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Bhanuprasad Maganlal Bhatnagar v. Pravin Tapubhai Naik And Others

Gujarat High Court
Dec 4, 1980
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion (M.P. Thakkar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

A doctor, aged about 37 and employed by the Directorate of Medical Services (Employees' State Insurance Scheme), sustained serious injuries on September 13, 1973 at about 3:30 p.m. when the scooter on which he was travelling from Nadiad to Ahmedabad collided with a truck belonging to respondent No. 2 and driven by respondent No. 1. The doctor was hospitalised for about five months, underwent five operations, developed a permanent limp due to shortening of his left leg by ½", and acquired other handicaps.

The injured doctor (the appellant) filed Motor Accident Claim Application No. 8/74 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol. He initially valued his claim at Rs. 40,000, and subsequently, with leave of the Tribunal, amended the valuation to Rs. 60,000. The truck driver and owner (respondents Nos. 1 and 2) denied that their truck was involved, asserting instead that the applicant had collided with a stationary truck parked on the road. The MACT disbelieved the respondents' denial that their truck was involved, but nonetheless dismissed the claim by finding the applicant negligent (relying principally on the panchnama showing the position of the scooter). The injured doctor appealed to this Court challenging the Tribunal's decision and seeking compensation of Rs. 60,000.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal erred in dismissing the appellant's claim and in finding the appellant negligent despite disbelieving the respondents' denial of involvement.
  2. Whether the amendment of the claim valuation (from Rs. 40,000 to Rs. 60,000) should relate back and whether any delay in increasing the valuation should be condoned.
  3. Whether, under sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurer's liability is limited to the sum assured or extends to costs and interest on the sum assured (i.e., whether the insurer can be required to indemnify costs and interest in addition to the sum assured).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant claimed that his scooter collided with the truck belonging to respondent No. 2 driven by respondent No. 1, causing serious injuries and loss, and sought compensation (eventually valued at Rs. 60,000).
  • He challenged the Tribunal's rejection of his claim and its finding that he was negligent.

Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (Truck Driver and Truck Owner) — Arguments

  • They asserted that their truck was not involved in the collision and that the applicant had collided with a stationary truck parked on the road.
  • The driver claimed that after he had passed the stationary truck he heard a noise and realized that a collision had occurred (implying non-involvement of his vehicle in the impact).

Respondent No. 3 (Insurance Company) — Argument

  • The insurance company contended that its liability is limited to the sum specified as the sum assured under the policy (Rs. 50,000 in the context of this opinion) and that it cannot be saddled with liability to indemnify the insured in respect of costs and interest over and above that sum.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the factual findings and legal issues as follows:

  1. On credibility and the circumstance of the collision:
    • The only potential eye-witnesses were the appellant (scooterist), the truck driver (respondent No. 1) and the driver's companion Dinesh. The driver and his companion maintained that their vehicle was not involved and therefore did not narrate the circumstances of the collision. The Tribunal had disbelieved their denial that their truck was involved.
    • Given that the truck bore serious damage (noted at the panchnama) and the Tribunal had disbelieved respondents' version, the Court concluded there was "no manner of doubt" that the collision occurred with the truck driven by respondent No. 1.
    • The Court held that where the occupants of the truck (other than the appellant) who could have explained the circumstances refuse to tell the truth, the only available evidence is the appellant's, and the finding must be based upon that evidence in light of the silence and falsehood of the other side.
  2. On the Tribunal's reliance on the panchnama to infer negligence:
    • The Tribunal had relied on a panchnama (Exh. 122) prepared between 5:30 and 6:30 p.m. though the collision occurred soon after 3:30 p.m. The panchnama described the scooter as lying across the road such that its front was 11½ feet from the western edge and its rear wheel 4½ feet from the eastern edge, from which the Tribunal inferred the scooter was on the wrong side of the road.
    • The Court found this inference unsustainable for several reasons stated in the opinion: the scooter might have been flung a distance depending on impact and speeds; vehicles or persons could have moved the truck or scooter after the collision to clear traffic; and there is no guarantee that the panchnama shows vehicles in the exact positions of impact. Consequently, the Court concluded there was no basis to infer the scooterist was on the wrong side from the position shown in the panchnama.
    • The Court also considered probabilities and human behaviour: it was unlikely the scooterist would intentionally ride into the path of the truck (i.e., commit suicide). The heavier vehicle's driver had the responsibility to slow down, change gear or take precautions to avoid collision.
    • The Court rejected the drivers' stated speeds (driver: 35–40 km/h; companion: 25–30 km/h) at face value, inferring that the truck was likely proceeding at a considerably high speed on a National Highway.
  3. On amendment of valuation and condonation of delay:
    • The appellant had amended the claim valuation from Rs. 40,000 to Rs. 60,000 by an application dated January 16, 1975 (Exh. 60). The learned Tribunal allowed the amendment by its order dated February 4, 1975 but observed, without granting a formal order condoning delay, that the amendment was "without prejudice" to the other side's contention that additional amount might not be awarded because the amendment was after the period of limitation.
    • The Court held that once the amendment was granted, the Tribunal should have passed an appropriate order on condonation of delay. The Court found no mala fides by the appellant, no prejudice to the other side, and noted that the appellant could have initially valued the claim at Rs. 60,000. On these grounds the Court concluded that the amendment relates back and that any delay should be condoned; accordingly, the Court condoned delay itself as a continuation of the main proceeding.
  4. On insurer's liability under Section 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act:
    • The insurance company argued its liability is confined to the sum assured and does not extend to costs or interest over that sum. The Court examined sub-section (1) of Section 96 (quoted in the opinion) which provides that the insurer shall pay "any sum, not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments."
    • The Court interpreted this provision to mean that the insurer's liability does not stop at the sum assured; rather, the insurer is statutorily liable to satisfy costs and interest on the sum assured (subject to the limitation that costs and interest are computed on the sum not exceeding the sum assured).
    • The Court gave pragmatic and principled reasons: compensation is payable in law from the date of the accident, but litigation may delay payment for years (seven years in this case). If interest and costs were not recoverable from the insurer, the third party would effectively lose the benefit of the sum assured while the insurer benefits from the use of the money during litigation. Thus, the statutory provision puts the burden of interest and costs on the insurer, which is both just and consistent with the text of Section 96(1).
  5. Resulting conclusion and allocation of liability:
    • The Court allowed the appeal in part, accepting the appellant's entitlement to compensation and reversing the Tribunal's adverse finding of negligence against the appellant that had led to dismissal.
    • The Court quantified relief and allocated liability between respondents and the insurer in the terms set out in its operative conclusion (see Holding and Implications below).

Holding and Implications

APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED

Holding (core rulings):

  • The appellant is entitled to a global sum of Rs. 60,000 by way of compensation for the injuries sustained.
  • The appellant is entitled to interest at 6% per annum on that amount from the date of the institution of the claim petition until realization.
  • The appellant is entitled to costs calculated on the said amount throughout.
  • The aforesaid amount shall be paid to the appellant by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (the truck driver and the truck owner).
  • The appellant may seek satisfaction of the judgment against respondent No. 3 (New India Assurance Co., the insurer) to the extent of Rs. 50,000 along with costs calculated on Rs. 50,000 and interest at 6% on Rs. 50,000 from the date of institution of the petition until realization.
  • The remaining liability (i.e., the portion of the Rs. 60,000 not covered by the insurer's Rs. 50,000) is to be borne by respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the appellant receives Rs. 60,000 plus interest and costs; respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are ordered to pay the compensation and remain liable for any portion not satisfied by the insurer; the insurer (respondent No. 3) is liable to the extent of Rs. 50,000 plus costs and interest on that sum under Section 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act as interpreted by the Court.
  • Statutory interpretation: the Court has construed Section 96(1) to require the insurer to satisfy costs and interest on the sum assured (subject to computation on the sum not exceeding the sum assured), thereby clarifying that insurer liability is not limited in practical effect to only the principal sum assured.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any broader novel precedent beyond this statutory interpretation and the allocation in this case; the decision primarily resolves the dispute between the parties by reversing the Tribunal's adverse finding against the appellant, condoning the amendment to the valuation, and allocating liability between the insured parties and the insurer as above.

Order: Appeal partly allowed.

Show all summary ...

M.P Thakkar, J.:— A doctor employed by the Directorate of Medical Services (Employees' State Insurance Scheme), aged about 37, sustained serious injuries on September 13, 1973 at 3.30 p.m when the scooter on which he was proceeding from Nadiad to Ahmedabad collided with a truck belonging to respondent No. 2 being driven by respondent No. 1. He had to be hospitalised for about five months and had to be operated upon five times. He developed permanent limp as a result of shortening of his left leg to the extent of ½″. He also acquired some other handicaps on account of the mishap. The injured doctor, appellant herein, instituted Motor Accident Claim Application No. 8/74 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal of Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol. Initially his claim for compensation before the Tribunal was valued at Rs. 40,000/- but subsequently with the leave of the Court the claim was raised to the figure of Rs. 60,000/-. The stand taken by the truck driver and the truck owner, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, before the learned Tribunal was that the applicant had dashed against some other truck, a stationary truck, which was parked on the road. According to them the truck belonging to respondent No. 2 which was being driven by respondent No. 1 was not involved in the accident at all. The version of respondent No. 1 driver was that at the point of time when he had passed beyond the stationary truck parked on one side of the road, he heard a noise and had realised that a collision had occurred. The learned Tribunal on an appreciation of evidence came to the conclusion that the defence of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to the effect that their truck was not at all involved in the collision was ‘untrue’. Their version that the applicant had collided with the stationary truck was ‘disbelieved’ and ‘rejected’. The learned Tribunal, however, came to the conclusion that the applicant had failed to establish that the collision had occurred on account of the negligence of respondent No. 1, driver though such was not the version of respondent No. 1 driver who (it will be recalled) had come forward with a total denial and had contended that there was no collision with his truck at all. Two persons would know about the circumstances in which the collision occurred if the truck driven by respondent No. 1 was involved in the accident viz. (1) the applicant, and (2) the driver. The driver did not say that though there was collision it was the applicant who was negligent. Where then was the question of resorting to the conjecture to hold that the driver who denied the collision altogether (and whose version was disbelieved) was not guilty of negligence, but the applicant (whose version regarding collision was believed) himself was negligent. Even so, strangely enough relying on the position of the scooter lying on the road as revealed by the panchnama which was made later in the evening, the learned Tribunal concluded that the applicant must have been negligent. In this view of the matter the learned Tribunal dismissed the claim petition instituted by the applicant doctor by his impugned order dated September 19, 1975. The injured doctor has approached this Court by way of the present appeal, has challenged the legality and validity of the decision rendered by the learned Tribunal, and has claimed compensation to the tune of Rs. 60,000/- for the injuries sustained by him.

2. ……… The collision occurred on the National Highway at a place about 2 kms. from Bareja at about 3.20 p.m By the very nature of things there is no eye-witness to the collision other than the applicant himself and the driver of the truck and his companion Dinesh who have been examined as the witnesses of the truck owner. The driver and his companion Dinesh have assumed the posture that the collision occurred with the stationary truck and not with their truck. They have, therefore, not narrated the circumstances in which the collision occurred. In view of the serious damage to the truck being driven by respondent No. 1 which was noticed at the time of the panchnama made on the date of the occurrence, there is no manner of doubt that the collision had taken place with the said truck as we have already discussed a short while ago. Barring the applicant the only other persons who could have thrown light on the question as to the manner and the circumstances in which the collision occurred were the driver and his companion. They have maintained complete silence for the very good reason that according to them the collision had not taken place with their vehicle and they had not seen the collision. It has been found that both of them are lying on this point. Under the circumstances, the only evidence which is available to us is the evidence provided by the applicant himself and the finding on this question will have to be recorded on the basis of his evidence in the light of the circumstance that the driver and his companion, who must have known in what circumstances the collision occurred, have refused to tell the truth and have maintained silence on this aspect.

3. It appears that the learned Tribunal was carried away by the contents of the panchnama, Exh. 122, of the scene of occurrence which was made between 5.30 and 6.30 p.m It was mentioned in the panchnama that the scooter was lying across the road in such a way that its front part was 11½ feet from the western edge of the tar road (i.e, the left hand side edge of the road having regard to the direction in which he was proceeding) and that its rear wheel was 4½ feet from the opposite edge viz. the eastern edge. From this recital he jumped to the conclusion that the scooter was entirely on its wrong side. Reliance was also placed on the circumstance that the collision took place with the front right hand side part of the truck. The learned Tribunal formed the opinion that having regard to this circumstance there was no possibility of the scooter being pushed on its right on the east. This was the sole ground on the basis of which the learned Tribunal recorded a finding adverse to the appellant on this question.

4. Now, in the first place the learned Tribunal has overlooked the circumstance that as a result of the collision the scooter may have been flung to some distance depending on the speed of the vehicles, the position of the scooter and several circumstances. In our opinion, it would not be possible to draw any inference as to on which side of the road the scooterist was going on the basis of the place, where the scooter was found to be lying ‘after’ the collision. In the second place it has been established that collision took place soon after 3.30 p.m and the panchnama was made at about 5.30 p.m The truck driver may have moved his vehicle soon after the collision in order that the traffic on the road was not blocked up. So also he or someone else might have moved the scooter so that it would not obstruct the traffic on the road. There was no guarantee that the vehicles in question remained frozen exactly on the spot where they were found at the time of the panchnama. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that there is no basis whatsoever for drawing the inference that the scooterist was going on the wrong side of the road. Going by probabilities it is impossible to believe that the scooterist would have proceeded headlong in the direction of truck. The scooterist could not have done so unless he wanted to commit suicide. The truck driver could have seen the scooterist coming from the opposite direction from a considerable distance. He should have, therefore, slowed down his vehicle or changed the gear or taken sufficient precautions in order to ensure that there was no collision, he being the driver of the heavier vehicle. The driver has stated in his evidence that he was moving at a speed of 35 to 40 kms. per hour. His companion Dinesh, who is the son of the truck-owner, and claims to be the cleaner of the vehicle, has deposed that the speed was 25 to 30 kms. per hour. We refuse to accept this evidence at its face value. In fact on probabilities we are inclined to believe that the truck driver must have been proceeding at a considerably high speed having regard to the fact that he was driving the vehicle on the National Highway.

5. …………

6. One more question requires to be resolved before we proceed to determine the issue regarding quantum of damages. It appears that initially the appellant had valued his claim for compensation at Rs. 40,000/-. Later on he made an application (Exh. 60) on January 16, 1975 for amendment of the claim petition by revising the valuation upwards from Rs. 40,000/- to Rs. 60,000/-. The learned Tribunal after hearing both the sides by his order dated February 4, 1975 passed below the application granted the prayer and permitted the appellant to amend the claim and to pay additional court-fees on that basis. In the course of his order he has observed that this will be without prejudice to the contention of the other side that the amendment having been made after the expiry of the period of limitation, no additional amount should be awarded to him even if he made out a case in that behalf. We are of the opinion that once the application for amendment was granted, the learned trial Judge ought to have passed an appropriate order in regard to condonation of delay. It was not a deliberate delay. The appellant was not to gain anything by valuing the claim at a lower figure initially. No prejudice was caused to the other side. The appellant could have valued his claim at Rs. 60,000/- even initially and the other side could not have objected to it. Merely because the valuation was revised after the period of limitation, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been occasioned to the other side. We are of the opinion that the learned Tribunal was perfectly justified in granting leave to amend the valuation and that once the amendment was allowed, it would relate back. Assuming that a formal order condoning delay was necessary and that the Tribunal had failed to do so whilst granting the application an appeal being a continuation of the main proceeding we can do so. In our opinion, delay, if any, deserves to be condoned. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, particularly having regard to the fact that there were no mala fides on the part of the appellant, and the most important factor viz. the other side has not changed its position at all, and there is no prejudice to the other side, we have no hesitation in doing so now.

7. … … ….

8. What has so far been accepted without debate, dispute or demur (of course it does not preclude the insurance company from doing so now merely on that account) has been questioned possibly for the first time by the insurance company. Counsel for the insurance company has contended that since the clause limiting the liability of the insurance company restricts the liability to the amount specified in the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurance company cannot be saddled with liability to indemnify the insured in respects of costs and interest on the amount of Rs. 50,000/-. In other words, Rs. 50,000/- means Rs. 50,000/- all told. Conveniently (does it behove the insurance company?) a blind eye is turned to the provision contained in sub-section (1) of section 96 which stares the insurance company in its face and which in terms provides that the liability of the insurer to satisfy the judgment against the insured will extend to the satisfaction of the decree for a sum not exceeding the sum assured along with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. The said provision in so far as material deserves to be quoted:

“96. (1)………………… the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay, to the person, entitled to the benefit of the decree, any sum, not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments.”

(Emphasis added).

9. Having regard to the provision contained in 1 section 96(1) there is no escape from the conclusion that the liability of the insurer does not stop short at the sum assured by the policy. An additional statutory liability is thrown on the shoulders of the insurer by providing that the insurer shall also be liable to make payment to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree, besides the sum assured under the policy, the amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on the said sum. Costs and interest must of course be computed on the sum not exceeding the sum assured. But subject to this limitation the burden to discharge the liability in respect of costs and interest on the sum assured has been cast on the insurer. The principle underlying the aforesaid provision is self evident. In the eye of law the compensation would be payable to the third party on the very date of the accident. However, when the liability is disputed by the other side, it has to be determined by a competent Court. In an ideal state of affairs one would expect it to be settled within a couple of months, but there is an inordinate time distance between what is ‘ideal’ and what is ‘real’. Till the dispute is settled by the Court which in the present state of affairs takes considerable time (in the present case it has taken about seven years) the third party who is sought to be protected would be virtually altogether deprived of the benefit of the sum assured, if the liability to pay costs and interest were not thrown on the shoulders of the insurer. In a given case the amount representing the loss of the interest and the amount of costs may be a very large amount. In the present case loss on account of interest itself would work out at about 42% going by the unrealistic rate of interest at 6% and at about 100% going by the rate of interest at 15% admittedly obtaining at present. If this amount cannot be recovered from the insurance company, the person who is entitled to the benefit of the decree would in reality stand to lose it altogether for it is seldom that it can be recovered from the truck owner or the driver. On the other hand, the insurance company, which is liable to pay the insured amount immediately would secure the benefit of the user of the said sum for the period during which the litigation remains pending in the Court. In other words, the insurer does earn interest on the amount which is payable at once but is paid after a lapse of years. Thus, it is the insurer who benefits by the delay occasioned in the Court. And it is, therefore, but just and proper that the insurer is saddled with the liability to this extent and is obliged to discharge the burden in respect of the item of interest. The same would be the position with regard to claim for costs. The claim is being resisted by the insured in order to protect the interests of the insurance company who would otherwise have to pay the sum assured. It, therefore, stands to reason that the insurer should be made liable to pay the interest and costs on the sum assured. On first principles, therefore, the burden should rest on the shoulders of the insurer and that principle has been given a statutory shape in sub-section (1) of section 96. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the liability to pay interest and costs on the sum assured will also have to be borne by the insurer notwithstanding the fact that in the insurance policy a particular amount is specified as the sum assured.

10. …………. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed. We hold that the appellant is entitled to a global sum of Rs. 60,000/- by way of compensation. The appellant will also be entitled to interest at 6% from the date of the institution of the claim petition till the date of realisation. He will also be entitled to costs calculated on the said amount throughout. We direct that the aforesaid amount shall be paid to the appellant by respondents Nos. 1 and 2. We also hold that the appellant will be entitled to seek satisfaction of the judgment as against respondent No. 3 insurance company, namely, New India Assurance Co. to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- along with costs calculated on Rs. 50,000/- and interest at 6% calculated on Rs. 50,000/- from the date of the institution of the petition till the date of realisation. The rest of the liability will have to be borne by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent.

11. Appeal partly allowed.