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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Nanikram Sobhraj Mills Pvt. Ltd.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (J.M. Panchal, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The assessee is a textile mill that manufactures silk cloth from purchased yarn. For the assessment year 1973–74 the assessee returned a loss and claimed a deduction for a provision for gratuity of Rs. 9,90,172 (computed on actuarial valuation). The Income-tax Officer disallowed the claim under section 40A(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner directed the Income-tax Officer to allow the deductible amount under Explanation 1 to section 40A(7) once the assessee produced evidence of approval of an irrevocable gratuity trust fund by the Commissioner of Income-tax. The assessee produced such evidence and the Income-tax Officer, by order dated March 31, 1977, allowed the deduction of Rs. 9,90,172.
The Commissioner of Income-tax, exercising powers under section 263 of the Act, considered the Income-tax Officer's order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue. The Commissioner held that section 40A(7) covered only actual liability for the year (not accrued past liabilities), and computed the admissible amount at 8-1/3% of salary to be substantially lower (the opinion records different salary figures in different places: Rs. 26,89,808 producing an approximate admissible amount of Rs. 2,32,848 in one passage, and Rs. 27,89,808 producing Rs. 2,32,484 in another). The Commissioner set aside the Income-tax Officer's order and directed recomputation under section 40A(7)(b)(ii).
The assessee appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal held that the Income-tax Officer's order had merged in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and that the Commissioner could not exercise revisionary powers under section 263 in respect of it; the Tribunal also concluded that the gratuity amount of Rs. 9,90,172 was correctly arrived at on the basis of total salary and dearness allowance and restored the Income-tax Officer's relief. The Commissioner then invoked section 256(1) of the Act and the Tribunal referred three questions of law to the High Court for opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax was illegal on any one of the grounds, namely, (a) that the basis of initiation of proceedings by the Commissioner of Income-tax was wrong; (b) that the order passed by the Income-tax Officer giving relief had merged in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and that, therefore, the Commissioner of Income-tax could not exercise powers under section 263 in respect thereof?
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal has been right in setting aside the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax and restoring the relief given by the Income-tax Officer?
- Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the basis of the total salary and the dearness allowance for the accounting period relevant to the assessment year 1973–74 being Rs. 27,89,808, the admissible amount at 8-1/3 per cent. of the same worked out to Rs. 2,32,484 approximately by the Commissioner of Income-tax as against the deduction of Rs. 9,90,172 granted by the Income-tax Officer, is wrong in law?
Arguments of the Parties
Commissioner of Income-tax / Revenue
- The Commissioner contended that the Income-tax Officer's allowance of the actuarial provision for gratuity was erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue, warranting exercise of revisionary powers under section 263.
- The Commissioner took the legal position that section 40A(7) permits deduction only in respect of the actual liability of the year in which the provision is made, and that an actuarial valuation covering past accrued liabilities is not admissible as a deduction.
- On the figures relied upon by the Commissioner (the opinion records two figures in different places), the Commissioner computed the total salary and dearness allowance as either Rs. 26,89,808 (yielding an admissible amount of about Rs. 2,32,848) or as Rs. 27,89,808 (yielding about Rs. 2,32,484), and maintained that the deduction of Rs. 9,90,172 allowed by the Income-tax Officer was excessive and incorrect.
Assessee
- The assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 9,90,172 as a provision for gratuity, computed on actuarial valuation, and sought allowance under the relevant statutory provisions.
- The assessee established that it had created an irrevocable gratuity trust fund before January 1, 1976, paid at least 50% of the amount into the fund before April 1, 1976 (and the balance before April 1, 1977), and obtained approval of the fund from the Commissioner of Income-tax.
- The assessee's position (as accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and by the Income-tax Officer on production of approval evidence) was that the actuarial provision corresponded to amounts attributable to each year of service of each employee and that the aggregate actuarial provision did not exceed the "admissible amount" as defined by Explanation 1 to section 40A(7).
- It was also noted that the Revenue did not appeal against the Income-tax Officer's order dated March 31, 1977, which allowed the deduction after production of approval evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court considered each referred question and explained its reasoning step by step:
- On the question of the Commissioner’s exercise of powers under section 263 (Question No. 1): The court rejected the Tribunal's conclusion that the Commissioner’s order was illegal on the ground that the Income-tax Officer’s order had merged in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner’s earlier order. The court traced the procedural history: the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had afforded relief conditionally (i.e., allowing the Income-tax Officer to give the admissible deduction once approval of the fund was produced). The assessee subsequently produced the approval and the Income-tax Officer granted the deduction by a later order dated March 31, 1977. Because the Revenue did not appeal from that March 31, 1977 order, that later order had not merged into the Appellate Assistant Commissioner’s May 27, 1976 order. Given the existence of a distinct Income-tax Officer’s order in respect of which no appeal had been filed by the Revenue, the Commissioner was entitled to examine and, if satisfied, to set aside that order under section 263. On this basis the Tribunal was held to be wrong in characterizing the Commissioner’s initiation of proceedings or exercise of jurisdiction as unlawful.
- On the merits of the admissible amount and the allowance of the actuarial provision (Questions No. 2 and 3): The court analysed the statutory scheme introduced by the Finance Act, 1975, inserted with retrospective effect from April 1, 1973, which placed specific restrictions on deduction of provisions for gratuity by way of section 40A(7) (including a non obstante clause). The court explained that although generally provisions for gratuity had earlier been dealt with under section 36(1)(v), from assessment year 1973–74 the specific rules of section 40A(7) govern the allowability, subject to exceptions.
- The court emphasised the statutory test in Explanation 1 to section 40A(7): the "admissible amount" is the amount of provision for gratuity to the extent it does not exceed an amount calculated at the rate of eight and one‑third per cent. of the salary of each employee entitled to gratuity for each year of his service in respect of which such provision is made. The court found on the facts that the assessee had (i) created an irrevocable approved fund in time, (ii) made the required contributions by the specified dates, and (iii) computed the provision on an actuarial basis with reference to each year of service of each employee and made contributions to the approved fund accordingly.
- The court noted that the Revenue did not contend that the per-employee per-year computation at 8-1/3% would produce an amount less than Rs. 9,90,172. Given the statutory definition and the factual finding that the actuarial computation and fund contributions were made with regard to year-by-year service entitlements, the court concluded that the admissible amount under Explanation 1 worked out to Rs. 9,90,172 in the present case and not to the substantially lower figures asserted by the Commissioner.
- On this basis the court held that the Tribunal was correct to set aside the Commissioner’s revisionary order (on the merits) and restore the Income-tax Officer’s relief to the assessee; even though the Commissioner had jurisdiction to invoke section 263, his substantive recomputation was not justified on the facts and law.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
(a) Question No. 1: Answered in the negative — the Tribunal was not right in holding that the Commissioner’s exercise of revisionary powers under section 263 was illegal. This part is decided in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
(b) Question No. 2 and Question No. 3: Answered in the affirmative — the Tribunal was right to set aside the Commissioner’s order on the merits and to restore the relief given by the Income-tax Officer; the admissible amount under Explanation 1 to section 40A(7) worked out to Rs. 9,90,172 and not the lower figure asserted by the Commissioner. These parts are decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Implications and direct effect:
- The Commissioner of Income-tax was properly empowered to exercise revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 in the circumstances, because a distinct order of the Income-tax Officer dated March 31, 1977 existed and had not been appealed by the Revenue.
- On the substantive issue under section 40A(7) (and Explanation 1 thereto), the court held that the assessee’s actuarial provision of Rs. 9,90,172 was admissible as the "admissible amount" (calculated with reference to each year of service at 8-1/3% of salary) in the facts of this case, and therefore the Tribunal correctly restored the Income-tax Officer’s allowance.
- The decision directly results in the assessee retaining the deduction of Rs. 9,90,172 as allowed by the Income-tax Officer and restored by the Tribunal. The court disposed of the reference with no order as to costs.
- The opinion does not discuss any broader precedent‑setting implications beyond resolving the questions between the parties; no new wider legal rule beyond the statutory interpretation applied to these facts is articulated in the opinion.
Reference disposed of. No order as to costs.
J.M Panchal, J.:— At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat-I, Ahmedabad, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal “B” Bench, Ahmedabad (“the Tribunal” for short), has made the present reference to this court under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”, for short), as the Tribunal was satisfied that three questions of law arise out of the order dated July 31, 1980, passed by it in I.T.A No. 8541.Ahd of 1979.
Facts:
The assessee-company runs a textile mill and manufactures silk cloth out of yarn purchased. The assessee-company submitted return of income for the assessment year 1973–74 showing loss of Rs. 2,88,080. The assessee had made a provision for gratuity amounting to Rs. 9,90,172 on actuarial valuation. Before the Income-tax. Officer, the assessee claimed deduction of the said amount. The Income-tax Officer took the view that the conditions specified in sub-section (7) of section 40A of the Act for the admissibility of the deduction of gratuity were not satisfied and, therefore, disallowed the said claim.
2. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax found that the conditions mentioned in section 40A(7) of the Act were subsequently fulfilled, inasmuch as an irrevocable trust fund had been created before January 1, 1976, and a sum equal to 50 per cent. of the amount was paid by the assessee by way of contribution to the trust before the 1st day of April, 1976. However, it was noticed that the irrevocable trust fund created by the assessee was not approved by the Commissioner of Income-tax under the provisions of the Act. In the circumstances, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax directed the Income-tax Officer to give deduction of the expenditure of the admissible amount mentioned in Explanation 1 to sub-section (7) of section 40A of the Act as and when the assessee produced evidence to show that the gratuity fund created by it was accorded approval by the Commissioner of Income-tax. On production of the evidence showing that the Commissioner of Income-tax had accorded approval to the gratuity fund created by the assessee, the Income-tax Officer by order dated March 31, 1977, allowed deduction of Rs. 9,90,172 as admissible amount under Explanation 1 to sub-section (7) of section 40A of the Act.
3. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat-I, Ahmedabad, exercised revisional powers under section 263 of the Act, as he considered that the order passed by the Income-tax Officer was erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The Commissioner of Income-tax took the view that the provision for the previous year made in section 40A, sub-section (7) of the Act, would cover only actual liability, which would be the amount of gratuity liability of the year in which the provision was made without taking into consideration the accrued liability and, therefore, the actuarial valuation covering all the past liabilities of the assessee would not be entitled to deduction. He also took the view that from the accounts it was evident that the total salary and dearness allowance for the accounting period relevant to the assessment year 1973–74 was Rs. 26,89,808 and the admissible amount at the rate of eight and one-third per cent. of the salary would be Rs. 2,32,848 approximately as against the amount of Rs. 9,90,172 which was granted by the Income-tax Officer as deduction. In view of the above conclusion, the Commissioner of Income-tax set aside the order dated March 31, 1977, passed by the Income-tax Officer and directed the Income-tax Officer to recompute the admissible amount under section 40A(7)(b)(ii) of the Act in accordance with law.
4. The assessee preferred an appeal being I.T.A No. 8541.Ahd of 1979 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that the order passed by the Income-tax Officer giving relief to the assessee had merged in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and, therefore, the Commissioner of Income-tax could not have exercised powers under section 263 of the Act. The Tribunal further held that on the basis of the total salary and the dearness allowance for the accounting period relevant to the assessment year 1973–74, the amount of gratuity worked out to Rs. 9,90,172 and, therefore, the Tribunal reversed the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax and restored the relief which was given by the Income-tax Officer by his order dated March 31, 1977, to the assessee.
5. The Commissioner of Income-tax moved an application under section 256(1) of the Act requiring the Tribunal to draw up a statement of case and refer the questions of law for the opinion of the High Court. The Tribunal was satisfied that three questions of law arose out of the order passed by it in I.T.A No. 8541.Ahd of 1979. The Tribunal, therefore, drew up the statement of case and has made reference of the following three questions of law for the opinion of this court:
“(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax was illegal on any one of the grounds, namely, (a) that the basis of initiation of proceedings by the Commissioner of Income-tax was wrong; (b) that the order passed by the Income-tax Officer giving relief had merged in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and that, therefore, the Commissioner of Income-tax could not exercise powers under section 263 in respect thereof?
(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal has been right in setting aside the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax and restoring the relief given by the Income-tax Officer?
(3) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the basis of the total salary and the dearness allowance for the accounting period relevant to the assessment year 1973–74 being Rs. 27,89,808, the admissible amount at 8-⅓ per cent. of the same worked out to Rs. 2,32,484 approximately by the Commissioner of Income-tax as against the deduction of Rs. 9,90,172 granted by the Income-tax Officer, is wrong in law?”
Reasons:
So far as the first question which pertains to exercise of powers by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 263 of the Act is concerned, we are of the view that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax was illegal as the order passed by the Income-tax Officer giving relief to the assessee had merged in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. As noted earlier, against the order of the Income-tax Officer disallowing deduction of gratuity, the assessee had preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who, by order dated May 27, 1976, had directed the Income-tax Officer to give deduction to the expenditure of the admissible amount under Explanation 1 to sub-section (7) of section 40A of the Act as and when the assessee produced the evidence regarding approval having been granted by the Commissioner of Income-tax to the gratuity fund created by it. The assessee had produced necessary evidence showing that approval had been granted by the Commissioner of Income-tax to the gratuity fund created by it and, therefore, by an order dated, March 31, 1977, the Income-tax Officer had allowed the deduction claimed by the assessee. Against that order of the Income-tax Officer, the Revenue had not filed any appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and, therefore, it cannot be said that the order dated March 31, 1977, passed by the Income-tax Officer had merged into the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which was passed on May 27, 1976. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the Commissioner of Income-tax was entitled to exercise the powers under section 263 of the Act and exercise of the powers by him could not have been termed as bad on the ground that the order of the Income-tax Officer had merged into the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and there was no order passed by the Income-tax Officer regarding which powers of revision under section 263 of the Act could have been exercised by the Commissioner of Income-tax.
6. In view of the above position, we are of the opinion that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not right in law in holding that the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax was illegal on any. of the grounds, viz., (a) that the basis of initiation of proceedings by the Commissioner of Income-tax was wrong; and (2) that the order passed by the Income-tax Officer giving relief merged in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and that, therefore, the Commissioner of Income-tax could not have exercised the powers under section 263 of the Act in respect thereof. Question No. 1, therefore, referred to us is answered in the negative i.e, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
7. However, the contention that the admissible amount at the rate of eight and one-third per cent. of the salary would be Rs. 2,32,484 as the total salary and dearness allowance for the accounting period relevant to the assessment year 1973–74 was Rs. 27,89,808 and, therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in allowing deduction of Rs. 9,90,172 has no substance. It may be noted that earlier the subject-matter as to allowability of contribution towards the approved gratuity fund was made in section 36(1)(v) of the Act. For and from the assessment year 1973–74, the allowability of any such provision is governed by section 40A(7) of the Act and not on general principles because of the fact that the provisions of section 40A(7) of the Act have overriding effect by virtue of the non obstante clause. Under the new section 40A(7) inserted by the Finance Act, 1975, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1973, no deduction is to be allowed in the computation of profits and gains of a business or profession in respect of any provision made for the payment of gratuity to the employees on retirement or on termination of employment. This is, however, subject to certain exceptions. The restriction is not to apply in relation to any provision made for the purpose of payment of a sum by way of contribution towards an approved gratuity fund that has become payable during the previous year, or for the purpose of meeting the actual liability in respect of payment of gratuity to the employees that has arisen during the previous year. The restriction is not also to apply in relation to any provision made for the previous year relevant to any of the assessment years 1973–74, 1974–75 and 1975–76 to the extent the amount of such provision does not exceed the “admissible amount” if the conditions set out in section 40A(7)(b)(ii) are fulfilled. In the facts of the present case, it was found by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that subsequent to the passing of the order by the Income-tax Officer, the conditions under section 40A(7) were fulfilled by the assessee. The assessee had created an irrevocable trust fund before January 1, 1976, and had paid a sum equal to at least 50 per cent. of the amount to the fund before April 1, 1976, and the balance amount before April 1, 1977. The Commissioner of Income-tax had granted approval to the fund created by the assessee. The provision regarding gratuity was made on actuarial basis, which amounted to Rs. 9,90,172 so far as the liability for the accounting period relating to the assessment year 1973–74 was concerned. In view of the provisions of Explanation 1 to sub-section (7) of section 40A of the Act, in our opinion, admissible amount means the amount of provision made by the assessee for the payment of gratuity to its employees on the retirement or on the termination of their employment for any reason to the extent such amount does not exceed an amount calculated at the rate of eight and one-third per cent. of the salary of each employee entitled to the payment of such gratuity for each year of his service in respect of which such provision is made. The gratuity amount in question was worked out on actuarial valuation and the said amount was paid by way of contribution to the approved gratuity fund having regard to each year of service of each employee. It is not the case of the Revenue that the computation of the amount of gratuity in respect of each employee for each year of his service at the rate of eight and one-third per cent. of the salary would be less than Rs. 9,90,174. In this view of the matter, we hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, on the basis of the total salary and dearness allowance for the accounting period relating to the assessment year 1973–74, the admissible amount at the rate of eight and one-third per cent. worked out to Rs. 9,90,172 and not Rs. 2,32,484 as contended by the Revenue. We are of the view that the Tribunal on the facts and in the circumstances of the case was right in setting aside the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax and restoring the reliefs given by the Income-tax Officer.
8. In view of the above discussion, question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative, i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. 3 referred to this court is also answered in the affirmative, i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
9. The reference stands accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.
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