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Commissioner Of Expenditure Tax v. Ambalal Sarabhai
Factual and Procedural Background
This reference concerns the applicability of section 5(a) of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957, to certain expenditure incurred by the assessee's wife for attending meetings of four social welfare institutions. The assessment relates to the assessment year 1959-60 (accounting year 1958-59). During the relevant year the assessee's wife was associated in various capacities with about twenty-four institutions and organizations engaged in social welfare work and corresponded with others. Four of those institutions held meetings outside Ahmedabad (Kasturba Gandhi National Memorial Trust; National Council of Women; Bombay State Welfare Board; Nutan Bagh Shiksha Sangh) and the wife incurred Rs. 5,182 for attending their meetings.
The Expenditure-tax Officer included the wife's expenditure in the assessee's taxable expenditure (under section 4(ii)) and denied the assessee's claim that the amount was exempt under section 5(a) because, in the Officer's view, there was no possibility of income arising from the wife's activity and hence it was not a "vocation or occupation". The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the Officer's view. On appeal to the Tribunal the assessee succeeded: the Tribunal held that profit motive was not necessary for an activity to be a "vocation or occupation" under section 5(a), concluded the wife was dedicated to social work, and held the expenditure exempt. The Commissioner of Expenditure-tax referred two questions to the court for opinion, challenging the Tribunal's view.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the activities which the wife of the assessee was engaged in amounted to a "vocation or occupation" within the meaning of section 5(a) of the Expenditure-tax Act?
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee was entitled to claim exemption under section 5(a) of the Act in respect of the expenditure incurred by the wife of the assessee wholly and exclusively for the purpose of her vocation or occupation?
Note: The court observed that the revenue did not press the second question and therefore it was unnecessary for the court to answer it.
Arguments of the Parties
Revenue's Arguments
- The activity of the assessee's wife could not be a "vocation or occupation" within section 5(a) because it was not carried on with any profit-making motive; section 5(a) should be read as requiring an activity to be one calculated to produce income.
- The juxtaposition of the words "vocation or occupation" with the phrase "for the purpose of earning income from any other source" in section 5(a) indicates legislative intent that a vocation or occupation must be an activity capable of producing income.
- The exemption in section 5(a) applies only to expenditure incurred by the assessee himself, and not to expenditure incurred by his wife (i.e., that an expenditure incurred by the wife could not be allowed as exempt under section 5(a)).
Assessee's Arguments
- The expenditure of Rs. 5,182 was incurred by the assessee's wife wholly and exclusively for the purpose of her vocation or occupation of social service and therefore exempt under section 5(a).
- The wife was associated in various capacities with numerous institutions engaged in social and constructive work, which showed dedication and regularity of activity consistent with a vocation or occupation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| P. Krishna Menon v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Supreme Court) | It is not the motive of the person doing an act that decides whether the act is the carrying on of a business, profession or vocation; an activity that produces income is taxable even if carried out without a motive to earn income. | The court applied the reasoning of this decision to the Expenditure-tax Act context and relied on it to reject the revenue's contention that a profit-making motive is necessary for an activity to be a "vocation or occupation" under section 5(a). |
| Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Incorporated Council of Law Reporting (1888) | Authority for the proposition that it is not essential to the carrying on of trade that those carrying it on should make a profit or even desire to make a profit. | Quoted in support of P. Krishna Menon's principle and used as historical authority showing the longstanding nature of the rule that profit motive is not necessary for calling an activity a trade/business/vocation. |
| Expenditure-tax v. Manorama Sarabhai (Division Bench of this Court) | Following the Supreme Court decision, held that absence of a profit motive does not prevent an activity from being a vocation or occupation within section 5(a) of the Expenditure-tax Act. | The court relied on this earlier Division Bench decision, which applied the Supreme Court principle to the Expenditure-tax Act, to support the conclusion that profit motive is not required under section 5(a). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the controversy primarily as a question of statutory interpretation of section 5(a) of the Expenditure-tax Act. It proceeded in two main analytical stages:
- Rejection of the profit-motive requirement: The court examined and rejected the revenue's contention that an activity must be engaged in with a profit-making motive in order to qualify as a "vocation or occupation" under section 5(a). The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in P. Krishna Menon (and the 1888 authority cited therein) which holds that the motive of the person is not determinative — if an activity in fact produces income it can be a business/profession/vocation even if carried on without an intent to profit. The court held that the reasoning of that decision applies equally to the Expenditure-tax Act and noted that a previous Division Bench of this court (Expenditure-tax v. Manorama Sarabhai) had already applied that principle to section 5(a).
- Interpretation of the term "occupation" and application to facts: The court observed that the legislature intentionally used the broader term "occupation" (in addition to "business, profession, vocation") in section 5(a) to capture a wider class of non-personal expenditure. The court analysed the ordinary-law and scholarly discussion of "occupation" (citing Corpus Juris Secundum) and distilled features indicative of "occupation": that it occupies time and attention, denotes a calling or trade, implies some degree of continuity or regularity (not merely momentary or occasional activity), and may be the principal or regular business of one's life. Applying that test to the Tribunal's factual findings (the wife's associations with about twenty-four institutions, holding offices such as vice-president, trustee, treasurer, member of managing committees, and her care and management of Kastruba Sevalaya — a home for unattached women and children and old and infirm men), the court concluded these facts established continuity, regularity and a dedication of life to social and constructive work. Thus the wife's activity was not an isolated or occasional hobby but a continuous, regular activity occupying her time and attention.
Because the wife's activity satisfied the indicators of "occupation", the court found it unnecessary to decide whether it also amounted to "vocation" and held the Tribunal's conclusion on that point to be justified. The court also noted that the second referred question (whether the assessee was entitled to claim exemption in respect of expenditure incurred by his wife) was not pressed by the revenue and so did not require an answer.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Tribunal was justified in holding that the activities which the assessee's wife was engaged in amounted to an "occupation" within the meaning of section 5(a) of the Expenditure-tax Act.
Implications:
- The court endorsed the Tribunal's factual finding that the wife's sustained involvement with numerous social and constructive institutions established continuity and dedication sufficient to qualify as an "occupation" under section 5(a).
- The court rejected the argument that a profit-making motive is a prerequisite for an activity to be a "vocation or occupation" under section 5(a), relying on Supreme Court authority and the court's own earlier Division Bench decision.
- The court did not decide the referred question whether the assessee could claim exemption for expenditure incurred by his wife because the revenue did not press that question; accordingly, no determination was made in this opinion on the entitlement of the assessee to claim the exemption for expenditure actually incurred by the wife.
- Practical outcome in this reference: the Tribunal's finding that the wife's activity is an "occupation" is upheld and the Commissioner is ordered to pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
1. This reference raises a short question of law relating to the applicability of section 5(a) of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957. The question is whether a certain amount expended by the assessee's wife for the purpose of attending meetings of four institutions of so welfare is exempt from expenditure-tax under that provision. The reference arises out of assessment of the assessee as an individual for the assessment year 1959-60, the relevant accounting year being the financial year 1958-59. The assessee's wife was, during the relevant year of account, associated in different capacities with about twenty-four institutions and organizations engaged in social welfare work and she was also connected with certain other institutions and organizations with which she had to carry on correspondence during the relevant year of account. Out of the twenty-four institutions with which she was associated in one capacity or the other, there were four whose meetings were held outside Ahmedabad and they were (1) Kasturba Gandhi National Memorial Trust, (2) National Council Of Women, (3) Bombay State Welfare Board, and (4) Nutan Bagh Shiksha Sangh. The assessee's wife incurred and expenditure of Rs. 5,182 for attending the meetings of these four institutions during the relevant year of account. The expenditure of the assessee's wife was included for the purpose of computation in the taxable expenditure of the assessee under purpose of computation in the taxable expenditure of the assessee under section 4(ii) and the question, therefore, arose whether the expenditure of Rs. 5,182 incurred by the assessee's wife was taxable as expenditure of the assessee or was exempt from expenditure-tax. The assessee claimed that this expenditure was incurred by his wife wholly and exclusively for the purpose of her vocation or occupation of social service carried on by her and it was, therefore, exempt from expenditure-tax under section 5(a). The claim to exemption was negatived by the Expenditure-tax Officer on the ground that there was no possibility of any income arising from the activity of the assessee's wife and it could not, therefore, be regarded as a vocation or occupation within the meaning of section 5(a). The assessee thereupon preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner took the same view as the Expenditure-tax Officer and the appeal was unsuccessful. The assessee then carried the matter in appeal to the Tribunal and before the Tribunal the fortunes were reversed : the assessee succeeded in establishing his claim to exemption under section 5(a). The Tribunal took the view that, in order that an activity should be a vocation or occupation within the meaning of section 5(a), it was not necessary that there should be any element of profit-making motive in it or that it should be carried on by the assessee with intent to make profit. The Tribunal pointed out that the assessee had furnished a list of various institutions and organizations with which his wife was connected in different capacities and observed that it was therefore, evident that the assessee's wife was a women who was dedicated to social and constructive work and, in the circumstances, the activity of the assessee's wife must be held to be a vocation or occupation of social worker within the meaning of section 5(a). The Tribunal also held that the expenditure in question was incurred by the assessee's wife in connection with her vocation or occupation of a social worker and the expenditure was, therefore, exempt from tax, even though in carrying on the activity she was no actuated by any profit-making motive. The Tribunal rejected the contention of the revenue that under section 5(a) the only expenditure which was eligible to exemption was expenditure incurred by the assessee and since the expenditure in the present case was an expenditure incurred by the assessee's wife, no exemption could be claimed in respect of it under section 5(a). The Tribunal pointed out that it would be highly inequitous if the benefit of the exempting provisions contained in section 5 was held restricted only to expenditure actually incurred by the assessee and was not extended to expenditure which, though not actually incurred by the assessee, was yet includible in the taxable expenditure of the assessee. The Tribunal accordingly held that the expenditure incurred by the assessee's wife was exempt under section 5(a). The view taken by the Tribunal is challenged before us in the present reference made at the instance of the Commissioner of Expenditure-tax.
2. Two questions are referred to us for our opinion and they are :
"(1) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the activities which the wife of the assessee was engaged in holding that the activities which the wife of the assessee was engaged in amounted to a vocation or occupation within the meaning of section 5(a) of the Act ?
(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee was entitled to claim exemption under section 5(a) of the Act in respect of the expenditure incurred by the wife of the assessee wholly and exclusively for the purpose of her vocation or occupation ?"
3. We may point out at the outset that, so far as the second question is concerned, the revenue did not press it and it is, therefore, not necessary for us to answer it. The only question argued before us was the first question and that raises the issue as the whether the activity of the assessee's wife during the relevant year of account could be said to be a vocation or occupation carried on by her within the meaning of section 5(a). The determination of this issue obviously depends upon a proper interpretation and application of section 5(a). We will, therefore, set out that provision in extenso :
"5. No expenditure-tax shall be payable under this Act in respect of any such expenditure as is referred to in the following clauses, and such expenditure shall not be included in the taxable expenditure of an assessee -
(a) any expenditure, whether in the nature of revenue expenditure of capital expenditure, incurred by the assessee wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business, profession, vocation or occupation carried on by him or for the purpose of earning income from any other source."
4. The revenue contended that, in order that an activity may be a vocation or occupation within the meaning of section 5(a), it must be shown that it was indulged in with a motive of making profit; that, as the activity of social service carried on by the assessee's wife was not performed with a view to making profit and there was no element of profit-making motive in it, the assessee's wife could not be said to be carrying on a vocation or occupation within the meaning of that section. The revenue relied strongly on the context in which the words "vocation or occupation" occur in the section and particularly the juxtaposition of the words "for the purpose of earning income from any source" as indicating the legislative intent that vocation or occupation must also be an activity calculated to produce income. But this contention can no longer be accepted in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Krishna Menon v. Commissioner of Income-tax. The assessee in that case was teaching his disciples Vedanta without any motive or intention of making profit out of such activity and the question was whether, in the absence of profit-making motive or intent, the activity could be regarded as a vocation. The Supreme Court held :
".... it is not the motive of the person doing an act which decides whether the act done by him is the carrying on of a business, profession or vocation. If any business, profession or vocation in fact produces and income, that is taxable income and none the less because it was carried on without the motive of producing any income. This, we believe, is too well established on the authorities now to be questioned. It was decided as early as 1888 in the case of Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Incorporated Council of Law Reporting and followed ever since, that 'it is not essential to the carrying on of trade that the people carrying it on should make a profit, nor is it even necessary to the carrying on of trade that the people carrying it on should desire or wish to make a profit'..... it matters not whether that activity is called by the name of business, profession, vocation or by any other name or with what intention it was carried on."
5. This decision of the Supreme Court was of course given in reference to a question arising under the Income-tax Act but the reasoning on which it is based must apply equally to a question arising under the Expenditure-tax Act. Moreover, there is also a decision of a Division Bench of this court consisting of K. T. Desai C.J., as he then was, and myself in commissioner of Expenditure-tax v. Manorama Sarabhai, where, following the above decision of the Supreme Court, we have taken the view that it is not necessary that income or profit motive should exist before an activity can be termed a vocation or occupation within the meaning of section 5(a). We must, therefore, hold, ejecting the contention of the revenue, that mere absence of profit-making motive or intent does not take an activity out of the category of vocation or occupation and the activity of the assessee's wife could not be denied the character of vocation or occupation merely because she was carrying on that activity without any motive or intent of earning income.
6. But the question still remains whether the activity of the assessee's wife could be said to constitute vocation or occupation within the meaning of section 5(a). Now "occupation" is admittedly a word of much wider import than "vocation" and if the activity of the assessee's wife falls within the category of "occupation", it would be unnecessary to consider whether it constitutes "vocation" as well. We will, therefore, first consider whether the activity of the assessee's wife could be regarded as an "occupation" within the meaning of that term as used in section 5(a). That raises a question : what is the true meaning of "occupation" in section 5(a) ? While considering this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that the object of the enactment of the Expenditure-tax Act was to impose an annual tax on personal expenditure so that it might discourage excessive personal expenditure and encourage savings. The non-personal expenditure incurred by an assessee was, therefore, sought to be excluded and that was done by enacting, inter alia, the exempting provisions in section 5. section 5(a) exempted expenditure incurred by an assessee wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business, profession, vocation or occupation carried on by him for the purpose of earning income from any other source, for such expenditure would be clearly non-personal expenditure. Now it is significant to note that, in enacting this exemption, the legislature did not restrict itself to the well-worn formula "business, profession or vocation" employed in the Income-tax Act but enlarged it by adding a word of large connotation, namely, "occupation". The legislative intent clearly was to bring within the scope and ambit of the exempting provision non personal expenditure incurred by an assessee in connection with a much wider class of activity than what would be comprehended within the expression "business, profession or vocation". The revenue also did not dispute this proposition and conceded that "occupation" was a word of much wider signification than "vocation" which, in its turn, was again wider than "business" or "profession", but the contention of the revenue was that, however wide that word might be, it did not include within it activity such as the one carried on by the assessee's wife in the present case. What then does the word "occupation" mean ?
7. The decided cases illustrate the futility of attempting a definition of the word "occupation". So vast is the range of human activity and so diverse and varied its nature that it is well-nigh impossible to find a definition exclusive or inclusive which will take in all activities falling within the matrix of "occupation" and leave out those which do not. The word "occupation" is a word of large and indefinite import and its meaning is not susceptible of any precise or definite formulation. No universal test can be laid down for determining when an activity amounts to an "occupation" and when it does not. But there are certain features which are, in any view of the matter, definitely indicative of what is "occupation" and they are clearly brought out in the discussion of the word "occupation" in Corpus Juris Secundum, volume 67, page 74. "The word 'occupation'" says Corpus Juris Secundum, "is employed as referred to that which occupies time and attention"; it also means "a calling or a trade" and then the Corpus Juris Secundum proceeds to elaborate the meaning :
"There is nothing ambiguous about the word 'occupation' as it is used in the sense of employing one's time. It is a relative term, in common use with a well understood meaning, and very broad in its scope and significance. It is described as a generic and very comprehensive term, which includes every species of the genus, it compasses the incidental, as well as the main, requirements of one's vocation, calling or business. The word 'occupation' is variously defined as meaning the principal business of one's life; the principal or usual business in which a man engages; that which principally takes up one's time, thought and energies; that which occupies or engages the time and attention;... that activity in which a person... is engaged with the element or a degree of permanency attached....
The word 'occupation' has reference to the principal or regular business of one's life,... The word particularly refers to the vocation, profession, trade, or calling which a person is engaged for hire or for profit and it has been repeatedly held that a person's principal business and chief means of obtaining a livelihood constitutes his occupation. The term 'occupation' expresses the idea of continuity; a continuous series in transaction,... and implies regularly in a specific line of endeavour. Furthermore, time is a necessary ingredient, and, although it need not be protracted, it must not be momentary. As generally understood, the term does not include an isolated or semi-occasional and temporary adventure in another line of endeavour, and does not extend to acts and duties which are simply incidents connected with the daily life.....
A person may engage in more than one occupation, or he may engage in two occupations at the same time, as where he carries on his chief occupation and also another as a side line."
8. It may be debatable whether the idea of continuity or regularity is a necessary ingredient of the concept of "occupation" and if so what degree of regularity or continuity is requisite to qualify an activity for coming within the category of "occupation". But one thing is clear that whatever else "occupation" may comprise, activity in a specific line of endeavour which engages or occupies time and attention of a person and which is carried on with a certain amount of continuity or regularity in the sense that it is not "momentary" - not "an isolated or semi-occasional and temporary adventure" in that line of endeavour - would certainly constitute "occupation". Applying this test to the facts found by the Tribunal, the activity of the assessee's wife must be held to be her "occupation".
9. The Tribunal found as a fact that the assessee's wife was associated in one capacity or another with twenty-four different institutions engaged in social and constructive work; she was a vice-president in some of the institutions, a trustee and treasurer in some others and a member of the managing committee in the rest; she was also devoting her time and attention to the care and management of Kastruba Sevalaya, Sardarnagar, Ahmedabad, which is a home for unattached women and children and old and infirm men. The Tribunal on the basis of these facts held that the assessee's wife was a woman who had dedicated her life to social and constructive work. The assessee's wife was thus engaged in social and constructive work and her activity in this particular line of endeavour was not momentary or in the nature of an isolated or semi-occasional adventure but it was a continuous regular activity engrossing her whole life; she was "dedicated to social and constructive work". The activity of the assessee's wife was not an isolated or stray activity in the field of social and constructive work, nor an activity indulged in by way of hobby to utilise her leisure hours but it was a serious pursuit to which she had dedicated her life and it must, therefore, be held to be her "occupation" within the meaning of section 5(a). In this view, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether it also constituted her "vocation" within the meaning of that section.
10. Our answer to the first question, therefore, is that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the activity which the assessee's wife was engaged in amounted to an "occupation" within the meaning of section 5(a). The Commissioner will pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.
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