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West Bengal State Electricity Board And Ors. v. Shanti Conductors Private Ltd. .

Gauhati High Court
Feb 3, 2003
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Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arose out of an order dated 11.11.2002 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati, in Title Suit No. 101/97, which rejected an application made by the revision petitioners (defendants) under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. While the revision was pending, the petitioners, by amendment petition, also challenged an order dated 6.1.2003 in the same suit whereby their application to invoke the provisions of section 89 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) was declined.

Material facts as stated in the opinion: Title Suit No. 101/96 (as referred to in the text) was instituted by the opposite party as plaintiffs and was decreed ex parte on 15.12.1999. The defendants (petitioners) filed an application to vacate that ex parte decree; it was vacated subject to conditions by order dated 19.8.2000 in Misc. (J) Case No. 117/2000. The defendants filed their written statement on 22.9.2000, indicating that the dispute was covered by an arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties. After filing the written statement, the defendants filed an application on 7.11.2000 seeking reference of the dispute to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; that prayer was declined by an order (referred to in the opinion). Thereafter the defendants applied for invocation of Section 89 CPC; that application was declined by the order dated 6.1.2003, which was also challenged in this revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to refer the dispute to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when the defendants sought reference after submitting their written statement.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in declining to invoke Section 89 CPC (settlement of disputes outside the Court), given the defendants' offer to settle by arbitration/conciliation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The plaint itself admitted the existence of an arbitration clause, and the defendants' written statement also indicated the arbitration clause in the agreement giving rise to the suit.
  • Because the arbitration clause existed and was admitted or asserted, the learned trial Court misconstrued its jurisdiction and wrongly declined to exercise powers under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  • As to Section 89 CPC, the petitioners contended that the Court is under a duty to determine whether elements of settlement exist and, if they do, to formulate terms and consider referral under Section 89(1).

Opposite Party's (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The trial court was justified in refusing to refer the matter to arbitration under Section 8 because the written statement had already been submitted by the defendants before they made the application for reference to arbitration.
  • Regarding Section 89, the plaintiffs' counsel clearly submitted before the trial court that the plaintiffs were not agreeable to settlement outside the court; therefore there was no element of compromise to warrant the court invoking Section 89.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which the opinion quotes in full (subsections (1)–(3)). The court emphasized the temporal requirement in Section 8(1) that an application to refer the dispute to arbitration must be made "not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute."

Applying that legal provision to the facts before it, the court noted that in the present case the defendants filed their application under Section 8 only after their written statement had already been submitted. Consequently, the application under Section 8 was held to be not maintainable. The court further explained that the mere admission or assertion of the existence of an arbitration clause in the plaint or written statement is immaterial to the operation of Section 8: the statutory scheme requires an application by a party within the specified time-frame, and if parties opt to contest the suit by filing and pursuing a written statement, the court cannot thereafter be required to refer the matter to arbitration under Section 8.

Turning to Section 89 CPC, the court quoted Section 89(1) and reviewed the submissions of the parties. The petitioners argued the court must first determine the existence of an "element of settlement" and then consider whether the proposed settlement would be acceptable to the parties. The respondents pointed out that the plaintiffs' counsel had clearly stated before the trial court that the plaintiffs were not agreeable to settlement outside the court.

On examining the impugned order dated 6.1.2003, the revisional court found that defendants had proposed settlement by arbitration and conciliation, but the plaintiffs unequivocally rejected any settlement outside the court. Given that foundation of Section 89 rests on mutual compromise, the court reasoned that no element of compromise existed where one party (the plaintiff) had outrightly rejected the offer. The court emphasized that compromise is bilateral; a one-sided offer that is rejected cannot be transformed into a settlement by judicial fiat. Hence the trial court was justified in refusing to delay disposal of the suit to pursue settlement efforts under Section 89.

Finally, the revisional court noted the principle of deference to the trial court: where two equally reasonable views are possible, the revisional court should be slow to substitute its view for that of the trial court. On the facts before it, the revisional court concluded the trial court had not acted contrary to Section 89 and therefore its order did not warrant interference.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is dismissed; the impugned orders of the trial court (refusing to refer the dispute to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and declining to invoke Section 89 CPC) are upheld and require no interference.

Implications:

  • The practical effect is that the trial court's orders stand: the defendants' application under Section 8 was held not maintainable because it was filed after submission of the written statement; and the trial court was justified in refusing to proceed under Section 89 CPC where the plaintiffs expressly declined settlement outside the court.
  • The opinion does not purport to set out or discuss any novel legal precedent beyond the application of the statutory text of Section 8 and Section 89 to the facts; no broader legal implications or new precedent are articulated in the provided opinion.
  • The court also recorded: "No order as to costs."
Show all summary ...

1. This revision originally arose out of order, dated 11.11.2002, passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) No. 1, Kamrup, Guwahati, in Title Suit No. 101/97, rejecting the application made by the revision petitioners defendants under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act of 1996). When the present revision was pending, the petitioners have, with the help of an amendment petition, also challenged, in this revision, the order, dated 6.1.2003, passed in the said suit, whereby an application made by the petitioners praying for invoking the provisions of section 89 CPC was declined by the learned trial Court.

2. In order to appreciate the relevant provisions of law involved in the present revision and the challenges made to the orders impugned in this revision, let me state, in a nutshell, the material facts, which have led to this revision.

3. Title Suit No. 101/96 aforementioned, instituted by the opposite party as plaintiffs, was decreed ex parte on 15.12.1999 The revision petitioners, as defendants, filed, inter alia, application for vacating the said ex parte decree. This ex-parte decree was vacated subject to certain conditions by order, dated 19.8.2000, passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 117/2000. Thereafter, the petitioners, as defendants, file their written statement, on 22.9.2000, indicating in their written statement to the effect that the dispute, which had arisen between the parties and led to the institution of the suit, was covered by arbitration clause of the agreement, which had been entered into between the parties concerned. After having, thus, submitted their written statement, the petitioners filed an application, on 7.11.2000, in the learned Court below, praying for referring the dispute between the parties to arbitration in terms of section 8 of the said Act of 1996. By the order, dated 11.11.2000, aforementioned, this prayer was declined, whereupon the petitioners made another application praying before the learned trial Court to invoke the provisions of compromise contained in section 89 CPC. This prayer too was declined by the order, dated 6.1.2003, aforementioned.

4. I have heard Mr. S.R Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioners. I have also heard Mr. S.P Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party, and perused the materials on record including the impugned orders.

5. It has been submitted, inter alia, on behalf of the petitioners, that in the plaint itself, the plaintiffs have admitted the existence of the arbitration clause and the written statement of the defendants also indicated about the existence of the arbitration clause in the agreement, which had given rise to the suit, but the learned Court below, under a misconceived view of its jurisdiction, declined to exercise the powers under section 8 of the said Act.

6. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Roy has pointed out that the learned trial Court was wholly justified in declining to refer the matter to arbitration on the ground that the written statement had already been submitted in the suit by the defendants before making their application for referring the matter to arbitration.

7. The rival submissions made before me, on behalf of the parties, makes me closely examine the provisions of section 8 of the said Act. For the sake of brevity, Section 8 is quoted hereinbelow:

“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement. — (1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.

(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.

(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”

8. A bare reading of section 8 shows that for enabling a Court to invoke the provisions of section 8, the application seeking to get the dispute referred to arbitration must be filed before the written statement is submitted.

9. In the case at hand, the application under section 8 was made by the defendants after the written statement stood submitted. Hence, this application was not maintainable. The fact that the existence of the arbitration clause was admitted in the plaint or asserted in the written statement is immaterial inasmuch as the Court, under section 8, can refer for arbitration a dispute pending in a civil suit only when the party or parties concerned make application for getting the dispute referred to arbitration. If despite existence of arbitration clause, the parties choose to contest the suit, the powers under section 8 cannot be invoked.

10. In the above view of the matter, the learned trial Court was, to my mind, fully justified in declining to get the matter referred to arbitration by its order, dated 11.11.2002, aforementioned. This impugned order therefore, needs no interference.

11. Coming to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the learned trial Court ought to have invoked its power under section 89 CPC, it is apposite to quote the sub-section (1) of section 89, which is relevant for the purpose of disposal of this revision. Section 89(1) runs as follows:

“89. Settlement of disputes outside the Court. — (1) Where it appears to the Court that there exist elements of settlement which may be acceptable to the parties, the Court shall formulate the terms of settlement and give them to the parties for their observations and after receiving the observations of the parties, the Court may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement and refer the same for-

(a) arbitration;

(b) conciliation;

(c) judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat; or

(d) mediation.”

12. It has been submitted by Mr. Bhattacharjee that it is the duty of the Court under section 89 to, first, determine if there is existence of element of settlement and if it appears to the Court that an element of settlement exists, the Court has to embark upon the question as to whether the elements of settlement, as appear to the Court, are acceptable to the parties concerned.

13. Repelling the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. S.P Roy has pointed out that a close reading of the impugned order, dated 6.1.2003, will show that the learned counsel for the plaintiff had clearly submitted before the learned trial Court that the plaintiffs were not agreeable to settlement outside the Court and in the face of such a clear submission made on behalf of the plaintiffs, it was obvious that no element of compromise existed and, hence, the learned trial Court was wholly justified in passing the order, dated 6.1.2003

14. On a fair reading of the order, dated 6.1.2003, it clearly transpires, I notice, that it was submitted before the learned trial Court, on behalf of the defendants, that the matter may be settled outside the Court by arbitration and conciliation, but the learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted before the Court that the plaintiffs were not agreeable to any settlement outside the Court.

15. Thus, in the face of what have been stated in the impugned order, dated 6.1.2003, it is abundantly clear that when the plaintiffs had declined to make even an endeavour for settlement outside the Court, the learned trial Court had nothing before it to show that any element of compromise existed particularly, when it is not the case of the petitioners that the stand taken by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs before the learned trial Court was incorrect and/or that the plaintiffs were willing to compromise. Foundation of section 89 rests on compromise, which needs agreement between the contesting parties. A compromise cannot be one-sided. If a defendant offers to compromise the suit and the plaintiff outright rejects the offer, no compromise can be reached; in such a situation if the trial Court declines to delay disposal of the suit by resorting to efforts of compromise, it cannot be said to have failed to exercise its jurisdiction under section 89.

16. In other words, if a defendant appears in a suit and offers to compromise the claim raised by the plaintiff, one can say that an element of compromise exists; but if the plaintiff, reacting to such offer, right away rejects the offer of compromise and if he wants a decision in the suit on merit, the element of compromise can no longer be said to exist/survive. The present one is one of such cases. In such a situation, if the Court makes no further efforts to make the parties reach an amicable settlement of their dispute, the Court cannot be said to have failed to exercise its jurisdiction under section 89. In a situation of this kind, the Court, which is in seisin of the matter, is the best judge of the matter and even if the revisional Court happens to think that the trial Court should have pursued the offer of compromise, notwithstanding the resistance offered, the revisional Court will be slow to interfere, for, it is trite that if two equally reasonable views are possible, the revisional Court will be slow to substitute its views in place of the views of the trial Court.

17. In the face of the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the learned trial Court has not, to my mind, acted contrary to the provisions of section 89 and hence, such an order cannot be, interfered with.

18. Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety, I am firmly of the view that the orders impugned in the present revision do not suffer from any infirmity of law and/or call for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

19. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this revision fails and the same shall stands disposed of accordingly.

20. No order as to costs.