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Rameshchandra Kashiram Vora v. State Of Gujarat Opponent.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Two separate anticipatory bail applications were filed and heard together because they raised a common question: whether the High Court should directly entertain applications for anticipatory bail or whether petitioners should first approach the Sessions Court.
Misc. Criminal Application No. 1145/86: The petitioner is a Sub-Accountant in the Central Bank of India. He is alleged to have committed offences of forgery, cheating and misappropriation of funds amounting to Rs. 1,14,000.87 while discharging his duties. He has been suspended in connection with these allegations.
Misc. Criminal Application No. 1151/86: The petitioner is accused of theft of a jeep belonging to his uncle. An initial complaint dated 12-3-1986 named no suspect; a subsequent complaint dated 25-4-1986 named the present petitioner for offences under Sections 379 and 506(2) IPC, alleging he left the village after the theft and later threatened the complainant. The petitioner apprehended arrest and applied for anticipatory bail. The two matters arise from Kutch District and Mehsana District respectively.
The statutory basis for anticipatory bail was quoted in the opinion: Section 438(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which permits a person who reasonably believes that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence to apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction that he be released on bail in the event of such arrest.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court should directly entertain applications for anticipatory bail, or whether petitioners should be directed to approach the Court of Session first.
- Whether an accused has a right, under Section 438 Cr. P.C., to choose the High Court as the forum for an anticipatory bail application and whether such an application should be dismissed simply because it was also maintainable before the Sessions Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners (through their learned counsel) submitted that Section 438 Cr. P.C. provides an option and right to an accused to select either the High Court or the Sessions Court for making an application for anticipatory bail.
- It was argued that an anticipatory bail application made to the High Court is maintainable under Section 438 and cannot be dismissed merely because the application is also maintainable before the Sessions Court.
- The petitioners also argued that anticipatory bail concerns liberty and, therefore, higher courts (including the High Court and the Supreme Court) ordinarily should not direct parties to pursue alternative remedies before lower authorities when liberty is at stake.
- The learned counsel relied on earlier authorities (including Eainub Bibi v. State of Gujarat and Brahmehari Satyanarayan Maharaj v. Kantilal L. Dave) to support approaches to higher courts in certain circumstances, though the opinion records that those authorities were not directly helpful on the central question here.
State's Arguments
- The State (through learned Additional Public Prosecutors) submitted that anticipatory bail is an urgent and extraordinary remedy and requires prompt resolution, but that opposing such applications effectively requires the Investigating Officer and case papers to be available to the court and Public Prosecutor.
- The State emphasized that if the High Court were to entertain many direct applications from across districts, Investigating Officers would be required to come to the High Court (in Ahmedabad), imposing considerable public expense and strain on public machinery and time.
- The State argued that the Sessions Court is ordinarily nearer and more accessible to the accused, can decide with expedition, and offers an equally efficacious remedy under the same statutory provision; therefore, the Sessions Court should ordinarily be approached first.
- The State relied upon decisions (including Hajialisher v. State of Rajasthan and Chhaju Ram v. State of Haryana) holding that although the High Court and Sessions Court have concurrent jurisdiction under Section 438, the ordinary practice should be to move the lower court first and that the High Court should entertain direct applications only in exceptional circumstances.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Eainub Bibi v. State of Gujarat (1984 Guj LH 37) | Held that the High Court was justified in entertaining a revision under Section 397 Cr. P.C. in a maintenance matter under Section 125 Cr.P.C.; principle that HC may intervene in certain family/maintenance matters. | The Court found this authority not helpful to the present question because the subject-matter (maintenance under Section 125) and procedural provision were different from anticipatory bail under Section 438. |
| Brahmehari Satyanarayan Maharaj v. Kantilal L. Dave (17 Guj LR 979 : 1976 Cri LJ 1806) | Addressed direct revision to the High Court and the effect of new Cr.P.C. provisions on approaches to the High Court; noted that when there are no successive approaches possible, insisting that the lower court be approached first may be abrogated. | The Court held this judgment not to be of assistance for the present question: while direct applications to the High Court are maintainable, the relevant inquiry is whether the High Court should exercise its discretion to entertain such applications in light of public convenience and the burden on investigating machinery. |
| Hajialisher v. State of Rajasthan (1976 Cri LJ 1658) | Stated that although the High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Sessions Court to grant bail, it is desirable that the lower court be moved first; High Court should entertain direct applications only in exceptional or special circumstances to avoid prejudicing trial and to conserve resources. | The Court described this ratio as persuasive and adopted the principle that ordinarily the Sessions Court should be approached first and that the High Court should reserve direct entertainment for exceptional cases. |
| Chhaju Ram v. State of Haryana (1978 Cri LJ 608) | Affirmed that Section 438 gives concurrent powers to High Court and Sessions Court; ordinarily the Court of Session should be approached first unless an adequate case is made for bypassing it; the rule is not inflexible but requires explanation for approaching the High Court directly. | The Court agreed respectfully with this view and used it to support the discretion to require petitioners to approach the Sessions Court first unless special and weighty reasons justify going directly to the High Court. |
| 18 Guj LR 131 : (1977 Cri LJ 1523) | Described in the opinion as guidelines previously laid down by the High Court (specific content not detailed in the provided opinion). | The Court noted that guidelines already exist in that authority but did not elaborate them in the present opinion; it relied on the existence of such guidelines as background for its exercise of discretion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by identifying the central discretionary question: although Section 438 permits an application for anticipatory bail to be made to either the High Court or the Sessions Court, the High Court must exercise its discretion whether to entertain every direct application.
Key steps in the court's reasoning (as stated in the opinion):
- The remedy of anticipatory bail is available under Section 438 to both the High Court and the Sessions Court; the availability itself does not decide the appropriate forum in every case.
- The court expressed practical concerns: if the High Court were to entertain many direct applications from across all districts, Investigating Officers and police would be required to attend in the High Court, producing significant public expense, time costs and strain on public machinery. This practical burden weighs against routine direct entertainment by the High Court.
- Ordinarily, the Sessions Court is nearer and more accessible to the accused; the remedy and statutory provision are the same at the Sessions Court; there is no reason to assume the Sessions Court will not act according to law.
- The High Court's discretion should therefore favor declining to entertain routine direct applications and instead require that petitioners first approach the Sessions Court, leaving the High Court open to entertain further applications (substantive Section 438 applications or revisions under Section 397 Cr.P.C.) where the accused remains aggrieved and the High Court can benefit from the Sessions Court's reasons.
- The High Court may nonetheless entertain direct applications in exceptional or special circumstances. Examples contemplated by the court (drawn from the opinion) include cases where the Public Prosecutor can act without calling the Investigating Officer, or where the facts are so clear that a rule can be issued and made absolute the same day. In such situations, delay in the High Court could defeat the purpose of anticipatory bail and the High Court need not require a prior approach to the Sessions Court.
- Applying these principles to the present matters, the court found that the factual circumstances would require the Public Prosecutor to call the Investigating Officers and take instructions so that the court could pass appropriate final orders. Given that necessity, these cases were not suitable for direct entertainment in the High Court and the practice of discouraging direct filings in the High Court should be followed.
- The court also addressed the petitioners' submission that matters of personal liberty should not be directed to alternative remedies: the court rejected the notion of an inflexible rule in favor of direct High Court intervention, noting that superior courts (including the Supreme Court and High Court) frequently direct parties to the lower authorities in appropriate cases.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
THE APPLICATIONS FOR ANTICIPATORY BAIL ARE DISMISSED insofar as the court declines to entertain them at this stage without the petitioners first approaching the Sessions Court.
Direct, case-specific consequence stated in the opinion:
- The petitioners in each case were directed not to be arrested until Monday, 19th May, 1986, so as to enable them to approach the Sessions Court.
- The applications were otherwise dismissed.
Implications:
The decision reflects an exercise of judicial discretion to conserve public resources and to respect the ordinary forum of the Sessions Court for anticipatory bail applications, while recognizing that direct High Court intervention remains available in exceptional circumstances. The opinion does not purport to establish a rigid rule barring direct High Court applications; rather, it adopts the view that the Sessions Court should ordinarily be approached first and the High Court should entertain direct applications only where special and cogent reasons exist. The opinion refers to earlier guidelines of the High Court (18 Guj LR 131 : 1977 Cri LJ 1523) and to persuasive authorities from other High Courts, but does not purport to lay down a novel binding precedent beyond its exercise of discretion in these particular cases.
Applications dismissed. (As recorded in the provided opinion.)
1. These are the two applications for anticipatory bail on totally different sets of facts. However, because of a common question, they are heard together. The common question is whether the High Court should directly entertain the applications for anticipatory bail or whether the petitioners should be directed to approach the Sessions Court first.
2. The petitioner in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1145/86, is a Sub-Accountant in the Central Bank of India and the allegations against him are that he has committed offences of forgery, cheating and misappropriation of funds amounting to Rs. 1,14,000.87. These offences are alleged to have been committed while the petitioner was discharging his duties as Sub-Accountant and he has been suspended in connection with the same.
3. In Misc. Criminal Application No. 1151 of 1986, the allegation against the petitioner is about theft of one jeep belonging to the complainant his uncle. In the complaint dt. 12-3-1986, no name is disclosed as suspect or accused. However, after about a month, another complaint is recorded on 25-4-1986 wherein his uncle Patel Kala Ranchhodbhai has accused the present petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 379,506(2) IPC and has stated that this accused had left the village after the theft of the jeep and the complainant had asked the police to make secret investigation against the petitioner in respect of that jeep and this petitioner on learning the said fact, threatened the complainant. Apprehending arrest by the police in connection with the offence of theft, the petitioner has preferred this application for anticipatory bail. The first matter arises from Kutch District and the second matter arises from Mehsana District. There is no doubt that application for anticipatory bail can be made to the Sessions Court or to the High Court. Section 438(1) of the Cr. P. C. reads as under:
When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested On an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail.
4. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that there is an option and right to the accused to select either the High Court or the Sessions Court for making an application for anticipatory bail and such an application is maintainable Under Section 438 of the Cr. P.C. and it cannot be dismissed on the ground that the application is also maintainable before the Sessions Court.
5. On behalf of the State, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutors have submitted that anticipatory bail is urgent and extraordinary remedy. It is urgent both from the point of view of the accused wanting to preserve his liberty as well as from the point of view of police investigation. If the accused is entitled for anticipatory bail, he should get the same urgently because delay in granting anticipatory bail would defeat the very purpose of anticipatory bail. On the other hand, if for granting urgent anticipatory bail, the police wants to oppose the same, they have to satisfy the court by bringing proper material and showing the same to the High Court. For that purpose, Investigating Officer, case papers etc. are required. The Public Prosecutor would certainly require that assistance and sometimes, the Court also may insist for the same. Such anticipatory bail applications would be coming from all the Districts of the State from different police stations and the Investigating Officers would be required to run down to Ahmedabad at the cost of considerable public expenses and public time and putting public machniery to easily avoidable and unnecessary strain. It is, therefore, submitted by the State that there is equally efficacious remedy of anticipatory bail nearer to the accused at the level of the Sessions Court which would be really easily accessible to the accused where orders can be passed with great expedition and with minimum strain on the public exchequer, public time & public machinery and that will not cause any prejudice to the accused.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred the case of Eainub Bibi v. State of Gujarat 1984 Guj LH 37. It was a case of revision application under Section 397 of the Cr. P. C. where the High Court had admitted the revision application and called for the R. & P. in a case of maintenance under Section 125 of Cr. P. Code and it was held that whenever the matter is pertaining to wife or any other person entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C., the High Court would be justified in entertaining the revision application. That judgment cannot be of any assistance to the petitioners in the present case. The situation regarding anticipatory bail is entirely different and the provision is also entirely different.
7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment in the case of Brahmehari Satyanarayan Maharaj v. Kantilal L. Dave 17 Guj LR 979 : 1976 Cri LJ 1806. In that case also, the question was regarding the direct revision to the High Court. The High Court Appellate Side Rules provided that High Court will not entertain revision if the lower court was not approached first and the High Court held that when there are no successive approaches, there cannot be, in the very nature of things, any insistence about the first approach and, therefore, the rule that Sessions Court should be approached first would stand abrogated after the commencement of new Cr. P. C. which provides that no successive revision application first to the Sessions Court and second to the High Court is maintainable. This judgment is also of no assistance to the present case because it is not that anticipatory bail application to the High Court directly is not maintainable. Such an application is maintainable, but the question is whether the High Court should exercise the discretion in entertaining the applications and putting considerable strain on public machinery at the cost of public expenses and public time so as to require investigating officers from different Districts to rush to the High Court. Every year there would be hundreds of such applications from all sessions division of the State.
8. The learned Counsel for the State has relied upon the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Hajialisher v. State of Rajasthan 1976 Cri LJ 1658 wherein it has been held as under:
Although the High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Sessions Court to grant bail under either of the aforesaid two sections, it is, according to me, desirable that the ordinary practice should be that the lower court should be first moved in the matter, though in exceptional cases or special circumstances, the High Court may entertain and decide an application for bail either under Section 438 or Section 439 Cr. P. C. This is specially important because any expression of opinion by the superior court is likely to prejudice, if not frequently, in cases few and far between, the trial in the lower court. In my opinion, it is only in exceptional circumstances that an application for bail should be made direct to the High Court and in the absence of special circumstances the application should not be entertained by the High Court.
9. Similar view is also taken by Punjab & Haryana High Court in a case of Chhaju Ram v. State of Haryana 1978 Cri LJ 608. In that case, the High Court held as under:
Section 438 of the Cr. P.C. gives concurrent powers of granting anticipatory bail both to the High Court and the Court of Session. As in other analogous provision in the Code it is normally to be presumed that the Court of Session would be first approached for the grant thereof unless an adequate case for not "approaching the said Court has been made out. This, of course, is not an inflexible rule. However, in the present case, the petitioners have not shown as to why they have chosen to by-pass the Court of Session whilst approaching the High Court directly. They should hence first approach the said Court for the grant of this relief.
10. I am in respectful agreement with the ratio of these two cases. I am of the opinion that it would be a sound exercise of judicial discretion not to entertain each and every application for anticipatory bail directly bypassing the Court of Session. Ordinarily, the Sessions Court is nearer to the accused and easily accessible and remedy of anticipatory bail is same and under same section and there is no reason to believe that Sessions Court will not act according to law and pass appropriate orders. In a given case, if any accused is grieved, his further remedy to approach the High Court is not barred and he may prefer a substantive application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 or revision application under Section 397 of the Cr. P. C. to the High Court and the High Court would have the benefit of the reasons given by the Sessions Court. It would be only in exceptional cases or special circumstances that the High Court may entertain such an application directly and these exceptional and" special circumstances must really be exceptional and should have valid and cogent reasons for by passing the Sessions Court and approaching the High Court. The High Court may also in exercise of its discretion entertain directly the applications for anticipatory bail where the Public Prosecutor can act without calling the Investigating Officer. There are cases where anticipatory bail applications can be and are finally granted on the same day. Where the facts are so clear and eloquent that rule can be issued and made absolute on the same day, the High Court may not reject the application and direct the accused to go to the Sessions Court. In other cases where rule is required to be issued and some time is required to be elapsed in order to enable the Public Prosecutor to get in touch with the Investigating Officer and to call him if necessary, during that time, if interim bail is got granted, the application might be frustrated and if interim bail is granted and the arrest delayed, sometimes the investigation may suffer irreparably. In such cases, the choice of avoiding the Sessions Court may also appear to be not bona fide. When the accused has simple and equally efficacious remedy available in the Sessions Court, special and weighty reasons would be required to make out a special and exceptional case for persuading the High Court to entertain such application directly.
11. In the facts of the present cases, it is not necessary for me to decide whether the petitioners in these cases should be or should not be granted anticipatory bail. Guidelines are already laid in 18 Guj LR 131 : (1977 Cri LJ 1523) by this High Court. But the facts are such that they would certainly require Public Prosecutor to call the Investigating Officers and take instructions so as to enable the Court to pass appropriate final orders. In such cases, it is necessary to discourage filing of such applications directly in the High Court.
12. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also submitted that anticipatory bail is a matter of liberty and in such matters, neither the Supreme Court nor the High Court would direct the party to avail alternative remedy and that petitions under Arts, 32 and 226 would be maintainable and would be entertained. There is no such inflexible rule or practice. In many cases, the Supreme Court has directed the parties to go to the lower authorities and High Court has also in exercise of its discretion directed the parties to avail of alternative remedy and ordinarily, there cannot be any objection to approach the Sessions Court first.
13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am not inclined to entertain these applications for anticipatory bail at this stage without the petitioners first approaching the Sessions Court and, therefore, these applications are dismissed. However, with a view to enable the petitioners to approach the Sessions Court, it is directed that the petitioner in each of these cases shall not be arrested till Monday, the 19th May, 1986. Applications dismissed.
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