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Mohanlal Nandlal Sharma And Another v. State Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This Revision Application challenges an order of the Sessions Judge, Baroda, which dismissed an application for revision of a magistrate's order convicting accused Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
Accused Nos. 1 and 2, together with accused No. 3, were charged with offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506(2) IPC; the three charges were joined and tried jointly. The learned Magistrate conducted a summary trial following the procedure prescribed for summons cases.
As a result of that trial, the learned Magistrate convicted accused Nos. 1 and 2 for the offence under Section 323 IPC and sentenced each to pay a fine of Rs. 40/- or, in default, suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven days. The Magistrate acquitted accused Nos. 1 and 2 of offences under Sections 504 and 506(2) IPC. Accused No. 3 was convicted under Section 323 IPC but released on admonition.
Accused Nos. 1 and 2 filed a revision application before the Sessions Judge, arguing (for the first time) that because offences under Sections 504 and 506(2) IPC are triable as warrant cases, the magistrate should have followed the warrant-case procedure rather than the summons-case procedure, and that the trial was therefore vitiated.
The Sessions Judge accepted that the magistrate erred in using the summons-case procedure instead of the warrant-case procedure but treated this as an irregularity curable under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), since accused Nos. 1 and 2 were acquitted of the warrant-triable offences and no miscarriage of justice had occurred. The Sessions Judge declined to intervene on the appreciation of evidence and dismissed the revision. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 then preferred the present revision before this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the magistrate's adoption of the procedure prescribed for summons cases (when offences triable as warrant cases were charged alongside a summons-triable offence) constituted an illegality that vitiated the whole trial or merely an irregularity curable under Section 537 CrPC.
- Whether Section 262 CrPC (as argued by the appellants) is an imperative provision whose breach necessarily renders a trial illegal and incapable of being cured by Section 537 CrPC.
- If the procedural error is an irregularity, whether it occasioned any failure of justice or prejudice to accused Nos. 1 and 2 such that Section 537 CrPC would not operate to save the conviction under Section 323 IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (Accused Nos. 1 and 2) — As advanced by Miss V. P. Shah
- The joined charges included offences under Sections 504 and 506(2) IPC, which are triable as warrant cases; therefore the joint trial should have been conducted according to the warrant-case procedure.
- Under Section 262 CrPC it was obligatory for the magistrate to follow the procedure prescribed for warrant cases; the magistrate's adoption of the summons-case procedure amounted to an illegality and vitiated the entire trial.
- Because this was an illegality (not a mere irregularity), the defect could not be cured by Section 537 CrPC. Counsel relied on Mangi Lal v. Emperor (AIR 1945 All 98) where Section 262 CrPC was treated as imperative and its breach deemed an illegality.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific arguments advanced by the State or respondent beyond the Sessions Judge's findings as to error and non-prejudice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mangi Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1945 All 98 | Relied upon by appellants for the proposition that Section 262 CrPC is imperative and breach constitutes an illegality (per Mulla J.). | The Court recorded that appellants relied on this decision but did not accept it as determinative; the Court proceeded to distinguish and treat the matter according to subsequent authority. |
| Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam, (quoted as (1901) 1 SCJ 573; AIR 1981 SC 986 in the text) | Holds that adoption of one procedure instead of the other (warrant procedure instead of summons procedure) is a mere irregularity curable under Section 537 CrPC where no prejudice to the accused is shown. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court judgment to conclude that the magistrate's adoption of the wrong procedure was a mere irregularity curable under Section 537 CrPC, and that the principle applies equally where the wrong procedure is the summons procedure used for offences triable as warrant cases. |
| Umer Saheb v. State, 1960 Cri LJ 573; AIR 1960 Bom 205 | Illustrates the distinction between provisions prescribing the mode/manner of trial (whose breach may be an illegality) and provisions relating to the conduct of trial (whose breach may be a curable irregularity). | The Court applied this distinction as the test for whether a breach is an illegality or an irregularity and used it to analyze Sections 241 and 251 CrPC and the nature of the procedural error in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise analysis:
- Acknowledgement of error: The Court agreed that the learned Magistrate erred in following the procedure prescribed for summons cases when the joined charges included offences (Sections 504 and 506(2) IPC) triable as warrant cases.
- Characterisation of the error: The Court rejected the appellants' submission that the breach of Section 262 CrPC (as contended) amounted to an illegality. Instead, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Gopal Das Sindhi, it held that adopting the wrong procedure (either way) is a mere irregularity rather than an illegality, provided no prejudice to the accused is shown.
- Application of the "mode or manner" vs "conduct" test: The Court reiterated the established test (as illustrated in Umer Saheb) that whether a breach is an illegality or irregularity depends on whether the provision prescribes the mode/manner of the trial (more likely to render the trial illegal) or merely relates to the conduct of the trial (more likely to be curable). The Court observed that Sections 241 (procedure for summons cases) and 251 (procedure for warrant cases) are analogous; the Supreme Court's treatment of Section 241 as not prescribing the mode/manner but the conduct of trial implies Section 251 is similarly situated.
- Summary trials and statutory combination: The Court noted that summary trials are governed by Section 263 (and Section 292 amalgamates the procedures of Sections 241 and 251 for summary trials). That statutory framing supports treating the adoption of the wrong procedure in summary proceedings as an irregularity.
- Determination of prejudice / failure of justice: The Court considered whether the irregularity occasioned any failure of justice to accused Nos. 1 and 2. It observed that (a) the appellants ought to have raised the objection before the Magistrate but did not, (b) the only offences triable as warrant cases were Sections 504 and 506(2) IPC and the appellants were acquitted of those, and (c) the conviction was only for Section 323 IPC — an offence triable as a summons case — for which the magistrate had in fact followed the applicable summons-case procedure. Consequently, no prejudice or failure of justice was shown in relation to the conviction under Section 323.
- Conclusion on curability: Because the irregularity did not occasion any failure of justice or prejudice, the Court held that the irregularity was curable under Section 537 CrPC and that the conviction under Section 323 is preserved by that provision.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court concluded that the magistrate's adoption of the summons-case procedure, though erroneous as to the joined warrant-triable offences, was a mere irregularity and not an illegality. Consequently, the conviction of accused Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 323 IPC is saved by Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the conviction under Section 323 IPC stands; the procedural irregularity in using the summons procedure did not vitiate that conviction because no failure of justice or prejudice to the accused was shown.
- The Court applied existing authorities (including the cited Supreme Court decision) to reaffirm that using the wrong procedural route (warrant vs summons procedure) in such circumstances is, in principle, a curable irregularity rather than an incurable illegality — subject to the absence of prejudice. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal precedent beyond applying these authorities to the facts of the case.
1. This Revision Application is directed against an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Baroda, dismissing an application for revision of the order of conviction and sentence passed against accused Nos. 1 and 2 for. offences under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code. Accused Nos. I and 2 along with accused No. 3 were charged for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code. The charges for all the three offences against accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were joined together and there was one joint trial for these offences.
The learned Magistrate tried the case summarily and followed the procedure prescribed for summons cases. As a result of the trial the learned Magistrate convicted accused Nos. 1 and 2 of the offences under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 40/- or in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven days. The learned Magistrate acquitted accused Nos. 1 and 2 of the charges under Sections 504 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code. So far as accused No. 3 was concerned she was also convicted by the learned Magistrate for the offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code but she was directed to be released on due admonition.
2. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence passed against them preferred a Revision, Application In the Court of the Sessions Judge, Baroda. A contention was raised for the first time before the learned Sessions Judge that the offences under Sections 504 and 506(2) of the Indian 'Penal Code being offences which were triable as warrant oases, the procedure prescribed for warrant cases should have been followed by the learned Magistrate and since The learned Magistrate did not follow the procedure prescribed for warrant cases but tried the case as a summons case, the whole trial was vitiated and the conviction recorded as -a result of such trial was liable to be quashed.
The learned Sessions Judge accepted the contention that the learned Magistrate was wrong, in following the procedure prescribed for summons cases and that the learned Magistrate should have followed the procedure prescribed for warrant cases but held that this constituted only an Irregularity and since accused Nos. 1 and 2 were acquitted of the offences under Sections 504 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, there was no miscarriage of justice and accused Nos. 1 and 2 were not in any way prejudiced on account of the case having been tried as a summons case and the irregularity was, therefore, cured by the provisions of Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
On the merits the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the appreciation of evidence by the learned Magistrate 'could not be said, to be in any way improper or perverse so as to call for interference by a Court of Revision. The learned Sessions Judge accordingly declined to make a reference to the High Court for setting aside the conviction and sentence passed against accused Nos. 1 and 2 and dismissed the Revision Application. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 thereupon preferred the present Revision Application before this Court.
3. The only contention which was urged by Miss V.P. Shah, learned advocate on behalf of accused Nos. 1 and 2 was that since the offences under Sections 504 and 506(2) were offences in respect of which the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases was required to be followed, the present case in which the charges for the offences under sections 323, 504 and 506(2) were joined should have been tiled in accordance with the procedure laid down for trial of warrant cases. Miss V. P. Shah contended that under Section 262 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was obligatory on the learned Magistrate to follow the procedure prescribed for warrant cases awl that inasmuch as the learned Magistrate followed the procedure prescribed for summons cases, he was guilty of an illegality which vitiated the whole trial and the conviction based on such trial was liable to be set aside . Miss V. P. Shah relied on a decision, of the Allahabad High Count reported in Mangi Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1945 All 98 where Mulla J. has taken the view that Section 262 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an imperative provision and a breach, of that provision constitutes not merely an irregularly, but an illegality.
The argument of Miss V. P. Shah was that the adoption by the learned Magistrate of thee procedure prescribed for summons cases was an illegality and could not, therefore' be cured by resort to the provisions of Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this illegality rendered the whole trial bad and vitiated the conviction under Section 323. This contention of Miss V. P. Shah is, in my opinion not well founded. It is no doubt true that, though the offence under Section 323 is triable as a summons case, the charge for the offence under Section 323 having joined with the charges for the offences under Sections 504 and 506(2) as arising out of the same transaction, the case should have been tried in accordance with the procedure prescribed for warrant cases and the learned Magistrate was obviously in error in following the procedure prescribed in summons cases. This error, however, in my opinion, constituted merely an irregularity and not an illegality. In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court reported in Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam (1901) 1 SCJ 573: (AIR 1981 SC 986) the question arose whether the adoption by the Magistrate of the procedure prescribed for warrant cases in a case where the offence was triable as a summons case constituted an illegality or a mere irregularity curable under the provisions of Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and dealing with this question the Supreme Court observed as follows :
"Regarding the second contention, it is true that after the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code an offence under Section 448 is triable as a summons case and Mr. Goswami adopted the procedure prescribed for a case, triable as a warrant case. We are, however, of the opinion that this irregularity does not vitiate the proceedings and is curable by tho provisions of section 537, as no prejudice to the accused has been established in the case."
It is clear from this judgment of the Supreme Court that the adoption Of one procedure instead of the other is a mere irregularity which does not vitiate the proceedings and is curable by the provisions of Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Miss V. P. Shah sought to distinguish this judgment by contending that in the case before the Supreme Court an offence triable as a summons case was tried in accordance with the procedure prescribed for a warrant case whereas in the present case the procedure prescribed for a summons case was followed even though the case Was triable as a warrant case.
Miss V. P. Shah contended that the procedure prescribed for a warrant case was more beneficial to the accused than the procedure prescribed for a summons case and that if the procedure prescribed for a warrant case was followed in the case of an offence triable as a summons case there was no prejudice to the accused but if the procedure prescribed for a summons case was follwing lowed in the case of an offence triable as a warrant case prejudice would be caused to the accused and It was, therefore, obvious that though the adoption of the procedure prescribed for a warrant case in case of an offence triable as a summons case might be considered to be a mere irregularity, the adoption of the procedure prescribed for a summons case in case of an offence triable as a warrant case could not be considered to be a mere irregularity but amounted to an illegality which vitiated the whole trial.
Miss V. P. Shah thus attempted to draw a distinction between a case where the procedure prescribed for a warrant case was followed in case of an offence triable as a summons case and a case where the procedure prescribed for a summons case was followed in case of an offence trial-
ble as a warrant case and contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court dealt only with the former case and did not cover the latter case.
Now it is no doubt true that in the- case before the Supreme Court the procedure prescribed for a warrant case was adopted in case of an offence triable as a summons case but the principle of the judgment must apply equally to a case where the procedure prescribed for a summons case is followed in case of an offence triable as a Warrant, case. In both cases the adoption, of the wrong procedure would be a mere irregularity and the Court would have to see whether such irregularity has occasioned any failure of justice. It must be remembered that the breach of every mandatory provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not render the trial of an accused person illegal however regrettable it may appear that the breach should have occurred. There is a distinction between provisions which prescribe the mode or manner of a trial and provisions which provide for the conduct of the trial. An infringement of a provision as to the mode or manner of a trial constitutes an illegality which vitiates the whole trial and cannot be cured by Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but an infringement of a provision which prescribes even mandatory a matter relating to the conduct or a trial constitutes a mere irregularity which can be cured by Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if there be no prejudice caused to the accused (vide Umer Saheb v. State, 1960 Cri LJ 573; (AIR 1960 Bom 205)). The test, therefore, for the purpose of determining whether the breach of any particular provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes an illegality or a mere irregularity is to see whether the provision prescribes the mode or manner of the trial or provides merely for the conduct of the trial.
Now Section 241 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes that the procedure set out in Chapter XX shall be observed in the trial of summons cases and Section 251 prescribes that the procedure set out in Chapter XXI shall be followed in the trial of warrant cases. The Supreme Court in the judgment mentioned above held that the adoption of the procedure prescribed for warrant cases in case of offences, triable as summons cases constituted a mere irregularity and not an illegality though it involved the breach of the mandatory provision contained in Section 241; of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This would mean that according to the Supreme Court, section 241 of the code of. Criminal procedure which requires that the procedure prescribed for summons cases shall be followed in summons cases was a provision which did not prescribe the manner or mode of the trial but provided merely for the conduct of the trial, for if that Section had been regarded by the Supreme Court as containing a provision prescribing the manner or mode of the trial, the Supreme Court would have held the breach of the mandatory provision contained in that Section to be an illegality and not a mere irregularity. If Section 241 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a provision which does not prescribe the manner Or mode of the trial but merely provides for the conduct of the trial, the breach of which would not constitute an illegality, it must follow that Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also equally a provision which does not prescribe the manner or mode of the trial but merely provides for the conduct of the trial, the breach of which cannot amount to an illegality. The nature of both the provisions being the same, if the breach of one provision constitutes a mere irregularity and not an illegality, the breach of the other provision must also equally constitute an irregularity and not an illegality. The adoption of the procedure Prescribed for summons cases in case of offences triable as warrant cases must, therefore, stand oh the same footing as the adoption of the procedure prescribed for warrant cases' in case of offences triable as summons cases and in both cases the consequence must be a mere irregularity and not an illegality. I do not, therefore, see how possibly can the judgment of the Supreme Court be distinguished as contended by Miss. V.P. Shah. The principle underlying the judgment of the Supreme Court must apply equally whether the procedure prescribed for warrant cases is followed in case of offences triable as summons cases or the procedure prescribed for summons cases is followed in case of offences triable as warrant cases. No doubt the trial in the present case was a summary trial and Section 263 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, applied to the trial and, not Section 241 or Section 251 or the Code of Criminal Procedure. But that makes no. difference for Section 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure combines the provisions contained in Sections 241 and 251 of the Code of Criminal "Procedure so far as summary trials are concerned and., prescribes that in summary trials the procedure prescribed for summons cases shall be followed in summons cases and the procedure prescribed for warrant cases shall be followed in warrant cases" and the adoption of the wrong procedure in either" case must, therefore, amount merely to an |irregularity and not an illegality I am, therefore, of the opinion that the adoption of the procedure prescribed for summons cases by the learned Magistrate was a mere irregularity which did not vitiate the trial and Was curable by the provisions of Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if if did not occasion any failure of Justice. The question, then arises as to whether any failure of justice was occasioned as a result of the learned Magistrate following the procedure prescribed for summons cases.
4. While dealing with the question whether any failure of justice was occasioned to accused No?. 1 and 2 by reason of the learned Magistrate following the procedure prescribed for summons cases, I must observe that the objections to this procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate could and should have been raised by accused Nos. 1 and 2 before the learned Magistrate but they failed to raise such objection and allowed the case to be tried in accordance with the procedure prescribed for summons cases. Out of the three offences with which accused Nos. 1 and a were charged, the offences under Sections 504 .and 506(2) were the only offences which were triable as warrant cases. The remaining Offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code was an offence triable as a summons case. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were acquitted of the offences under Sections 504 and 506(2) and the conviction of accused Nos. 1 and 2 was only for the remaining offence under Section 323 which was triable as a summons case. If the offence under Section 323 was triable as a summons case, I do not sea what failure of justice could possibly be occasioned to accused Nos. 1 and 2 by reason, of the learned Magistrate following the procedure prescribed for summons cases. So far as the conviction for the offence under Section 323; is concerned, no Prejudice could possibly be caused to accused Nos. 1 and 2, for the procedure followed by the learned Magistrate was the procedure applicable to a trial for such offence. In my opinion no failure of justice was occasioned and no prejudice was caused to accused Nos. 1 and 2 as a result of the irregularity in the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate and the conviction of accused Nos. 1 and 2 for the offence under Section 323 must therefore, be held to be saved by the curative provisions of Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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