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State Of Gujarat v. Dr. C.K Patel .

Gujarat High Court
Feb 13, 1991
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.J. Vaidya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This batch comprises nine acquittal appeals filed by the State against a judgment and order dated 6-2-1990 of the Learned J.M.F.C., Deesa. The respondent-accused had been tried for alleged contraventions under the Gujarat Minimum Wages Rules, 1961 read with Sections 18 and 22 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1943, but were acquitted by the trial court on the short ground that the complainant was absent when the cases were called out. The State, through Mr. D.K. Trivedi (learned P.P.), challenged those acquittals. The defence (Mr. K.G. Zaveri) opposed the challenge and relied in part on a prior decision (Criminal Appeal No. 238/83 decided 17-11-1990) that had affirmed an acquittal in another matter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court's acquittals, granted under Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground of the complainant's absence, were arbitrary, illegal or unjust in the factual context of prolonged adjournments and delay.
  2. Whether the trial court failed to observe the requirements and spirit of Section 309 of the Code regarding expeditious conduct of trials and the recording of reasons for adjournments, thereby warranting interference with the acquittals.
  3. Whether the prior decision relied upon by the defence (Criminal Appeal No. 238/83) was applicable to these cases or distinguishable on facts.

Arguments of the Parties

State / Learned P.P. (Mr. D.K. Trivedi)

  • Submitted that offences under labour legislation are increasingly being dealt with lightly and perfunctorily instead of being decided on merits.
  • Contended that the trial court arbitrarily terminated trials into premature acquittals on the ground of complainant's absence despite long delays and numerous adjournments that had been given to the accused.
  • Pointed out that in the proceedings the plea of the accused was not recorded for one year and ten months and other delays followed, causing protracted trials and hardship to the complainant (a public servant).
  • Sought quashing of the impugned acquittal orders and remand to the trial court for disposal on merits.

Respondent-Accused / Defence (Mr. K.G. Zaveri)

  • Argued that the trial court had fairly exercised its discretion under Section 256 CrPC in acquitting the accused and that such exercise should not be lightly interfered with by this Court.
  • Contended that the complainant, despite being summoned, did not take steps to be present or arrange a representative, and therefore the trial court was justified in acquitting on his absence.
  • Filed an affidavit-in-reply countering affidavits filed by the learned A.P.P. in-charge and the complainant.
  • Relied on an identical matter (Criminal Appeal No. 238/83 decided 17-11-1990 by K.G. Shah, J.) in which an acquittal was affirmed, arguing that these appeals should be dismissed similarly; alternatively, urged that if appeals were allowed, the cases should not be remanded because of their age.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Criminal Appeal No. 238/83 (Coram: K.G. Shah, J.), decided 17-11-1990 Confirmation of an order of acquittal (State appeal dismissed) The Court held the precedent to be distinguishable on facts and of no assistance to the accused in the present matters because in that prior case the acquittal orders were passed long before (in 1982) and the matter came up for final hearing only after 8 years; whereas in the present cases, the plea was not recorded for one year and ten months and there were occasions when the accused themselves remained absent after being given frequent adjournments.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the record and accepted, in full, many of the factual contentions raised by the learned P.P. The analysis proceeded along the following lines:

  1. Delay and procedural laxity: The Court criticized the trial court for consuming as many as four years in conducting a trial that required examination of hardly a witness or two. It emphasized that the plea of the accused was not recorded for one year and ten months and that for two further years the proceedings drifted. The Court described this as reflecting lack of will and duty on the part of the trial court to proceed expeditiously.
  2. Statutory framework — Section 309 CrPC: The Court observed that the trial court appeared unaware of the provisions of Section 309 of the Code that regulate the manner in which trials are to be conducted and controlled to ensure expeditious trials and to prevent undue frequencies of adjournments. The Court emphasized that adjournments should not be granted without reasons being recorded, and that costs may be awarded in appropriate cases to deter dilatory practices.
  3. Improper use of Section 256 CrPC: While acknowledging that reasonable adjournments are within the trial court's discretion, the Court found that the trial court here resorted to an "easy premature acquittal" under Section 256 on the simple ground of complainant's absence, without regard to the pattern of prior delays that favoured the accused.
  4. Burden and conduct of parties: The Court noted that the accused had been repeatedly granted adjournments and, on several occasions, the accused themselves remained absent. Under these circumstances the Court found it inappropriate for the accused to rely on the complainant's later absence to justify acquittal.
  5. Distinguishing the precedent relied on by the defence: The Court distinguished Criminal Appeal No. 238/83 on factual grounds and held that it did not apply to the present circumstances.
  6. Institutional recommendations: Beyond deciding the appeals, the Court commented on systemic concerns: it recommended that Sessions Judges periodically inspect Rojkam (daily cause) proceedings of subordinate criminal courts to detect unnecessary delays, premature acquittals, and inappropriately light sentences; where serious lapses are found, the magistrate should be called upon for explanation and the matter may be placed on his service record. The Court also suggested that complainants should report such lapses to the Sessions Judge and, where appropriate, costs should be imposed to curb recalcitrant behaviour by complainants.
  7. Conclusion from analysis: On the basis of the above factual findings and legal considerations, and without resolving the merits of the underlying allegations or affidavits, the Court concluded that the order of acquittal was arbitrary, illegal and unjust and therefore liable to be quashed and set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEALS ALLOWED. The impugned judgments and orders of acquittal passed by the trial court are quashed and set aside. The matters are remanded to the trial court with directions to dispose of the same on merits according to law as expeditiously as possible.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • The Court directed both counsel (Mr. D.K. Trivedi and Mr. K.G. Zaveri) to intimate their respective parties to appear before the trial court on or before 4-3-1991 and take a future date for the trial to proceed.
  • The trial court was directed to keep in mind the provisions of Section 309 CrPC and the observations made by this Court to ensure that trials proceed smoothly and terminate according to law.
  • The matters are to be tried on merits expeditiously; the acquittals have been set aside and will not stand.

Broader implications and court observations:

  • The Court expressed concern over a perceived tendency in some subordinate courts to deal perfunctorily with labour legislation cases — either by accepting guilty pleas too readily and imposing unduly light sentences or by granting repeated adjournments and then acquitting on the complainant's absence.
  • The Court suggested administrative measures for Sessions Judges to inspect Rojkam proceedings, call for explanations from magistrates where serious lapses are detected, and, where justified, place such matters on service records to safeguard the promise of law and the objective of social welfare statutes.

Note on precedent and authority: The Court distinguished the single case relied upon by the defence (Criminal Appeal No. 238/83) on its facts and did not treat it as dispositive for these appeals.

Result: Appeals succeed and are allowed; impugned acquittals quashed and set aside; cases remanded for trial on merits with directions to proceed expeditiously in accordance with Section 309 CrPC and the observations contained in this judgment.

Show all summary ...

K.J Vaidya, J.:— This group of nine acquittal appeals by the State arise of the judgment and order dated 6-2-1990, passed by the Learned J.M.F.C, Deesa wherein the respondent-accused who came to be tried for the alleged contravention of certain provisions under the Gujarat Minimum Wages Rules, 1961 read with Sections 18 and 22 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1943, was ordered to be acquitted on the short ground of the complainant being absent when the cases were called out.

2. Mr. D.K Trivedi, the learned P.P while challenging the impugned orders of acquittal, with due respect to the trial Court, submitted that these days a tendency appears to be increasingly growing taking offences under the labour legislation too lightly and accordingly are more disposed off perfunctorily rather than deciding them on merits. The learned P.P further submitted that in the instant cases also, the trial court has not evinced the desired care while arbitrarily terminating the trials into premature acquittals. The learned P.P further submitted that in the beginning of the proceedings, long-rope was given to the accused as cases went on being adjourned from time to time and then all of a sudden, on the ground of the absence of the complainant, the accused came to be acquitted. Mr. Trivedi further submitted that on number of occasions, not only the accused had remained absent, but the first and foremost simple step like recording the plea of the accused could not be taken up for an year and ten months and thereafter also the trial dragged on for a considerable long period.

3. Such protracted trials are heart-breaking enough to anybody much less a complainant, who is a public servant and has to attend many other important public duties. On the basis of above submissions, Mr. Trivedi finally urged that the impugned orders of acquittal being patently illegal, arbitrary and unjust, the same deserve to be quashed and set aside with orders remanding the same to the trial court.

4. As against the above, Mr. K.G Zaveri, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-accused submitted that since the trial court has fairly exercised its discretion under Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short-the Code) in acquitting the accused, the same should not be lightly interfered with. He further submitted that if despite summons being issued to the complainant, he did not care either to remain personally present or make any arrangements to keep somebody from his office present before the court seeking adjournment then in that case, the trial court certainly cannot be blamed for the acquittal. Mr. Zaveri, in reply to two affidavits filed by (1) the learned A.P.P in-charge of the cases before the trial court; and (2) the complainant, has submitted affidavit-in-reply of the respondent-accused countering the allegations made in those two affidavits. Mr. Zaveri further submitted that in identical matter, since this court - (Coram: K.G Shah, J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 238/83 decided on 17-11-1990, has confirmed the order of acquittal dismissing the State appeal, these appeals also should meet with the same fate and must be dismissed. Mr. Zaveri finally in the alternative also urged that offences by now having become quite old, even if these appeals were to be allowed, the same should not be remanded.

5. Now on going through the record and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of these cases, it appears that arguments of the learned P.P has considerable force and therefore deserves to be accepted in toto. No doubt, it is true there are very many other factors as well responsible for unduly delaying the trials, still however, it is simply difficult to understand as to how and why the trial court should consume as many as four long years in conducting a trial which hardly requires a witness or two to be examined. It is indeed a matter of sheer regret that a simple thing like recording the plea of the accused could not take place for an year and ten months and thereafter also for other two years, the proceedings went on drifting aimlessly. Such sort of situation simply reflects upon the lack of will and duty on the part of the trial court to proceed expeditiously ahead with trials in utter disregard of the interests of the workers and object of the statute. This also incidently sadly reflects upon the trial court of its total unawareness of the provisions contained in Section 309 of the Code pertaining to the manner as how trial proceedings are to be conducted and controlled. No doubt, some times, the cases deserve to be adjourned from time to time in overall and larger interests of justice and therefore granting of reasonable adjournments are quite within the discretion of the trial court, but at the same time, while exercising such discretion, the court cannot be permitted to altogether ignore directions given in Section 309 of the Code, which aims at the expeditious trials by regulating and controlling the undue frequencies of adjournments. No cases should ordinarily be adjourned without the reasons for the same being recorded. Not only that but in appropriate cases, on justifiable grounds, the trial courts are duty bound to award costs so as to control the dilatory practics of the recalcitrant parties. Accordingly, the cases where unjust absence of the complainant causes undue hardship and inconvenience to the other side, the trial court can meet with the said situation by awarding costs, if need be, by frequently awarding such costs in order to control such recalcitrant complainant enforcing him to appear before the court. In fact, cases involving beneficial social pieces of legislation, require special and adequate care to be taken by the trial court and that ordinarily should not permit itself to resort to easy premature acquittals under Section 256 of the Code on the ground of the absence of the complainant throwing the grievances of the aggrieved labourers no the wind.

6. Now, turning to the grievance of the learned P.P regarding the growing tendency amongst some of the trial courts in taking too lightly cases under the labour legislation and disposing of the same in perfunctory manner, it cannot be denied that the same is without any substance. These days, we do come across number of such cases wherein Rojkam proceedings sadly reflect two types of modus operandi in conduct of trials. They are—(1) either immediately on appearance before the court or some times thereafter, whenever accused appears, moment he pleads guilty, the same is accepted without any reservation and then is let-off with some ridiculous sentence — many a time, in clear disregard of the minimum punishment prescribed under the Act, and (2) in the beginning by giving long-rope to parties by freely giving adjournments after adjournments and then conveniently terminating the cases on the ground of absence of the complainant or the witnesses, with added label of the old case. Rarely one comes across the cases under labour legislation wherein the same are decided on merits after full-dress trial. Thus, unfortunately, in the midst of such disqueting circumstances, where there exist vast and widening gap between the law in its letters and forms, the law in its spirit and action and ultimate deliverance of justice with the aid of the said laws through the instrumentality of the court, the future prospects of both the labour legislation as well as the beneficiaries thereunder, to say the least, is not encouraging enough, unless something radical is done at the grass-root level. It appears that on this side of administration of justice, the learned Sessions Judges can certainly do well to check and control the above unfortunate situations if with surprise frequencies, they call for the Rojkam proceedings from subordinate criminal courts for inspection and after personally examining the same, find out as to in how many cases, proceedings were unnecessarily delayed or accused were acquitted prematurely without being tried on merits or despite the inflexible minimum punishment provided under the particular statute, the accused have been let off with light sentences as a result of plea-bargaining. If during the course of such inspections, any serious lapse is noticed impairing the image of the administration of justice which cannot be accepted as a simple ordinary judicial error, or some honest and bona fide inadvertent mistake or to put it more broadly which cannot be reasonably and satisfactorily explained, the same should form a part of the service record of the concerned Magistrate after calling upon him to furnish the explanation report in the said regard. Further in such cases of serious lapses on the part of the learned Magistrate, it is equally the duty of the complainant to report the matter to the concerned Sessions Judge while filing appeals before the High Court. If the learned Sessions Judges also fail to entertain this sort of care and anxiety and thereby fail in their respective duties, then in that case, it will indeed be difficult to take exception against the allegation that the absence of vigilance on the part of the courts over their subordinate courts is one of the main hindrances between the promise of law and ultimate goal of justice.

7. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of these cases, even without entering into the merits of allegations and countering allegations in affidavits and replies thereto filed by the parties, it appears to this court that the order of acquittal being arbitrary, illegal and unjust, deserves to be quashed and set aside.

8. Now coming next to the reliance placed on the judgment cited above by Mr. Zaveri, it has to be stated that the same having no bearing on facts and circumstances of these cases, it is of no assistance to the accused. Each case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of that particular case. The present cases are clearly distinguishable from the judgment cited above. It appears that in the said judgment, the orders of acquittal were passed long before in the year 1982 and that the matter came up for final hearing in the year 1990, i.e to say after 8 prolonged years. Further, in the present cases, for no fault of the complainant, even the plea was not recorded for one year and ten months. Not only that, but on number of occasions, the accused remained absent. Thus, when the accused on the one hand was given free-hand and pampered by granting frequent adjournments on mere asking, thereby permitting him to delay the trials causing lot of inconveniences and hardships to the complainant, then in that case, he is certainly not entitled to be heard to find fault with the absence of the complainant in justification of acquittal, on the ground of absence of the complainant. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to accept the submissions of Mr. Zaveri.

9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present appeals deserve to be remanded to the trial court. Both Mr. D.K Triveri, the learned P.P and Mr. K.S Zaveri, the learned Advocate for the respondent are directed to intimate their respective parties to appear before the trial court on or before 4-3-1991 and take future date for the trial to proceed. The trial court while conducting the cases, henceforth, shall bear in mind the relevant provisions contained in Section 309 of the Code as well as observations made hereinabove with a view to see that the trial proceeds smoothly and terminates according to law.

10. In the result, these appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned judgment and orders of acquittal passed by the trial court are quashed and set aside. The matters are remanded to the trial court with a direction to dispose of the same on merits according to law as expeditiously as possible.

11. Appeals allowed.