998 while certified copy denotes that the copy was ready for delivery on 27th of January, 1998. Period thereafter till filing of application is not properly explained. Such applicants are not entitled to any premium, according to learned Advocate for the Opponent. On merits, it was submitted that the decision of this Court in Spl. C.A. No. 1687 of 1974 was delivered with reference to the special provisions made by the Rules in the Gujarat Gram and Nagar Panchayat Taxes and Frees Rules while in the Municipalities Act, Section 280(8), the term owner is defined and such definition we do not find in the particular Act referred in Special Civil Application No. 1687 of 1974. It is submitted that even the policy decision that the Municipality took and which is placed by the petitioners on record at Annexure-K of the main petitions, very clearly establishes that the house taxes be exempted for the persons who starts their industries in the houses and premises owned by them or to the persons who starts new industries in the GIDC Estates. Therefore, the question of application of the ratio laid down in Special Civil Application No. 1687 of 1974 would not arise. Relying upon a decision in the matter of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand and Ors. as , it was submitted that when there are exemptions from the tax granted by the statutory authorities either by way of a policy or by way of provision, the same must be strictly construed. It was submitted that policy adopted by Kapadvanj Nagarpalika in respect of exemption from house tax is very clear by Annexure-`K'. It is submitted therefore that those matters were not covered by the decision of this Court delivered in Spl. C.A. No. 1687 of 1994 (supra). It was further submitted that even, prima facie, it could not be established in those matters that by the petitioners tenants or the owner of the premises lodged objections before Kapadvanj Nagarpalika, which was the issue required to be decided on recording of the evidence and could not be decided in the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Like wise, the notices were duly served upon the owner and the petitioners, bills were duly served upon the owner as well as upon the petitioners, Objections were not filed, even then, alternative efficacious remedy of filing an appeal under the Gujarat Municipalities Act was available and not availed of and the presence of learned Counsel would not have made any difference to the decision of the court. It is, therefore, submitted that in any view of matter, there is no mistake apparent on the face of record as to review the reasoned judgment of this Court, which would amount to sit as a court of appeal over the judgment of parallel jurisdiction and quash the same altogether, as what is prayed for in the pretext of review is nothing but recalling of the whole order.

Page 1850

9. Having heard learned Counsels in marathon details, the question primarily arises as to whether the delay caused of 139 days or 145 days in filing these Review Petitions can be condoned for the causes mentioned and pleaded by the applicants to be sufficient cause. We may not here agree with Mr. Desai that the court has to see only sufficient cause and not the merits of the case. The decision relied on this aspect by learned Advocate Mr. V.C. Desai for the Opponent is altogether on different facts. The law is well settled that while deciding applications, the phrase Sufficient cause be liberally construed and for advancement of justice only. Therefore whenever applicants pray for condonation of delay, the causes advanced must appeal to the court to be reasonable, looking to all facts of the case. Needless it is to be observed that when phrase Sufficient cause is to be looked into for the advancement of justice, the merits for which the condonation of delay is sought, has to be cursorily looked upon by the court. In this view of matter as well as when since learned Counsel for the applicants has in detail made contentions on merits of the case, it is required to look first the merits of the Review Petitions, for condonation of delay.

10. It is not in dispute that the powers of the Court to review its previous decisions has no other limitation except as provided by Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There are three grounds on which Review is permitted, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence, (ii) some mistake or error apparent on the face of record and (iii) for any other sufficient reasons. Except in these three circumstances, no review is permitted by law.

11. In this respect, it is necessary to observe that how the Apex Court has settled this law. In the matter of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma as . In para - 3 the Apex Court observed as under:

3. The Judicial Commissioner gave two reasons for reviewing his predecessor's order. The first was that his predecessor had overlooked two important documents Exhibits A/1 and A/3 which showed that the respondents were in possession of the sites even in the year 1948-49 and that the grants must have been made even by then. The second was that there was a patent illegality in permitting the appellant to question, in a single Writ Petition, `settlement' made in favour of the different respondents. We are afraid that neither of the reasons mentioned by the learned Judicial Commissioner constitutes a ground for review. It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 1909 there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there Page 1851 are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court.

12. Likewise, the same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the matter of Meera Bhanja (Smt) v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt). as , wherein the Supreme Court observed in paras 8 and 9 as under:

8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking a review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Apex Court then referred to the observations made in the decision of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (supra), as referred to above. The Apex Court further observed in para-9 as under:

9 Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Malikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record:

An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and Page 1852 complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.

13. Now, so far as the present case is concerned, true it is that, the only circumstance pleaded in the Review is error apparent on the face of record has been based upon (i) absence of advocate, (ii) true points could not be made out, and (iii) earlier there was a decision of this Court. Without further entering into the merits but for the purpose only as aforesaid, if the record is seen, it is apparent from the record that the court had become helpless as the learned Counsel for the petitioners could not make him available for hearing even if the petitions were adjourned 10 times. Therefore, merely, since the learned Counsel for the petitioners was not available and the matter was decided on merits, hardly could be said a ground for review in particular facts and circumstances of this case and covered under mistake apparent on the face of the record. The mistake apparent on the face of the record are the mistakes which are evident and for which the review court would not enter into re-appreciation of the material produced in the earlier proceedings. Those evident errors can be corrected under the review jurisdiction. The decisions cited by learned Counsel in support of his say are the decisions pertaining to the facts of that particular case and deciding the principles exercising of review jurisdiction. Now, in this case, when we go through the petitions filed and the affidavit-in-reply preferred by the respondent Nagarpalika, it undoubtedly borne out that it was a disputed question of fact whether any objections came to be filed either by the owner or the petitioners before the Municipality. By bare reading of Annexure-`K' to the petition, makes it very clear that rented premises were not exempted from the house tax and classes of persons and property exempted are well defined at Annexure-K, in which category, undoubtedly, the present applicants would not fall. Above all, the decision of this Court in the matter of Shri Kailas Mills, Bulsar v. The Sarpanch, Daheri Gram Panchayat, Bulsar, (Spl. Civil Application No. 1687 of 1974) rests on the particular rules framed under the Gujarat Gram and Nagar Panchayat Taxes and Fees Rules, wherein after interpreting the phrase belonging to rented premises were declared exempted from the house rent with reference to that particular statute, and by no stretch of reasoning, this could be said to be a precedent to be followed by the Division Bench in the Special Civil Applications in question. Therefore, the fact remains that, prima facie, it could not be shown that the objections were taken by the applicants before Kapadvanj Municipality, and alternative efficacious remedy of appeal was whether resorted to and more so when Annexure-K makes it very clear that the applicants were not entitled to exemption from the house tax. Consequently this goes to indicate that the process of assessment could not be challenged by way of petitions in the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It must be noted that no rejoinder-in-affidavit-in_ reply came to be filed in these petitions nor anything could be produced to say that, in fact, the objections were filed and that were received duly by Kapadvanj Nagarpalika. Some copies of letters placed on record cannot be made to Page 1853 believe a court of law that such letters were received by the respondent - Nagarpalika. Even it was not made clear that by contract, it was whose responsibility to pay tax, either by owner or by tenants. Above all, the matter was covered by a decision of this Court in the matter of Gujarat Vidya Sabha v. Municipal Corporation of The City of Ahmedabad as reported in 1995 (1) GLR 419, which still holds field. Therefore examining merits, prima facie, for aforesaid purpose, we have to conclude that these are not the cases to exercise review jurisdiction treating the absence of learned Counsel and the ratio laid down in Spl. C.A. No. 1687 of 1974 to be the ground for review of the judgment and order as such grounds cannot be labelled them to be mistakes committed by the Division Bench of this Court apparent on the face of the record. If this is to be permitted, then it would be necessary for this Court to observe that there was no disputed question of facts, and that in fact, prima facie, the applicants were exempted from house tax even though the policy of exemption adopted by Municipality had been placed on record at Annexure-K, to which, no affidavit-in-rejoinder could be filed. It must be borne in mind that the Division Bench dealing with the review proceedings cannot over step its jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code by reasoning that the reasons adopted by earlier Bench were suffering from patent error, that would amount to sitting as a court of appeal over the decision rendered by a court of equal jurisdiction in the guise of review petition. Errors would not become patent errors merely labelling them to be patent errors, and that too, on only two grounds, as mentioned above. There is no error at all apparent on the face of the record striking one on merely looking at the record. This is discussed only with reference to the fact that while dealing with sufficient cause for condonation of delay, liberal approach to advance the cause of justice becomes the pious duty of the court and merits are one of the considerations.

14. Now, therefore, above are the merits of the review petitions, keeping in mind those merits, while we consider the condonation of delay application, what is stated in Para - 9 of the application is as under:

9. It is submitted that the order is dated 13th of January, 1998 but since the advocate was absent the petitioner came to know about the said order only on 17th January 1998 and the copy was received by the petitioner on 12th March, 1998. Thereafter the main Director of the company who was handling the matter had gone to pilgrimage for three months and he could return only on or about 5th July 1998 and thereafter this review application is made as expeditiously as possible. The delay is, therefore, required to be condoned in the interest of justice.

15. On this ground, delay is sought to be condoned. True it is that, no pedantic view for looking for the condonation of delay of each day is required to be taken, but the endeavour of the court must be necessarily to examine whether the circumstances were beyond reach and control of the party - seeking lifting of the bar of limitation. It is therefore to consider as to whether or not a cause is sufficient, it is required to be borne in mind that Page 1854 the delay caused could have been avoided by the party by exercise of due care and attention. In other words, whether it is a bona fide cause inasmuch as nothing shall be deemed to be done bona fide or in good faith, which is not done with due care and attention. If the applicants have acted with due care and attention, they may be entitled to condonation of delay without relating to the duration of delay. With the above said observations made by the applicants in para-9, when certified copy placed on record is examined, it is obvious that the applicants applied for certified copies on 17th of January, 1998. The certified copy was ready for delivery on 27th of January, 1998, but, however, the reasons not stated in the applications or not submitted before this Court, the delivery was taken by the applicants of the certified copy of the judgment and order on 12th of March, 1998, for which, however a vague statement is made in para-9 that the certified copy was received by the petitioner on 12th of March, 1998. Not only that we find again a vague statement that thereafter main Director of the Company, who was handling the matter, had gone to pilgrimage for three months and he could not return till 5th of July, 1998 and thereafter this application for condonation of delay came to be filed. We are bereft of the reasons to interpret the phrase sufficient cause liberally as prescribed by the law in absence of the circumstances which could not be shown that in good faith for the reasons beyond the control of the applicants, though they acted diligently, the delay occurred. There is no explanatory statement at all in respect of the period from 27th of January, 1998 to 12th of March, 1998. When in fact on 27th of January, 1998, the certified copy was ready and was obtained only on 12th of March, 1998. This period is blank. Not only that, about the pilgrimage of main Director, there is vagueness in the statement made in para-9 of the application. The law does not enjoin a duty upon the court to construe the phrase sufficient cause to such applicants, who could not show their diligence and the circumstances beyond their control, if not the explanation of each days delay. In these circumstances, we are constrained to come to the conclusion that no sufficient cause could be shown by the applicants to condone the delay caused in preferring the Review Petitions. We are fortified by the decisions of the Apex Court in the matter of State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction Co. as wherein in para-21, on the facts of that case, when the applicants failed to state the commencement or termination of strike in question, the Apex Court observed that the application for condonation of delay was completely vague and no error was committed by the High Court in rejecting such application. In the matter of Ashis Kumar Hazra v. Rubi Park Cooperative Housing Society Limited as , the Supreme Court in para-3 observed that the explanation for the period of Page 1855 delay on 26.10.1974 till the date when the civil suit came to be filed was required to be explained and in absence of such explanation, the delay condonation application came to be rejected. In the case before us, it is clear that from 27th of January 1998 to 12th of March, 1998, it is not explained that what the applicants did. Mere pilgrimage of main Director is so a vague ground, to be liberally construed to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

16. In the above view of matter, Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 1233 of 1998 filed for condonation of delay caused in filing of Review Applications No. 1250/1998, 1251/1998, 1252/1998, 1253/1998. 1254/1998, 1255/1998, 1256/1998 and 1257 of 1998 stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. Consequently, Review Applications No. 1250/1998 in Spl. C.A. No. 4910.1997, 1251/1998 in Spl. C.A. No. 4911/1997, 1252/1998 in Spl. C.A. No. 4912/1997, 1253/1998 in Spl. C.A. No. 4913/1977, 1254/1998 in Spl. C.A. No. 4914 of 1997, 1255/1998 in Spl. C.A. No. 4915/1997, 1256/1998 in Spl. C.A. No. 4916/1997 and 1257 of 1998 in Spl. C.A. No. 4917/1997 are also stand dismissed.