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Thongam (Ongb) Sanatombi Devi v. District Magistrate
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (as provided)
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns a writ petition challenging the detention of the petitioner's husband, Sri Thongam Bungbung Singh @ Bung, a Rifleman (No. 405288) of the 4th Battalion, IRB, Manipur Police. He was alleged to have engaged in extortion under the guise of AMADA/other underground organizations and was arrested by members of AMADA on 6.4.2007 and handed over to the O/C Imphal P.S., resulting in registration of FIR No. 93(4)/2007 under sections 386 IPC and 25(1-B) (as stated in the opinion). He was remanded to police custody till 13.4.2007.
While in custody, the detaining authority issued order No. Crl/NSA/No.8 of 2007 dated 12.4.2007 detaining him under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) on the ground that detention was necessary to prevent activities prejudicial to maintenance of public order and because he was likely to obtain bail. Grounds of detention were supplied on 17.4.2007 under section 8 of the NSA, describing alleged extortion, possession of a country-made 12 bore gun with one round, prior conduct and the likelihood of continued prejudicial activity if released.
The detaining order was approved by the Government of Manipur on 21.4.2007. The detenue filed representations dated 2.5.2007 to both the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Manipur and to the Union Home Ministry; those representations were considered by the Advisory Board under section 9 NSA on 29–30.5.2007 which opined that causes for detention existed and recommended detention for a maximum of 12 months. The Government of Manipur confirmed detention and fixed the detention period for 12 months by order dated 31.5.2007.
The petitioner assailed the detention order by filing this writ petition on two grounds: (1) absence of material before the detaining authority to conclude the detenue was likely to be released on bail (alleged non-application of mind), and (2) delay in disposal of the detenue's representations by respondent Nos. 2 and 4.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the detaining authority had material before it to reasonably form the subjective satisfaction that the detenue was likely to be released on bail and, if released, would probably engage in activities prejudicial to public order (i.e., whether there was non-application of mind).
- Whether any delay in disposal of the detenue's representations by the State authorities (respondent Nos. 2 and 4) amounted to such negligence, indifference or unreasonableness that it vitiated the detention order.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The detention order was issued without material to satisfy the detaining authority that the detenue was likely to be released on bail, implying non-application of mind.
- There was delay in disposal of the detenue's representations by respondent Nos. 2 and 4, which, the petitioner contended, should vitiate the detention.
- The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon several decisions of the Supreme Court (listed in the opinion) to substantiate the contention that cogent material is necessary before a detention order can be sustained and that mere ipse dixit of the detaining authority is insufficient.
Respondents' Arguments
- The State and Union respondents placed before the court the writ petition, counter-affidavits and relevant departmental files; they contended that the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction was based on materials and records placed before him and not merely on ipse dixit.
- The State respondents explained the time taken in disposing of the detenue's representations (notably that the State's disposal of the representation to the State Government took only four days) and provided justification for the period taken to forward para-wise comments to the Central Government; the court notes that the State set out reasons in the affidavit in opposition.
- The respondents relied upon established principles that preventive detention requires subjective satisfaction of the executive but that such satisfaction must be on material and may legitimately be left to the discretion of the executive in appropriate cases.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (quoted at start) | The opinion opens with a quotation from Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian reproduced from this decision. | The quotation serves as a thematic preface in the opinion; no further substantive application is recorded in the excerpt. |
| Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah (1985) 4 SCC 232 : AIR 1986 SC 315 | This decision was relied upon by the petitioner; the opinion does not specify the exact principle from this case in the provided text. | The court records that the petitioner relied on this case among others; no discrete application beyond noting reliance is set out in the excerpt. |
| Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad (1986) 4 SCC 416 : AIR 1986 SC 2090 | The opinion lists this authority as relied upon by the petitioner; the specific rule cited from it is not described in the provided text. | Not specifically analyzed in the excerpt beyond being one of the authorities on which petitioner relied. |
| Dharmendra Sugancband Chelawat v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 746 : AIR 1990 SC 1196 | Listed among authorities relied on by the petitioner; specific principle not detailed in the excerpt. | Recorded as part of the petitioner's reliance; no separate application described in the excerpt. |
| Kamarunnissa v. Union of India (1991) 1 SCC 128 : AIR 1991 SC 1640 | The court quotes the holding that for a person already in custody, a detention order is valid if (1) the authority knows the person is in custody, and (2) on reliable materials the authority believes there is a real possibility of bail and that if released the person would probably indulge in prejudicial activity. | The court applied and cited this principle when assessing whether the detaining authority had reasonable grounds and reliable materials for its subjective satisfaction about the detainee's likelihood of release on bail and continued prejudicial activity. |
| Amritlal v. Union Govt through Secretary, Ministry of Finance (2001) 1 SCC 341 | Stated in the opinion: absence of cogent materials before the officer renders the order mere 'ipse dixit' of the officer; such orders cannot be sustained. | The court used this principle to evaluate whether the detaining authority's satisfaction was supported by materials rather than ipse dixit, ultimately finding materials existed in this case. |
| TV. Sravanan alias S.A.R Prasana Venkatachaariar Chaturvedi v. State of T.N (2006) 2 SCC 664 | The opinion records that the Supreme Court reiterated that imminent possibility of being released on bail must be based on cogent material; detention based on mere ipse dixit cannot be sustained. | The court relied on this articulation to test the sufficiency of materials before the detaining authority and concluded that non-application of mind was not established on the record. |
| A. Shanthi (Smt.) v. Govt. of T.N (2006) 9 SCC 711 | The opinion lists this authority among those relied upon; the specific principle from it is not detailed in the provided text. | The case is recorded among cited authorities; the excerpt does not set out a distinct application. |
| A.P. Saravanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 10 SCC 212 | The opinion states the principle that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is the cumulative result of all grounds of detention. | The court cited this principle to support the proposition that subjective satisfaction must be based on materials cumulatively considered and, applying that test, found the detaining authority had materials before it. |
| Gurdeu Singh v. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 545 | The opinion refers to principles laid down in this case supporting that the detention order cannot be said illegal on grounds of non-application of mind where subjective satisfaction is based on materials. | The court invoked this authority to bolster the conclusion that the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction, having regard to the materials, did not amount to non-application of mind. |
| Chowarpu Raghunandan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) 3 SCC 754 | The opinion quotes that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority should be reasonable and is open to judicial review to test due and proper application of mind to relevant and vital materials. | The court applied this principle to examine whether due and proper application of mind occurred; it concluded that the detaining authority's satisfaction met the required standard on the available record. |
| Union of India v. Paul Manickam (2003) 8 SCC 342 | The opinion reproduces paragraph 7 stating preventive detention is anticipatory and precautionary (not punitive); executive discretion is involved and it is not practicable to lay down wholly objective rules for detention. | The court cited this passage to frame the context of preventive detention as an executive discretion-based, anticipatory measure and applied that understanding when assessing the impugned detention order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court commenced by noting the procedural record: writ petition, counter-affidavits, and the relevant files of the State Home Department and Union Ministry of Home Affairs were perused. The court identified two principal challenges by the petitioner: alleged delay in disposal of representations and alleged non-application of mind / absence of material to justify the detaining authority's satisfaction regarding likelihood of bail.
On the delay point, the court observed that the relevant legal test is not the raw number of days, but whether there is a reasonable explanation for the time taken to dispose of representations and to forward para-wise comments to the Central Government. The court found no material pleading in the writ petition concerning delay by respondent No. 4 and noted that in the absence of such pleading the State respondents were not afforded an opportunity to explain by affidavit. The court accepted the State's account that the time taken by the State to dispose of the representations was only four days and that the State had provided justifications in the affidavit-in-opposition. Consequently, the court found no basis to conclude the delay was due to supine indifference, slackness, or callousness of the respondents.
On the non-application of mind / material-for-bail point, the court reviewed established legal principles from Supreme Court authorities as recorded in the opinion: preventive detention requires subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority but that subjective satisfaction must rest on material; for a person in custody a detention order may be valid where the authority knows the person is in custody and there is reliable material to show a real possibility of bail and that, if released, the person would likely indulge in prejudicial activity (Kamarunnissa). The court recalled that the subjective satisfaction is the cumulative result of all grounds (A.P. Saravanan) and that courts can test whether there was due and proper application of mind to relevant materials (Chowarpu Raghunandan). The court also noted authorities warning against sustaining detention orders based on mere ipse dixit where cogent material is absent (Amritlal; TV. Sravanan).
Applying these principles to the material on record (including the detaining authority's order, the detailed grounds served under section 8, the departmental files and the Advisory Board's opinion), the court concluded that the detaining authority had before it relevant materials on which subjective satisfaction was formed. The court expressly stated that after careful perusal of the records it "cannot come to the conclusion that there is non-application of mind in coming to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and based on no materials."
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The court's core ruling can be stated as: DISMISSED — the detention order was not vitiated by delay in disposal of representations nor by non-application of mind.
Implications: The direct consequence is that the detention order against the petitioner's husband was upheld and the petition failed. The opinion applies and reiterates established principles concerning preventive detention: (a) the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction must be based on material (and can be a cumulative evaluation of the grounds), (b) delay in considering representations will vitiate detention only if unexplained or unreasonable, and (c) detention based on mere ipse dixit is impermissible. The opinion, as provided, does not announce any new legal principle or wider precedent beyond applying settled authorities to the facts of this case.
Note: All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion excerpt and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.
T.N.K Singh, J.:— Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab’ (C/B), (1994) 3 SCC 569 observed that:
“When Law ends. Tyranny begins:
Legislation begins where Evils begins.
The function of the judiciary begins when
The function of the Legislature ends,
Because the law is, when the Judges say it is
Since the power to interpret the law vests in The judges.”
2. When the protector of the law himself became the law breaker by indulging in activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order, evils begins which cannot be taken lightly not only by law enforcing agency and the Judges but also by the society.
3. The Parliament in 31st Year of Republic had enacted the National Security Act, 1980 for detention of a person with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, relation with India with the Foreign Power, with the security of India and acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the States and from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the Public Order. The anti-social and anti-national elements including secessionists, communal, pro-castor elements, and also other elements who adversely influence and affect the services essential to the community was a grave challenge to the lawful authorities sometime even whole the society to ransom. The husband of the petitioner/detenue is a member of the Disciplined Security Force. He is a Rifleman of 4th Bn. Indian Battalion, he had been detained under National Security Act, 1980 for preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public orders. Heard Mr. Ch. Ngongo, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/detenue, Mr. Jalal Uddin, learned counsel appearing for the State respondents and also Mr. K. Kumar, learned C.G.S.C appearing for the Union of India.
4. After filtering the unnecessary detailed facts, the short fact which would be sufficient for deciding the present case is that the petitioner's husband Sri Thongam Bungbung Singh @ Bung was appointed as Rifleman of 4th Bn. IRB (Indian Reserved Battalion) in the Manipur Police Department in the year, 2005 under Rifleman No. 405288. After completing the training, the petitioner's husband was posted at the Bn. HQ at Koirengei Thenguching and started to carry out normal duties of being a Rifleman. On the charge that the petitioner's husband was extracting money in the name of AMADA (All Manipur Anti-Drug Association)/any underground organization operating in Manipur Valley was arrested by members of AMADA on 6.4.2007 and handover to O/C Imphal P.S and formally arrested in connection with FIR No. 93(4)/2007, under sections 386, IPC and 25(I-B) A, Act. The petitioner's husband was remanded to police custody till 13.4.2007
5. When the petitioner's husband had been in judicial custody in connection with the said FIR, the respondent No. 1 issued order being No. Crl/NSA/No. 8 of 2007, dated 12.4.2007 for directing the petitioner's husband to be detained under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 until further orders. Under the said order dated 12.4.2007 the detaining authority was satisfied that it is considered necessary to detain the petitioner's husband with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public orders and also that he is also liable to be released on bail in near future.
6. Under the letter of the District Magistrate, Imphal West District being No. Cri./NSA/No. 8 of 2007, dated 17.4.2007 the grounds of detention were furnished to the petitioner's husband under section 8 of N.S.A, 1980. In the said letter of the District Magistrate, Imphal West District dated 17.4.2007 it has been mentioned that the petitioner's husband even if he is the member of the Disciplined Security Forces had indulged in unlawful activities such as extraction of money and other illegal activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public orders and the application of normal Criminal Law against the petitioner's husband will not or effective to prevent him from the commission of further prejudicial activities. Paras 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the said letter dated 17.4.2007 are quoted hereunder:
“1. That, you were appointed as a Rifleman of 4th Bn. IRB in Manipur Police Department in the year 2005 under Rifleman No. 405288. Thereafter, you got basic training since the last week of September, 2005 along with 660 new recruits at the Manipur Police Training School, Partgei. The course of the training were concluded in the 2nd Week of July, 2006. During the training you were detailed in the E-Coy as a driver in the M.T Section. After completion of the training, all the Riflemen were posted at the Bn. HQ at Koirengei Thenuching and started to carry out normal sentry and escort duties. In the month of December, 2006, you along with 98 Riflemen were undergoing commando training the 1st Bn. Manipur Rifles.
2. That, you went to your house from the Bn. HQ and place of posting with or without leave/permission on the pay day time and other off duty time. When you visited your house, you used to consume S.P Tablet with your local friends. You were always thinking as to how you should overcome the impending defts for purchasing S.P Tablets No. 4 drugs, etc., with your monthly pay. You were determined to earn money without hectic labour in order to meet your expenditure. Lastly, you were determined to extort money in the name of AMADA/any underground organization operating in Manipur Valley. With this view in mind, you contacted Shri Bung Singh of Heirangoithong, Mr. Kenedy Singh of Heirangoithong Maibam Leikai, Mr. Ph. Sandeep Sharma of Irom Pukhrimapal and Mr. W. James Singh @ Ibungo of Sagolband Nepra Menjor Leikai all drug addicts in the last part of 2006 and discussed in length to extort money from the drug addicts, drunkard, wine sellers, etc., in the name of AMADA. You further decided to purchase any country made gun for extortion of money. Accordingly, in the month of February, 2007 you and your associates noted above had purchased one country made 12 bore gun with one round from Md. Tomba of Lilong Turel Ahanbi for Rs. 3,500 through one Md. Taj of Lilong. After purchasing the gun, you and your associates started to extort money and Mobile Phones from the general public more particularly drug addicts, drunkards, wine sellers on many occasions pretending as the members of AMADA and KYKL organization. On 2.4.2007 at about 7 p.m you along with your associates namely Ph. Sandeep Sharma, Tourangbam Manoobi Singh and Mr. W. James Singh @ Ibungo went upto the Thabal Chongba function at Kwakeithel Thounaojam Leikai in order to extort money from the drug addicts holding the country made 12 bore gun, Shri Ph Sandeep Sharma, T. Manaobi Singh and W. James Singh were arrested by the members of AMADA whereas you escaped under the cover of darkness.
Such act of extortion of money carried out by you being an employee of the law enforcing agency gave a terror wave to the general public which, is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
3. That, on 6.4.2007 at about 1 p.m you were arrested by a team of AMADA from your house and recovered one country made 12 bore gun with 1 round and handed over to the OC/Imphal PS with a written report and recovered items. On the strength of the report OC/Imphal PS registered a regular case under FIR No. 93(4) 2007 Imphal P.S under section 386, IPC & 25(1-B) A Act and investigated into. During the course of the investigation of the case, you were arrested on 6.4.2007 and reseized the 12 bore country made gun with 1 round by observing formality. You were remanded to police custody till 13.4.2007
4. That, in view of your tendencies and inclinations reflected in the offences committed by you in the proximate past as a hard core member of the armed gang which aim of earning money without hectic labour I am satisfied that after having availed of bail facilities and becoming a free person you being a hard core member of the said armed gang would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. Hence, the application of normal criminal law against you will not at all be effective to prevent you from the commission of further prejudicial activities. An alternative preventive measure is, therefore, immediately called for.
From the above grounds, I am satisfied that with a view to prevent you from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, I have made this order directing that you be detained under NSA, 1980.”
7. The said order of the detaining authority dated 12.4.2007 was also approved by the Govt, of Manipur vide order being No. 17(1) 1085/2007-H, dated 21st April, 2007. It is stated that the petitioner's husband filed a representation dated 2.5.2007 to the Chief Secretary to the Govt, of Manipur for revocation of the detention order in the interest of justice for the reasons mentioned in the representation. It is also stated that another representation dated 2.5.2007 was also filed to the Secretary to the Govt, of India, Ministry of Home Affairs (Department of Internal Security), North Block, New Delhi for revocation of the detention order. The said two representations, i.e, representation to the Chief Secretary to the Govt, of Manipur and representation to the Secretary to the Govt, of India, Ministry of Home Affairs are pari materia.
8. The representation dated 2.5.2007 to the Chief Secretary to the Govt, of Manipur was rejected and intimated accordingly to the petitioner's husband under the letter of the Joint Secretary (Home), Govt, of Manipur being No. 17(1)/1085/2007-H, dated Imphal, 7th May, 2007. In compliance with the relevant provisions of the National Security Act, the Advisory Board constituted under section 9 of the N.S.A, 1980 had carefully considered the case of the petitioner's husband in its sitting held on 29.5.2007 and 30.5.2007 respectively and unanimously opined that there are sufficient causes for detention and continued detention of the petitioner's husband and also the Govt, of Manipur after consideration of all the past activities of the petitioner's husband as an extremist and his past activities to the security of the State and maintenance of the public order and also the likelihood of his continuing such activities, the moment he is released from detention was of the further opinion that the petitioner's husband should be detained for a maximum period of 12 months as provided under section 13 of the said Act. Accordingly, the Govt, of Manipur was pleased to confirm the said detention order and further fixed the period of detention for 12 months from the date of detention vide orders of the Govt, of Manipur No. 17(1) 1085/2007-H, dated Imphal, the 31st May, 2007. The petitioner by filing the present writ petition is assailing the detention order only on two counts;
(1) There is no material before detaining authority for coming to the conclusion that the petitioner's, husband (detenue) is likely to be released on bail and (2). There is delay in disposal of the representations of the detenue by the respondent Nos. 2 and 4. It would be worth to be mentioned that while assailing the detention order for delay in disposal of the representations of the detenue by the respondent Nos. 2 and 4, there is no material pleading in the writ petition regarding the delay in disposal of the representations of the detenue by the respondent Nos. 2 and 4. It appears that in the course of hearing of the present writ petition, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had tried to substantiate the plea for delay in disposal of the representations of the detenue by the respondent No. 4 by relying on the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in the absence of the material pleading in the writ petition, submitted that there was a delay in furnishing the para-wise comments to the representations of the detenue by the State Government to the Central Government. As there was no pleading in the writ petition that there is a delay in sending the para-wise comments to the said representations of the detenue to the Central Government, the State respondents had no chance to give reasons and explanations for the alleged delay in sending the para-wise comments by way of filing affidavit-in-opposition.
9. It is fairly well-settled law that number of days taken in disposal of the representations filed by the detenue against the detention order is not deciding factor while deciding as to whether detention order is vitiated because of the delay in disposal of the representations, but the factor to be decided is as to whether there is reasonable explanation or justification for the time taken in disposal of the representations of the detenue. We afraid that in the absence of material pleading regarding the delay in disposal of the representations by the respondent No. 4 and also without giving opportunity to the State respondents to put up their case regarding the time taken in sending the para-wise comments to the representations of the petitioner's husband to the Central Government, it would not be just and proper to give a finding that there was no reasonable explanation or justification for the period taken by the State-respondents in sending the parawise comments to the said representations of the detenue to the Central Government. The time taken for disposal of the representations of the petitioner's husband to the State Government was only 4 days. The State respondents through the affidavit in opposition filed in the present petition had clearly given the justification and reasons for taking 4 days time in disposing of the representations of the petitioner's husband.
10. For the reasons given above, we are of the considered view that there is no material for coming to the finding that the delay in disposal of the representations of the detenue was caused on account of supine indifference, slackness or callousness of the respondents in considering the representations.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that there is no material before the detaining authority for coming to satisfaction that the petitioner's husband is likely to be released on bail and as such there is non-application of mind by the detaining authority in issuing the detention order. In order to substantiate his case, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in:
(1) Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : AIR 1986 SC 315,
(2) Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 416 : AIR 1986 SC 2090;
(3) Dharmendra Sugancband Chelawat v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 746 : AIR 1990 SC 1196,
(4) Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 : AIR 1991 SC 1640,
(5) Amritlal v. Union Govt, through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, (2001) 1 SCC 341,
(6) TV. Sravanan alias S.A.R Prasana Venkatachaariar Chaturvedi v. State of T.N, (2006) 2 SCC 664, and
(7) A. Shanthi (Smt.) v. Govt. of T.N, (2006) 9 SCC 711.
12. For deciding this point, we have carefully perused not only the writ petition and counter affidavit filed by the respondents but also the relevant file of the Govt, of Manipur, Home Department and relevant file of the Govt, of India, Ministry of Home Affairs which were made available before this court by the learned State counsel and the learned Central Govt. Standing Counsel for perusal.
13. It is a settled position of law that the nature of satisfaction of the detaining authority in issuing the detention order under National, Security Act for preventing a detenue from indulging in such activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the security of the State is only a subjective satisfaction but subjective, satisfaction should not be on no material.
14. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the materials and records was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in A.P Saravanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2001) 10 SCC 212. According to the learned counsel for the respondents no set standards have been laid down by the Act for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The subjective satisfaction in the present case had been arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before him. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the grounds of non-application of mind in view of the principles laid down in Gurdeu Singh v. Union of India, (2002) 1 SCC 545.
15. The Supreme Court in Chowarpu Raghunandan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 3 SCC 754 has observed that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority should be reasonable and it is always open to the court exercising powers of judicial review to see whether there has been due and proper application of mind to relevant and vital materials.
16. We are conscious enough to the observations made by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph 7 of Union of India v. Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342, as follows:
“Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive, but only preventive. It is resorted to when the executive is convinced on the materials available and placed before it that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authorities. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct, the failure to conform to which alone should lead to detention.”
17. The Apex Court in Kamarunnissa (supra) held that “In the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody, (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity.”
18. The Apex court in Amritlal (supra) held that “In absence of cogent materials before the officer passing the detention order than it is merely an ‘ipse dixit’ of the officer passing the detention order. The Apex Court reiterated in TV. Sravanan @ S A.R Prasana (supra) that “Imminent possibility of being released on bail must be based on cogent material, in absence of such material, detention order based on mere ‘ipse dixit’ of the detaining authority regarding imminent possibility of detenue's prayer for bail being granted cannot be sustained.”
19. As we have discussed above, satisfaction of the detenue authority for issuing the detention order is only a subjective satisfaction. We, within the four corners of law laid down by 1 he Apex Court in the cases discussed above, perused the materials available on record to see as to whether the relevant materials were placed before the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order on not be effective to prevent him from the commission of further prejudicial activities. After careful perusal of the records made available before this court, we cannot come to the conclusion that there is non-application of mind in coming to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and based on no materials.
20. Accordingly, we are constrained to come to the finding that this writ petition is devoid of merit and dismissed.
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