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Commissioner Of Gift-Tax, Gujarat I. v. Chhotalal Mohanlal.

Gujarat High Court
Oct 8, 1973
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — B.K. Mehta, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The relevant assessment year is 1963-64. The respondent-assessee was a partner in the firm M/s. Chhotalal Vadilal. A partnership deed dated 12 November 1958 gave the respondent a seven annas share while two other partners, Gunvantlal Chhotalal and Pravinchandra Vadilal, had four annas and five annas respectively. That partnership continued until the assessment year 1962-63. With effect from 9 November 1961 (relevant to assessment year 1963-64) the firm was reconstituted under a new deed between the respondent, Gunvantlal Chhotalal and Ramniklal Chhotalal. Under the new deed the respondent's share was fixed at 25% and Gunvantlal at 25%; the original partner Pravinchandra Vadilal retired and Ramniklal (son of the respondent) joined with a 25% share. Two minor sons of the respondent, Kiritkumar and Deepakkumar, were admitted to the benefits of the partnership with 12% and 13% shares in profits respectively.

The Gift-tax Officer held that by reducing his share by 19% the respondent had gifted 19% of the goodwill; goodwill value was assessed and gift-tax levied. The respondent appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who, relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Karnaji Lumbaji, held there was no gift of the goodwill but found there was a gift of the right to receive future profits in favour of the minors and valued that gift. The respondent further appealed to the Appellate Tribunal which held there was no gift of the respondent's share in goodwill and concluded that the right to share in future profits was not an existing property and therefore not a gift under the Gift-tax Act. The revenue sought and obtained a reference from the Tribunal on two questions of law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the benefits of partnership given to minors, Kiritkumar Chhotalal and Deepakkumar Chhotalal, was a gift under the Gift-tax Act, 1958?
  2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was a gift under the provisions of the Gift-tax Act, 1958, when Shri Ramniklal Chhotalal joined as a partner?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments (as presented by Mr. K. H. Kaji)

  • When the firm was reconstituted (Pravinchandra retiring and Ramniklal joining, plus minors admitted to benefits), the respondent's share fell from 44 paise (equivalent to seven annas) to 25 paise (25%). This diminution reduced the value of the respondent's property.
  • Such diminution amounted to a transfer of property within the definition of "gift" under section 2(xii) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958, and particularly fell within the wider definition of "transfer of property" in section 2(xxiv)(d) (transactions intended to diminish the value of one's property and increase another's).
  • Accordingly, the admission of minors to partnership benefits constituted a transfer/gift that should be liable to gift-tax.
  • Mr. Kaji did not press Question No. 2 at the hearing in view of the Gujarat High Court decision in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Karnaji Lumbaji.

Tribunal / Appellate Assistant Commissioner / Respondent positions (as recorded)

  • The Appellate Assistant Commissioner relied on the Gujarat High Court decision in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Karnaji Lumbaji to hold there was no gift of the goodwill.
  • The Appellate Assistant Commissioner nonetheless held there was a gift of the right to receive future profits in favour of the minors, valued that right and determined gift-tax accordingly.
  • The Appellate Tribunal affirmed that there was no gift of the respondent's share in the goodwill and further held that the right to share future profits amounted to a future property and not an existing property; therefore, it did not attract liability under the Gift-tax Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as recorded in the opinion)
Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Karnaji Lumbaji (Gujarat High Court) Authority holding that, in the circumstances considered in that case, there was no gift of goodwill (as a matter relied on by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and mentioned by the parties). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner relied on this decision to hold there was no gift of goodwill. The revenue's counsel did not press Question No. 2 before the Court in view of this decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the matter by reference to the relevant provisions of the Gift-tax Act, 1958, as they had been cited to it:

  • Section 2(xii) defines "gift" as the transfer by one person to another of any existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, and includes transfers deemed to be gifts under section 4.
  • Section 2(xxii) defines "property" to include any interest in movable or immovable property.
  • Section 2(xxiv) defines "transfer of property" and includes clause (d), which covers transactions entered into with intent to diminish directly or indirectly the value of one's own property and increase the value of another person's property.
  • Section 4(d) covers situations where a person entitled to property causes it to be vested jointly without adequate consideration and an appropriation is made from that property benefiting the appropriator; such appropriation may be deemed a gift.

Applying those provisions to the facts, the Court proceeded as follows:

  1. The Court observed that under the old partnership one partner (Pravinchandra) had a five-annas share (~31%). Under the new deed Ramniklal received 25% and the two minors together had 25% (12% + 13%). Given those allocations, it could not be said that the 25% given jointly to the two minors represented a relinquishment or abandonment by the respondent of his prior share. In other words, the diminution in the respondent's percentage was not shown to be an abandonment of a specific portion of property by the respondent.
  2. Even assuming (for argument) that the right to share profits of a partnership is a property or interest in property, the Court held that the reconstitution did not amount to a relinquishment or abandonment of any debt, contract, actionable claim or interest in property by the respondent which would amount to a transfer as contemplated by section 2(xxiv).
  3. The Court emphasised the textual requirement of clause (d) of section 2(xxiv): it postulates that a transaction must be entered into by a person with the intent to diminish the value of his own property and to increase the value of another's. The Court found that when minors are admitted to the "benefits of partnership" they do not become partners themselves; they are admitted to benefits with the consent of partners (citing section 4 of the Partnership Act definition). Therefore, there was no transaction entered into between the minors and the adult partners of the firm in the sense required by clause (d).
  4. Because clause (d) was not applicable, there could be no transfer of property within the meaning of section 2(xxiv), and without a transfer of property the definition of "gift" in section 2(xii) could not be attracted.

On that basis the Court rejected the revenue's contention that the admission of minors to partnership benefits constituted a gift chargeable to gift-tax.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

On Question No. 1: The benefits of partnership given to the minors, Kiritkumar Chhotalal and Deepakkumar Chhotalal, were NOT a gift within the meaning of the Gift-tax Act, 1958.

The Court expressly answered Question No. 1 in favour of the assessee. At the hearing the revenue did not press Question No. 2 in view of the Gujarat High Court decision in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Karnaji Lumbaji.

Direct consequences recorded in the opinion:

  • The Court ruled for the respondent-assessee on the referred question and ordered that the applicant (revenue) pay the costs of the reference to the respondent.

Broader implications: The opinion confines its decision to the statutory definitions and the facts of the case. The opinion does not state or claim the setting of any new precedent beyond its findings on the application of the Gift-tax Act to the particular facts; the decision turns on the Court's construction of sections 2(xii), 2(xxii), 2(xxiv) and section 4(d) of the Gift-tax Act and on the factual conclusion that no requisite transfer occurred when minors were admitted to the benefits of partnership.

Show all summary ...

B.K Mehta, J.:— A few facts need be stated to appreciate the question which has been referred to us by the Appellate Tribunal. The relevant assessment year in this case is 1963-64. The assessee was a partner in the firm carrying on business under the name and style of M/s. Chhotalal Vadilal. There were two other partners besides the respondent-assessee. A partnership deed of November 12, 1958, was executed between the partners in respect of the said partnership business. According to the said partnership deed, the respondent-assessee had seven annas interest whereas the other two partners, namely, Shri Gunvantlal Chhotalal and Shri Pravinchandra Vadilal, had four annas and five annas share, respectively, in the profit and loss of the partnership business. It appears that this partnership continued till the assessment year 1962-63. However, from the beginning of S.Y 2018, relevant to the assessment year 1963-64, with which we are concerned here, there was a change in the constitution of the firm. A new partnership deed was executed on November 9, 1961, between the respondent-assessee, Gunvantlal Chhotalal and Ramniklal Chhotalal. According to this new partnership deed the respondent-asses-see's share was fixed at 25% in the profit and loss of the business. Gunvantlal Chhotalal continued to have 25% of share in the new partnership business. The original partner, Shri Pravinchandra Vadilal, retired and Ramniklal Chhotalal, the son of the respondent-assessee, joined the partnership business in his place. The two minor sons of the respondent-assessee, Kiritkumar and Deepakkumar, were admitted to the benefits of partnership having 12% and 13% shares, respectively, in the profits of the partnership business. Ramniklal Chhotalal was given 25% share in the profit and loss of the new partnership business. It appears that the Gift-tax Officer on the above facts held that the assessee by depriving himself of the 19% share of profit, gifted away 19% share in the goodwill of the firm. The value of the goodwill was determined at Rs. 2,22,021 and therespondent-assessee's share at 19% therein was determined at Rs. 42,184 which was treated as the amount liable to bear gift-tax. The respondent-asses-see, therefore, went in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who, however, held, relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Karnaji Lumbaji 1, that there was no gift of the goodwill by the respondent-assessee. It appears, however, that the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that though there was no gift in respect of the share of the respondent-assessee in goodwill, there was gift of the right to receive future profits in favour of the minors, Kiritkumar and Deepakkumar. He, therefore, proceeded to value the said right and ultimately determined the value of gift at Rs. 1,44,247. The respondent-assessee, therefore, went in appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal confirmed the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that there was no gift of the share of the respondent-assessee in the goodwill. It then proceeded to examine the definition of “gift” under the Gift-tax Act and was of the opinion, having regard to the said definition, that in order to attract the liability under the Gift-tax Act, there should be transfer of existing movable or immovable property. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the right to share future profit was a future property and not existing property. As the right to share future profit was not considered to be existing property, the Tribunal held that there was no gift of any property and in that view of the matter, allowed the appeal of the respondent-assessee and set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. At the instance of the revenue, therefore, the Tribunal has referred the following two questions to us:

“(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the benefits of partnership given to minors, Kiritkumar Chhotalal and Deepakkumar Chhotalal, was a gift under the Gift-tax Act, 1958?

(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was a gift under the provisions of the Gift-tax Act, 1958, when Shri Ramniklal Chhotalal joined as a partner?”

2. At the time of hearing of this reference, Mr. K.H Kaji, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the revenue, did not press question No. 2, in view of the decision of this court in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Karnaji Lumbaji. As regards question No. 1, his contention is that in so far as there was reconstitution of the firm between the respondent-assessee, Gunvantlal Chhotalal and Pravinchandra Vadilal, whereby Pravinchandra Vadilal retired and Ramniklal Chhotalal joined the business of partnership in his place and the two minor sons of Chhotalal were admitted to the benefits of partnership, the result was that the share of Chhotalal, respondent-asses-see herein, was reduced from 44 paise in the profits of the said old partnership business to 25 paise in the new partnership business and the value of his property was diminished. Consequently and to that extent, therefore, there was a transfer of property which would be included within the definition of the term “gift” under section 2(xii) of the Gift-tax Act. In the submission of Mr. Kaji, therefore, the Tribunal was in error in holding that there was no transfer of any existing movable property and what was transferred was only the right to receive profits in future.

3. In order to appreciate this contention of Mr. Kaji, we refer to a few of the relevant provisions of the Gift-tax Act. Section 2(xii) of the Gift-tax Act defines what is a “gift”. It reads as under:

“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(xii) ‘gift’ means the transfer by one person to another of any existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration in money or money's worth, and includes the transfer of any property deemed to be a gift under section 4.”

4. The term “property” has been defined by clause (xxii) of section 2, which reads as under:

“(xxii) ‘property’ includes any interest in property, movable or immovable.”

5. The term “transfer of property” is defined in clause (xxiv) of section 2. The said definition so far as it is relevant for the purposes of the contention of Mr. Kaji provides as under:

“(xxiv) ‘transfer of property’ means any disposition, conveyance, assignment, settlement, delivery, payment or other alienation of property and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes,—………..

(d) any transaction entered into by any person with intent thereby to diminish directly or indirectly the value of his own property and to increase the value of the property of any other person.”

6. Section 4 provides for transfers which are included in the term “gift” for the purposes of the said Act. The relevant clause on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Kaji for the purpose of this reference provides as under:

“4. Gifts to include certain transfers.—For the purposes of this Act,—……..

(d) where a person absolutely entitled to property causes or has caused the same to be vested in whatever manner in himself and any other person jointly without adequate consideration and such other person makes an appropriation from or out of the said property, the amount of the appropriation used for the benefit of the person making the appropriation or for the benefit of any other person shall be deemed to be a gift made in his favour by the person who causes or has caused the property to be so vested.”

7. It was, therefore, urged that if by the reconstitution of the firm, the respondent-assessee has reduced his share by accepting 25% instead of 44% (which is equivalent to seven annas in a rupee) he diminished to that extent the value of his own property and releases or abandons the same in favour of the minors and to that extent it is a transfer of property which comes within the mischief of the definition of the word “gift”, and, therefore, must bear the liability of gift-tax.

8. It is no doubt an ingenious contention which has been urged on behalf of the revenue. In the first instance, the benefits to which the minors, Kiritkumar and Deepakkumar, have been admitted under the reconstituted firm were to the extent of 12% and 13%, respectively, in the profit of the business of the new partnership firm. Under the old partnership, one Pravinchandra Vadilal was entitled to five annas share (which is equivalent to about 31%). The new partner, Ramniklal Chhotalal, who joined the new partnership business from November 9, 1961, was given a share of 25% in the profit and loss of the business. In those facts, it, therefore, cannot be said that the share of 25% which has been given jointly to the two minors was any relinquishment or abandonment by the respondent-assessee. In the second place, assuming that the right to share in the profits of a partnership business is a property, even then, it cannot be said that when the firm was reconstituted and the minor sons were admitted to the benefits of the partnership business, there was consequently a relinquishment or abandonment of any debt, contract or other actionable claim or any interest in the property of any person. We, therefore, cannot uphold the contention of Mr. Kaji that to the extent to which as a result of the reconstitution the share of the respondent-assessee was reduced, to that extent there was a relinquishment or abandonment of any interest in the property. The partnership has been defined under section 4 of the Partnership Act as the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all and the partners who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually “partners” and collectively “a firm”. It should be noted that the minors when they were admitted to the benefits of a partnership did not become by themselves the partners of the firm. They are admitted to the benefits of partnership with the consent of all the partners. It, therefore, cannot be said that when a firm is reconstituted and as a result of its reconstitution shares of some partners who have continued after the reconstitution have been diminished and the new partners who joined the partnership business after reconstitution have been given some shares by the adjustment of the shares amongst the old partners, there is a transfer of property within the meaning of section 2(xxiv) of the Gift-tax Act. Clause (d) of sub-section (xxiv) of section 2 on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Kaji postulates that a transaction should have been entered into between two persons with the intention thereby to diminish directly or indirectly the value of his own property and to increase the value of the property of any other person. It cannot be said that when the minors are admitted to the benefits of partnership a transaction was entered into between the minors and the adult partners of the firm. In our opinion, therefore, clause (d) does not take the case of the revenue any further with the result that there would be no transfer of property and without transfer of property section 2(xii) of the Act is not attracted.

9. The result, therefore, is that we answer question No. 1 in favour of the assessee that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the benefits of partnership given to minors, Kiritkumar Chhotalal and Deepak kumar Chhotalal, was not a gift under the Gift-tax Act, 1958. The applicant will pay costs of this reference to the respondent.