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Stock Exchange v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income-Tax
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, a Stock Exchange, challenged reassessment notices issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Asstt. CIT), Circle-2(5), Ahmedabad dated 20 July 1995 for the assessment years 1989-90 to 1993-94.
Historically, the petitioner’s income was treated as exempt from income-tax for earlier years (1959-60 to 1984-85) on the ground that it was held for charitable purposes and was claimed to be entitled to exemption under s.4(3)(i) of the IT Act, 1922 and later under s.11 of the IT Act, 1961. The petitioner was registered under s.12A for s.11 purposes. Following governmental correspondence in 1980, a Notification dated 24 September 1987 granted exemption under s.10(23C)(iv) for assessment years 1985-86 to 1988-89. Renewal was not granted after expiry.
A CBDT communication of 9 September 1991 stated that the petitioner’s case was covered by s.10(23A) and not s.10(23C)(iv); the Central Government by order dated 9 September 1991 communicated that exemption under s.10(23C)(iv) could not be continued in favour of the petitioner. The Board later removed language in that order indicating coverage under s.10(23A) by an order dated 31 October 1996.
The petitioner challenged the 9 September 1991 order by Special Civil Application No. 2164 of 1996. This Court, by order dated 9 January 1997, held that the basis for the 9 September 1991 decision was withdrawn, that the 9 September 1991 order became an order giving no reason, that no decision on s.10(23C)(iv) had been taken by the Central Government, and permitted the petitioner to make a fresh application for the relevant years. Subsequently, the Central Government by letter dated 7 March 1997 informed the petitioner that it could not be notified under s.10(23C)(iv) because its activities were mainly intended to protect and regulate the interests of its members (share-brokers).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the reassessment notices issued under s.148 of the Income-tax Act for the assessment years 1989-90 to 1993-94 were legally valid (i.e., whether the AO had recorded relevant and cogent reasons to form a belief that income had escaped assessment).
- Whether the sanction required under s.151(2) for issuance of reassessment notices beyond four years was validly granted — specifically, whether the Dy. CIT applied his mind or acted mechanically.
- Whether the reopening of assessments constituted an impermissible mere change of opinion by the tax authorities in light of earlier acceptance of returns under s.143(1)(a) and prior communications/notifications concerning exemption.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner relied on its historical treatment as exempt (1959-60 to 1984-85 under s.11 and registration under s.12A) and on the Central Government Notification (24 September 1987) granting exemption under s.10(23C)(iv) for 1985-86 to 1988-89, contending that the AO therefore had no valid reason to believe income had escaped assessment for the years in question.
- For assessment years where exemption under s.11 was claimed (notably 1990-91 and 1992-93), the petitioner contended that the reasons recorded in the reassessment notices were erroneous and based on incorrect facts.
- For assessment years 1989-90 and 1990-91 (which required sanction under s.151), the petitioner contended that the sanction granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax was a mechanical one without application of mind.
- The petitioner argued that a mere change of opinion is not a valid ground to reopen assessments under s.148 and that the impugned notices did not disclose valid reasons to enable reopening.
- The petitioner relied on judicial decisions (listed in the opinion) to support these contentions.
Respondent / Revenue's Position (as recorded by the AO and relied upon by the Court)
- The AO recorded distinct reasons for reopening for each assessment year. For 1989-90, the AO noted no return was filed (claiming exemption under s.10(23C)(iv)), renewal of that exemption had been rejected, no approval under s.10(23A) had been obtained, and certain heads of income (house property, specific services, interest and dividends) were not exempt — including reported interest income of Rs. 13,89,070 which was exigible to tax.
- For 1990-91 and 1993-94 the AO again recorded reasons and, because the matters fell beyond four years, obtained sanction from the Dy. CIT; the Dy. CIT’s endorsements indicated agreement with the AO’s reasons.
- For the years where exemption under s.11 was claimed, the AO recorded that the application for registration was not found at that time and that the claim under s.10(23A) was also asserted in return notes, making it appropriate to reopen when it transpired s.10(23) exemptions were not admissible.
- For the other assessment years, the AO recorded that claims under s.10(23A) alone were wrong; thus, the AO maintained that the reasons recorded had a direct and rational connection to the formation of belief necessary under s.148.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| VXL India Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT (1995) 215 ITR 295 (Guj) | Examined whether the order disclosed reasons showing the basis of valuation adopted in the assessment order was incorrect; relevance of reasons for reopening. | The Court held that VXL did not assist the petitioner because, unlike in VXL where reasons were not disclosed to show an error in basis of valuation, the impugned notices in the present case recorded cogent and valid reasons. |
| ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das (1976) 103 ITR 437 (SC) | Laid down that reasons for formation of belief under s.147(a) (reopening) must have a rational connection or relevant bearing on the formation of the belief. | The Court applied this test and concluded the impugned notices contained reasons that satisfied the rational-connection requirement laid down by the Supreme Court. |
| Chhugamal Rajpal vs. S. P. Chaliha & Ors. (1971) 79 ITR 603 (SC) | Considered the requirement under s.151(2) that the sanctioning authority must apply mind to the reasons recorded by the AO; criticized cases where AO recorded no reasons and sanction was affirmed mechanically. | The Court distinguished Chhugamal Rajpal: in that case the AO had recorded no reason and the sanctioning authority had affirmed mechanically; in the present matter the AO recorded reasons and the Dy. CIT’s endorsements demonstrated agreement and application of mind, satisfying s.151(2). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining (as recorded in the impugned notices) the reasons the Assessing Officer had recorded for issuing notices under s.148 for each assessment year and by testing those reasons against the legal standards established by precedents.
For the assessment year 1989-90 the AO noted that no return had been filed because the petitioner claimed full exemption under s.10(23C)(iv); the renewal of that exemption had been rejected; no approval under s.10(23A) was then in place; and certain categories of income (house property, certain services, interest, dividends) were not exempt — the notice quantifying interest income of Rs. 13,89,070 as taxable. The Court recorded that these matters amounted to "cogent reasons" supporting reopening under s.148.
For assessment years 1990-91 and 1993-94 (beyond the four-year period), the statutory sanction under s.151 was obtained from the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. The petitioner alleged that sanction was mechanical; the Court examined the endorsements and found they showed the Dy. CIT's agreement with the AO’s reasons, meaning the requirements of s.151(2) were satisfied. The Court drew a clear distinction with Chhugamal Rajpal where no reasons had been recorded by the AO and sanctions had been affirmed without material application of mind.
The Court addressed the contention that reassessment represented merely a change of opinion. It noted that where returns were accepted under s.143(1)(a), the AO may not have expressed views at the time of original acceptance; consequently, when it later transpired (for example, that exemptions under s.10(23A) or s.10(23C)(iv) were not admissible or that registration records were not then available), the AO's subsequent recording of reasons could be legitimate. The Court observed that registration under s.12A (granted in 1977) could be set up by the petitioner in response to reassessment notices, but it was not reasonable to expect the AO, while dealing with a particular year, to traverse the entire past record to find a historical registration.
The Court concluded that the reasons recorded in the impugned notices bore a direct and rational connection to the formation of belief required by s.148 (as interpreted by ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das). It also held that it was not the Court's function to re-assess the sufficiency of those reasons beyond checking that they were not vague or remote from the formation of belief.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition challenging the reassessment notices was dismissed. The Court concluded that the impugned notices were validly issued in the lawful exercise of the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction and that the statutory requirements (including the rational connection test under s.147/148 and the sanction requirement under s.151(2)) were satisfied.
DISPOSED OF / Petition rejected — the petition is rejected, interim relief stands vacated, and there is no order as to costs.
Implications: The direct consequence is that the reassessment proceedings initiated by the Revenue may proceed for the assessment years 1989-90 to 1993-94. The Court did not indicate that it was laying down any new legal principle or broader precedent beyond applying existing authorities (notably ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das and distinguishing Chhugamal Rajpal). The opinion therefore affirms that where the AO records cogent reasons connected to the formation of belief and the sanctioning authority records agreement, reopening under s.148/s.151(2) can be valid even where original returns were accepted under s.143(1)(a).
1. The petitioner Stock Exchange challenges the reassessment notices issued by the Asstt. CIT, Circle-2(5), Ahmedabad on 20th July, 1995 for the asst. yrs. 1989-90 to 1993-94.
2. The case of the petitioner is that its income was held to be exempt from income-tax on the ground that it was held for charitable purposes in the past for the asst. yrs. 1959-60 to 1984-85. According to the petitioner, it was entitled to exemption under s. 4(3)(i) of the IT Act, 1922 and later under s. 11 of the Act of 1961. The petitioner contends that it was registered under s. 12a of the it act with the CIT, Ahmedabad for the purpose of grant of exemption under s. 11 of the Act. As it was represented by some of the Stock Exchanges that they should be recognised as institutions established for charitable purposes under s. 10(23C)(iv) of the said Act also, the Government of India informed some of these Stock Exchanges including the petitioner by its letter dt. 18th December, 1980 that they should submit applications for consideration of issuing Notification under the said provision. Thereafter, a Notification came to the issued on 24th September, 1987 of granting exemption under s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act for the asst. yrs. 1985-86 to 1988-89. On the expiry of the said period, the petitioner applied for renewal of exemption under the said provision but no renewal was granted. By letter dt. 9th September, 1991, the CBDT wrote to the petitioner that it had examined its case and that as the case of the petitioner was covered under specific provision contained under s. 10(23A), the provisions of s. 10(23C)(iv) which apply to charitable institutions and trusts in general, would not apply in case of the Stock Exchanges. Thereupon, the petitioner sent a request that it's application for renewal of exemption under s. 10(23C)(iv) should be treated as an application under s. 10(23A), and exemption be continued from asst. yr. 1989-90 onwards. By its order dt. 9th September, 1991 it was ordered that the exemption under s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act cannot be continued in favour of the petitioner Stock Exchange. Thereafter, by order dt. 31st October, 1996 the Board deleted from its earlier order dt. 9th September, 1991, the words to the effect that the case of the Stock Exchange was covered by the specific provisions of s. 10(23A) of the Act.
3. The petitioner had filed Special Civil Application No. 2164 of 1996 challenging the order dt. 9th September, 1991. In that petition, since the ground on which the order dt. 9th September, 1991 rejecting the petitioner's application was passed, came to be withdrawn, it was held by this Court by its decision dt. 9th January, 1997 that the very basis for the decision communicated to the petitioner was withdrawn and therefore, the order dt. 9th September, 1991 became an order giving no reason. It was also held that there was no decision taken by the Central Government on the subject under s. 10(23C)(iv). In this background, the petitioner was permitted to make a fresh application in respect of these relevant assessment years on which the Government was required to take decision within the stipulated time. The petition came to be disposed of accordingly.
4. Therefore, as it is now pointed out to us, the Central Government by its letter dt. 7th March, 1997 has communicated to the petitioner its decision that it could not be notified under s. 10(23C)(iv) of the Act, since its activities were mainly intended to protect and regulate the interests of its members viz. the share-brokers only.
5. It is now contended on behalf of the petitioner that in view of the Department's acceptance in the past for the years 1959-60 to 1984-85 that the income held by the petitioner-assessee was entitled to be exempted under s. 11 of the Act and later on in view of the Notification issued by the Central Government under s. 10(23C)(iv) granting exemption to the petitioner for the years 1984-85 to 1988-89, the AO did not have any valid reason to form a belief that the assessee's income had escaped assessment in respect of these five assessment years. As regards the asst. yrs. 1990-91 and 1992-93, it was contended that the exemption was claimed by the assessee under s. 11 of the Act and the reasons recorded in the notices which are issued in respect of these two years were totally erroneous and proceeded on incorrect facts. As regards the asst. yrs. 1989-90 and 1990-91 which required sanction for issue of notice as contemplated by the provisions of s. 151 of the Act, it was contended that the sanction which was granted was a mechanical one without any application of mind by the Dy. CIT. It was contended that mere change of opinion was no ground to initiate reassessment proceedings and none of the impugned notices disclose any valid reason which can enable the AO to reopen the assessment under the provisions of s. 148. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions on the following decisions.
1. VXL India Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT (1995) 215 ITR 295 (Guj) : TC 51R.1569
2. ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das (1976) 103 ITR 437 (SC) : TC 51R.598
3. Chhugamal Rajpal vs. S. P. Chaliha & Ors. (1971) 79 ITR 603 (SC) : TC 51R.611
6. For the asst. yr. 1988-89, no returns were filed by the petitioner on the ground that it's income was exempt under s. 10(23A) of the Act or 10(23C)(iv) thereof. For the asst. yrs. 1989-90 1990-91 and 1993-94, the assessee had claimed exemption under s. 10(23C)(iv) and 10(23A) of the Act and not under s. 11 thereof. For the asst. yrs. 1991-92 and 1992-93, the petitioner assessee had claimed exemption under s. 11 of the Act and also in the note appended to the returns exemption under s. 10(23C)(iv) or s. 10(23A) of the Act. All the returns which were filed by the petitioner were accepted under s. 143(1)(a).
The show cause notices have been separately issued for all these years.
7. The reasons which prompted the AO to issue notices under s. 148 of the Act are separately stated in respect of each of these five assessment years. For the year 1989-90, the assessee has not filed any return of income on the ground that its entire income was exempt under s. 10(23C)(iv). It has been recorded in the notice that the application of the assessee for renewal of exemption under s. 10(23C)(iv) was rejected and though the application for exemption under s. 10(23A) was pending, the income from house property, from specific services rendered by the assessee or by way of interest or dividend derived from its investment could not be exempted. It was noted that the claim of the assessee that it's income was not taxable, was wrong from the reason that no approval under s. 10(23A) was obtained and even if such an approval was received, the income from house property, specific services and by way of interest or dividend could not be exempt. It was also noted that the interest income on investment which was liable to be taxed even if assessees were to be granted exemption under s. 10(23A) itself, was Rs. 13,89,070 besides other income exigible to tax. It will, thus, be noted from the notice that the AO recorded cogent reasons for reopening the assessment under s. 148.
8. Similarly, for the asst. yrs. 1990-91 and 1993-94 the AO separately recorded his reasons for issuing the reassessment notices. For these two years, since the matter fell beyond four years and sanction envisaged by s. 151 of the Act was, therefore, required, the sanction was obtained from the Dy. CIT for each of these two years which is on record. The grievance of the petitioner is that merely by saying "yes, I agree with the reasons recorded by the AO" it cannot be said that the requirements of the provisions of s. 151(2) was fulfilled. Under the said provisions, the Dy. CIT has to satisfy himself on the reasons recorded by the AO as to whether it is a fit case for issuance of notice. Therefore, he is required to apply his mind to the reasons which have been recorded by the AO. In the present case, the endorsements made by the Dy. CIT clearly show that he was in agreement with the reasons recorded by the AO. Therefore, the requirements of s. 151(2) have been clearly satisfied and it cannot be said that the Dy. CIT had acted mechanically in the matter. Reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner on the decision of Chhugamal Rajpal vs. S. P. Chaliha & Ors. (supra) is wholly misconceived because in that matter the AO had not recorded any reason and the authority had affirmed such an action under s. 151(2) of the Act. It was in terms held that the ITO had not even come to a prima facie conclusion that the loan transaction to which he referred were not genuine transactions and he only appeared to have vague feeling that they might be bogus transactions. It was held that such a conclusion did not fulfil the requirements of s. 151(2) by which on the basis of the reasons recorded by the AO, the Dy. CIT was required to decide whether it was a fit case for issue of the notice. We may note here that in a case where a reasoned order is passed while making an assessment in subsequent proceedings of issuing reassessment notices it is easier to ascertain whether there was mere change of opinion than in a case where the returns are accepted as they are filed and the AO does not express his views explicitly. Thus, if the AO has considered as to whether s. 11 exemption could be claimed or whether exemption under s. 10(23A) could be granted, and made a speaking order or expressed his opinion while passing the assessment order, then one could have at this point of time perhaps contended that there was a mere change of opinion. But in the instant case, the returns were accepted as they were on an assumption that the assessees' claim for exemption was correct and now the AO has recorded cogent reasons for issuing notices because it transpires that exemptions under ss. 10(23A) or 10(23C)(iv) were not admissible and as has been recorded in the notice in respect of the assessment years for which exemption under s. 11 is claimed, even the applications for registration was not found. The fact that the petitioner was in fact registered in the year 1977 under s. 12A of the Act for the purpose of s. 11 can always be brought to the notice of the AO by responding to these reassessment notices and it could not be expected of the AO while dealing with a matter for a particular assessment year to pick up the entire past records and trace out that in the year 1977-78 there is a registration granted to the petitioner under s. 12A of the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that in respect of those two asst. yrs. 1991-92 and 1992-93 for which exemption under s. 11 was claimed by the petitioner, the recitation of the fact that registration application was not found, is wholly irrelevant and not germane to the matter. It will also be noticed that in respect of those two years, the petitioner did not claim exemption only under s. 11 but also in the note which was appended to the returns, in terms it referred to exemption being claimed under s. 10(23A). Therefore, when it is not clear that the AO had, at the relevant time, applied his mind and granted exemption under a particular provision, when now it transpires that the petitioner is not entitled to any exemption under s. 10(23), the AO has even in respect of those two years issued notices for valid and cogent reasons which are therein mentioned.
9. As regards the other three assessment years, the petitioner had claimed exemption only under s. 10(23A) and the AO has recorded that, that claim was wrong and that reason cannot be said to be irrelavant or a reason which cannot form basis for the issuance of notice under s. 148 of the Act.
10. The reasons which have been given in all these notices have direct and rational connection with the formation of the belief by the AO under s. 148 of the Act. It is not for this Court to go in to sufficiency of these reasons and it cannot be said that the reasons are vague or distant. Under these circumstances, the decision of this Court in VXL India Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT (supra) in which it was held that since the order did not say that the basis of valuation adopted in the assessment order was incorrect and did not disclose any reason as to why the AO considered that taking into consideration the fluctuation of the exchange rate for the purpose of valuing the exchange rate in that case, it was erroneous, cannot assist the petitioner. The decision of the Supreme Court in ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das (supra), laid down that reasons for formation of the belief contemplated by s. 147(a) of the IT Act, 1961 for the reopening of an assessment must have a rational connection or relevant bearing on the formation of the belief. The impugned notices, since they record cogent and valid reasons, satisfy the tests which have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the said decision.
11. In the above view of the matter, the grounds on which the impugned notices are challenged, fail. The impugned notices have been issued in lawful exercise of the jurisdiction by the AO and there is absolutely no warrant for interference by this Court with them. The petition is, therefore, rejected with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated.
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