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Ananda Bezbaruah Accused-Petitioner v. Union Of India .

Gauhati High Court
Mar 15, 1993
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition was filed by the accused (petitioner), formerly Deputy General Manager and officiating General Manager (Administration) until April 1988, seeking quashing of the order framing charge and the related proceedings in Special Case No. 28(c)/90 under S. 5(1)(e) read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in the Court of the Special Judge, Assam, Guwahati.

Facts alleged in the FIR (lodged on 21-3-88 by Shri S.K. Saikia, Superintendent of Police, CBI/ACB, Shillong) included that the petitioner had amassed wealth disproportionate to known sources of income, and that a two-storied building stood in the name of his wife, Mrs. Era Bezbaruah. The investigation recovered documents (including income-tax returns of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah) and produced a chargesheet calculating total assets at the close of the check period of Rs. 8,22,796.53 and alleged disproportionate assets of Rs. 5,46,923.57 (as per the chargesheet), while the trial court's order of framing charge used altered figures and produced a higher figure of alleged disproportionate assets (stated as Rs. 7,80,322.80 or variants in the record).

The valuation of the building was re-examined during proceedings (chargesheet initially included building at Rs. 8,55,065; later reduced to Rs. 6,81,000 after re-valuation). The petitioner asserted that the land and building were the exclusive property of his wife (an income-tax payer) and relied on the wife's income-tax returns and associated documents seized in investigation.

The petition raised specific challenges to framing of charge and to the characterization of the wife's property as benami. After consideration of records and precedents, the revisional court concluded the framing of charge under S.5(1)(e) read with S.5(2) was vitiated and quashed the charges; the revision petition was allowed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the charge framed under S. 5(1)(e) read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was based on consideration of the record and documents submitted, and whether those materials were sufficient to presume the petitioner guilty under those sections?
  2. Whether the property standing in the name of the petitioner's wife, Mrs. Era Bezbaruah, was a benami property?
  3. Whether, on the materials on record (if unrebutted), conviction under the said sections could be said to be reasonably possible?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Choudhury)

  • The trial court erred in framing the charge and in its computation, having treated an item shown as "expenditure" in the chargesheet (Rs. 1,45,574.77) as "savings" in the order of framing charge, resulting in an inflated figure of disproportionate assets.
  • The main documentary evidence relied upon by the prosecution (the wife's income-tax returns and related documents) shows that the land and building were acquired from the wife's own sources (including a registered gift of land and loans/receipts documented in her tax returns), and that she is an income-tax payer; thus the property is her own and not benami.
  • If the value of the building and land recorded in the wife's name is excluded from the petitioner's asset calculation, there remains no disproportionate asset attributable to the petitioner.
  • The petitioner confined submissions to prosecution documents and witness statements collected during investigation and argued that these materials, if properly evaluated, undermine the prima facie case against him.

Prosecution's Arguments (CBI, as advanced by Mr. Hazarika, Public Prosecutor)

  • The trial court was entitled to sift and evaluate the material and documentary evidence at the framing stage (citing Niranjan Singh Karam Singh v. Jitendra Bhimraj), and having done so the Special Judge found a prima facie case under S.5(1)(e) read with S.5(2).
  • At the initial stage the proceedings should not be quashed; if the accused had a good case, that would emerge during trial.
  • The prosecution relied on several precedents in support of the continued framing and trial (multiple Supreme Court decisions were cited by the Public Prosecutor, though the opinion indicates the court found the instant facts warranted a different view).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M. Krishna Reddy v. State Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Hyderabad (1992/1993) Sets out ingredients required to sustain a charge under S.5(1)(e): (1) accused is a public servant; (2) nature/extent of pecuniary resources or property in possession; (3) known sources of income; (4) disproportion between possession and known sources, after which burden shifts to accused to satisfactorily account for possession. The court referenced these ingredients as the legal test to be satisfied by prosecution. The court examined whether prosecution had established these elements prima facie and found prosecution had not established benami status of the wife's property; therefore the necessary ingredients were not established in this case at the framing stage.
Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of M.P. (1977) 1 SCC 816 : AIR 1977 SC 796 Burden of proving a transaction to be benami rests strictly on the person asserting it; mere conjecture or surmise is insufficient; proof requires legal evidence enabling an inference to be drawn of benami intention. The court applied this principle to hold that the prosecution had not discharged the burden of proving the land and building to be benami; materials (income-tax return, gift deed, witnesses) supported the conclusion that the property belonged to the wife and were insufficient to prove benami at the framing stage.
Niranjan Singh Karam Singh v. Jitendra Bhimraj (1990) 4 SCC 76 : AIR 1990 SC 1962 At the Ss. 227-228 (framing) stage the court must evaluate material and documents on record to see if facts, taken at their face value, disclose all ingredients of the alleged offence; the court may sift evidence for this limited purpose. The prosecution relied on this decision to justify the Special Judge's sifting; the revisional court recognised the principle but concluded that in the present case the Special Judge had failed to properly evaluate crucial materials (notably the wife's income-tax return) at the framing stage, and therefore the charge was vitiated.
CSD Swami v. The State (AIR 1960 SC 7) Interpretation of "satisfactorily account for": accused must not only offer a plausible explanation but must satisfy the court that the explanation is worthy of acceptance. The court relied on this principle in assessing whether the accused had satisfactorily accounted for assets; finding that the prosecution had failed to establish benami property, the question of satisfactorily accounting for the total assets did not arise to the prosecution's detriment.
Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhaji Rao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692 : AIR 1988 SC 709 When asked to quash a prosecution at initial stage, the test is whether uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish the offence; courts may quash if chances of conviction are bleak or prosecution serves no useful purpose having regard to special features. The revisional court applied this standard and, considering the special features (availability of the wife's income-tax return and other documentation), found it was expedient in the interest of justice to quash the charges since the prosecution had not established ingredients prima facie.
1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : AIR 1991 SC 1260 (cited by prosecution) The opinion records this authority as relied on by the prosecution; the specific rule/principle relied upon from this decision is not elaborated in the opinion. The court noted the prosecution's reliance but found the facts and materials of the instant case warranted a different conclusion; the opinion does not detail any direct application of this precedent to the court's reasoning.
(1992) 3 SCC 317 (cited by prosecution) Cited by the prosecution; the opinion does not specify the precise rule or principle drawn from this decision. The court recorded the citation but did not rely upon it in resolving the issues; the opinion states the facts warranted a different view than the prosecution advanced.
(1981) 3 SCC 20 : AIR 1981 SC 1183 (cited by prosecution) Cited by the prosecution; the opinion does not elaborate the specific principle referred to from this decision. The court recorded the citation but the opinion indicates those references did not support the prosecution's position on the particular facts of this case.
(1983) 1 Gauhati LR 109 (NOC 57) (regional citation relied by prosecution) Cited by prosecution; the opinion does not explain the legal principle extracted from this regional report. The court noted the citation; it did not rely on it in reaching the decision and observed that the facts of the case warranted a different outcome.
AIR 1954 SC 359 (1954) (cited by prosecution) Cited by prosecution (paras 9–11 referenced); the opinion does not spell out the exact rule relied upon from this older authority within its discussion. The court noted the reliance but did not adopt those references as controlling in light of the specific documentary and oral material in the instant case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of factual and legal observations constrained to the record:

  1. Mathematical/record inconsistency: The court examined the chargesheet and the Special Judge's order of framing charge and found a critical computational inconsistency — an amount shown in the chargesheet as "expenditure" (Rs. 1,45,574.77) was treated as "savings" in the framing order. This mischaracterisation altered the calculation of alleged disproportionate assets. The court referred to the prosecution's documents (e.g., Annexure V, document 34) which explained the amount labelled as expenditure and which established total anterior assets and savings of Rs. 4,03,287.96.
  2. Recalculation on record: Using the correct figures from the prosecution's own documents, the court recalculated the alleged disproportionate assets to be Rs. 6,50,025.06 (total assets as per the framing order Rs. 10,53,313.02 minus savings and anterior assets Rs. 4,03,287.96). The court accepted the prosecution's documents for this arithmetic correction.
  3. Documentary and witness materials on benami issue: The court examined document 3 (the wife's income-tax returns for assessment years 1985–86 to 1987–88), the registered gift deed(s) showing the wife received the plot of land from her mother, the lease agreement (document 7), and statements of witnesses examined by the Investigating Officer (notably P.W. 7—Income-tax Officer M. Chakraborty, P.W. 9—Nabin Chandra Das, and P.W. 12—tenant/lease witness). These materials, the court found, explain the wife's source of income, the gift of land, and the means by which the building was constructed and partly tenanted.
  4. Applicable legal standards: The court set out controlling legal principles — M. Krishna Reddy for the ingredients of S.5(1)(e) and the shift of burden to the accused once prosecution establishes the ingredients; Krishnanand Agnihotri for the strict burden on the party asserting a transaction is benami; CSD Swami for the meaning of "satisfactorily account for"; and Niranjan Singh for the scope of judicial sifting at the framing (Ss. 227–228) stage.
  5. Application of principles to the facts: Applying these standards, the court concluded that the prosecution had not, on the materials it itself collected, established that the land and building were benami property of the petitioner. Because the prosecution's own documentary and oral evidence (income-tax returns, gift deed, lease, witness statements) disclosed the wife's independent sources and receipts toward the construction and ownership, the inclusion of that property's valuation in the petitioner's asset base was not justified on the record.
  6. Consequence for prima facie case: Given that the wife's property had not been shown to be benami and that the trial court had mis-evaluated a key numeric item (treating expenditure as savings), the court held the ingredients of S.5(1)(e) read with S.5(2) were not established prima facie. The trial court's order of framing charge was therefore vitiated by failure to evaluate material, uncontroverted evidence (document 3 and witness statements) at the framing stage.
  7. Disposition: Applying the test for quashing prosecutions at the initial stage (as explained in Madhavrao Scindia), and considering the special features of the record, the court found it was appropriate in the interest of justice to quash the charges and allow the revision petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Revision allowed; the order framing charge under S. 5(1)(e) read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is quashed.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The charge framed by the Special Judge against the petitioner under S.5(1)(e) read with S.5(2) was quashed and the revision petition allowed — the immediate criminal proceedings in Special Case No. 28(c)/90, as challenged, cannot proceed on the basis of the impugned charge framed on the record as it stood.
  • Reason for relief: The court's order is grounded in its finding that the prosecution had not established prima facie that the property in the wife's name was benami (given documentary and witness material seized by the prosecution itself), and that a material miscalculation by the trial court affected the alleged disproportionate asset figure.
  • Broader precedent: The court applied existing Supreme Court standards (as cited) concerning (a) the ingredients of S.5(1)(e), (b) burden on parties asserting benami transactions, (c) the meaning of "satisfactorily account for", and (d) the scope of judicial sifting at the framing stage. The opinion does not state that it creates any new legal precedent; it applies established principles to the specific facts and materials of this case and quashes the charges on that factual and legal basis.

This summary has been prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those expressly set out in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. This criminal revision has been preferred by the accused petitioner for quashing the impugned order of framing charge and also the proceeding in the Special Case No. 28(c)/90 under S. 5(1)(e) read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 pending in the Court of Special Judge, Assam, Guwahati.

2. Petitioner was the Deputy General Manager and was officiating in the post of General Manager (Administration), till April, 1988. On21-3-88 one Shri S.K Saikia, Superintendent of Police, CBI/ACB, Shillong lodged an FIR on informations, alleging inter alia that the petitioner had amassed huge wealth by dishonest and corrupt means during his service career which was grossly disproportionate to the known source of income of the petitioner. Further, it was alleged that the petitioner had constructed a two storied palatial building in the name of his wife Mrs. Era Bezbaruah and found to be in possession of disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs. 2,50,000/- approximately. During the investigation some documents from the house of the accused petitioner including a file of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah (4 nos.) containing documents pertaining to (contd. on col. 2) income, land, property (SI. No. 21), wherein it was disclosed that during the check period, i.e 1-11-81 to 22-3-88, the petitioner was found in possession of total assets worth of Rs. 8,22,796.53/- and the petitioner could satisfactorily account for Rs. 2,75,872.51/- and thereby total, disproportionate assets in possession of the petitioner during the check period was to the tune of Rs. 5,46,923.57/-. The total break up given in the chargesheet and in the order of charge framed by the learned Special Judge (Annexure VII to the petition) is as follows:

The total break up according to the chargesheet submitted by CBI: A) Assets at the begining of check period Rs. 1,27,415.45/- B) Assets at the close of the check period Assets acquired during the check period Rs. 9,50,211.53/- (B − A) Rs. 8,22,796.53/- C) Income and other receipts during the check period Rs. 4,21,447.28/- D) Expenditure during the check period Rs. 1,45,574.77/- Likely savings (C − D) Rs. 2,75,872.51/- Assets acquired during the check period Rs. 8,22,796.08/- Likely savings— Rs. 2,75,872.51/- Total disproportionate assets during the check period Rs. 5,46,923.57/- The total break up according to the order of charges framed by the trial Court: Total assets at the beginning of a) Check period, i.e Anterior assets Rs. 1,27,425.45/- b) Savings Rs. 1,45,574.77/- c) Total assets the petitioner should have Rs. 2,72,990.22/- d) Assets at the close of check period Rs. 10,53,313.02/- Total disproportionate assets the petitioner could not satisfactorily account for Rs. 7,80,322.80/- (Expenditure figure was wrongly taken as savings figure)

3. In para 10 of the chargesheet the value of the building was included in the assets of the petitioner at the close of the check period amounting Rs. 8,55,065/- but the said value, has been reduced to Rs. 6,81,000/- (Annexure VI to the petition) after a re-valuation report by the Public Prosecutor, C.B.I The accused petitioner had shown the value of the house i.e the cost of construction of the building at Rs. 2,50,000/- which was based on Assam PWD's prevailing rates while according to the Management of OIL the total remitted cost of the building on 20-4-87 was Rs. 3,14,0001-. The petitioner's assertion was that the land and building as shown in the Income-tax Return of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah, wife of the petitioner (Document 3 of the prosecution) is the exclusive property of petitioner's wife who was an income tax payee. With these materials as indicated above by the accused petitioner the point for consideration for quashing the proceeding are:

(a) Whether the charge framed under S. 5(1)(e) S. 5(2) of the Act was based on consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and were sufficient for presuming the petitioner guilty under the said sections of the Act?

(b) Whether the property in the name of the wife of the petitioner Mrs. Era Bezbaruah is a benami property? and

(c) Whether the materials on record, if unrebutted, is such, on the basis of which conviction under the said sections can be said unreasonably possible?

4. In this revision petition Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner invited Court's attention to the record, i.e, documentary and oral evidence, on which the prosecution based its charges against the accused petitioner, contending that the trial Court had gone wrong in framing charges holding that there was disproportionate excess asset of Rupees 8,80,322.30/-. Further contention of Mr. Choudhury was that the trial Court had committed an error apparent on the face of the record, in arriving at the figure shown in the chargesheet as expenditure (Rupees 1,45,575.77) which was shown in the order of the charge as savings by ignoring material piece of evidence, resulting in grave injustice to the petitioner while excess asset was shown against the petitioner. The trial Court did not consider the building as the property of the wife of the petitioner holding wrongfully the landed property as well as the building as benami in complete violation of law. According to the learned counsel if the value of the building with land is deducted from the account, alleged to be disproportionate, there will remain nothing as disproportionate amount.

5. Section 5(1)(e) of the Act reads as follows:

“Section 5(1)(e): A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct — if he or any person on his behalf is in possession or has at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his sources of income.”

A reading of the section transpires that it is not mere acquisition of property that constitutes an offence, under the provisions of the Act but its failure to satisfactorily account for such possession that makes the possession objectionable as offending the law. In the recent decision of the Apex Court, M. Krishna Reddy v. State Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Hyderabad. of Police, Hyderabad, (1992) 2 UJ (SC) 613 : (1993 Cri LJ 308) it was held that to substantiate a charge under S. 5(1)(e) of the Act the ingredients to be established by the prosecution are (1) accused is a public servant, (2) the nature and the extent of pecuniary resources or property were found in his possession or any person on his behalf, (3) what were the known sources of income and (4) that the property/resources found in possession of the accused or any person on his behalf were disproportionate to his known source of income. After proving these requirements by the prosecution, the burden for satisfactorily accounting for possession of such resources or property shifts to the accused.

6. In this case it appears that, the prosecution in its chargesheet showed Rupees 1,45,574.77/- as expenditure which the Special Judge has shown as savings in its calculation in the order of framing charges. This resulted in overlooking the actual savings and expenditure of the accused as recorded in the chargesheet (document 5), and sanction order (document 34). On perusal of the document 34 it is evident that, the aforementioned amount of expenditure has been elaborately explained vide paras 9 and 10 of Annexure V and in paras 10 and 11 of document 34. Further Annexure V of the petition disclosed that the anterior assets and the savings (prior to check period and during the check period respectively) was Rupees 4,03,287.96/- which is as follows:

Anteriod assets …….Rs. 1,27,415.45/- Savings …….Rs. 2,75,872.51/- Total Rs. 4,03,287.96/-

(Vide Annexure V para 13)

Accordingly the alleged disproportionate assets should be Rs. 6,50,025.06/- as assumed by the prosecution. This would be as follows:

Total assets (as per learned Spl Judge's order of framing charges) (Annexure VII) ……Rs. 10,53,313.02/- Saving and anterior assets ……Rs. 4,03,287.96/- Total Rs. 6,50,025.06/-

7. Allegation of benami property of the petitioner shown in the name of his wife Mrs. Era Bazbaruah has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the materials, i.e, income-tax return which is the document seized and relied by the prosecution clearly proved the petitioner's case (account of Rs. 6,50,025.06/-) that the evidence available from the income-tax return of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah (document 3) is more than sufficient to discharge the petitioner and allegation that the Special Judge has committed an error on the face of the record in arriving at the figure by conveniently ignoring this material piece of document of the prosecution find force in favour of the petitioner.

8. During the investigation the Investigating Authority collected many documents including the Income-tax Return (document 3), agreement of lease deed (document 7), file of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah regarding income-tax (document 14) and the files containing photo copies of correspondences made to the petitioner during departmental enquiry conducted by the Vigilance Department of Oil India Limited (document 33 and Annexure I to the petition). The Investigating Officer during investigation examined many persons acquainted with the facts and circumstances — they are — Nabin Chandra Das, Mandal (P.W 9), Sonwarmal Jha (P.W 2) and M. Choudhury, Income-tax Officer, Ward-I, Digboi (P.W 7). Document 3, i.e Income-tax Return relating to the period 1985–86, 1986–87 and 1987–88 has given detailed sources of income of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah including the loan she had taken for construction of the building which has been accepted by the income-tax department. Apparently Mrs. Era Bezbaruah is an income-tax payee. In the chargesheet (Annexure V) while calculating the total income of the petitioner the business income of his wife Mrs. Era Bezbaruah was also taken into account. The detailed account regarding her source of income and receipts towards the construction of the house is explained vide the document 3.

9. Document 3, i.e the Income-tax Return, which is the main material document of the prosecution, need some discussion. It is to be examined if this document and the valuation of the building (Annexure VI of the petition) can be taken into consideration to decide whether there will be no amount to be disproportionate assets against the accused. Mrs. Era Bezbaruah has her own source of income and from this she constructed the house on a plot of land gifted to her by her late mother. In the Income-tax Return (document 3) for the assessment year 1985–86 detailed account of amount and the building of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah was given. A plot of land measuring 3 Kathas in Dag No. 1202, Patta No. 76 is received through a gift from Smti Charulata Bhuyan, mother of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah vide registered Gift Deed No. 8561 dated 7-11-81 and 10389 dated 23-12-81. P.W 9 Nabin Das, Mandal in the SDC office, Dispur Circle stated before the Investigating Officer that under the said Dag number and Patta number more than 8 Bigha 3 Katha 12 Lechas of land belonged to Smti Charubala Bhuyan, mother of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah and that as per record mutation in the name of Charulata Bhuyan entered into file No. 6/2/44/78 on 21-4-79 by Addl. Deputy Collector vide order No. 826/53-54 dated 21-4-79 of the SDC, as maintained in the remark column of the records. Shri M. Chakraborty (P.W 7) admitted before the Investigating Officer that Mrs. Era Bezbaruah filed her return of income for the assessment years 1985–86 to 1987–88. Income-tax Return (document 3) disclosed that after completion of the ground floor of the building it was given on rent to M/s. Mayur (Plywood Industries) for the residential purposes of its Managing Director (P.W 12) who was also examined by the Investigating Officer. He stated that the house was tenanted to him by Mrs. Era Bezbaruah w.e.f 1-2-84 at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per month as per lease agreement entered under his signature. This lease agreement was collected by the Investigating Officer (document 7).

10. In Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of M.P, (1977) 1 SCC 816 : AIR 1977 SC 796 : (1977 Cri LJ 566): the Apex Court held (Para 26):—

“The burden of showing that a particular transaction is benami and the owner is not the real owner always rests on the person asserting it to be so and this burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of benami is the intention of the parties and not unoften, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of the serious onus that rests on him, nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises as a substitute for proof.”

11. In the case of M. Krishna Reddy v. State Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Hyderabad. (1993 Cri LJ 308) (supra) the Apex Court set aside the conviction of the appellant under S. 5(1)(e) and sentence of imprisonment and fine and allowed the appeal by relying on Agnihotri's case (1977 Cri LJ 566) (SC) (supra). In that case the allegation was that there were some benami transaction and so the appellant was not entitled to any deduction. The Apex Court allowed deduction to amount of Rs. 2,09,095.28/- from the value of total disproportionate assets of Rs. 2,37,842.00/- relying on unassailable documents, such as, Income-tax Return of his son-in-law Dr. K. Ravindra Reddi, wealth-tax return of his wife and oral testimony of the Income-tax Officer. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh v. Jitendra Bhimraj, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : AIR 1990 SC 1962 : (1990 Cri LJ 1869) the Apex Court held (Para 7):—

“It seems well settled that at the Ss. 227-228 stage, i.e, stage of framing the charge, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view of finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.”

12. Mr. Hazarika, learned Public Prosecutor, C.B.I made his submission relying on (1990) 4 SCC 76 : AIR 1990 SC 1962 : (1990 Cri LJ 1869) (Niranjan Singh Karam Singh v. Jitendra Bhimraj) that it is the trial Court which would sift and evaluate the material documents on record with a view to find out the existence of all the ingredients of the offence. After proceeding in the light of this judgment the Special Judge found a prima facie case against the accused petitioner under S. 5(1)(e) read with S. 5(2) of the Act. He further submitted that at this initial stage the proceeding should not be quashed and if the accused petitioner has a good case obviously it will come out in the trial. In this case as discussed above the accused petitioner confined his submission to the documents collected during the investigation which are the documents of the prosecution and the statements of the witnesses as recorded by the Investigating Officer.

13. In view of the order of the charge (3rd para) the interpretation of the words “satisfactorily account for”, as submitted by Mr. Choudhury, the petitioner had explained his stand on the basis of the Income-tax Return (document 3) which is the document relied by the prosecution and submitted that if the construction work in the name of the wife of the petitioner was excluded there will be no disproportionate asset. While interpreting the words “satisfactorily account for” in AIR 1960 SC 7 : (1960 Cri LJ 131) (CSD Swami v. The State) the Apex Court held that the legislature has advisedly used the expression “satisfactorily account”, and cast a burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the Court that his explanation was worthy of acceptance. If the prosecution fails to establish that the property or any benami property included in the assets of the accused, then the question of ‘satisfactorily account for’ total assets by the accused does not arise at all. In this case in hand prosecution failed to establish on the materials collected by it that the land and building in the name of the wife of the petitioner was a benami property and in that event the valuation of the land and property standing in the name of Mrs. Era Bezbaruah is to be excluded from the total assets of the accused petitioner as materials on record clearly established that land and the building were acquired by Mrs. Bezbaruah from the source of her income as explained in document 3, i.e, the Income-tax Return, and the statement of the P.Ws 7, 9 and 12. In my view exclusion and non-consideration of the document 3 collected by prosecution, at the Ss. 227-228 stage, i.e, stage of framing charge vitiated the evaluation of the materials and documents on record to find out a prima facie case against the accused petitioner. The learned Public Prosecutor, C.B.I relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court:

1. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : AIR 1991 SC 1260 : (1991 Cri LJ 1438) (para 63)

2. (1992) 3 SCC 317 : (1992 Cri LJ 1956)

3. AIR 1960 SC 7 : (1960 Cri LJ 131)

4. (1981) 3 SCC 20 : AIR 1981 SC 1183 (para 12)

5. (1983) 1 Gauhati LR 109 (NOC 57)

6. AIR 1954 SC 359 : (1954 Cri LJ 1002) (paras 9, 10 and 11)

In this case the accused petitioner made reliance entirely on the materials collected by the prosecution which, in my view, requires consideration from a different perspective to consider the case of the petitioner. In that view of the matter I find no support of those references as the facts and circumstances of this case warrant a different view.

14. From the above discussion, decision requires whether the charge framed by the Special Judge under the said sections of the Act deserve to be quashed at this initial stage. In (1988) 1 SCC 692 : AIR 1988 SC 709 : (1988 Cri LJ 853) (Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhaji rao Chandrojirao Angre) the Apex Court held (para 7):—

“The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”

In the light of this decision I hold that the inclusion of property of the wife as benami, without evaluating the materials on record, i.e document 3 and statements of P.Ws 7, 9 and 12 the charges framed under S. 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 are vitiated as ingredients of the said sections were not established prima facie. Materials collected by the prosecution during the investigation clearly establish that the property alleged to be benami property of the petitioner in the name of his wife is her Own property acquired by her from her own source of income. In that event, if the valuation of the land and the building is excluded from the total assets of the petitioner there will be no disproportionate income.

15. The important and vital material on record was not considered by the learned Special Judge in framing the charge under S. 5(1)(e) read with S. 5(2) of the. Act. Those materials on record are sufficient which give a satisfactory account for total assets of the accused petitioner. I find it a fit case to interfere with the order of framing of charge under the said sections of the Act and accordingly I quash the same. In the result the revision petition is allowed.

16. Revision allowed.