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Bhanushanker Ambalal Joshi v. Laxman Kala And Others Opponents.

Gujarat High Court
Jul 28, 1960
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the landlord of two survey numbers (681/J and 681) held by opponents 1 and 2 as tenants. The petitioner gave notice and instituted a tenancy suit before the Mamlatdar at Kodinar seeking possession on the ground that he bona fide required the lands for personal cultivation. Both fields had been gifted to the petitioner by his father on 1 June 1953 and a mutation entry had been made; the petitioner's father was still alive.

The Mamlatdar initially decided in favour of the petitioner, granting possession of half the suit lands on the finding that the petitioner bona fide required the lands for personal cultivation and that income from the lands would be his principal source of income. On appeal, the Prant Officer held that the gift was invalid under the Act and remanded the matter for enquiry into the validity of the transfer under the Tenancy Act. On remand the Mamlatdar concluded that the petitioner had obtained a certificate under Section 84A of the Tenancy Act and thus treated the transfer as valid, confirming the original decision.

The Collector thereafter reversed the Mamlatdar's decision on two grounds: (1) that the gift was not valid because it did not meet the requirements of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act; and (2) that the landlord had not satisfied the conditions of Section 31A(d) of the Tenancy Act. The landlord (petitioner) filed a revision before the Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal found in the landlord's favour on the question of the landlord-tenant relationship but held that the landlord had not fulfilled the conditions of Section 31A(d) and dismissed the revision. The landlord then brought this petition to the Court.

At the hearing before the two judges, Mr. Nanavaty (advocate for the petitioner) relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Waman Ganesh Joshi v. Ganu Guna Khapre, 61 Bom LR 1267, arguing that the Revenue Tribunal erred in its interpretation of Section 31A(d) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. It was also argued that decisions of the Bombay High Court are binding on this Court; this point had been referred to a Full Bench which had pressed the view that decisions of the Bombay Court given prior to 1 May 1960 are binding on this High Court. The present petition was then taken up for disposal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the phrase "landlord himself" in Section 31A(d) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 should be construed to include a transferee (a person who received the land by transfer from the original landlord) or whether it refers only to the individual who was the landlord in his own name on the relevant date.
  2. Whether decisions of the Bombay High Court (in particular Waman Ganesh Joshi v. Ganu Guna Khapre, 61 Bom LR 1267) are binding on this Court, especially in light of the Full Bench view that Bombay decisions prior to 1 May 1960 are binding on this High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Reliance on the Bombay High Court decision in Waman Ganesh Joshi v. Ganu Guna Khapre, 61 Bom LR 1267, as supporting the construction that would help the petitioner on Section 31A(d).
  • Submission that the expression "landlord" in Section 14 of the Act should be read to include predecessors-in-title and that the same meaning should be applied to the term as used in Section 31A(d), i.e., urging an analogy between Section 14 and Section 31A(d).
  • Reference to other provisions (Sections 34 and 35, and Section 84A) to show that transfers are not prohibited under the Act and to support the view that a transferee should not be excluded from the benefit of Section 31.
  • Overall contention that the Revenue Tribunal erred in its interpretation of Section 31A(d) and that the petitioner, as transferee by gift, should be able to invoke the right under Section 31 to terminate the tenancy for personal cultivation.

The opinion records that the respondent was not represented by counsel; an amicus curiae was requested to present the other side because of the case's importance. Detailed arguments by the respondent or amicus are not set out in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Waman Ganesh Joshi v. Ganu Guna Khapre, 61 Bom LR 1267 Interpreted conditions like those in Section 31A(d) to support a construction relied upon by the petitioner (as applied by the Bombay High Court). The petitioner relied heavily on this decision. The Court carefully considered and ultimately disagreed with the Bombay High Court's view in that case, holding that a crucial textual difference (the presence of the word "himself" in Section 31A(d)) leads to a different construction and that Waman Ganesh was not persuasive in the present context.
Khalilulla Hasmiya v. Yesu, 59 Bom LR 201 (AIR 1937 Bom 200) An earlier Bombay High Court decision that discussed provisions of an amended section; it was treated as an antecedent authority by the Bombay Division Bench in Waman Ganesh. The Court noted that the Bombay Division Bench in Waman Ganesh relied on Khalilulla Hasmiya. However, this Court observed that the later decision did not sufficiently account for the amendment that inserted the word "himself" into Clause (d) of Section 31A; consequently, the precedent was not treated as controlling in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court confined the dispute to a narrow question of statutory construction focused on the words "landlord himself" in Section 31A(d). The analysis proceeded in the following steps, following only the reasoning present in the opinion:

  1. Contextual reading: The Court emphasised that Section 31A must be read in the context of Section 31, to which it explicitly refers. Section 31 recognises the landlord's right to terminate a tenancy for personal cultivation (or non-agricultural purpose), but that right is not absolute and is subject to strict conditions set out in Section 31A.
  2. Identification of the operative language: Clause (d) of Section 31A requires that the land "stands in the record of rights or in any public record or similar revenue record on the 1st day of January 1952 and thereafter ... in the name of the landlord himself or of any of his ancestors, or if the landlord is a member of a joint family, in the name of a member of such family." The Court highlighted the plain language and the distinct phrasing "landlord himself."
  3. Rejection of the analogy with Section 14: The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the meaning of "landlord" in Section 14 should be carried over to Section 31A(d). The Court explained that Section 14 deals generally with termination for tenant defaults, whereas Section 31 and 31A are corollary provisions specifically regulating termination for personal cultivation or non-agricultural use; therefore, the conditions in Section 31A must be strictly fulfilled and are not analogous to Section 14.
  4. Consideration of Sections 34, 35 and 84A: The Court observed that Sections 34 and 35 (relating to maximum holdings and their application to transfers) and Section 84A (validation of transfers made before the appointed day) do not support the petitioner's contention that transfers should entitle a transferee to the benefit of Section 31 without limitation. While transfers are permitted under the Act, that fact does not eliminate specific eligibility conditions for termination under Section 31.
  5. Literal and purposive construction of "landlord himself": The Court rejected the petitioner's proposed expansive construction that would include transferees. It reasoned that the express wording should be given full effect so that no material word becomes inoperative. Reading "landlord himself" to mean the individual who, on the datum date (1-1-1952), is shown in the records as the landlord (or his ancestor, or, in the case of joint family, another member) is consistent with the manifest object of the clause: to confine the benefit of Section 31 to those persons who were the landlord or whose ancestor was shown as landlord on the relevant date.
  6. Distinguishing and disagreeing with Bombay authorities: The Court carefully examined the Bombay Division Bench decision in Waman Ganesh (61 Bom LR 1267) and the earlier Khalilulla Hasmiya decision it relied upon. The Court found a material and crucial difference between the statutory language considered in those earlier cases and Clause (d) of Section 31A — namely, the introduction of the word "himself" in clause (d). The Court observed that the earlier decision did not adequately focus on this amendment and consequently held that Waman Ganesh was not persuasive for the present provision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed; the Court held that the expression "landlord himself" in Section 31A(d) must be read to mean the individual who was shown in the relevant records on 1 January 1952 as the landlord (or his ancestor, or, in the case of a joint family, a member of such family) and does not include a transferee who received the land from such a landlord. The rule (petition) is discharged.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's challenge to the Revenue Tribunal's conclusion that he failed to satisfy Section 31A(d) was unsuccessful; the petitioner (landlord by gift) cannot rely on Section 31 to terminate the tenancy because he does not fall within "landlord himself" as required by Clause (d).
  • Broader consequences: The opinion expressly disagrees with the Bombay High Court decision relied upon by the petitioner (Waman Ganesh Joshi v. Ganu Guna Khapre) to the extent that it was thought to support the petitioner's case; the Court based its disagreement on the statutory wording (particularly the word "himself"). The opinion does not set out an extended discussion of any other broader legal or administrative implications beyond this disposition.

The Court also records that the respondent was not represented by counsel and that an amicus curiae assisted the Court; the Court thanks Mr. Sompura for that assistance.

Show all summary ...

1. This petition came up for hearing before my brother Miabhoy and myself when Mr. Nanavaty, learned advocate for the petitioner, relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Waman Ganesh Joshi v. Ganu Guna Khapre, 61 Bom LR 1267, in support of the argument that the Revenue Tribunal was in error in interpreting Section 31A(d) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. It was also argued before us that decisions of the Bombay High Court are binding on this Court Then question had by that time been referred to a Bench of this Court. The Full Bench has now pressed the view that a decision of the Bombay Court given prior to the 1st May 1960, is on this High Court. Therefore, speaking generally, that decision of a Division Bench would be followed by a Division Bench of this Court. At that time, we had found it difficult to agree with the view expressed in the case of Waman Ganesh 61 Bom LR 1267 and the petition is now before us for disposal.

2. The facts are these. The petitioner is the landlord of the two survey numbers 681/J, and 681 respectively held by opponents 1 and 2 as tenants of the same. The petitioner gave due notice and then filed a tenancy suit before the Mamlatdar, Kodinar, for possession of the same on the ground that he required the lands bona fide for personal cultivation. Both the fields had been gifted to the petitioner by his father on 1st June 1953 and a mutation entry in that behalf had been made. The petitioner's father is alive. The Mamlatdar decided the suit in favour of the petitioner, holding that he required the lands bona fide for his personal cultivation and that the income from the lands would be his principal source of income. The Mamlatdar being of that view, passed an order in favour of the petitioner for possession of half of the suit lands. In appeal, the Prant Officer felt that the gift was invalid under the Act and therefore the petitioner had no right to apply for possession. He remanded the case for enquiry whether under the Tenancy Act the transfer was valid or not. On remand, the Mamlatdar held that the petitioner had obtained certificate under section 84a of the tenancy act and therefore the transfer in his favour should in any event be regarded as valid. In the result, he confirmed his original judgment and passed an order in favour of the petitioner for possession of half the suit lands. The matter was once again carried is appeal, this time to the Collector, who reversed the decision of the Mamlatdar on two grounds, firstly that the gift was not valid because it did not fulfil the requirements of Section 123 of the Transfer of Properly Act; secondly that the landlord had not fulfilled the conditions laid down in Section 31A (d) of the Tenancy Act. The landlord carried the matter in revision to the Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal decided in favour of the landlord OH the point relating to the factum of relationship of landlord and tenant, but it decided against him on the ground that he had not fulfilled the conditions laid down in Section 31A(d). In the result, the Tribunal dismissed the revision application and the landlord has come to this Court on this petition.

3. The question that has been argued before us by Mr. Nanavaty lies in a narrow compass. He relics sirongly on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Waman Ganesh v. Ganu Guna, 61 Bom LR 1267 of which we have already made mention and to which we shall presently turn. He has also drawn our attention to a number of provisions in the Act. Relying on Section 14 of the Act, it is argued that the landlord envisaged by that section would be not only the individual landlord himself but would include a predecessor-in-title of that landlord. The argument has proceeded that the expression "landlord" should have the same meaning in Section 14 as well as in Section 31A(d). It will be convenient to set out the provisions of Section 31A(d):

"31A. The right of a landlord to terminate a tenancy for cultivating the land personally under Section 31 shall be subject to the following conditions;

(d) The land leased stands in the record of rights or in any public record or similar revenue record on the 1st day of January 1952 and thereafter during the period between the said date and the appointed day in the name of the landlord himself or of any of his ancestors, or if the landlord is a member of a joint family, in the name of a member of such family".

The argument founded on a comparison of the two sections is not tenable and for the simple reason that while Section 14 deals generally with the question of termination of tenancy in case of certain defaults committed by the tenant, Section 31A, which has to be read with Section 31, is more of the nature of a corollary to section 31. the provision contained in section 31 lays down certain conditions of termination of tenancy. These conditions have to be strictly fulfilled We are unable to see any anology of the nature suggested by Mr. Nanavaly between section 14 and section 31a. Two other sections, to which our attention has been drawn by Mr. Nanavaty are Sections 34 and 35. Section 34 relates to the maximum land that can be held by a person and Section 35 rules that provision of Section 34 applies to lands coming into possession of persons on gift, purchase, assignment or any other kind of transfer inter vivos, or by bequest, except in favour of recognised heirs. We do not see anything in any provision of these two sections which can lend any support to the present argument. Lastly, our attention has been drawn by learned advocate to Section 84A of the Act. That section relates to validation of transfers made before the appointed day. The argument here is that an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act relating to transfer goes to show that transfers are not prohibited. We agree that such is the position. But it does not therefore follow that because transfers are allowed under the Act, there should be no restriction or limitation on the light of a landlord to terminate the tenancy of a tenant, on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 31.

4. Section 31A(d) has to be read, not by itself, but contextually, and particularly along with Section 31 to which it makes express reference in the initial part of the section. Section 31 deals with matters which are quite distinct from matters enumerated in Section 14. Section 31 recognises in favour of the landlord the right to terminate tenancy on two grounds mentioned in it: if he bona fide requires the land (a) for cultivating personally, or (b) for any non-agricultural purpose. This right recognised in favour of the landlord by Section 31 is not however an absolute right. It is hedged in by certain conditions, some of which are to be found in Section 31A. One condition is that the land of which the landlord seeks possession on the ground that he bona fide requires it for cultivating personally, must have stood in the record of rights or any public record or similar revenue record on 1-1-1952 and thereafter upto the appointed day, which is 15-6-1955, in the name of the landlord himself or any of his ancestors or, if the landlord is member of a joint family, in the name of any member of such family. The language of Clause (d) appears to us to be clear and there is nothing doubtful or ambiguous about it. Be it noted, the section speaks not of a 'landlord' but of 'landlord him self'.

5. The construction sought to be placed on behalf of the petitioner on the words landlord himself by including in their connotation a transferee from a landlord seems to us to be highly artificial and open to grave objection. We are unable to stretch their meaning to what seems to us to be a breaking point. In our judgment, effect must be given if possible to every word in the clause so that no part of it and no material word in it will be inoperative or superfluous. In that view of the matter we must read the words "in the name of the landlord himself" as the landlord individually and not anyone claiming through him as a successor-in-interest. Considerable support is to be derived for the view which we are inclined to take when we read the expression "in the name of the landlord himself" along with the words which follow upon it viz., "or any of his ancestors, or if the landlord is a member of a joint family, in the name of a member of such family". The date 1-1-1952, no doubt arbitrary, is the datum line. The manifest object of the provision is to see that the benefit of Section 31 is to be confined to a person who on that date is shown to be himself the landlord or to a person whose ancestor is shown to be the landlord on that date and in the case of the landlord being a member of a joint family, then in the name of any other member of that family on that date. The benefit does not rest in or accrue to any other person. Therefore, a transferee from a landlord in whose name the land is shown to stand cannot fit into the structure of this clause.

6. The greatest reliance, however, is placed on the decision in 61 Bom LR 1267 mentioned above. We have given careful and anxious consideration to that decision of the Bombay High Court. The learned Judges who decided that case drew upon an earlier decision of the same High Court where Clause (1) of Sub-section (24) of Section 34 came up for construction. We may mention that the provision in the present Clause (d) of Section 31A is on the same lines as Clause (1) of Sub-section (2A) of Section 34 but with a material and crucial difference, and which in our judgment is a very vital difference. While the relevant clause in Section 34 spoke of a landlord, clause (d) of section 31-a speaks of "landlord himself". A careful scrutiny of the decision shows that no emphasis was laid at the bar on the introduction by an amendment of the word "himself" in Clause (d) of Section 31A. The learned Judges rested their judgment on an earlier Bombay case in Khalilulla Hasmiya v. Yesu, 59 Bom LR 201: (AIR 1937 Bom 200). At p. 204 of the report (Bom LR): (at p. 201 of AIR), in that case, Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was), has made some observations pointing out the provisions of the amended section. The attention of the learned Judges in the later case appears to have been drawn to those observations but they expressed the view that:

"But even in the amended clause, the words of the original Clause (1) of Sub-section (2A) of Section 34 are substantially retained and, with respect, we are of the view that the decision in the aforesaid case still holds good in so far as clause (d) of section 31a of the present act deals with the conditions that the name of the landlord must stand in the record of rights on the date and during the period specified in the clause"
.

7. With respect, we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Waman Ganesh v. Ganu Guna, 61 Bom LR 1267. For reasons already discussed we are of the opinion that the expression "landlord himself" in Section 31A(d) cannot embrace a person who is a transferee of a landlord. In the result the petition fails and will be dismissed. The rule will be discharged. The respondent in this case is not represented by an advocate. Having regard to the importance of the matter, we had requested Mr. Som-pura to Dresent the other side of the case amicus curiae. We thank him for the help rendered by him.