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Kumar Gangaram v. Estate Officer, Gujarat Housing Board, Rajkot
Case Summary: Special Civil Application under Article 227 (M.B. Shah, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner challenged by way of a Special Civil Application under Article 227 the judgment and order dated 20-9-1989 of the Joint District Judge, Rajkot, which arose from an appeal under Section 9 of the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (the Act).
Facts as set out in the opinion: Prabhakar Badheka was the original allottee of the premises allotted by the Gujarat Housing Board. The Gujarat Housing Board allegedly recovered possession of the flat on 26-2-1979 for non-payment of instalments and locked the flat. The Board says the petitioner broke open the lock on 27-2-1979 and entered; the petitioner claims higher officers permitted him to occupy and that no order had been passed against him. A trial court in Regular Civil Suit No. 37 of 1979 found that the plaintiff (petitioner) failed to show possession had been restored after recovery. This Court had earlier observed (in Appeal from Order No. 360 of 1980) that the Gujarat Housing Board would not dispossess the petitioner except by due process of law. Proceedings under Section 4 of the Act resulted in an order dated 30-11-1980 by the competent authority directing eviction of the petitioner; the petitioner appealed to the District Judge under Section 9 of the Act. The appeal was heard and decided by the Joint District Judge, whose order the petitioner challenged in this Special Civil Application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the notice under Section 4 of the Act was vague because it did not specify that the petitioner was in possession of a particular room of the specified premises.
- Whether the eviction order was collusive because it was passed only against the petitioner and not against the original allottee (Prabhakar Badheka), given the petitioner's asserted status as tenant of Badheka.
- Whether the premises ceased to be "public premises" in December 1988 (by virtue of a hire-purchase scheme and alleged payment of instalments) so that proceedings and the eviction order were without jurisdiction.
- Whether the Joint District Judge had jurisdiction to decide the appeal under Section 9 of the Act, in view of the requirement that the appellate officer be the District Judge or a judicial officer designated by the District Judge.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- That the Section 4 notice was vague because it did not explicitly identify the petitioner as being in possession of a particular room of the premises.
- That eviction was collusive because the order targeted only the petitioner and not the original allottee (Prabhakar Badheka); the petitioner asserted he was a tenant of Badheka.
- That the premises ceased to be "public premises" in December 1988 under the hire-purchase scheme (installments payable by December 1988), meaning the competent authority lacked jurisdiction to order eviction.
- That the Joint District Judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Section 9 because he was not a designated judge as required by that Section.
Respondent / Gujarat Housing Board's Position (as reflected in the record)
- The Gujarat Housing Board recovered possession of the flat from the allottee (Prabhakar Badheka) on 26-2-1979 for non-payment of instalments and locked the premises.
- The Board alleges the petitioner broke open the lock and entered the flat on 27-2-1979, thereby occupying without authority.
- The Board produced a trial court order (Regular Civil Suit No. 37 of 1979) holding the plaintiff failed to prove that possession had been restored after recovery, concluding there was no prima facie case for the plaintiff.
- The Board relied on an earlier order of this Court (Appeal from Order No. 360 of 1980) directing that the Board will not dispossess the petitioner except by due process of law; consequentially, proceedings under Section 4 of the Act were initiated and an eviction order of 30-11-1980 was passed, leading to the appeal under Section 9.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court reviewed the record, the orders relied upon by the Gujarat Housing Board and the petitioner's submissions. The reasoning followed these principal lines:
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Review of factual record and earlier orders:
- The trial court order in Regular Civil Suit No. 37 of 1979 found the petitioner had not proved restoration of possession after the Board's recovery; this undermined the petitioner's claim of lawful possession.
- The Board's material showed recovery on 26-2-1979 and its contention that the petitioner entered after the Board had secured the premises.
- This Court's prior observation that the Board would not dispossess except by due process preceded the Section 4 proceedings and the competent authority's eviction order of 30-11-1980, which was appealed under Section 9.
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On the contention of vagueness of the Section 4 notice:
- The court agreed broadly with the Joint District Judge that the show cause notice was not vague and there was no basis to characterize it as such.
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On eviction of the original allottee and petitioner's status:
- The court held there was no question of evicting the original allottee (Badheka) since it could not be said he was an unauthorised occupant.
- Whereas the petitioner had been inducted into the premises in violation of terms and conditions, and his possession of part of the premises allotted to Badheka was unauthorised.
- The appellate court correctly concluded the petitioner failed to prove he was a tenant of Badheka because no evidence supported that claim.
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On the contention that the premises ceased to be public premises in 1988:
- The court observed there was no evidence on record that a sale-deed had been executed in favour of Badheka in 1988 or that all instalments had been paid. The competent authority had passed the eviction order in 1983 when the premises were admittedly public premises.
- Therefore, the contention that the order was without jurisdiction on that ground lacked foundation in the record.
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On the jurisdiction of the Joint District Judge to hear the appeal under Section 9:
- The court examined Section 9(1) of the Act, which provides an appeal to the district judge or "such other judicial officer in that district who has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the state as the district judge may designate in this behalf."
- The court reasoned that if the District Judge designated the Joint District Judge, that would satisfy the statute's requirement; there was nothing on record showing the District Judge had not designated the Joint District Judge.
- The court noted the roznama and history of transfers: the appeal was transferred among courts and, with consent of advocates, was fixed for hearing by the Joint District Judge; no objection to jurisdiction was taken before the Joint District Judge at hearing.
- The court relied on Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869, which empower the State Government to appoint a Joint Judge with co-extensive powers and concurrent jurisdiction and provide that regulations and acts applying to a District Judge also apply to the Joint Judge. The opinion quoted Sections 12 and 13 and concluded the Joint District Judge had jurisdiction to hear appeals under Section 9 of the Act.
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Conclusion from analysis:
- The court broadly accepted the reasons given by the Joint District Judge in rejecting the petitioner's contentions and found no illegality or error in that order on the grounds raised by the petitioner.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The petition is rejected.
Immediate procedural disposition:
- The opinion states that the ad interim relief previously granted by this Court "stands vacated." Nevertheless, taking into account the facts and circumstances and the petitioner's request, the Court ordered that the ad interim relief shall continue for a period of four weeks from the date of the order (i.e., a limited continuation of interim relief despite vacatur language).
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the Joint District Judge's order dismissing the petitioner's contentions and upholding the competent authority's eviction order remains in place and the Special Civil Application fails.
- The opinion indicates there was no basis to stay or overturn the eviction order on the grounds presented; however, a short continuance of interim relief was granted for four weeks as a matter of temporary accommodation.
- The opinion does not discuss any broader legal principle or purport to set a new precedent; it resolves jurisdictional and fact-specific objections on the record before the court.
Final line in the opinion: "Petition rejected."
M.B Shah, J.:— Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order dated 20-9-1989 passed by the Joint District Judge, Rajkot in an appeal filed under Section 9 of the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the petitioner has filed this Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. Mr. Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, vehemently submitted as under:
(1) Notice under Section 4 of the Act is vague because it is not specifically stated that the petitioner was in possession of a particular room of the specified premises.
(2) Eviction order is passed only against the petitioner and not against the original allottee - Prabhakar Badheka - and the petitioner is a tenant of the original allottee - Prabhakar Badheka. The order passed against him is collusive.
(3) In December 1988 the premises ceased to be public premises. As per the scheme of hire-purchase the premises were allotted in the year 1968 and all the instalments were required to be paid on or before December 1988. Hence, after December 1988, the premises cease to be public premises, and therefore, the order is without jurisdiction.
(4) That the Joint District Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the Appeal under Section 9 of the Act as he was not a designated Judge as provided in the said Section.
3. It is admitted fact that one Prabhakar Badheka was allotted the premises in dispute by the Gujarat Housing Board. It seems that he had inducted the petitioner in the premises. On 26-2-1979 the Gujarat Housing Board recovered the possession of the said flat (premises in dispute) on the ground of non-payment of instalments. On the basis of the order passed by the Competent Officer under the provisions of the Act, the Gujarat Housing Board has taken possession from the allottee - Prabhakar Badheka and put the said flat in lock and key on 26-2-1979. It is the say of the Gujarat Housing Board that on 27-2-1979 the petitioner broke open the lock and key of the Gujarat Housing Board and entered into the flat. As against this, it is the say of the petitioner that as no order was passed against him, he approached the higher officers and the higher officers of the Gujarat Housing Board permitted him to occupy the said premises. Alongwith the affidavit in reply, the Gujarat Housing Board has produced on record the order passed below Ex. 5 in Regular Civil Suit No. 37 of 1979 wherein the trial Court has held as under:
“Thus, the plaintiff has failed to prove that after the recovery by defendant No. 1, his possession was restored by the officer concerned and, therefore, there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, the observation of the XI GLR 971 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The plaintiff will not cause any irreparable loss as he was not in the possession of the premises at the time of the suit and no greater hardship will cause to the plaintiff. So, I decide that there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and decide issue No. 1 in the negative and pass the following order”.
4. The respondent has also produced on record the order passed by this Court in Appeal from Order No. 360 of 1980 wherein it has been stated that the Gujarat Housing Board will not dispossess the petitioner except by process of law. Thereafter proceedings under Section 4 of the Act were initiated against the present petitioner. Notice under Section 4 of the Act was served upon the petitioner and after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the competent authority passed an order dated 30-11-1980 to evict the petitioner from the disputed premises. Against that order the petitioner preferred appeal before the District Judge under Section 9 of the Act.
5. The appeal came up for hearing before the Joint District Judge. Before the Joint District Judge, the learned advocate for the petitioner has raised all the contentions stated above except the last contention. The learned Judge considered the said contentions in detail and rejected them. I broadly agree with the reason given by the Joint District Judge. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to discuss the reasons given by the learned Joint District Judge in dealing with the contentions of the learned advocate for the petitioner. As such, it is difficult to hold that the show cause notice is in anyway vague. Further, there is no question of evicting the original allottee - ??? Badheka as it cannot be said that he is in on authorised occupation of the premises. As the petitioner was inducted in the premises in violation of the terms and conditions, his possession of some part of the disputed premises allotted to Badheka is unauthorised one. The appellate Court has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to prove that he was a tenant of Badheka as there was no evidence on record to substantiate the said contention.
6. However, it is clarified that with regard to the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner that Badheka has become owner of the disputed premises in the year 1988, it should be noted that at present there is no evidence on record to prove that in the year 1988 the Gujarat Housing Board has executed any sale-deed in favour of the original allottee - Badheka. Whatever may be the position, it cannot be said that the order passed by the learned Joint District Judge is in any way illegal or erroneous on this ground because the competent authority has passed the order in the year 1983 and at the relevant time admittedly the premises were public premises. At present there is nothing on record to show that the original allottee has paid all the instalments and the sale-deed is executed by the Gujarat Housing Board in his favour. Hence, this contention is without any foundation or basis. In this view of the matter, the reasons given by the learned Joint District Judge are not discussed in detail in this order.
7. The last contention which requires consideration is whether the Joint District Judgehad jurisdiction to hear the appeal or not Alongwith the affidavit in rejoinder the petitioner has produced on record the rojnama at Annexure III which reveals that on 7-3-1984 the appeal was transferred to Joint District Judge, Rajkot as per Order No. A. On 23-8-1985 by order No. A/946, the appeal was transferred to the Court of Extra Assistant Judge for disposal. On 4-5-1985, it was again transferred to Assistant Judge. On 10-8-1987 it seems that it was pending for hearing before the Second Joint District Judge. On 27-4-1989, the Joint District Judge fixed the hearing in view of the letter received from the District Judge stating that the High Court has directed that the appeal should be disposed of within three months. He has fixed the hearing on 2-5-1989 after informing the advocates for the parties.
8. From the aforesaid facts, it seems that with the consent of the learned advocates for the parties, the matter was fixed for hearing by the Joint District Judge. It should also be noted that before the Joint District Judge it was not contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the Joint District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Section 9 of the Act. There is nothing on record to show that the District Judge has not designated the Joint District Judge to hear the appeal as provided under Section 9 of the Act.
9. Apart from this aspect, it cannot be said that the Joint District Judge has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Section 9 of the. Act. The relevant sub-section (1) of the Section 9 of the Act reads as under:
“9.(1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the competent officer made in respect of any public premises under Section 5 or section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the district judge of the district in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer in that district who has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the state as the district judge may designate in this behalf.”
10. This section specifically provides that appeal can be decided by the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situated. It could also be decided by such other judicial officer in that district who has for at least ten years held a Judicial office in the State as the district judge may designate in this behalf. Therefore, if the district judge has specifically directed that the appeal shall be heard and decided by the Joint District Judge then it can be said that the district judge has designated the Joint District Judge to hear the appeal. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Joint District Judge had no jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal.
11. Further, Section 12 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869, empowers the State Government to appoint in any district a Joint Judge who shall be invested with co-extensive powers and a concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge. The relevant sections are Sections 12 and 13 and they are as under.
“12. The (State) Government may appoint in any District a Joint Judge who shall be invested with co-extensive powers and concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge, except that he shall not keep a file of civil suits and shall transact such civil business only as he may receive from the District Judge, or as may have been referred to the Joint Judge by order of the High Court.
13. All Regulations and Acts now or hereafter in force and applying to a District Judge shall be deemed to apply also to the Joint Judge, and the seal of the Joint Judge shall be the same as if used by the District Judge.”
12. From bare reading of the aforesaid two sections it is abundantly clear that the Joint District Judge is invested with co-extensive powers and is having concurrent jurisdiction alongwilh the District Judge except for a limited purpose as provided in Section 12. Under Section 13 all Regulations and Acts applying to a District Judge also apply to the Joint District Judge. In view of these provisions the Joint District Judge also has jurisdiction to hear appeals under Section 9 of the Act. Hence, there is no substance in the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner that the order passed by the Joint District Judge is without jurisdiction.
13. In the result, this petition is rejected. Ad interim relief stands vacated. Mr. Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, prays that ad interim relief granted by this Court may be continued for some time. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, ad interim relief granted by this Court shall continue for a period of four weeks from today.
14. Petition rejected.
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