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Parshuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. v. D.R Trivedi, Wealth-Tax Officer, Morvi, And Another.
Structured Summary of the Opinion: Petition for Rectification of Wealth-tax Assessments
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner sought rectification of three wealth-tax assessment orders for the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60. In each assessment the petitioner had claimed a deduction in computing net wealth for an annual amount described as a provision for taxation. The Wealth-tax Officer disallowed these deductions on the ground that the amounts were not "debt owed" by the petitioner within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, and therefore added back the amounts to the petitioner's net wealth. The assessment orders were dated 22 September 1958, 28 September 1958 and 27 October 1959 respectively. The petitioner did not appeal those assessments.
Subsequently the petitioner relied on judicial decisions (including this Court's decision in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and a Supreme Court decision in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax) which, as interpreted in the opinion, established that such provisions for taxation constitute a "debt owed" within section 2(m) and are deductible in computing net wealth. The petitioner filed applications for rectification under section 35 of the Wealth-tax Act, which the Wealth-tax Officer rejected by a composite order dated 24 April 1962 on the sole ground that there was no error of law apparent on the face of the assessment records.
The petitioner then filed revision applications to the Commissioner of Wealth-tax; these were dismissed by a composite order dated 23 March 1964 on the same ground. The petitioner thereafter filed the present writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution, seeking certiorari to quash the Wealth-tax Officer's refusal to rectify and the Commissioner's rejection of the revision applications, and mandamus directing rectification to allow the claimed deductions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the assessment orders disallowed the claim for deduction in respect of provision for taxation on a basis that amounted to an error of law apparent on the face of the record, thereby attracting rectification under section 35 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.
- Whether a subsequent judicial pronouncement interpreting section 2(m) (that provisions for taxation constitute "debt owed") can render an earlier assessment order defective from the outset and thus susceptible to rectification even if that pronouncement was not available to the assessing officer at the time of assessment.
- Whether the High Court should exercise its discretion under article 226 when the assessee had not pursued the statutory remedy of appeal against the original assessment orders but instead sought rectification and thereafter filed a writ petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The assessment orders contained an error of law apparent on the face of the record because the amounts claimed as provision for taxation were "debt owed" within the meaning of section 2(m) and therefore deductible when computing net wealth.
- This position was settled by this Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd., and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd., so the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner were wrong to refuse rectification.
- Because the assessment orders disclosed a mistake apparent on the face of the record, the petitioner was entitled to rectification under section 35 and to judicial relief by certiorari when rectification and revision were refused.
Respondents' (Revenue) Arguments
- The assessment orders did not disclose any mistake apparent on the face of the record when they were made; the asserted error arises only because later judicial pronouncements changed or clarified the law, and subsequent rulings cannot retroactively make a valid assessment erroneous for purposes of rectification under section 35.
- The decisions relied on by the petitioner (Raipur Manufacturing and Kesoram) were not before the Wealth-tax Officer at the time of the original assessments; therefore rectification was not justified.
- Because the petitioner did not adopt the statutory remedy of appeal against the assessment orders, the Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under article 226 to grant relief; the finality of the assessment should not be impaired by later judicial decisions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. | Held that amounts claimed as provision for taxation are deductible in computing net wealth because they constitute "debt owed" within section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. | The Court treated this decision as establishing the correct interpretation of section 2(m) and as showing that the petitioner's assessment orders proceeded on a wrong view of law; the decision supported the conclusion that the assessment orders disclosed a mistake apparent on the face of the record. |
| Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax (Supreme Court) | Affirmed the view that provisions for taxation are "debt owed" under section 2(m) (as an appellate/supreme authority confirming the interpretation). | The Court noted that, given the Supreme Court's affirmation, the revenue could not contest that such provisions were within section 2(m); this reinforced the conclusion that the earlier assessments were founded on an erroneous view of the law. |
| Bhagwandas Kevaldas v. N. D. Mehrotra (Bombay High Court) | Holds that a later judicial interpretation of law declares what the law always was; an order may disclose an error apparent on the face of the record in the light of such interpretation, and rectification may accordingly be appropriate. | The Court relied on this decision to fortify its view that subsequent judicial pronouncements can demonstrate an error apparent on the face of an earlier order because the court only interprets statutory law and states what the law had always been. |
| Shantilal Rawji v. M. C. Nair, IV Income-tax Officer | Referenced in Bhagwandas Kevaldas as a case whose interpretation affects the question of jurisdiction and rectification; used to illustrate the general principle that judicial decisions declare the law as it always was. | The opinion cites the use of Shantilal Rawji in Bhagwandas to support the proposition that judicial interpretation may show an error apparent on the face of the record; the Court accepted the reasoning quoted from Bhagwandas which relied on Shantilal Rawji. |
| M. K. Venkatachalam, Income-tax Officer v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. | Used to demonstrate that an assessment order is liable to modification under the rectification power (section 35) if the condition precedent (mistake apparent from the record) is satisfied. | The Court cited this authority to reject the submission that an assessment, once final and unappealed, cannot be rectified under section 35; it supported the proposition that finality is subject to the rectification power when a mistake apparent on the face of the record exists. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by stating the settled principle that certiorari will lie where an inferior tribunal's order contains an error of law apparent on the face of the record; however, not every legal error is amenable to certiorari — only those which are apparent on the record.
The central inquiry was whether the disallowance in the assessment orders of the petitioner's provision-for-taxation deductions amounted to a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The respondents argued that the mistake must have been committed at the time the order was made and not be the result of later judicial pronouncements; since Raipur and Kesoram were decided after the assessment orders, the revenue said rectification could not be justified.
The Court rejected that submission. It emphasized that the judicial decisions did not "make" the law but interpreted an expression—section 2(m)—already on the statute book. Those decisions, according to the Court, stated what the law had always been; they did not create new law retrospectively but declared the correct interpretation of an existing statutory phrase. Consequently, the fact that the interpreting decisions were not available to the assessing officer when the assessment orders were made did not prevent those orders from being treated as disclosing an error of law apparent on the face of the record.
On that footing the Court held that the disallowance of the provision-for-taxation deduction proceeded on a wrong view of the law and therefore rendered the assessment orders bad from their inception. The Court found that both the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax committed an apparent error of law in rejecting the rectification and revision applications respectively.
The Court further observed that by the time the Commissioner decided the revision applications (23 March 1964), this Court's decision in Raipur Manufacturing (given on 15–16 October 1962) was already pronounced and had been specifically called to the Commissioner's attention in the petitioner's memorandum of revision. The Commissioner therefore ought to have given effect to that decision; his failure to do so constituted an error apparent on the face of the record which vitiated his order.
To reinforce its approach, the Court relied on the Bombay High Court's decision in Bhagwandas Kevaldas, quoting the passage that a court's decision interprets and declares the law as it always was, so that the correctness of an order must be judged in the light of such interpretation when considering whether an error is apparent from the record.
The Court also addressed and rejected the revenue's submission that finality of assessment prevents rectification where no appeal was taken. The Court cited M. K. Venkatachalam v. Bombay Dyeing to show that an assessment remains liable to modification under section 35 if the precondition (mistake apparent from the record) is satisfied. Thus, lack of appeal did not preclude rectification. On the exercise of discretion under article 226, the Court concluded that the petitioner had established the presence of a patent error of law apparent on the face of the record and that this warranted the Court's discretionary intervention.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition succeeds; the rule is made absolute. The Court issued a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders of the Wealth-tax Officer (refusing rectification) and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax (rejecting revision). The Wealth-tax Officer was directed to pass appropriate orders on the petitioner's three section 35 applications (each dated 20 March 1962) for assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60 in accordance with law and in the light of the observations in the judgment. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the petition.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The assessment orders disallowing the petitioner's provision-for-taxation deductions have been quashed, and the assessing authority is directed to reconsider the rectification applications under section 35 in accordance with the Court's reasoning that such provisions constitute "debt owed" under section 2(m) as declared by judicial interpretation.
- Scope of rectification: The Court clarified that a later judicial interpretation that declares the correct meaning of statutory language can show that an earlier assessment order was erroneous from the beginning; such an order may therefore disclose a mistake apparent on the face of the record and be rectifiable under section 35 even if the interpreting decision was delivered after the assessment order.
- No broader precedent claim made in the opinion beyond applying existing principles: The opinion relies on and applies existing judicial authorities and principles (as catalogued above) and directs remedial action in the present cases. The opinion does not purport to set a novel principle beyond the declared application of those authorities.
Note: All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or law beyond what the opinion states.
1. This petition challenges the refusal of the revenue authorities to rectify orders of assessment to wealth-tax made on the petitioner for the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60. In the course of the assessment proceedings, the petitioner claimed to deduct in computation of the net wealth on the relevant valuation date a certain amount each year in respect of provision for taxation but the claim was disallowed on the ground that the amount provided for tax liability did not constitute "debt owed" from the petitioner on the relevant valuation date within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The Wealth-tax Officer accordingly added back the amounts claimed by way of deduction and computed the net wealth of the petitioner on that basis. The orders of assessment for the respective assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60 were made on 22nd September, 1958, 28th September, 1958, and 27the October, 1959. The petitioner did not prefer appeals against th orders of assessment. Subsequently, however, the petitioner came to know from a decision given by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that the amounts claimed by it in respect of provision for taxation were deductible in computing the net wealth of the petitioner within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, on the ground that there was an error apparent on the face of the record in each case in so far as the amounts claimed by the petitioner in respect of provision for taxation were wrongly disallowed and added back by the Wealth-tax Officer. The applications were rejected by the Wealth-tax Officer by a composite order dated 24th April, 1962. The only ground given by the Wealth-tax Officer for rejecting the applications was that there was no error of law apparent on the face of the record in the assessment orders and section 35 was accordingly not attracted. The petitioner preferred revision applications to the Commissioner of Wealth-tax but the revision applications were also unsuccessful and they were dismissed by a composite order dated 23rd March, 1964, on the same ground. The petitioner thereupon preferred the present petition seeking a writ of certiorari quashing the order passed by the Wealth-tax Officer refusing rectification and the order of the Commissioner rejecting the revision applications of the petitioner as also a writ of mandamus directing the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax to rectify the orders of assessment by allowing deductions of the amounts claimed by way of provision for taxation.
2. The principal argument of the petitioner in support of the petition was that there was clearly an error of law apparent on the face of the record in each of the three assessment orders inasmuch as the amount claimed by the petitioner in respect of provision for taxation was a "debt owed" by the petitioner within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, and was, therefore, deductible in computing the net wealth of the petitioner on the relevant valuation date. This position was settled beyond doubt so far as assessments in the State of Gujarat are concerned by the decision of this court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and the view taken by this court was affirmed by the Supreme Court in an appeal from the Calcutta High Court in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax. The Wealth-tax Officer was, therefore, wrong in refusing to rectify the orders of assessment on the ground that the assessment orders did not disclose any error of law apparent on the face of the record. It was urged that the Commissioner of Wealth-tax was in any event in error in rejecting the revision applications of the petitioner since at that date the decision of this court in Raipur Manufacturing Company's case was already declared and having regard to this decision it was indisputable that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the assessment orders. The petitioner contended that the orders of the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax were, therefore, vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record and were liable to be quashed and set aside on certiorari. The revenue did not contest the position and, indeed, having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kesoram Industries case, it was not possible for them to do so, that the amount claimed as provision for taxation was a "debt owed" within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, and was, therefore, deductible in computing the net wealth of the petitioner on the relevant valuation date. But the contention raised by them was that the assessment orders did not disclose any error of law apparent on the face of the record and, in any event, so far us the orders of the wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax refusing rectification were concerned, there was no error of law apparent on the face of the record which would attract the certiorari jurisdiction of this court. The revenue also urged that in any event this court should not interfere in the exercise of its discretion under article 226 of the Constitution since the petitioner did not adopt the statutory remedy of an appeal for challenging the orders of assessment but preferred applications for rectification and the applications for rectification were disposed of at a time when there was no decision of the Supreme Court declaratory of the law on the point. These were the rival contentions of the parties and we shall now proceed to examine them.
3. Now, it is well-settled that a writ of certiorari can be issued where the order of the inferior tribunal is shown to suffer from an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record. It is not every error of law which is amenable to the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court but only an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record that can be corrected in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction by the High Court. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration in this petition is whether the orders of the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax suffer from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The contention raised before the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax was that the assessment orders in so far as they disallowed the claim for deduction in respect of the amount of provision for taxation suffered from an error of law apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as the amount of the provision for taxation was a "debt owed" by the petitioner within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, and was, therefore, deductible in computing the net wealth of the petitioner. This contention was negatived by the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax who took the view that the disallowance of the claim for deduction in respect of the amount of provision for taxation did not constitute a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Can this view taken by the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax be said to suffer from an error of law apparent on the face of the record ? The answer to this question must depend on the decision of the question whether the disallowance of the claim for deduction in the assessment orders was a mistake which was apparent on the face of the record. It is to the determination of that question that we must, therefore, now turn.
4. It was urged by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the revenue that the orders of assessment to wealth-tax made on the petitioner, in so far as they disallowed the claim for deduction in respect of the amount of provision for taxation, did not disclose any mistake apparent from the record and, therefore, the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax committed no error of law apparent on the face of the record in rejecting the petitioner's applications for rectification of the assessment orders. To attract the provisions of section 35 of the Act, and to bring the error, if any, in an assessment order within the meaning of the expression "mistake apparent from the record", it was urged that what must be shown is that the mistake was committed at the time of the making of the order and not that the order was ultimately found to suffer from an infirmity or a mistake was subsequently discovered in the order as a result of later judicial pronouncements. It was strenuously contended that neither the decision of this court in Raipur Manufacturing Company's case nor the decision of the Supreme Court in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills' case was pronounced before the Wealth-tax Officer made the assessment orders in the petitioner's cases and since the law was not yet settled as on the date of the said assessment orders, it could not be said that the assessment orders disclosed any mistake of law apparent from the record. The submission in other words was that the assessment orders were proper and valid when they were made and merely because the said orders were later found to be erroneous in view of the subsequent judicial pronouncements, the provisions of section 35 would not be attracted and the Wealth-tax Officer would not be justified in rectifying the said orders on the ground that they disclosed a mistake of law apparent from the record.
5. We are of the opinion that the submission is not well-founded. It is true that the Wealth-tax Officer did not have before him the decision of this court in Raipur Manufacturing Company's case or that of the Supreme Court in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills' case when he passed the assessment orders in the petitioner's cases and that both the decisions were given after the assessment orders were made. But these decisions did not enact or make the law in any sense but merely interpreted the expression "debt owed" occurring on section 2(m) of the Act which was undoubtedly on the statute book at the time when the assessment orders were made by the Wealth-tax Officer. These decisions, in so far as they declared that the amounts claimed by an assessee in respect of provision for taxation are deductible in computing the net wealth of the assessee since they represent "debt owed" by the assess within the meaning of section 2(m) of the Act, merely stated what the law had always been and must always be understood to have been. The fact that these decisions were not before the Wealth-tax Officer when he made the orders of assessment in the petitioner's case has, therefore, no material bearing on the question whether the said orders disclose any mistake apparent from the record. If that be the correct legal position, and we hold that it is, the only conclusion possible is that the assessment orders, in so far as they disallowed the claim of the petitioner for deduction in respect of the amount of provision for taxation, proceeded on a wrong view of that law and the said orders were bad at their very inception, on the date on which they were made. The orders of assessment thus disclosed a mistake apparent from the record and were liable to be rectified in exercise of the powers conferred under section 35 of the Act. In our opinion, therefore, the Wealth-tax Officer committed an apparent error of law in rejecting the petitioner's application for rectification of the mistake and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax likewise committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in rejecting the petitioner's revision application.
6. We find further that at least on the date of the decision of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax rejecting the revision applications of the petitioner directed against the order of the Wealth-tax Officer refusing to exercise the powers conferred under section 35 of the Act, the decision of this court in Raipur Manufacturing Company's case was already pronounced. The decision of this court in Raipur Manufacturing Company's case was given on October 15 and 16, 1962, whereas the decision of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax in the revision application preferred by the petitioner was given on March 23, 1964. In fact, we find that in the memo, of revision application presented by the petitioner to the Commissioner of Wealth-tax, a copy of which is annexed as "exhibit B, collectively" to the petition, pointed reference has been made to the decision of this court in Raipur Manufacturing Company's case and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax was invited to exercise his revisional jurisdiction so as to give effect to the said decision. We are of the opinion that, in these circumstances, it was incumbent upon the Commissioner of Wealth-tax to give effect to the decision of this court in Raipur Manufacturing Company's case and inasmuch as he failed to do so, there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record which has altogether vitiated his order.
7. In the view that we are taking, namely, that an order of assessment based upon an interpretation or application of law which is ultimately found to be wrong in the light of judicial pronouncements rendered subsequently, discloses a mistake apparent from the record, we are fortified by the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhagwandas Kevaldas v. N. D. Mehrotra. In that case, the assessment of the petitioner for the year 1948-49 was finalised on March 31, 1953. The Income-tax Officer omitted to charge any interest under section 18A(6) of the Income-tax Act. On October 4, 1956, the Income-tax Officer passed an order under section 35 rectifying the original assessment by including the interest chargeable under section 18A (6). In the meantime section 18A (6) was amended with retrospective effect from April 1, 1958, and the 5th proviso was added investing the Income-tax Officer with a discretion to reduce or waive the interest. The petitioner applied to the Commissioner for revision of the order of the Income-tax Officer and the Commissioner substantially dismissed the application but modified the order of the Income-tax Officer and directed that interest should be charged for a shorter period. The petitioner preferred a petition in the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality of the order of the Income-tax Officer. It was contended on behalf of the assessee that, in view of the judgment of that court in Shantilal Rawji v. M. C. Nair, IV Income-tax Officer, the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to pass the order of rectification because the Income-tax Officer, by virtue of the discretion retrospectively vested in him to waive the interest payable by the assessee, must be deemed to have waived the amount of interest notwithstanding the fact that the 5th proviso was not there on the statute book when the assessment order was made. It was contended on behalf of the revenue that the decision in Shantilal Rawji's case was not before the income-tax authorities when the order of rectification was made and, in the absence of a judicial pronouncement to the effect that an order of rectification of the nature passed by the Income-tax Officer in the circumstances of that case would be without jurisdiction, it could not be said that the impugned order disclosed an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Negativing this argument, S. T. Desai J., speaking for the Division Bench, observed at page 543 of the report :
"The argument is not tenable and for this reason. When the court decides a matter it dies not make the law in any sense but all it dies is that it interprets the law and states what the law has always been and must be understood to have been. A question of error of law apparent on the face of the record does arise on this petition and what we have to see is whether at the date of the petition, the petitioner is able to establish from the record including the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Therefore, it is in the light of the decision in Shantilal Rawji's case, that we have to examine the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax and if that be done - and we have no doubt that that is the only correct approach in these matters - it is difficult to see how it can be said that there is no error of law apparent on the face of the record."
8. There can be no doubt, therefore, that in rejecting the petitioner's applications for rectification, the Wealth-tax Officer and in rejecting the petitioner's revision applications, the Commissioner of Wealth-tax have committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record and the orders are, therefore, liable to be quashed.
9. It was next urged by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the revenue that once an assessment proceeding has been completed by making an order of assessment which has become final by the assessee having not challenged the said order by adopting the statutory remedy of appeal, the finality of the order passed by the assessing authority cannot be impaired by subsequent judicial pronouncements which may have the effect of showing that the assessment was made on a wrong view of the law and further that the finality of the said order cannot, in any event, be taken away by invoking the power of rectification under section 35 of the Act on the basis of the decision of the court subsequently rendered. It was further contended that in any event this court should not in the exercise of its discretion under article 226 of the Constitution interfere with an order passed in the circumstances aforementioned by the authorities functioning under the Act rejecting an application for rectification. We are unable to accede to this submission. In our opinion, the order of assessment passed by the Wealth-tax Officer cannot be said to be final in the literal sense of the word. The order was and continued to be liable to be modified under section 35 of the Act if the condition precedent for the exercise of the power under that section was satisfied (vide M. K. Venkatachalam, Income-tax Officer v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.). If it is shown in a given case that the order of assessment made by the Wealth-tax Officer discloses a mistake apparent from the record, the condition precedent for the exercise of the power under section 35 would be satisfied and the order would ordinarily be liable to be modified in exercise of the power conferred by the said section notwithstanding the fact that no appeal was preferred from the order of assessment. If, as in the present case, the order of the Wealth-tax Officer disclosed a mistake apparent from the record, the assessee would be entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Wealth-tax Officer to rectify the said mistake and the application cannot be thrown out either on the ground that the finality of the original assessment order cannot be taken away by invoking the power of rectification on the basis of the decision of the court subsequently rendered or on the ground that the said order having become final, since no appeal was preferred, therefore, the power of rectification cannot be exercised. As regards the further contention on behalf of the revenue that we should not exercise our discretion under article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioner in the circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that no grounds are made out be the respondents for denying to the petitioner the relief he has prayed for when we find that he has succeeded in showing that the impugned orders suffer from the vice of an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The only ground urged on behalf of the revenue for not exercising the discretion in favour of the petitioner was that the petitioner has not adopted the statutory remedy of an appeal for challenging the orders of assessment and the orders of assessment having thus become final, he cannot be allowed to challenge them by preferring applications for rectification and then a writ petition. We have held above that the orders of assessment did not become final in the literal sense of the word and if as a result of the judgment of this court in Raipur Manufacturing Company's case, the orders disclosed a mistake apparent from the record, the assessee was entitled to apply for rectification and that is what he has done in the present case. The relief sought by him has been denied by the Wealth-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Wealth-tax although he has shown that in the orders of assessment there was a mistake apparent from the record and in view of the failure of the authorities under the Act to grant relief on an erroneous view of the law, a patent error of law clearly appears on the face of the record and we think this is a fit case for exercise of our discretion in favour of the petitioner.
10. In the result, the petition succeeds. The rule is made absolute. We issue a writ of certiorari against the respondents as prayed in prayer clauses (a) and (b) and quash and set aside the impugned orders passed by the respondents. The Wealth-tax Officer is directed to pass appropriate orders on the three applications, each dated March 20, 1962, filed by the petitioner under section 35 of the Wealth-tax Act for the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60 in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The respondents will pay the costs of the petition to the petitioner.
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