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Parasram Manjimal And Others v. The Kalol Municipality, Kalol .
Court Opinion Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
These two writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 challenged notices issued by the respondent Municipality to petitioners requiring them to remove unauthorised cabins and structures erected on parts of a public street in Kalol town.
In Special Civil Application No. 498 of 1970 the petitioners were monthly lessees occupying pieces of land which formed part of a public street near Vishnu Talkies. Various short-term leases (including for 1967-68 and 1968-69) expired on 31 March 1969. The Municipality passed resolutions (including Resolution No.235 on 30 December 1968) and served notices beginning in December 1969 and thereafter (February and April 1970) seeking removal of the cabins and to take possession of the land. The petitioners had earlier filed a writ (Special Civil Application No.1646 of 1969) which they withdrew after the Municipality indicated it would withdraw the impugned notices and could issue fresh notices.
In Special Civil Application No. 527 of 1970 the petitioner occupied land near Khani Bungalow under prior leases (last for 1965-66 and 1966-67) and had paid rent only up to 31 March 1967. The Municipality served notices in 1968 and later (March and April 1970) calling for removal of the cabin and surrender of possession. The petitioner had earlier challenged a different notice (Special Civil Application No.1415 of 1968) under Section 233; the Gujarat High Court had quashed that notice and declared Section 233 ultra vires. The petitioner again challenged the 1970 notice under Section 185 and contended Section 185 was ultra vires Article 14.
Because the petitions raised similar questions, the court disposed of both by a common judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 185 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 empowers the Municipality or Chief Officer to remove obstructions or encroachments only if those encroachments were made after the local area became a municipal borough under the Act.
- Whether sub-section (2) of Section 185 permits the Chief Officer to remove obstructions or encroachments only after a prosecution is launched and a conviction obtained under sub-section (1) (i.e., whether forcible removal is conditional upon prior prosecution and conviction).
- Whether Section 185 is ultra vires the State Legislature and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because it allegedly confers uncanalised or arbitrary powers on municipalities and their officers.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Section 185 applies only to obstructions or encroachments made after the area has become a municipal borough; since the encroachments in question pre-dated the area becoming a municipal borough under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, the section cannot be invoked.
- Under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) read together, the Chief Officer may remove obstructions only if the Municipality prosecutes and obtains a conviction under sub-section (1); hence forcible removal without prior prosecution and conviction is impermissible.
- Section 185 is violative of Article 14 because it gives municipal authorities and officers uncanalised discretion (no sufficient guidelines), enabling arbitrary or discriminatory action; reliance was placed on Northern India Caterers (Pvt) Ltd. v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1581).
Respondent-Municipality's Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dakore Town Municipality v. Anupram Haribhai Travedi, (1913) 15 Bom LR 833 | Explains that municipality powers to require removal of encroachments depend on statutory conditions (Sections 113 and 122 of the District Municipal Act); the statutory conditions must be shown to exist. | The court considered the decision but held it did not advance the petitioners' case; the repealing/deeming provisions in the Gujarat Act meant the petitioners' reliance on the Dakore decision was not dispositive here. |
| Emperor v. Vishvanath Nana Karpe, AIR 1926 Bom 535 | Holds that public streets are vested in municipalities as trustees for the purposes of the Act and that ordinarily a municipality should not permit permanent obstructions on streets (citing provisions like Section 50 and Section 122 of the Bombay District Municipal Act). | The court relied on this authority to support the view that municipalities have duties (not merely powers) to remove obstructions and encroachments on public streets and cannot lawfully permit permanent obstructions. |
| Cantonment Board, Meerut v. Narain Dass, AIR 1970 SC 105 | Distinguishes provisions dealing with erection of buildings on private land (Section 185 equivalent) and those dealing with projections into streets/drains (Section 187 equivalent); public interest permits wide power to remove encroachments on streets to prevent disappearance of streets/roads. | The court used the Supreme Court's distinction to reinforce that powers to remove structures projecting into or encroaching on public streets are wide and not subject to the limitations applicable to prosecutions for erection of buildings on private land. |
| Northern India Caterers (Pvt) Ltd. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1581 | Was relied on by petitioners to argue that absence of guidelines can render administrative power arbitrary and violative of Article 14. | The court held this authority inapplicable to the facts: Section 185 provides conditions/guidelines and there are not two competitive powers enabling pick-and-choose discrimination; therefore, the Northern India Caterers decision did not assist the petitioners. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Threshold interpretive issue (timing requirement): The court examined the plain language of Section 185 and rejected the petitioners' contention that the section applies only to encroachments made after the area becomes a municipal borough. The court observed that Section 279 (the repealing clause) contains a deeming provision that any local area which immediately before the Gujarat Act was a municipal district shall be deemed to be a municipal borough under the new Act. Section 279(2) did not prescribe any date-limitation for that deeming, and the court concluded that reading a temporal limitation into Section 185 would defeat the continuity intended by the repealing provision. Consequently, the municipality and its officers could act under Section 185 in respect of obstructions or encroachments made even prior to the Gujarat Municipalities Act coming into force.
2. Use of historical precedents and statutes: The court reviewed earlier municipal enactments (Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, and Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925) and authority (including Dakore and Emperor v. Vishvanath) to establish that corresponding powers existed under the prior law and that the repealing/deeming provisions maintain continuity of authority. The quoted authorities were used to underline the principle that public streets are vested in municipalities as trustees and that municipalities have both power and duty to remove obstructions.
3. Article 14 challenge (unca nalised/arbitrary power): The court addressed the claim that Section 185 lacked guidelines and conferred arbitrary discretion. It found that Section 185 contains specific conditions (the nature of the obstruction or encroachment and that it is on public places or streets or on open spaces not private property) which guide the exercise of power. The court rejected the submission that multiple competing powers existed enabling discriminatory application; accordingly the petitioners' reliance on Northern India Caterers was held to be inapplicable.
4. Requirement of prosecution and conviction prior to forcible removal: The court analysed sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 185 and concluded there is no express or implied provision making forcible removal by the Chief Officer conditional upon a prior prosecution and conviction. The power to prosecute and the power to remove encroachments are separate; the availability of prosecution/conviction does not limit the Chief Officer's independent authority to remove unauthorised obstructions or encroachments.
5. Practical application to the facts: Given that leases had expired and the constructions thus became encroachments/obstructions on public streets, the court held that the municipality and its officers were entitled and under a duty to remove them under Section 185. Accordingly, the petitioners' challenges to the notices under Section 185 failed on all three principal grounds argued.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: Both petitions are dismissed.
Specific outcomes as recorded by the court:
- The rules issued in the petitions are discharged and the petitions fail.
- There shall be no order as to costs in both petitions.
- An application for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by the court on the ground that the petitions did not involve any question of wide public importance.
- The court expressly refused leave (certification) to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Practical consequences arising from the judgment (as stated in the opinion):
- The Municipality and the Chief Officer have the power and, where appropriate, the duty to remove unauthorised obstructions or encroachments on public streets under Section 185 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, including where the encroachments pre-dated the coming into force of that Act (having regard to the deeming provision in Section 279).
- The Chief Officer may remove such obstructions or encroachments without first obtaining a prosecution and conviction; prosecution and forcible removal are separate remedies under Section 185.
The opinion does not elaborate on broader doctrinal consequences beyond these direct effects on the parties and the statutory interpretation applied to Sections 185 and 279.
1. These two petitions under Arts, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are directed against the notices issued by the respondent-Municipality to the respective petitioners to open and remove the unauthorised construction of cabins and structures on the plots of a public street in the town of Kalol. The short facts leading to these petitions are as under:
2. In Special Civil Application No.498 of 1970, there is a piece of land near Vishnu Talkies in Kalol town. The said piece of land is a part of the public street and as such vested in the respondent-Municipality. The petitioners were in possession of the said piece of land as lessees. They were said to be in possession since more than 15 years and are running the business in the cabins which they had put up on the said land since inception of the tenancy. The petitioners are monthly tenants and paying rent of the premises to the respondent-Municipality. It appears that various pieces of public street lands were leased out to the petitioners and other persons for a limited and a specified period of one year or more at a time with the permission of the State Government under S. 65(2) of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. The petitioners have erected wooden cabins on these lands. It also appears that the last lease made in favour of the petitioners in respect of the different pieces of land was for two years, namely, 1967-68 and 1968-69, and the period of leases had expired on March 31, 1969. A resolution was passed by the General Board of the respondent-Municipality being resolution No.13 dated April 25, 1968 granting the aforesaid lessees, which in term were sanctioned by the State Government by its order of July 26, 1968. The petitioners have paid the rent in respect of the pieces of land leased out to them upto March 31, 1969. It appears that on 30th December, 1968 the respondent-Municipality passed a resolution being Resolution No.235 deciding to take possession of the land in question from the petitioners. The respondent-Municipality thereafter served the petitioners with notices on 16-12-1969 that they were in unlawful possession of the pieces of land in question from April, 1, 1969 and their occupations of land beyond March 31, 1969 was an unlawful encroachment. It was also intimated to the petitioners in the said notices that the pieces of land were required by the Municipality for its own use and that it could not be let out to the petitioners any further. It appears that the petitioners moved the Gujarat High Court by their Special Civil Application No.1646 of 1969 for appropriate writs, orders and directions to quash and set aside the said notices. As the respondent-Municipality in the said application had declared before the Court its intention to withdraw the impugned notices reserving the right to issue fresh notices after giving an opportunity to the petitioners to show cause why an action should not be taken under Section 185(2) or any other relevant provisions of the Act, the petitioners had withdrawn in about February 1970 the said Special Civil Application. It appears that thereafter on 23rd February 1970 the petitioners were served with notices calling upon them to show cause why the illegal encroachment made by the petitioners by constructing cabins on the part of the public street should not be removed within 4 days of the service of the notice, and if they did not show cause by 2nd March, 1970, the respondent-Municipality would take necessary action in the matter. The petitioners filed their reply to the aforesaid notices. It appears that thereafter the respondent-Municipality had issued a notice again on April 7, 1970 to all the petitioners calling upon them to vacate the lands by removing cabins on or before 16th April, 1970 and in case of default the respondent-Municipality threatened to take necessary action to remove the said cabins forcibly. The petitioners, therefore, approached this court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for appropriate writs, orders and directions to quash and set aside the said notices as they were without jurisdiction and authority on the various grounds stated in the memo of petition contending inter alia, that Section 185 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 under which the impugned notices were issued was ultra vires as offending Art, 14 of the Constitution.
3. In Special Civil Application No.527 of 1970, the petitioner was given a piece of land near Khani Bungalow in town of Kalol and the last lease in respect of the said piece of land was for two years, namely, for the years 1965-66 and 1966-67. The petitioner has erected a wooden cabin over the said piece of land and has paid rent upto March 31, 1967 to the respondent-Municipality. It appears that on August 9/12, 1968 the respondent-Municipality gave a notice to the petitioner that he was in unlawful possession of the piece of land in question on and from March 31m 1967 and he was asked to show cause why he should not hand over the possession of the said piece of land to the respondent-Municipality. As the explanation submitted by the petitioner by his letter of September 12, 1968 did not satisfy the Municipality, it called upon the petitioner by its letter of November 5, 1968 to hand over the vacant possession of the piece of land within one month of the receipt of the notice. The petitioner, therefore, moved the High Court by his Special Civil application, being Special Civil application No.1415 of 1968 challenging that the said notice was without authority and jurisdiction as Section 233 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act under which the said notice was issued was ultra vires and ineffective as it offended Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. In the said petition, the High Court of Gujarat, by its orders of November 15, 1969 issued necessary writs quashing the aforesaid notice and also declaring Section 233 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act as ultra vires. It appears further that the respondent-Municipality served another notice on the petitioner on Mach 11, 1970 calling upon him to show cause why the alleged encroachment should not be removed under Section 185 of the Act. The petitioner filed his reply to the said notice by his letter of March 19, 1970 contending, inter alia, that the piece of land in question was not a part of the public street and the petitioner could not have a recourse to the coercive machinery under the Municipal Act but must have a recourse to a proper legal action in Court of law and also on the ground of Section 185 being ultra vires as being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. It appears that the explanation did not satisfy the respondent-Municipality which called upon the petitioner by its notice of 10th/13th April, 1970 that if the petitioner did not voluntarily remove himself the cabin from the land and hand over the quiet possession to the Municipality, latest by April 21, 1970, the Municipality would be compelled to removed the said encroachment forcibly. The petitioner being aggrieved with the said notice has approached this Court for appropriate writs, orders and directions to quash and set aside the said notice.
4. As both these petitions involve identical questions and the contentions raised in both of them are similar, we intend to dispose off both these petitions by this common judgment Mr. N.H.Bhat, the learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners in both these petitions, has urged that the impugned notices are beyond the power of the respondent-Municipality under Section 185 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, inasmuch as the alleged unauthorised abstractions or encroachments have not been made after the area in question has become a Municipal Borough under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, as required under Section 185 of the said Act. The second contention of Mr. Bhatt on behalf of the petitioners was, that the Chief Officer shall have a power to remove such obstructions or encroachments as described under sub-section (1) of Section 185 provided the Municipality prosecutes and obtains the conviction under sub-section (1) of S. 185 against the person alleged to have made such obstructions or encroachments and unless such a prosecution is made and conviction is obtained, the Chief Officer is not entitled under sub-section (2) of S. 185 to remove any such obstructions or encroachments. The third contention of Mr. Bhatt on behalf of the petitioners was that Section 185 was ultra vires the power of the State Legislature, inasmuch as it was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
5. In our opinion none of the contentions of Mr. Bhatt on behalf of the petitioners has any merit in it. The relevant sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 185 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, provide as under:--
"S. 185. Obstructions and encroachments upon public streets and open places.
(1) whoever in any area after it has become a municipal borough.
(a) shall have built or set up, or shall build or set up, any wall, or any fence, rail, post, stall, verandah, platform, plinth, step or any projecting structure or thing or other encroachment or obstruction, or
(b) shall deposit or cause to be placed or deposited any box, bale, package or merchandise, or any other thing, in any public place or street or in or over or upon any open drain, gutter, sewer or aqueduct in such place or street shall be punished with fine which may extend to fifty rupees and with further fine which may extend to ten rupees for every day on which such projection, encroachment, obstruction or deposit continues after the date of first conviction for such offence.
(2) The Chief Officer shall have power to remove any such obstruction or encroachment, and shall have the like power to remove any unauthorised obstruction or encroachment of the like nature in any open space not being private property, whether such space is vested in the municipality or not:
Provided that if the space be vested in Government the permission of the collector shall have first been obtained; the expense of such removal shall be paid by the person who has caused the said obstruction or encroachment, and shall be recoverable in the same manner as an amount claimed on account of any tax recoverable under Chapter IX."
In view of sub-section (1) of S. 185 a contention was sought to be raised that the Chief Officer is entitled to remove obstruction or encroachment provided such encroachment or obstruction is made in an area after it has become a municipal borough. On behalf of the petitioners our attention was drawn to the opening part of sub-section (1) which reads:-
"Whoever in any area after it has become a municipal borough, (a) shall have built or set up, or shall build or set up, any wall..............etc., or (b) shall deposit or cause to be placed or deposited any box ................ etc.,"
It was pointed out to us that the respondent-Municipality was a district Municipality before it was converted into a borough municipality under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. Our attention was also drawn to Section 2(13) where the term "Municipal borough" has been defined. The relevant definition reads:
"'Municipal Borough' means a local area declared as or deemed to be a municipal borough under Section 4 of this Act."
Now. Section 4. Sub-s (3) provides as under:-
S.4 Declaration of municipal boroughs and alteration of their limits.
(1) ..........................
(2) ..........................
(3) Each of the local areas which, immediately before the date of the coming into force of this Act, constituted a municipal borough or municipal district under relevant earlier municipal law shall on and from the said date, be deemed to be municipal borough constituted under this Act."
A reliance was, therefore, placed on sub-section (3) of S. 4 and it was urged that the respondent-Municipality, being a municipal district before the application of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, is deemed to be a municipal borough constituted under the said Act on and from the date of coming into the force of the said Act. It was, therefore, contended that the Municipality shall have a power to prosecute a person under Sec. 185(1) and the Chief Officer shall have a power to remove such illegal encroachments and obstructions after the local area in which such encroachments or obstructions are made, has become a borough under the Act. We are not at all, impressed by this argument that section 185 empowers municipality of chief officer to take necessary action in respect of the unauthorised obstructions or encroachments made in an area only after it has become a borough. On plain reading of Section 185 it does not appear to us that such encroachment or obstruction pertaining which the Municipality or Chief Officer is authorised to take an action under the said section, should necessarily have been made after the area has become municipal borough. While urging it to be so. What has been lost sight of by Mr. Bhatt on behalf of the petitioners is, that under Section 279 of the said Act which provides for the repeal of the Bombay District Municipal Act. 1901 and the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, it has been provided that notwithstanding the repeal of the said Acts, any local areas declared to be either a municipal borough or municipal district immediately before the date on which this Act comes into force, would be deemed to be municipal borough under this Act. The relevant portion of Section 279 reads as under:--
"S.279. Repeal.
(1) The Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901 and that act as adapted and applied to the Saurashtra area of the Gujarat State, and the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, and that Act as adapted and applied to the Saurashtra area of the Gujarat State and that Act as extended to the Kutch area of the Gujarat State are hereby repealed. (Bom. III of 1901. Bom. XVIII of 1925).
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Acts--
(i) any local areas declared to be either a municipal borough or municipal district immediately before the date on which this Act comes into force (hereinafter referred to as "the said date") shall be deemed to be municipal borough under this Act.
(ii) the municipalities constituted under the said Acts immediately before the said date (hereinafter called :the old municipalities") shall be deemed to be municipalities of the respective boroughs (hereinafter respectively called "the new municipalities" and "the new boroughs.");
.........................................."
It is clear from this repealing section that any local area which was declared to be a municipal district under the repealed Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 would be deemed to be a municipal borough under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. Mr. Bhatt has submitted that such a local areas would be deemed to be municipal borough under the Gujarat Municipalities. Act. 1963 and, therefore sub-section (2) of S. 4 would be attracted and it would be a borough only on and from the date of coming into force of the Gujarat Municipalities Act only. It should be noted that Section 279(2) does not lay down any such date from which an area which was a municipal district under the repealed law would be deemed to be a municipal borough under the Gujarat Municipalities Act. It appears that in order to give a continuity to the local administration of the area concerned and also to empower the authorities of the district municipalities under the Gujarat Municipalities Act. 1963, that the repealing section has provided a deeming fiction to treat the local area either under the Municipal Act as a municipal borough under the new act. Mr. Bhatt has urged that this deeming fiction should be taken to all logical conclusions and there cannot be any other course but to accept that such a deeming fiction would be effective only from the date of the commencement of the Act as prescribed in Section 4(3). It should be recalled that Section 4 is a part of Chapter II which provides for Municipal Boroughs and constitution of Municipalities. Section 4 deals with declaration of municipalities and alteration of their limits. Section 279 on the other hand deals with the repeal of the previous Acts under which a local area is constituted as a municipal district or municipal borough and in order to provide a continuity in respect of the acts done and omissions made that the repealing section has provided that a local area under the repealed Act would be deemed to be a municipal borough under the Act, and deeming fiction without any reference to the date. No doubt borough so deemed would be under the new Act but to import the reference of date prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 4 would have the effect of defeating the purpose sought to be achieved under Section 279(2). It should be noted that the leases which have been created in respect of the lands in question, with which we are concerned in these petitions, were prior to coming into operation of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, and the unauthorised encroachments or obstructions were also made before coming into force of the Gujarat Municipalities Act. 1963. The said Act came into force on 1-1-1965. The effect of the repealing section is, as is well-known to enforce the consequences arising from the obligations and/or liabilities incurred under the old repealed Acts. It, therefore, appears to us clearly that under Section 279 the Legislature has provided that notwithstanding the repeal of the said Acts any local areas which are declared to the municipal district under the repealed Acts would be deemed to be a municipal borough under the new Act. The effect of such repeal has been provided in sub-clauses (I) and (ii) of sub-section (2) of S. 279. Mr. Bhatt has drawn our attention to the decision of Bombay High Court in the Dakore town Municipality v. Anupram Haribhai Travedi, (1913) 15 Bom LR 833, where a resident of Dakore town sued the Municipality for an injunction to restrain the municipality from obstructing him in reinstating the stone of the Otla which was removed by the Municipality as an encroachment. Dealing with the power under the District Municipal Act under Sections 113 and 122 of the District Municipal Act, 1901. His Lordship Chief Justice Scoot as he then was, speaking for the Court observed:--
"............ The Municipality is the creature of the statute with duties, inter alia, to preserve the passage along public streets, and, under Sections 113 and 122 of the District Municipal Act. It is given certain powers depending upon the existence of certain conditions for the removal of encroachments or obstructions upon the streets. Under Section 113, if it is proved that the encroachment objected to is an obstruction to the safe and convenient passage along a street, the Municipality may by written notices require the owner to remove it. Under Section 122 the municipality have power to remove an encroachment which may have been set up after the place has become a municipal district. It matters not in either case whether the encroachment has been in existence for 12 years or more, but the statutory conditions regulating the exercise of the power must be shown to exist. The Municipality in the present case have not shown either that the stone which they have removed was an obstruction to the safe and convenient passage along the streets or that the stone was set up by the plaintiff after the place became a municipal district."
The authority which has been cited by Mr. Bhatt, in our opinion, does not take the case of the petitioners any further. In our opinion in the cases before us the repealing clause has provided that notwithstanding the repeal of the old Act under which an area has been constituted a district municipality,. It would be deemed to be a municipal borough under the new Act and, therefore, the defining C1 (13) of S. 2 or sub-section (3) of S. 4 do not apply at all because that definition is subject to contrary as appearing in the reference or the context. Section 279, as we have stated, provides for the effect of the repeal of the old Acts. It should be also noted that in the District Municipal Act, 1901, and the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, there were such corresponding provisions enabling the municipality and their officers to take necessary action in respect of the encroachment or obstruction on the public streets. As stated earlier, sub-section (2) of S. 279 does not lay down any date from which a local area declared to be a municipal district under the repealing Act would be deemed to be a borough under the new Act and, therefore, under Section 185(1)(2), the Municipalities and their officers have the right to remove the encroachment or obstruction made on the public streets, even though such obstructions or encroachments have been made prior to the Gujarat Municipalities Act came into force. In our opinion this is not merely a right or power of the Municipalities or their officers in the Municipalities Acts, but they are the powers coupled with the duties and if any such encroachments or obstructions are made on the public streets, the local authorities can be compelled to remove such obstructions or encroachments as they hold these public streets under the relevant sections of the Municipalities Acts as tustees and for being used for the purposes of the Act as has been held as early as in the case of Emperor v. Vishvanath Nana Karpe, AIR 1926 Bom 535, which was a case of an obstruction made on the public street of a district municipality, wherein it has been observed:--
"The contention that has been put before us, as also before the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge is, that under Section 90 of the Bombay district Municipal Act, the municipality has authority to discontinue or stop up any public street, and, therefore, they have power to discontinue or stop up a part of such street. Accordingly, it is contended that there is no objection to their allowing a strip of a street to be used as a market for the sale of timber. I think that in considering this argument, it is important to remember that public streets are vested in the municipality for the purpose of being maintained as public streets, under Section 50 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, and that section expressly declares that public streets so vested in them shall be applied by them as trustees subject to the provisions and for the purposes of the Act. Therefore, it rests upon any one who supports the action of the municipality to show that it had statutory authority to divert a portion of a public street in the manner that has been done. I also think that the Act contains clear provisions, which show that ordinarily a municipality should not allow a permanent obstruction upon any public street vested in the municipality. Section 122 of the Bombay District Municipal Act is a very plain enactment to that effect."
6. There are corresponding provisions in the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 similar to the provisions contained in Section 50 of the Bombay District Municipal Act and Section 122 of the Bombay District Municipal Act in respect of the obstructions and encroachments of public streets and removal thereof. In the matter of the Cantonment Board. Meerut v. Narain Dass, AIR 1970 SC 105, the Court while dealing with the powers of the Cantonment Authority under Section 185(1) and S. 187(1) of the Cantonments Act (1924) in respect of erection or re-erection of buildings either on the private land or the construction or projection or structures on any public streets. His Lordship Justice Hegde speaking for the Court observed in paragraphs 7 and 8 as under:--
"This section deals with a constructions which are projections or structures overhanging, projecting into or encroaching on any street or any drain, sewer or aqueduct. Undoubtedly the kiosk is a structure. Further it is a projection into a drain. It is also encroaches on the drain if it does not also overhang it. Therefore, the Act complained of clearly falls within the scope of S. 187(1).
In other words Section 185 deals with erection or re-erection of buildings on private lands whereas Section 187 deals with the construction or projections or structures overhanging, projecting into or encroaching on any street, any drain or aqueduct. The two provisions deal with different situations one has nothing to do with the other. Obviously the legislature does not want the Cantonment Board to demolish buildings erected on private lands after the period mentioned in Section 185(1), but public interest requires that no such limitation should be placed on the Cantonment Board while acting under Section 187(1). Otherwise our streets and roads may soon disappear. The High Court missed the distinction between Sections 185(1) and S. 187(1). Quite clearly the present case falls within Section 187(1).
7. The present case with which we are concerned is also in respect of obstructions and encroachments upon public streets and it empowers as well as lays down a duty on the municipalities and their officers to take necessary action under sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof in respect of an obstruction of encroachment made on the public street. This is as stated earlier a power of the Municipality coupled with duty and the municipalities are not entitled under law to lease out permanently or for a considerable period the land forming part of the public street and the action of the municipality in leasing out such land would be clearly contrary to law and without any authority or jurisdiction. And if such obstructions or encroachments remain or public streets, not only the municipality and its officers are empowered to take necessary action, but they would be under the duty to remove such encroachments or obstructions. The contention that these lands were leased out to the petitioners by the municipality has to bearing on the question which arises for our determination, namely, whether the municipalities and their officers are entitled to remove the encroachments or obstructions on public streets and more so when the period under the lease expired. In our opinion at any rate after the periods of the leases in question have expired, there is no doubt that such constructions are encroachments or obstructions on public streets and the municipalities and their officers have the power to remove such obstructions or encroachments under Section 185 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. The first contention of Mr. Bhatt, therefore, should be rejected.
8. The challenge to the vires of Section 185 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, also has no substance. Mr. Bhatt has in support of this contention relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Northern India Caterers (Pvt) Ltd. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1581. It was urged that there are no guidelines in Section 185 and the absence of such guidelines in the section would enable the municipalities and their officers to pic and choose and to discriminate between persons similarly situated so that the municipalities and their officers will resort to these remedies in some cases while in other cases they would resort to any ordinary course of law to remove such obstructions and encroachments in public streets. In submission of Mr. Bhatt, therefore, the power which have been granted t the municipalities and their officers are uncanalised and arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In our opinion the contention is not well-founded at all. Section 185 gives a complete guide line, inasmuch as it lays down certain conditions to be fulfilled before the municipalities or their officers can take necessary action thereunder. The necessary conditions are that the encroachment or obstruction as illustrated under sub-section (1) of S. 185 should have been caused on the public streets in an area which is declared to be a municipal borough under the Act or any unauthorised obstruction or encroachment of the like nature as illustrated in sub-section (1) of S. 185 has been made or caused to be made on the places not being private property, whether such place is vested in the municipality or not. It, therefore, cannot be urged that the legislature has not provided any guidelines and the power which has been granted to the Municipalities and their officers is arbitrary and uncanalised and, therefore, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The authority which has been pressed in service in support of his contentions not applicable in case of a power as one under Section 185 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. In the first place there are no two competitive power in the field which may enable the Municipalities or their officers to resort to either of them and pick and choose persons in exercise thereof and thereby discriminate between persons similarly situated, nor can it be said that the power is so arbitrary and uncanalised that it would be violative of Art, 14 of the Constitution. The decision of the Supreme Court which has been pressed in service is of no avail to the petitioners.
9. The last contention of Mr. Bhatt on behalf of the petitioners that unless the prosecution is launched and conviction is obtained the Chief Officer is not entitled to remove, under sub-section (2) of S. 185, such obstructions or encroachments, is devoid of any substance. The power of the municipality to launch a prosecution and obtain a conviction in cases of encroachments or obstructions on public streets is a power which is over and above the powers vested in the Chief Officer to remove such obstructions or encroachments forcibly. The person who is liable for causing such an obstruction or encroachment would expose himself to the prosecution, if made, and conviction, if imposed by the court. Reading sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 185 we do not find anything expressly or impliedly to suggest that the Chief Officer would be entitled to take forcibly measures to remove such encroachment or obstruction only after the prosecution is launched and conviction is obtained in respect thereof. Mr. Bhatt has made an attempt to suggest to us that the obstruction or encroachment which an officer has a power to remove as "such obstruction or encroachment" and, therefore, in submission of Mr. Bhatt such obstruction or encroachment would be an encroachment or obstruction in respect of which the prosecution is launched and conviction is obtained. In our opinion, the contention is not correct because obstruction or encroachment in respect of which the Chief Officer is empowered to take forcible action is either such as mentioned in Cls (a) and (b) of S. 185. The last contention of Mr. Bhatt, therefore, also deserves to be rejected.
10. The result is, that both these petitions should fail and the rule which has been issued should be discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there should be no order as to costs in both the petitions. Mr. K.K. Chochawala, appearing for Mr. N.H. Bhatt, at this stage applied for a certificate to go to the Supreme Court. As these petitions do not deal with any question of wide public importance, the application of Mr. Chokhawal is rejected.
11. Petitions dismissed;
12. Leave refused.
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