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Municipal Employees ... v. State Of Gujarat And...

Gujarat High Court
Feb 9, 1994
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioners: Petitioner No. 1 is a union of workmen employed by the Baroda Municipal Corporation (Respondent No. 3); Petitioner No. 2 is the General Secretary of that union.

In a resolution (Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982) the Baroda Municipal Corporation sanctioned a fixed-time scheme to grant higher grades to employees who completed specified periods of service (eligibility at 10 years, 18 years and 22 years where promotion to a higher post was not available). The Corporation also prescribed procedure and norms pursuant to that resolution (produced at Annexure-A to the petition).

The State Government of Gujarat cancelled the Corporation's resolution by an order dated December 30, 1983 (produced at Annexure-K). The Government stated that, in its opinion, the Corporation's resolution sanctioning the fixed-time promotion scheme was contrary to the "general principles of granting of promotion" and that the Corporation had acted in excess of its powers under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (BPMC Act). The Government purported to exercise powers under the BPMC Act to suspend the execution of Resolution No. 222.

The petition challenged the legality and validity of the Government's order of December 30, 1983 and consequent circulars issued to give effect to it. The petition sought quashing of the Government order and the related circulars. The court disposed of the petition by allowing it: the impugned Government order was quashed and set aside and the consequent circulars were also quashed and set aside; the Rule was made absolute with no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, has the power to grant its employees a higher grade on completion of specified periods of service (fixed time promotions) when promotion to a higher post was not available.
  2. Whether the State Government could suspend or cancel such a decision of the Municipal Corporation in exercise of its powers under the BPMC Act (the Government invoked provisions described in the opinion as being under Section 45(1) / section 451(1) of the BPMC Act).
  3. Whether Resolution No. 222 (fixing eligibility at 10/18/22 years) was contrary to Sub-section (4) of Section 51 of the BPMC Act and/or the Government's order dated September 19, 1987 (which fixed monetary thresholds for creating new posts), including the application of the Explanation to Section 51(4) that treats an increase in the salary of a permanent post as creation of a new post.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Municipal Corporation had authority to lay down a promotion policy granting higher grade on completion of specified service periods where promotion by vacancy was not available.
  • The Government's cancellation/suspension order was issued under section 451(1) (as recorded in the opinion) on the ground that the resolution violated undefined "general principles of granting of promotion," but the Government did not identify or explain any such general principles.
  • Even if there were general principles, the Government had not shown that the Corporation was prohibited by statute from departing from them and setting its own promotion policy.
  • The Government's reliance on Section 51(4) of the BPMC Act and on its September 19, 1987 order (fixing monetary limits for creation of new permanent offices) was misplaced because those provisions and the order relate to creation of new posts, not to laying down eligibility criteria for grant of higher grade to existing employees.
  • The Explanation to Section 51(4) (treating a salary increase as creation of a new post) did not apply because the resolution did not increase the salary of any permanent post; it only established eligibility criteria for benefit on completion of service periods.

Respondents' Arguments (as stated in the opinion)

  • The Government contended that the Corporation's Resolution No. 222 was contrary to "general principles of granting of promotion" and therefore beyond the Corporation's powers; this was the stated basis for suspending execution of the resolution under the BPMC Act.
  • Respondents argued that Resolution No. 222 was contrary to Sub-section (4) of Section 51 of the BPMC Act and to the Government order dated September 19, 1987 (which fixed salary-thresholds for creation of new posts), implying the resolution effectively created posts or altered pay conditions in breach of those provisions.
  • Respondents asserted implementation of Resolution No. 222 would impose a substantial additional financial burden on the Municipal Corporation (figures were supplied in affidavit material, including an assertion by the Municipal Commissioner that the additional burden would be about Rs. 80–85 lakhs per year and that total annual salary bill was about 40% of annual income).
  • The Municipal Corporation pointed to a separate settlement in another challenge (Special Civil Application No. 6873 of 1987) which resulted in a new policy of fixed time-scale (9, 18 and 27 years, effective 1-4-1992) and asserted a majority of employees had accepted that policy, arguing this should weigh against quashing the Government order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. S. Bhatt, AIR 1989 SC 1972 The decision discusses modern principles of personnel management: employees must have opportunity for promotion; long stagnation in the same post is inimical to organizational health and justice. Although the Supreme Court disagreed with the Tribunal's strict interpretation of the bye-law, it declined to disturb the Tribunal's relief because of the equities and the management principles involved. The court relied on the reasoning in this decision to emphasise that modern personnel management supports providing promotion opportunities and that the Corporation's fixed-time promotion scheme aligned with those principles; the Government's contrary view was regarded as prima facie archaic and unreasonable on the merits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps, each tied to the specific legal claims and materials placed before the court:

  1. Nature of Government action and its stated basis:

    The impugned Government order was issued in purported exercise of powers under the BPMC Act (the opinion records invocation of a provision described as Section 451(1) in one place and Section 45(1) in another). The Government's stated ground for suspension/cancellation was that the Corporation's Resolution No. 222 was contrary to "general principles of granting of promotion" and that the Corporation had thereby exceeded its statutory powers.

  2. Requirement to identify the "general principles":

    The court observed that no general principles governing fixed-time promotions were specified by the Government in the order, nor were any such principles pointed out by counsel for the respondents. The court stressed that even if such general principles existed, the Government would need to show that the Corporation lacked statutory authority to depart from them; no such statute or principle was pointed to.

  3. Analysis of Section 51(4) and the Government's September 19, 1987 order:

    The respondents relied on Sub-section (4) of Section 51 of the BPMC Act and on the Government order of September 19, 1987 (which fixed monetary thresholds for creation of new permanent posts) to argue the resolution was impermissible. The court examined the statutory text and concluded that Section 51(4) and the Government's order apply to the creation of new posts. The court found these provisions concern formation of new permanent offices exceeding certain salary thresholds and do not restrict a Corporation from laying down a promotion policy or eligibility criteria for employees already in service.

  4. Application of the Explanation to Section 51(4):

    The court examined whether the Explanation (which treats an increase in salary of a permanent post as creation of a new post) applied. It concluded the Explanation was not applicable because Resolution No. 222 did not increase the salary of any permanent post; rather, it established eligibility criteria for granting higher grade to existing employees who had stagnated without promotion due to lack of vacancies.

  5. Merits: personnel management principles and reliance on precedent:

    The court referred to the Supreme Court decision in Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. S. Bhatt (AIR 1989 SC 1972), which emphasised modern personnel management principles requiring opportunities for promotion and decried long stagnation of employees. Applying that reasoning, the court found that Resolution No. 222 was consistent with modern personnel management and that the Government's view opposing the resolution was, at least prima facie, archaic and unreasonable.

  6. Financial burden and relevance:

    The respondents argued implementation would impose heavy financial burden. The court observed that the affidavits contained general budgetary figures but did not specifically quantify the additional burden caused by implementing Resolution No. 222 (except an earlier averment by the Municipal Commissioner estimating Rs. 80–85 lakhs per year, which was contested). The court held that potential financial burden was not a material question for deciding the legality and validity of the Government's order: the core issue was whether the Government lawfully exercised its power to suspend/cancel the Corporation's resolution on the statutory grounds advanced.

  7. Other procedural/settlement matters:

    The respondents pointed to another union's challenge that had been settled, resulting in a different fixed-time policy (9/18/27 years) accepted by many employees. The court held that such settlement or subsequent policy evolution did not validate the Government's order; the legality of the Government order had to be judged on its own merits. Further, the court noted the Corporation itself had power to modify or cancel its own resolution under the Rules in Schedule-A (reference to Section 453 of the Act and Clause (r) of Rule 1, Chapter II of Schedule-A) and could take appropriate action in accordance with law even if the Government's order were quashed.

  8. Conclusion on excess of power:

    Because the Government failed to identify applicable "general principles" or to show any statutory prohibition preventing the Corporation from adopting the promotion policy, and because Section 51(4) and the Explanation did not apply to the resolution (they govern creation of posts and not eligibility criteria for existing employees), the court concluded the Government's stated ground — that the Corporation acted in excess of its powers — was unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE PETITION IS ALLOWED; THE IMPUGNED GOVERNMENT ORDER DATED 30-12-1983 IS QUASHED AND SET ASIDE.

Accompanying directions and immediate effects:

  • The consequence circulars issued by the Municipal Corporation and the Municipal Commissioner (produced at Annexure-L, MGN dated 26-2-1984 and Annexure-O dated 8-3-1984) are also quashed and set aside.
  • Rule made absolute accordingly, with no order as to costs.
  • The court expressly noted that the Corporation remains free to modify or cancel its own resolution in accordance with law (citing Section 453 and Schedule-A Rule 1 Clause (r)); the decision will not preclude the Corporation from taking appropriate lawful action in that regard.

Broader implications: The opinion does not proclaim a new legal principle or binding precedent beyond adjudicating the legality of the Government's specific order in this case. The court relied on established management principles (as reflected in the cited Supreme Court decision) and statutory construction of Section 51(4) to reach its conclusion; it did not articulate a novel rule of law beyond these applications.

Show all summary ...

1. Is it not within the powers of Municipal Corporation constituted under the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, to grant to its employees higher grade on completion of service of certain number of years? Can such decision of a Corporation be suspended by State Government in exercise of its powers under Section 451 of the BPMC Act? Broadly these are the questions which have arisen for consideration in this petition.

2. Petitioner No. 1 is a union of workmen employed by Respondent No. 3, i.e., Baroda Municipal Corporation. Petitioner No. 2 is the General Secretary of the Union. Respondent No. 3 passed Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982 and granted sanction for giving the benefit of higher grades to its employees. As per the resolution an employee who may complete ten years, eighteen years and twenty two years of service and who may have been deprived of promotion to higher post on account of non-availability of posts is to be granted the benefit of higher grade. The State Government of Gujarat cancelled the said resolution by order dated December 30, 1983 produced at Annexure-K to the petition. The legality and validity of this order passed by the Government is challenged by the petitioners. The petitioners have also challenged the legality and validity of the consequent circulars giving effect to the Government orders. The procedure prescribed and the norms laid down pursuant to Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982 passed by the Corporation is produced at Annexure-A to the petition.

3. By impugned order dated December 30, 1983 the Government cancelled the aforesaid resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation on the ground that in the opinion of the Government the resolution of the Corporation sanctioning the fixed time promotion scheme was contrary to the "general principles of granting of promotion", and therefore the Corporation acted in excess of the powers conferred on it by the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (for short 'BPMC Act'). On the aforesaid ground, in exercise of powers under Section 45(1) of the BPMC Act the Government suspended execution of Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1992 passed by the Corporation.

4. It is an undisputed position that the impugned order is passed by the Government in exercise of powers under section 451(1) of the bpmc act. As stated above, the reason for suspending execution of the resolution is that in the opinion of the Government it was contrary to the general principles of granting of promotion. It is contended that there are no general principles regarding grant of fixed time promotion. No such "general principles of granting of promotion" have been spelt out by the Government. No such principles have been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents. Even if it is assumed for moment that there are such general principles governing grant of fixed time promotion, then also before exercising the powers under section 451(1) of bpmc act it is necessary for the Government to show that it was not within the powers of the Municipal Corporation to make departure from the general principles and lay down its own promotion policy. Neither such general principles have been pointed out to us nor any such provision in the Act has been pointed out which prohibits the Municipal Corporation from laying down the rules regarding grant of benefit of higher grade on completion of 10 years, 18 years or 22 years of service by its employees. Thus the very basis of the Government order that the Municipal Corporation has acted in excess of its power is not sustainable.

5. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982 passed by the Municipal Corporation is contrary to the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 51 of the BPMC Act. In order to examine the submission, the provisions of Section 51 of the Act may be reproduced.

"51. (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (4) the Standing Committee shall from time to time determine the number, designations, grades, salaries, fees, and allowances of auditors, assistant auditors, officers, clerks and servants to be immediately subordinate to the Municipal Chief Auditor and the Municipal Secretary respectively.

(2) The Commissioner shall, from time to time, prepare and bring before the Standing Committee a statement setting forth the number, designations and grades of the other officers and servants who should in his opinion be maintained; and the amount and nature of the salaries, fees and allowances, which he proposes should be paid to each.

(3) The Standing Committee shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (4), sanction such statement either as it stands or subject to such modifications as it deems expedient.

(4) No new permanent office of which the minimum monthly salary, exclusive of allowances, exceeds such amount as may be fixed by the State Government by a general or special order from time to time in the case of each Corporation shall be created except with the previous sanction of the Corporation and no new office of which the minimum or maximum monthly salary exclusive of allowances exceeds such amount as may be fixed in this behalf by the State Government, by a general or special order, from time to time in the case of each Corporation shall be created except with the previous sanction of the State Government.

(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the right of the Corporation or of the Commissioner to make any temporary appointment which it or he is empowered to make under Section 53.

Explanation :- An increase in the salary of any permanent office shall be deemed, for the purpose of Sub-Section (4), to be creation of new office if, by reason of such increase, the minimum or, as the case may be, the maximum monthly salary, exclusive of allowances, exceeds the minimum, or as the case may be, the maximum amount fixed by State Government for the purpose of the said Sub-section (4)".

6. Chapter IV of the BPMC Act deals with the municipal officers and servants - their appointment and conditions of service. Sections 51 to 55 deal with other officers and servants of the Corporation, who are not covered by the provisions of Sections 45 to 50 of the Act. It is contended that the Government has issued order dated September 19, 1987 under the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 51 of BPMC Act. By this order the Corporation has been directed that no new permanent office of which the minimum monthly salary, exclusive of allowance, exceeds Rs. 350/- or maximum monthly salary exclusive of allowances exceeds Rs. 650/- shall be created except with the previous sanction of the Government. It is further directed that no new permanent office of which the minimum salary exclusive of the allowances exceeds Rs. 700/- or the maximum monthly salary exclusive of the allowances exceeds Rs. 1,300/- shall be created except with the previous sanction of the State Government. Therefore, it is contended that the resolution passed by the Corporation is contrary to the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 51 read with Government order dated September 19, 1987.

7. Bare reading of the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 51 of the BPMC Act and the order dated September 19, 1987 passed by the Government makes it clear that the provisions of Sub-section (4) and the order passed by it applies to creation of new posts. This has thing to do with the service conditions of the employees already in service. Neither Sub-section (4) of Section 51 nor the orders dated September 19, 1987 passed thereunder by the Government places any restriction on the powers of the Municipal Corporation for laying down policy for grant of promotion or grant of benefit higher grade on completion of service of certain number of years'. Therefore the reliance placed on the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 51 of the Act and the order dated September 19, 1987 passed by the Government is of no help to the respondents.

8. The argument that the explanation to Sub-section (4) of Section 51 of the BPMC Act would apply may be examined. Explanation to Sub-section (4) deals with a situation wherein salary of any permanent post is increased. Such increase in the salary of permanent post is considered to be creation of new posts. By Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982 the Corporation has not decided to increase the salary of any permanent post. As indicated hereinabove all that has been done by the Corporation is to lay down the eligibility criteria for grant of higher grade to the employees. The eligibility criteria fixed is that the employee concerned should have completed ten years of service on or after 1-1-1973. If the employee has completed ten years of service, on completion of ten years of service in the same post, without benefit of promotion to a higher post on account of the fact that there was no vacancy in the higher post, he would be entitled to the benefit of higher grade in service. This does not amount to increase in salary of any permanent post. Similarly, by this very resolution benefit of further higher grade is conferred upon the employee who completes 18 years of service. Again, similar benefit is conferred on the completion of 22 years of service. Therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the Municipal Corporation and the Municipal Commissioner that Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982 is covered by the provisions of Section 51(4) read with the explanation cannot be accepted and the same is rejected.

9. The reason mentioned in the impugned order passed by the Government that the promotion policy adopted by the Corporation is contrary to the "general principles of granting promoting" may be examined. As indicated hereinabove, neither in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Government or on behalf of the Corporation and the Municipal Commissioner, any explanation is provided as regards "general principles" of granting promotion. We fail to understand, from where the Government has invented this concept of "general principles of granting promotion". On the contrary, the principles of personnel management require that an employee should not be stagnated on one post in all his service and must have a chance of being promoted to the higher post. As observed hereinabove, even if there be any such "general principles" there is nothing to indicate that the Corporation has no power to make departure therefrom. Therefore it cannot be said that the Corporation has acted in excess of its powers.

10. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K. G. S. Bhatt, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1972. In that case a Civil Engineer-A in the Central Food and Technology Research Institute, Mysore was denied promotion though he had served for nearly two decades. He approached the Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, making grievance regarding non-promotion and asking for the relief for being promoted to a higher post. He relied upon certain bye-laws of the society, i.e., the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. The Tribunal found that the employee had remained in the same cadre and pay-scale till 1981 while junior scientific officers and junior technical officers were given periodical promotion under bye-law 71(ii). The employee was denied promotion on the ground that he was not engaged in the "scientific work" and the bye-law covered only the employees who were engaged in the scientific work. The Central Administrative Tribunal allowed the claim of the employee and directed that he will be granted promotion as prayed for by him. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research challenged the legality and validity of the decision of the Tribunal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not agree with the interpretation placed by the Tribunal on the bye-laws. The Supreme Court held that as per the extant bye-law only one who is engaged in the scientific work was entitled to the benefit of the bye-law. It was the necessary qualification for being considered for accelerated promotion. The Bye-law had no application to the staff who were doing administrative work. The employee in that case was falling under administrative category and therefore stood excluded from purview of bye-law 71(b) (ii). Even so, the Supreme Court thought it proper not to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal.

11. Reasons for non-interference with the decision of the Tribunal have been inter alia mentioned in para 9 of the reported decision, which reads as follows :

That then is the scope of bye-law 71 (b) (1). But that does not mean that we should interfere with the relief granted to Respondent. By pointing out the error that crept into the decision of the Tribunal, we need not take to its logical end which will defeat justice. Respondent 1 is not a lay-man. He is highly qualified engineer. Although joined service with a Diploma in Engineering, he later passed Bachelor of Engineering (B. E.) and also acquired M. Tech. degree and one more diploma (D. P. M.). He was however, left without opportunity for promotion for about twenty years. This indeed is a sad commentary on the appellant and management. It is often said and indeed, adroitly, an organisation public or private does not hire a hand out engages or employs a whole man. The person is recruited by an organisation not just for a job, but for a whole career. One must therefore, be given an opportunity to advance. This is oldest and most important features of the free enterprise system. The opportunity for advancement is a requirement for progress of any organisation. It is an incentive for personnel development as well (See : Principles of Personnel Management by Flipo Edwin B. 4th Ed. p. 246). Every management must provide realistic opportunities for promising Employees to move upward.

" The organisation that fails to develop a satisfactory procedure for promotion is bound to pay severe penalty in terms of administrative costs, mis-location of personnel, low morale, and ineffectual performance, among both non-managerial employees and their Supervisors."
(See p. 277). There cannot be any modern management much less any career planning manpower development, management development etc. which is not related to a system of promotions. (See Management of Personnel in Indian Enterprises by Prof. N. N. Chatterjee, Chap. 12. 128). The Appellant appears to have overlooked this basic requirement of management so far as Respondent No. 1 was concerned till N. R. and A. S. were introduced.

The aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the contrary shows that modern principles of personnel management requires that there should be an opportunity to every employee for promotion to a higher post. In view of this position, what the Municipal Corporation has done by passing Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982 is in accordance with the modern principles of personnel management. The view taken by the Government prima facie appears to be archaic and out-dated. Thus, even on merits the order passed by the Government is unjust and unreasonable.

12. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that if the Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982 and the policy embodies therein is implemented, it will entail heavy financial burden upon the Municipal Corporation. In further affidavit dated February 8, 1994 some particulars are given showing the total figure of revenue by way of taxes and the amount of expenditure incurred by the Corporation towards salaries. However, it is not indicated even in this further affidavit as to what will be the additional financial burden upon the Municipal Corporation on account of the implementation of the promotion policy embodied in the Resolution No. 222 dated a July 6, 1982. The figures mentioned in Para 4 of the affidavit-in-reply are of the year 1990-91. Broad picture of collection of tax, revenue and the expenditure on salary is mentioned therein as in the year 1990-91. As stated hereinabove, no particulars whatsoever are mentioned as regard the likely additional burden. However, in the affidavit-in-reply dated August 26, 1984 sworn by Shri Fatesingh Jasol, the then Municipal Commissioner, it is stated in para 3.4 that the additional financial burden would be to the tune of about Rs. 80 to 85 lacks per year. It is also stated therein that the total annual salary bill would be about 40% of the total annual income of the Corporation. Of course these averment have been denied in the affidavit-in-rejoinder dated 3-9-1984 filed by petitioner No. 2, i.e., Ranjitsinh Ramsinh Bodana. It is averred by him that the total annual income of the Municipal Corporation was nearly Rs. 51 crores and there was scope for further increase as the Corporation had increased the rate of octroi.

13. Be that as it may. Whether the implementation of the Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982 would entail heavy financial burden upon the Municipal Corporation or not is not a question relevant for the purposes of deciding the issues involved in this petition. In this petition we are concerned with the legality and validity of the order dated December 30, 1983 passed by the Government. The only ground on which the Government has exercised its power is that the Corporation has passed Resolution No. 222 in excess of powers conferred upon it. This ground as indicated hereinabove is not sustainable. Therefore the impugned order dated December 30, 1983 cannot be sustained.

14. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this very resolution was challenged by another Union by filing Special Civil Application No. 6873 of 1987. In that petition the Union arrived at a settlement with the Municipal Corporation. Pursuant to the settlement the petition has been withdrawn. It is submitted that the Corporation has evolved a new policy of fixed time-scale. As per this policy the employees are to be given benefit of higher grade at the end of 9 years, 18 years and 27 years of service. This policy is made effective from April 1, 1992. It is further submitted that about 70% of the employees have voluntarily accepted this policy. Therefore it is submitted that the order passed by the Government be not quashed and set aside. The submission cannot be accepted. The legality and validity of the order passed by the Government has to be adjudged on its own merits. If the impugned order is quashed and set aside, there is nothing to prevent the Municipal Corporation from modifying and/or cancelling its own resolution.

15. The Municipal Corporation has ample power to modify or cancel its own resolution. Here reference may be made to Section 453 of the Act which inter alia provides that Rules in Schedule-A as amended from time to time shall be deemed to be part of the Act. In Chapter II of the Schedule-A, Rule 1 provides for regulating the Corporation's proceedings. Clause (r) of Rule 1 of Chapter II reads as follows :

"no resolution passed by the Corporation shall be modified or cancelled within three months after the passing thereof, except by resolution supported by not less than one half of the whole number of councillors or by such larger number of councillors as may be required by this Act in any particular cases and passed at a meeting whereof notice shall have been given fulfilling the requirements of Clause (h) and setting forth fully the resolution which it is proposed to modify or cancel at such meeting and the motion or proposition for the modification or cancellation of such resolution."

In view of the aforesaid provision Corporation could have modified or cancelled its resolution even within a period of three months from the date of passing the resolution with requisite majority as provided in the rule. However, after the period of three months of the passing of resolution, even this restriction is not applicable. If the Corporation though that its Resolution No. 222 dated July 6, 1982 was required to be modified or cancelled, it had not to depend upon the orders of the Government. The Corporation itself could have and should have taken appropriate steps for modifying and/or cancelling its own resolution. We make it clear that the decision in this petition will not preclude the Corporation from taking appropriate action in accordance with law.

16. No other contention is raised.

17. In the result the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated December 30, 1983 passed by the State Government of Gujarat, produced at Annexure-K, is quashed and set aside. The consequent circulars issued by the Municipal Corporation and the Municipal Commissioner produced at Annexure-L, MGN dated 26-2-1984 and Annexure-O dated 8-3-1984 are also quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute accordingly, with no order as to costs.