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Bank Of India v. Baroda Cables Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Gujarat High Court
Sep 1, 1997
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Letters Patent Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is against an order dated 27 February 1997 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 8588 of 1996. The opinion is authored by C.K. Thakkar, J.

Relevant facts from the opinion (as stated):

  • Appellant: Bank of India ("Bank"). The Bank had filed Special Civil Suit No. 89 of 1985 in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), Godhra for recovery of Rs. 82,18,857.02 against respondent Nos. 1 to 3.
  • During pendency of that suit, an arrangement/settlement was said to have been arrived at between defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and Sunflow Metals Private Limited (respondent No. 5). Applications were made for joinder and settlement under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; the settlement was accepted by the Bank and a decree was to be passed on that basis.
  • In December 1994, a Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) for Gujarat and certain Union Territories was established at Ahmedabad. The Bank applied on 22 March 1995 to transfer the Civil Suit to the DRT; by order dated 18 April 1995 the Civil Judge transferred the suit and forwarded records under Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks & Financial Institutions Act, 1993 ("the Act").
  • Upon receipt by the DRT, two applications (Ex. R.405 and Ex. R.407) were filed requesting retransfer to the Civil Court on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction; both applications and subsequent review applications were rejected by the Tribunal.
  • Baroda Cables Private Limited filed Special Civil Application No. 8588 of 1996 challenging the Tribunal's rejection. On 6 November 1996 the learned single Judge issued an ex parte rule and granted ad interim relief (stay) as to further proceedings before the DRT; that ad interim relief was later confirmed and continued by the learned single Judge in the order dated 27 February 1997, which is the subject of the present Letters Patent Appeal filed by the Bank.
  • Counsel who appeared before the Division Bench in the appeal were Mr. J.T. Trivedi for the appellant (Bank) and Mr. S.N. Shelat (instructed by Mr. H.M. Parikh and K.C. Shah) for the respondents.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against the learned single Judge's order when that order was described in terms as a petition under Article 227 but, in substance, treated as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the order of transfer of the civil suit to the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Act was lawful and whether, accordingly, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
  3. Whether an aggrieved party can be constrained from approaching this Court under Articles 226/227 when an alternative statutory remedy (an appeal under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Act) is available.
  4. Whether an appeal under Section 20 of the Act lies against any order (including interlocutory or interim orders) made by the Tribunal, or only against final orders.
  5. Whether the ad interim/interim relief granted by the learned single Judge should be continued or vacated in light of the availability of statutory appeal remedies.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Bank of India) Arguments

  • Transfer to the Debt Recovery Tribunal: Under Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Act all pending proceedings automatically stood transferred to the Tribunal; the civil court's transfer order was lawful and the DRT therefore had jurisdiction.
  • If the Tribunal had jurisdiction, its orders could not be challenged on the ground that it had no jurisdiction; hence the respondents' contention that Tribunal lacked jurisdiction was untenable.
  • Alternative statutory remedy exists: Even if the Tribunal's order were to be considered illegal, respondents had a statutory remedy by way of appeal under Section 20 of the Act. Ordinarily, courts under Articles 226/227 should not entertain petitions when an adequate statutory remedy is available.
  • Consequently, the learned single Judge erred in entertaining the petition and in granting interim relief.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Tribunal erred in rejecting the respondents' applications; that order was without jurisdiction and therefore alternative statutory remedy should not operate as a bar to approaching this Court.
  • The order passed by the Tribunal was interim in nature and it was doubtful whether an appeal would lie against such interlocutory orders under Section 20; hence the respondents sought relief before this Court.
  • Ordinarily, when a petition is admitted and a "Rule" is issued (i.e., notice for consideration), this Court would not interfere at that stage; the petition ought to be decided on merits.
  • On merits, the respondents submitted that the Tribunal ought to have allowed their applications and that rejection caused prejudice.

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion does not cite any specific case authorities by name. It does mention that a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had earlier declared certain provisions of the Act ultra vires and that the Supreme Court had admitted an appeal and stayed that judgment, but no case names or formal precedents are cited in the provided opinion.

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal:

  • The respondents argued the petition was filed under Article 227 (for which Letters Patent Appeal would not lie), and therefore the appeal was not maintainable. The Division Bench rejected that contention because in substance the petition had been treated as one under Article 226. The Court relied on the substance of the petition and the manner in which the learned single Judge treated it (i.e., noting a related Article 226 challenge pending in another petition) to conclude that a Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable.

Jurisdictional and alternative remedy analysis:

  • The Bank's primary contention was that Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Act effected automatic transfer of pending proceedings to the DRT and that, therefore, the Tribunal had jurisdiction; any challenge to its orders should proceed by the statutory appeal mechanism.
  • The Court examined the scheme of the Act, focusing on Sections 17, 18 and 20. It noted that the Act does not define the term "order" but accepted established law that "order" can include both interim and final orders.
  • Section 17 describes the jurisdiction and authority of the Tribunal; Section 20 provides for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal from "an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act." The Court observed that Section 20 is not limited to "final" orders and therefore, on a plain reading, any order by the Tribunal is subject to challenge by appeal under Section 20.
  • Given the availability of appeals under Section 20 even against interlocutory orders, the Court held that ordinarily aggrieved parties should pursue the statutory appellate remedy rather than relief under Articles 226/227. This principle weighed against maintaining interim relief granted by the single Judge.

Decision on interim relief and procedural directions:

  • Although the Division Bench considered that the interim relief granted by the single Judge "deserves interference" and should be vacated because an alternative remedy exists, it recognized the petition had already been admitted and was pending for final hearing.
  • To balance interests, the Court allowed the respondents a specific period (until 30 September 1997) to file an appeal under Section 20 and directed the Appellate Tribunal to entertain such an appeal without raising limitation objections. The Tribunal was directed to decide any application for stay/interim relief after hearing parties by 20 October 1997.
  • Until the Appellate Tribunal decides interim relief, the interim relief granted by the learned single Judge was ordered to continue (i.e., remain operative) for the interim period provided by the Court's directions.
  • The Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the substantive merits of the underlying dispute and directed that the Appellate Tribunal decide the appeal on its own merits, uninfluenced by observations made by the learned single Judge or by the Division Bench.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal was partly allowed. The Division Bench concluded that interim relief granted by the learned single Judge should be vacated in principle because an alternative statutory remedy (appeal under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Act) is available. However, in view of the circumstances and because the petition was admitted and pending, the Court granted limited procedural relief and timelines to the respondents:

  • The respondents were granted liberty to file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal on or before 30 September 1997; the Tribunal was directed to entertain such an appeal notwithstanding any limitation objection.
  • The Appellate Tribunal was directed to consider any application for interim relief or stay and to pass appropriate orders after hearing the parties by 20 October 1997.
  • Until the Appellate Tribunal's order (or until 20 October 1997 as the date for decision), the interim relief previously granted by the learned single Judge would continue to operate.
  • The Division Bench expressly did not express any opinion on the merits; it directed that the Appellate Tribunal decide on the merits afresh.
  • The appeal was "partly allowed" and there was "no order as to costs."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The decision requires the respondents to pursue the statutory appellate remedy under Section 20 if they wish to challenge the Tribunal's orders. The Appellate Tribunal is required to hear any such appeal even if filed late (within the time granted by the Division Bench) and to decide interim relief promptly by the date specified.
  • No sweeping new precedent: The Court confined itself to interpretation and application of the Act's provisions (notably Section 20) as they bear on the availability of appeal and the propriety of interim relief; it expressly refrained from deciding substantive merits and did not purport to lay down new broad legal principles beyond the immediate statutory interpretation and procedural directions in the case.

This summary is strictly limited to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not infer or add information beyond the text of that opinion.

Show all summary ...

C.K Thakkar, J.:— This appeal is filed against an order passed by the learned single Judge on February 27, 1997 in Special Civil Application No. 8588 of 1996.

2. Few relevant facts for deciding this Letters Patent Appeal may now be stated: The appellant is Bank of India (“Bank” for short). It filed Special Civil Suit No. 89 of 1985 in the Court of Civil Judge (SD, Godhra for recovery of amount of Rs. 82,18,857-02 ps. with interest and costs. It was against the respondent Nos. 1 to 3. During pendency of the suit, it appears that some arrangement was arrived at between the debtors, i.e, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Sunflow Metals Private Limited Respondent No. 5 herein, pursuant to which an application was made by the said Sunflow Metals Private Limited before the learned Civil Judge to be joined as party to the suit. Likewise, the respondent No. 1 also made an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 stating therein that a settlement between defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and Sunflow Metals Private Limited which was also accepted by the Bank. On the basis of the said compromise and settlement, a decree was to be passed. In the meanwhile, however during the pendency of the suit, Debt Recovery Tribunal for the State of Gujarat, Union Territories of Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman & Div came to be established at Ahmedabad in December 1994. The appellant-Bank, therefore, filed an application on March 22, 1995 for transferring the case to the Debt Recovery-Tribunal. By an order dated April 18, 1995, the Civil Judge (SD) Godhra transferred the suit to Debt Recovery Tribunal and all the records and proceedings were forwarded to the said Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of Section 31 of Recovery of Debts Due to Bank & Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). When the records and proceedings were received by Debt Recovery Tribunal, two applications were filed before the Tribunal being Ex. R. 405 and Ex. R. 407 requesting the Tribunal to retransfer the matter to the Court of learned Civil Judge (SD), Godhra as the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and the matter can only be decided by a Civil Court. Both these applications were rejected by the Tribunal and review applications also met with the same fate. Since the applications were disposed of and no relief was granted to the respondents, the above petition was filed by Baroda Cables Private Limited, being Special Civil Application No. 8588 of 1996. When the matter was placed for admission before the learned single Judge, on November 6, 1996, the following order was passed:

“Special Civil Application No. 2170 of 1995 involving challenge of vires of the Recovery of Debts Due to the Banks & Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is pending. In the present matter, the question is with regard to recording of settlement under Rule 3 Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure and joinder of purchaser in the pending proceeding. The Tribunal has dismissed the application of the concerned patties. That is how the petitioner is before this Court.

Rule returnable on 28-11-1996. Ad interim stay of the proceedings in terms of para 26(iv). Still then Notice as to interim relief returnable on the date.”

Para 26(iv) of the petition reads as under:

“That pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of this Special. Civil Application Yours Lordships be graciously pleased to stay further proceedings before the Honlble The Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Special Civil Suit No. 89 of 1985 transferred from the Court of Civil Judge (S.D) Godhra, District Panchmahal.”

3. Pursuant to notices issued by the Court, parties appeared, hearing took place and by the impugned order dated February 27, 1997, the learned single Judge confirmed ad interim relief granted earlier and it was ordered to be continued till disposal of the petition. That order was passed on February 27, 1997. It is against that order that the present Letters Patent Appeal is filed.

4. We have heard Mr. J.T Trivedi, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. S.N Shelat instructed by Mr. H.M Parikh and K.C Shah for the respondents.

5. A preliminary contention was raised by the respondents regarding maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal. It was contended that a petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and that even, the learned single Judge has also observed in the order that the petition was under Article 227 of the Constitution. Letters Patent Appeal, therefore, does not lie. We, are, however, unable to uphold this contention. It is true that the learned single Judge has observed in the order that the petition was under Article 227 of the Constitution. But it is clear that in substance and in reality, the petition was treated as under Article 226 of the Constitution. The first sentence of the order, dated November 6, 1996 makes it clear that another petition being Special Civil Application No. 2170 of 1995 involving challenge of vires of the Act was pending. It is true that in the present petition (Special Civil Application No. 8588 of 1996) constitutional validity of the Act was not challenged. The fact, however, remains that when the Court issued notice and granted ad interim relief, the Court considered the fact that validity of the Act was challenged in some other matter which was pending. It is in the light of that fact that ex parte rule was issued, ad interim relief was granted and notice was issued as to why ad interim should not be made interim relief. Subsequently, ad interim relief was confirmed and made interim relief. In these circumstances, in our opinion, the petition cannot be said to be under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Letters Patent Appeal would, therefore, be maintainable.

6. Coming to the merits of the matter, it was contended by Mr. Trivedi, learned Counsel for the appellant-Bank that in accordance with the provisions of Section 31 of the Act, all pending proceeding automatically stood transferred before the Tribunal constituted under the Act. In view of the said provision, it cannot be contended that the order passed by the Civil Judge (SD) Godhra transferring the matter to Debt Recovery Tribunal was illegal or unlawful. If the said order was legal, any order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal could not be assailed on the ground that Tribunal had no jurisdiction. If the Tribunal had jurisdiction and decided the application, such order is not ultra vires or without jurisdiction.

7. It was further argued that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the order of Debt Recovery Tribunal is illegal or unlawful, alternative statutory remedy is available to the respondents as appeal is provided under Section 20 of the Act. Mr. Trivedi submitted that ordinarily in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court would not entertain a petition if alternative remedy, statutory in nature, is available to an aggrieved party. The aggrieved party has to approach appellate forum by invoking the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. On that ground also, according to Mr. Trivedi, the learned single Judge has committed an error of law in entertaining a petition and in granting interim relief.

8. The respondents, on the other hand submitted that the Tribunal has committed an error of law in rejecting the application of the petitioners and since the order was without jurisdiction, alternative remedy is no bar in approaching this Court. It was also submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal was interim in nature and it is doubtful whether an appeal would lie against such interlocutory order. It was further urged that ordinarily when a petition is admitted and “Rule” is issued, this Court would not interfere at that stage and a petition should be decided on merits. It was submitted that even on merits, the Tribunal ought to have allowed the applications and rejection of applications has caused great prejudice to the petitioners.

9. Having considered the matter and having heard the arguments of learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the view that interim relief should be vacated. So far as constitutional validity of the Act is concerned, it is conceded by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that in the petition it has not been challenged. Our attention was invited by Mr. Trivedi on behalf of the Bank that though similar petitions are pending, interim relief against operation of the Act has been refused by this Court. He also stated that though a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi finally decided the matter and declared the provisions of the Act ultra vires, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has admitted an appeal and has granted stay against operation of the judgment of the High Court. It is, therefore, clear that as on today, there is no stay against operation of the provisions of the Act, and hence, we will have to deal with the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

10. The next question for our consideration is that if the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal is not in accordance with law, what would be the remedy available to the aggrieved party. In our opinion, the aggrieved party should approach Appellate Forum, if it is otherwise available. In this connection, the rival contention on behalf of the parties is as to whether an appeal against such an order is maintainable. According to Mr. Trivedi, every order passed by the Tribunal is appealable under Section 20 of the Act, whereas according to the respondents, no appeal would lie, if such order is not final.

11. In this connection, it would be relevant to consider the relevant provisions, of the Act. Now the term “order” is not defined in the act but it is settled law that “order” may mean “interim order” as also “final order”. The jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal has been dealt with in Section 17 of the Act. Sub-section (1) states that “A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions.” Sub-section (2) is relevant, which reads as under:

“(2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act.”

12. Section 18 bars jurisdiction of all other authorities and Courts. Section 20 is material for the purpose of deciding the controversy raised in this appeal and may be quoted in extenso:

“20. (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.

(2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from an order made by a Tribunal with the consent of the parties.

(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order made or deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is received by him and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed:

Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain, an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.”

13. Looking to the above provisions, there is no doubt in our minds that there is no provision in the Act stating that an appeal would lie before An Appellate Tribunal only when the order is final in nature. On the contrary, looking to the above provisions in their entirety, it is clear that any order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal is subject to challenge under Section 20 before the Appellate Tribunal. If it is so, in our opinion, the contention of Mr. Trivedi is well-founded that the aggrieved party should approach the Appellate Tribunal for redress of grievances.

14. As the petition is already admitted and is pending for final hearing, we do not enter into a larger question. In our opinion, however, interim relief which was granted by the learned single Judge deserves interference and it should be vacated. Since the order, according to us, is subject to appeal, an appeal can be filed before the Appellate Authority. As interim relief is operative and we are vacating it on the ground that alternative remedy is available to the appellant, it would be in the fitness of things if we grant reasonable time to the respondents to approach the Appellate Forum and to enable the Appellate Tribunal to pass an appropriate order regarding continuance or otherwise of interim relief. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that it would be proper if we grant liberty to the respondents to file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and also to make a prayer for interim relief. If such an appeal is filed on or before 30th September 1997, the Tribunal shall entertain the said appeal without raising any objection as to the period of limitation. The Tribunal will also pass appropriate order on an application for stay or interim relief after hearing the parties before 20th October 1997. Till then, interim relief granted by the learned single Judge will continue.

15. We may clarify that we are not expressing any opinion on merits one way or the other and as and when such an appeal will be placed before the Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal will decide the same on its own merits, without being influenced by the observations made by the learned single Judge or by us. Appeal is accordingly partly allowed, however, with no order as to costs.

16. Partly allowed.