1. This appeal filed by an insurance company under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), has been referred to us by the Division Bench consisting of S.B. Majmudar and I.C. Bhatt, jj., as they then were, which took the view that Section 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act required correct interpretation in view of the apparently conflicting judgments of two Division Benches of this Court, in the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal 1979 ACJ 65(Gujarat) and in the State of Gujarat v. Hansa Visanji Rana 1988 (2) TAC 135. The order for reference was made at the time of admitting the appeal and the relevant portion of the said order which relates to the controversy is reproduced hereinbelow:

Admit. This appeal is directed to be referred to a larger Bench in view of the fact that the decision on which the appellant insurance company relies in the case of State of Gujarat v. Hansa Visanji Rana 1988 (2) TAC 135, comes to'a conclusion which is directly contrary to the conclusion reached on similar facts by earlier Division Bench of this Court in the. case of Oriental Fire and. General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal 1979 ACJ 65 (Gujarat), on identical facts situation, the insurance company's liability has been fixed at Rs. 50,000/- while as per the decision in State of Gujarat v. Hansa Visanji Rana 1988 (2) TAC 135, another Division Bench of this Court has come to the conclusion that the liability of the insurance company on such facts will be Rs. 15,000/-. Unfortunately, the decision in Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal 1979 ACJ 65 (Gujarat), was not brought to the notice of the later Division Bench which decided the case of State of Gujarat v. Hansa Visanji Rana (supra). Therefore, this conflict is required to be resolved by a larger Bench.

2. Before considering the relevant provisions of the Act and the apparent conflict between the two Division Bench judgments referred to hereinabove, it would be necessary to have a look at the facts involved in this appeal in order to appreciate whether the facts were identical to the fact situation giving rise to the earlier Division Bench judgments. The deceased Arvindji and some of the staff members of O.N.G.C. were proceeding for field work in a jeep car belonging to O.N.G.C. It met with an accident with one Matador van coming from opposite direction and in that accident Arvindji was injured on the head and he ultimately expired. His heirs, therefore, filed the claim petition against the owners and insurers of both the vehicles. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mehsana, found after appreciation of the evidence on record that both the vehicles were driven by the respective drivers rashly and negligently on a public road and, therefore, the opponents were liable to pay compensation to the claimants in equal proportion. As the total compensation awarded by the Tribunal was Rs. 53,200/- with running interest, the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. which had insured the jeep in which the deceased was carried at the time of the accident, has filed this appeal against the award of Rs. 26,600/- passed against it.

3. Mr. R.H. Mehta, learned advocate appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the appellant insurance company had not insured and was not expected under law to insure the risk to an employee being carried in a private vehicle of O.N.G.C. He submits that even if the victim of the accident is assumed to be carried in the vehicle by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, the liability of the insurance company in respect of such a passenger would be limited to Rs. 15,000/- as per Sub-clause (ii) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act and not under Sub-clause (i) of Section 95(2)(b) which, according to Mr. Mehta, would apply in case of third party risk. He relies on the judgment in Hansa Visanji Rana 1988 (2) TAC 135 and submits that the earlier Division Bench judgment in Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal 1979 ACJ 65 (Gujarat), is erroneous. It is clear from the order of reference as well as on a reading of the later Division Bench judgment that the judgment in Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal (supra) was not brought to the notice of the later Division Bench consisting of AC. Gheewala and B.S. Kapadia, JJ.

4. Both Division Benches had to consider the question of liability of the insurance company and the quantum to be awarded particularly with reference to Section 95(2)(b) of the Act. In view of the limited scope of controversy, it is not necessary in this appeal to consider the implications of Sub-section (1) and the proviso thereto, which provide for compulsory insurance coverage against any liability which may be incurred in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person, including passengers of a public service vehicle and the employees of the insured and any passengers carried in a vehicle. Sub-section (2) lays down the extent to which compulsory insurance coverage has to be given in the policy. The relevant provisions of Sub-section (2) are the following:

5. In the earlier case of Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal 1979 ACJ 65 (Gujarat), the Division Bench referred to Sub-clause (i) and came to the conclusion that the insurance company was liable to indemnify the insured to the extent of Rs. 50,000/-. No reference-was made to Sub-clause (ii), nor any submission was made on that count. In that case Modern Construction Company, which was a Government contractor engaged in constructing dam for the Government, carried Government servants to the dam site for discharge of their duties, as no Government vehicle was available on the date of the accident. Even though two Government employees who were the victims of the accident were not the employees of the construction company which was the owner of the vehicle, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that in order to claim the coverage the passenger carried in a vehicle must be a passenger who is either employed by the insured or whose employment with someone else has a reasonable and rational association with the business which the insured construction company was carrying on. The Division Bench refused to narrow down or widen the connotation of the phrase 'a contract of employment' appearing in Sub-section (2)(b). It held that the contract of employment referred to in this sub-section would not mean only the contract between the insured and the deceased because the phrase is not conditioned by any qualifying words. It also refused to give it a wider connotation as the insurance company should not be fastened with the liability of every employed person carried by the vehicle irrespective of whether his employment had any reasonable connection with the business of the owner of the vehicle in any manner. The Division Bench took this view and rejected the narrow construction by accepting the test applied by the House of Lords in Izzard v. Universal Insurance Co. Ltd. (1937) 2 All ER 79. It was the test of practical and business association irrespective of the person whose employee the deceased was. The Division Bench, therefore, held that such a person who was not an employee of the insured-owner of the motor vehicle, but who was carried by reason of employment which had a reasonable relationship or nexus with the business of the employer was required to be covered under Sub-section (2)(b) of Section 95. The judgment in Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal 1979 ACJ 65 (Gujarat), therefore, can be said to lay down the aforesaid ratio. The Division Bench, therefore, resorted to Sub-clause (i) of Sub-section (2)(b) by awarding Rs. 50,000/- on the basis that the victim was not a passenger carried for hire or reward but he was carried in pursuance of a contract of employment. It appears that the question of applying Sub-clause (ii) was not raised. This ratio was also followed by another Division Bench in United India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shantaben Jerambhai Parmar 1983 ACJ 74 (Gujarat).

6. In the case of Hansa Visanji Rana 1988 (2) TAC 135, the later Division Bench was concerned with a similar fact situation. The husband of the appellant, i.e., Visanji Shamji Rana, who was serving as a Fisheries Officer under the Government of Gujarat, left by jeep car belonging to the State Government for going to Bhavnagar in connection with the office work. Because of the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle, the jeep car fell down from a height of 20' and Visanji and others sustained injuries. Visanji died as a result of the injuries suffered by him. His heirs filed the claim petition and the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Amreli, awarded an amount of Rs. 90,500/- with running interest. The State of Gujarat challenged the award by filing First Appeal No. 464 of 1981. The insurance company filed cross-objections contending that the Government employee travelling in the Government jeep was not required to be covered and in fact not covered by the insurance policy and further contended that a passenger travelling in a Government jeep was not a third party. The Division Bench referred to Sub-section (1) and the proviso to Section 95 along with the exceptions and came to the conclusion that the deceased Visanji was travelling in the jeep in pursuance of the contract of employment but was certainly covered by the policy which would include the liability of passengers carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of the contract of employment. The Division Bench, therefore, referred to Sub-section (2) in order to determine the limit of liability. It referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. 1971 ACJ 206 (SC) and also another judgment of the Supreme Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. 1977 ACJ 343 (SC) and held that Sub-clause (i) of Section 95(2)(b) would provide the limit for third parties while Sub-clause (ii) prescribes the limit for passengers. The court held that the deceased was a passenger in the jeep and, therefore, the liability of the insurance company would be limited to Rs. 10,000/- for each individual passenger. The judgment of the earlier Division Bench was, no doubt, not brought to the notice of the later Division Bench in Hansa Visanji Rana 1988 (2) TAC 135. However, on a reading of both the sub-clauses, we think that the earlier Division Bench had impliedly arrived at a correct conclusion, even though it had not considered the applicability of Sub-clause (ii).

7. Sub-section (2)(b) of Section 95 contemplates the liability in respect of passengers carried in a vehicle, which would fall into 2 categories:

(i) passengers carried for hire or reward;

(ii) passengers carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment.

When a limit of Rs. 50,000/- was laid down in Sub-clause (i) the legislature excluded the passengers carried for hire or reward, but not other persons carried in the vehicle or third parties who were victims of the accident. It specifically provides that the policy of insurance shall cover any liability, in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward. This clause, therefore, would naturally include passengers carried in a vehicle by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. This would be a perfectly natural and literal interpretation of Sub-clause (i). Sub-clause (ii) speaks of 'passengers' without referring to the category in which they fall. However, when the category of 'passengers carried for hire or reward' is specifically excluded in Sub-clause (i), that sub-clause would cover all other persons including the passengers carried in the vehicle by reason of or in pursuance of the contract of employment. Moreover, Sub-clause (ii) does not speak of the remaining type of passengers in order to distinguish it from Sub-clause (i). Therefore, by implication it would mean that Sub-clause (ii) applies to passengers carried for hire or reward.

8. This view of ours is also strengthened by the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the Bill which ultimately became the act no. 47 of 1982, which substituted Sub-clause (ii) and limited the liability for each individual passenger to Rs. 15,000/-. It was stated that the limit with respect to the insurer's liability for a passenger involved in an accident in public service vehicle was being fixed at Rs. 15,000/-. The legislative intent, therefore, seems to apply Sub-clause (ii) to public service vehicles like the buses, which would have varying carriage capacity. In such public service vehicles, the limit per passenger would be Rs. 15,000/-. Sub-clause (i), therefore, would be attracted in cases where persons other than the passengers carried for hire or reward become victims of motor accident. Though Sub-clause (ii) is not specific, it has to be interpreted as applicable to passengers of a public service vehicle in order to avoid absurdity or frustration of the legislative intent. The Supreme Court also, which had to decide the question of determining liability in case of passengers carried in a large bus, in the case of M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty 1987 ACJ 872 (SC), held, by referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act, that the. liability of the insurer was limited by the extent specified in Sub-clause (ii).

9. We, therefore, are of the view that while deciding the case of Hansa Visanji Rana 1988 (2) TAG 135, the later Division Bench proceeded on an unwarranted assumption that Sub-clause (i) of Section 95(2)(b) prescribed the limit for third parties only and it erroneously held that persons carried by reason of employment would be covered by Sub-clause (ii). We agree with the view taken by the earlier Division Bench in the case of Ganchi Ramanlal Kantilal 1979 ACJ 65 (Gujarat), which even without referring to Sub-clause (ii) had taken the correct view by impliedly determining the liability for such employees under Sub-clause (i)- In Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. 1971 ACJ 206 (SC) also, on which the later Division Bench placed reliance, the Supreme Court had also to deal with the case in which passengers of a passenger-bus belonging to the appellant transport company died on the spot because of the accident. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of the transport company by holding that the maximum liability per passenger was indicated by the limit in respect of the vehicle with different seating capacities as per Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 95 before the amendment in 1982. The later Division Bench has also referred to the Supreme Court judgment in Pushpabai's case 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), wherein the Supreme Court in the context of a passenger travelling gratis held that a policy of insurance was not required under Sub-clause (ii) of Section 95(2)(b) to cover risk to the passengers who were not carried for hire or reward. Neither the judgment in Sheikhupura Transport Co. (supra) nor in Pushpabai (supra) lays down that the liability for employees earned pursuant to the contract of employment would not be covered by Sub-clause (i) of Sub-section (2)(b). This would be the correct interpretation of Section 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act.

10. We may incidentally observe that the contentions urged by Mr. R.H. Mehta for the appellant insurance company before us were not taken by way of defence before the Claims Tribunal. However, the learned advocate for the appellant was permitted to raise the above contentions in view of the reference made by the Division Bench.

11. In this view of the matter, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.

A.N. Divecha, J.

12. I had the advantage of going through the judgment of my learned brother, namely, C. V. Jani, J. in this matter. I agree with the conclusion reached by him and also with the reasoning given in support thereof. I, however, think it fit to add a few words of my own.

13. I do not propose to repeat the factual data in extenso; my learned brother has given the necessary details and particulars in that regard in his judgment. Suffice it to say that the case before us centres round the extent of liability of the insurance company of the motor vehicle in question with respect to the death of or the bodily injury to a person travelling in the said motor vehicle not as a passenger for hire or reward. The motor vehicle involved in the present case was a jeep bearing RTO registration No. GRG 9056 ('the jeep' for convenience) belonging to Oil & Natural Gas Commission ('the Commission' for convenience). It was insured with the appellant herein, that is, the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. ('the insurer' for convenience). The claimants before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal ('the Tribunal' for convenience) were a person and the heirs of another person travelling in the jeep. It collided with another motor vehicle (a matador) bearing RTO registration No. GRW 168 ('the matador' for convenience). The matador was insured with the United India Insurance Co. Ltd. The Tribunal found the drivers of both the vehicles equally rash and negligent in driving their respective vehicles. The Tribunal awarded compensation in the sum of Rs. 53,200/- to the claimants (the heirs of a person travelling in the jeep) in M.A.C. Petition No. 636 of 1983 and Rs. 1,870/- to the claimant (another person travelling in the jeep) in M.A.C. Petition No. 243 of 1983. In view of the finding of the Tribunal that both the drivers were equally rash and negligent in driving their respective vehicles, it held that both the insurance companies were liable for compensation in equal proportion. The present appellant has challenged its liability to answer the award on the ground that it exceeds the extent of liability provided under the relevant provisions contained in Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 ('the Act' for brief).

14. It would be quite proper to look at the relevant provisions contained in Section 95(2)(b) of the Act in order to set at rest the controversy occasioning the reference of this matter to this Full Bench. My learned brother Jani, J. has quoted the relevant provisions in his judgment. 1 do not propose to burden this judgment by any reproduction thereof.

15. On analysis thereof, my learned brother Jani, J. has given his decision that the present case would fall within the purview of Section 95(2)(b)(i) of the Act and it will not be governed by Sub-clause (ii) thereof. It has been concluded that Sub-clause (i) thereof would take within its sweep all persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward. I fully agree with it.

16. A difficulty might arise in interpretation of Sub-clause (ii) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act as the word 'passengers' occurring therein is not preceded or succeeded by any qualifying words like 'carried for hire or reward'. In that view of the matter, a passenger carried in such a vehicle may be a person carried for hire or reward or otherwise than that. While coming to the conclusion that the present case would fall within the purview of Sub-clause (i) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act and it will not be governed by Sub-clause (ii) thereof, my learned brother Jani, J. has tacitly interpreted the word 'passengers' occurring in Sub-clause (ii) thereof to mean 'passengers carried for hire or reward'. The question that might arise would be whether or not it is permissible to the court to read such words in that provision. In other words, can the court, by the process of interpretation, add words to a statutory provision?

17. Before answering this question it would be quite proper to look at the meaning of the word passenger'. The word 'passenger' has not been defined in the Act. It is a settled principle of law that the meaning of the word not defined in the statute will have to be ascertained by shuffling pages of a dictionary, more particularly when such a word is quite common. No binding ruling for this proposition of law is required to be referred to. A reference may, however, be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 922.

18. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 8th Edn. 1990, published by Oxford University Press, it has been defined to mean for our purpose "a traveller in or on a public or private conveyance (other than the driver, pilot, crew, etc.)". It thus becomes clear from the dictionary meaning of the word 'passenger' that any person other than the driver, the pilot or the crew of the vehicle in question travelling therein would be a passenger. It would be immaterial whether such a person travels therein for hire or reward.

19. It thus becomes clear that passengers for the purpose of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act will have to be divided into two categories, namely, (1) passengers carried for hire or reward and (2) passengers carried otherwise than for hire or reward. The second category of passengers can further be sub-divided into two categories for the same purpose, namely, (1) passengers carried by reason of a contract of employment and (2) passengers carried in pursuance of. a contract of employment. Sub-clause (i) thereof carves out an exception qua passengers carried for hire or reward. It would mean that passengers canied otherwise than for hire or reward or, in other words, by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, would necessarily fall within the purview of Sub-clause (i) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act.

20. It is true that Sub-clause (ii) thereof refers to 'passengers' without any qualifying words 'carried for hire or reward'. However, these words will have to be read in that provision. The reason, therefore, is quite simple. It is a settled principle of law that no word in a statute has to be treated as redundant. As aforesaid, Sub-clause (i) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act takes within its sweep persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward. It would, therefore, mean that passengers carried otherwise than for hire or reward will be governed by that provision for the purposes of the Act. Once this be the position, Sub-clause (ii) will have to be necessarily read as taking within its sweep only those persons who are passengers carried in the motor vehicle in question for hire or reward. Not to read Sub-clause (ii) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act in this fashion would render the phrase 'carried for hire or reward' occurring immediately after the word 'passengers' in Sub-clause (i) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act wholly redundant. This cannot be allowed to happen in view of the settled principle of interpretation.

21. It is also a settled principle of law that, when there appears some conflict between two provisions of a statute, they have to be harmoniously read and interpreted. The word 'passengers' occurring in Sub-clause (ii) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act occurring without any qualifying words like 'carried for hire or reward' preceding or succeeding it will normally have to be understood to mean passengers of both the categories, namely, passengers carried for hire or reward and passengers carried otherwise than for hire or reward, that is, by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Once it is found that the second category of passengers fall within the purview of Sub-clause (i) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act, the natural meaning to the word 'passengers' simpliciter occurring in Sub-clause (ii) thereof will result into some conflict between the said two provisions. This conflict can be reconciled and resolved only by interpreting the word 'passengers' occurring in Sub-clause (ii) thereof to mean 'passengers carried for hire or reward'.

22. It is also a settled principle of law that, if there is any ambiguity in any provision of law, it should be so construed as to further the legislative intent rather than to frustrate it. In this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi 1981 ACJ 507 (SC). It has been held therein:

The ambiguity in the language used by the legislature in the opening part of Section 95(2) and the doubt arising out of the correlation of that language with the words 'in all' which occur in Clause (a), must be resolved by having regard to the underlying legislative purpose of the provisions contained in Chapter VIII of the Act which deals with third party risks. That is a sensitive process which has to accommodate the claims of the society as reflected in that purpose. Indeed, it is in this area of legislative ambiguities, unfortunately, not receding, that courts have to fill gaps, clear doubts and mitigate hardships. There is no table of logarithms to guide or govern statutory construction in this area, which leaves a sufficient and desirable discretion for the Judges to interpret laws in the light of their purpose, where the language used by the law-makers does not yield to one and one meaning only. Considering the matter that way it is appropriate to hold that the word 'accident' is used in the expression 'any one accident' from the point of view of the various claimants, each of whom is entitled to make a separate claim for the accident suffered by him and not from the point of view of the insurer.

(Emphasis supplied) This dictum of law pronounced by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Jadavji Keshavji Modi 1981 ACJ 507 (SC), is quite self-explanatory and needs no elaboration or elucidation thereof.

23. It is true that ordinarily the court does not have power to add any word or words in a statutory provision. It is, however, equally true that at times the court is required to interpret an undefined word in a statutory provision by qualifying it with another word or phrase or expression. In this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 87. In the context of interpretation of Section 14-B in the light of the relevant provisions contained in Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it has been held:

True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but 'where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appeal' to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words' (Craies Statute Law, 7th Edn., p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar (1988) 2 SCC 513, at pp. 524-25, where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into its words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so as to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.

24. In the case of Hameedia Hardware Stores (1988) 2 SCC 513, the Supreme Court practically redrafted Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. This was done with a view to avoiding frustration of the legislative intent in enacting the relevant provisions contained in section 10 thereof.

25. It would be quite proper to look at the relevant provisions contained in Section 95(2)(b) of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by act 47 of 1982 with effect from 1.10.1982 which reads as under:

(b) where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment,

(i) in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, a limit of fifty thousand in pees in all;

(ii) in respect of passengers, (1) a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry not more than thirty passengers;

(2) a limit of seventy-five thousand rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry more than thirty but not more than sixty passengers;

(3) a limit of one lakh rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry more than sixty passengers; and (4) subject to the limits aforesaid, ten thousand rupees for each individual passenger where the vehicle is a motor cab and five thousand rupees for each individual passenger in any other case;

26. It clearly transpires from the aforesaid provisions of law as they stood prior to 1st October, 1982, that for the purpose of Section 95(2)(b)(ii) the vehicle in contemplation was a public service vehicle. It cannot be gainsaid that only a public service vehicle will have a registered capacity to carry a certain number of passengers. A public service vehicle has been defined in Section 2(25) of the Act to mean any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward and includes a motor cab, contract carriage and stage carriage. It would thus mean that a public service vehicle is meant for carrying passengers for hire or reward. When Sub-clause (ii) of Section 95(2)(b) of the Act confines itself only to a public service vehicle, the extent of liability mentioned therein will be referable only to passengers carried therein for hire or reward. In fact the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the Bill culminating into act 47 of 1982 clearly mentions that the limit with respect to the insurance liability for a passenger involved in an accident in a public service vehicle was being fixed at Rs. 15,000/-. It thus becomes clear that the position of law for the purpose of the true scope and ambit of Section 95(2)(b)(ii) of the Act would remain the same as it was prior to its amendment by act 47 of 1982 except to the extent of the liability of the insurer upwardly revised thereby with respect to an individual passenger. Looking from this angle also, the inescapable conclusion would be that Section 95(2)(b)(ii) of the Act would remain confined to passengers carried for hire or reward.

27. in view of my aforesaid discussion, I am also of the opinion that Section 95(2)(b)(i) will take within its sweep persons carried as passengers otherwise than for hire or reward, that is, by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment and Sub-clause (ii) thereof will be confined to persons as passengers in a motor vehicle carried for hire or reward. In that view of the matter, I agree with the conclusion reached by my learned brother Jani, J. in his judgment in this case.