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Bharat Tobacco Co., Kaira v. Maula Saheb A. Jamadar And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant-plaintiff instituted a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nadiad, seeking recovery of Rs. 5,06,348.85 from Messrs. Inter-State Trading Corporation (a partnership) and its three partners (the respondents). The appellant moved for attachment before judgment by a Notice of Motion, seeking attachment of properties specified in an annexed Schedule on three grounds: (1) that the defendants were disposing of their property and had begun selling stock-in-trade; (2) that the defendants intended to sell two cars (an Ambassador and a Fiat) and had negotiated sales; and (3) that the defendants were about to abscond to Pakistan. The learned trial Judge dismissed the application for attachment before judgment on 5 June 1979. The appellant has appealed against that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Court could order attachment before judgment under Order 38, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the facts alleged by the appellant.
- Whether an allegation that the defendants were about to abscond to Pakistan is a ground for attachment under Order 38, Rule 5, or falls under Order 38, Rule 1.
- Whether the sale of stock-in-trade in the ordinary course of business to out-of-jurisdiction buyers constitutes disposal of property "with a view to obstructing or delaying the execution" of a prospective decree sufficient to justify attachment before judgment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The respondents had begun disposing of their property, including sales of stock-in-trade, and intended to sell cars (Ambassador and Fiat).
- The respondents were about to abscond to Pakistan.
- On these grounds, attachment before judgment in respect of the properties listed in the Schedule was sought to secure satisfaction of any decree.
Respondents' Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The respondents are dealers in tobacco who purchased tobacco on credit from the appellant and traded in tobacco in the usual course of business.
- The alleged sales of stock-in-trade were to bona fide tobacco dealers in Tamil Nadu and were consistent with ordinary trading activities.
- There was no allegation that the sales were made at prices far below market value or intended to liquidate assets to defeat a potential decree.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the scope and requirements of Order 38, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
- Order 38, Rule 5 permits attachment before judgment if the defendant fails to furnish security and the court is satisfied that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay execution of a prospective decree, is about to dispose of or remove property.
- Sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 authorises conditional attachment of specified property at the time of making the order.
- The court held that an allegation of intended absconding to Pakistan is not a ground under Rule 5 but would fall under Order 38, Rule 1; accordingly, that ground could not support a Rule 5 attachment in this case.
- Because the properties scheduled in the application were admittedly outside the local jurisdiction of the Nadiad Court, there was no allegation that the defendants were removing property from the court's local limits; therefore the only potentially applicable ground was disposal of property to obstruct execution.
- The court emphasised that it is insufficient to merely reproduce the language of Order 38, Rule 5; the party seeking attachment must establish by affidavit or otherwise facts that satisfy the court that the defendant is about to dispose of property with intent to obstruct or delay execution.
- The court stressed that attachment before judgment is a drastic remedy that can seriously affect reputation and business, so the power must be exercised with utmost circumspection and not used as an instrument of oppression or coercion.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the sole factual circumstance relied upon — purported sales of tobacco (stated to be worth Rs. 3 lakhs) to two firms in Tamil Nadu — was consistent with the defendants' ordinary course of trade as wholesale tobacco dealers and did not prima facie demonstrate an intent to defeat a prospective decree.
- There was no allegation that the sales were at prices far below market value or otherwise designed to liquidate assets to defeat the plaintiff's claim; the defendants' established trading presence further undermined the contention that the sales were intended to obstruct enforcement.
- Accordingly, the trial Judge properly concluded that the material did not furnish prima facie evidence sufficient to justify exercise of the attachment power under Order 38, Rule 5.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed.
Implications:
- The order of the trial Judge dismissing the application for attachment before judgment is upheld.
- The decision directly denies the appellant the remedy of attachment before judgment on the material presented; no broader precedent was established by judicial citation in this opinion beyond the court's application of Order 38, Rule 5 principles.
1. The appellant-plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nadiad, to recover an amount of Rs. 5,06,348-85 ps, from Messrs. Inter-State Trading Corporation, a partnership firm, and its three partners who are the respondents herein. In the said suit the appellant-plaintiff took out a Notice of Motion for attachment before judgment on three grounds (1) that the defendants-respondents were about to dispose of their property and had in fact started selling off the stock-in-trade; (2) the defendants intended to dispose of their Ambassador and Fiat cars and had in fact negotiated for the sale of those cars with two different parties; and (3) that the defendants were about to abscond to Pakistan. The properties in respect of which attachment was sought were set out in detail in the Schedule annexed to the Notice of Motion. The learned trial Judge dismissed the application for attachment before judgment on 5th June, 1979 and it is against that order of dismissal that the original plaintiff has preferred this appeal.
2. Under Order 38, Rule 5 of the CPC, the Court is invested with power to order attachment before judgment if the defendant fails to furnish security at any stage of the suit.
3. Before the Court exercises the power under the said rule it must be satisfied that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of the decree that may be passed against him, (a) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property, or (b) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. If the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied by affidavit or otherwise, the Court may direct the defendant to furnish security, in such sum as it may specify in its order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Court, when required, the said property or the value thereof, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree. Sub-rule (3) of Rule-5 of Order 38 empowers the Court to direct the conditional attachment of the whole or any portion of the property so specified in the application at the time of the passing of the said order. In the instant case attachment before judgment was sought on three grounds set out earlier. Out of these three grounds, the ground that the defendants are likely to run away to Pakistan cannot be invoked for the purpose of attachment before judgment under Order 38, Rule 5 of the Code. That would be a valid ground to invoke the Court's jurisdiction under Order 38, Rule 1 of the CPC. In the instant case there is no allegation that the defendants are about to remove the whole or any part of their property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court for the obvious reason that the properties set out in the Schedule appended to the application are admittedly outside the jurisdiction of the Nadiad Court. The only ground which can, therefore, survive is that the defendants are about to dispose of the whole or any part of their property with a view to obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree that may be passed against them in the suit. In support of the said ground the allegation is that the defendants have disposed of some part of the stock-in-trade to (1) Messrs. L.N Nooruddin & Sons of Trichinopally (Tamil Nadu) and (2) Messrs. S. Kadarkhan and Sons, Salem (Tamil Nadu). Now the defendants are dealers in tobacco. They had purchased tobacco from the appellant firm on credit and the suit also is to recover the price of goods sold and deliver to the defendants. It is thus obvious that the defendants are trading in tobacco and if in the usual course of business they sold a part of their stock-in-trade to the aforesaid two firms carrying on business in Tamil Nadu, it cannot be said that they disposed of the goods with a view to obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree that may be passed against them in the suit instituted by the appellant. The learned trial Judge has rightly observed that in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Order 38, Rule 5 of the Code, it is not sufficient to reproduce the language of that rule but the party seeking the order must establish by affidavit or otherwise facts which would satisfy the Court that the opposite party is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property with a view to obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree that may be passed in the suit. An order of attachment before judgment is a drastic order and ordinarily the Court would be slow in exercising the power conferred upon it under Order 38, Rule 5 of the Code for the simple reason that if the power is not exercised with utmost care and caution, it may ruin the reputation, and business of the party against whom the power is exercised. The Court must act with utmost circumspection before issuing an order of attachment so that the power vested in the Court is not abused by an unscrupulous litigant as a weapon of oppression against the opposite party. It is the duty of the Court to take care to see that it is not used as an instrument to coerce the opposite party to settle the matter with the party armed with an order of attachment before judgment on the latter's terms. The learned trial Judge was, therefore, right in observing that mechanical reproduction of the language of Order 38 Rule 5 of the Code will not entitle the party to an order of attachment before judgment. What is important is that the party seeking an order of attachment before judgment must place material on record which would satisfy the Court that the opposite party is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property with a view to defeating the decree that may ultimately be passed against him in the suit. In the instant case we find that the only allegation made against the respondents-defendants is that they disposed of tobacco worth Rs. 3 lakhs to the aforesaid two firms carrying on business in Tamil Nadu. Assuming for the sake of argument that this allegation is well-founded, it does not furnish sufficient cause for the exercise of power under Order 38, Rule 5 of the Code for the simple reason that the defendants who are trading in tobacco are bound to enter into contracts with dealers in tobacco in ordinary course of business. There is no allegation that the tobacco stated to have been sold to the aforesaid two Tamil Nadu parties was sold at a price far below the market price prevailing at the relevant point of time with a view to liquidating the stock-in-trade to defeat the decree that may be passed in the suit instituted by the appellant-plaintiff. The very nature of the transaction with the aforesaid two Tamil Nadu firms reveals that the defendants are wholesale dealers in tobacco and have firm roots at the place where they are carrying on business in the aforesaid name. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that this single circumstance did not furnish ‘prima facie’ evidence sufficient to satisfy the Court that the defendants were out to dispose of their property with a view to defeating the claim of the appellant-plaintiff, should a decree as prayed be passed in the suit instituted in the Nadiad Court.
4. [Not reported. Only portions approved for reporting by High Court are reported.]
5. [Not reported. Only portions approved for reporting by High Court are reported.]
6. [Not reported. Only portions approved for reporting by High Court are reported.]
7. [Not reported. Only portions approved for reporting by High Court are reported.]
8. Appeal dismissed.
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