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Sub Uman Singh Gurung And Another v. Shri Seva Rama Dutta And Others

Gauhati High Court
Aug 17, 1990
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (J.M Srivastava, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the claimants (the parents) against the judgment and award dated 21.11.1983 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kamrup, Guwahati.

The claim arose from a motor-vehicle accident on 7.11.1977 in which the claimants' seven-year-old son (their only child) died. The bus involved belonged to respondent No.1, was driven at the time by respondent No.2, and was insured with respondent No.3.

The claimants had sought Rs. 100,000 as compensation. The Tribunal held the respondents liable for rash and negligent driving and awarded Rs. 20,000. The claimants appealed that award.

In this appeal respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not appear. Respondent No.3 (the insurer) contested the appeal through counsel.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compensation of Rs. 20,000 awarded by the Tribunal was adequate for the death of the claimants' seven-year-old son.
  2. If the compensation was inadequate, what amount of compensation should be awarded and on what basis (i.e., whether and to what extent future expectancy/dependency of parents on a deceased minor may be taken into account)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Claimants') Arguments

  • The deceased was the only son, bright in studies and good at sports; parents had reasonable expectations that he would do well in life.
  • The father was a Junior Commissioned Officer in the Indian Army, strengthening the claim of reasonable expectation from the child.
  • The compensation of Rs. 20,000 was grossly inadequate; at least Rs. 100,000 should be awarded.
  • Counsel advanced a computed approach: parents would have borne support/education costs until about age 22 (about 15 years), after which the child could be expected to provide support; using multipliers and estimating a monthly contribution (first suggested at Rs. 800/month yielding Rs. 100,000 after deductions), the claimants sought Rs.100,000. Counsel alternatively argued a realistic estimate of settlement by age 26 and support at about Rs.400/month would justify Rs.50,000 for loss of expectancy.
  • Appellants cited several cases where courts have accounted for dependency/expectancy and awarded larger sums for deaths of children of varying ages to support their submission that future prospects should be considered.

Respondent Insurance Company's Arguments (Respondent No.3)

  • Given the age of the deceased (a minor), the compensation awarded by the Tribunal (Rs.20,000) was fair and adequate.
  • In the case of a minor the expectation of future dependency is speculative; therefore compensation should be confined to mental shock and pain suffered by the parents rather than computation of future prospects.
  • The insurer relied on New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sangey Tsering (1989) 1 GLR 416 for the proposition that compensation for death of a minor should relate to mental shock and pain rather than dependency calculations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sangey Tsering, (1989) 1 GLR 416 The view that compensation for death of a minor should be related to the mental shock and pain sustained by the claimants; dependency-based calculation did not find favour in that decision. The court considered this view but expressly rejected it as an absolute rule; the court held that future prospects should not be ignored and that limiting compensation to shock and pain alone is unsound.
K.L. Pasriya v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co., 1986 ACJ 252 (P & H) Award of Rs.20,000 for death of a 5-year-old and the proposition that dependency and multiplier must be evaluated. Cited by appellants as authority that dependency/multiplier evaluations are appropriate even in deaths of minors; used by this court to support taking future prospects into account.
M.M. Patel v. Union of India, 1982 ACJ 426 (Gujarat) For death of a 13-year-old, Rs.54,000 allowed; principle that a positive, optimistic approach to chance/life should be taken in evaluating prospects. Cited by appellants; the court relied on such authorities to reject the narrow shock-only approach and to permit consideration of future prospects.
M. Mazzafar v. M. Shaikh, 1980 ACJ 516 (J & K) For death of a 12-year-old, compensation enhanced from Rs.10,000 to Rs.25,000. Cited as precedent indicating courts have enhanced awards for minors by considering prospects; relied upon in the court's reasoning to permit consideration of expectancy.
Abdul Wahab v. Chandra Prakash, 1986 AZJ 1087 (Allahabad) For death of a 2-year-old, Rs.25,000 awarded: Rs.5,000 for mental shock and Rs.20,000 for reasonably foreseeable support. Cited to show that courts have apportioned awards between mental shock and foreseeable future support; used to support the court's view that both elements may be considered.
Altah Baksh v. D.N. Panda, 1983 ACJ 650 (Orissa) For death of an 8-month-old female child, Rs.8,000 awarded. Cited as part of comparative authorities demonstrating that compensation need not be limited to shock and that future prospects have been recognized in other decisions.
E. Enjanadevi v. Arumugham, 1983 ACJ 625 (Madras) For death of a 12-year-old son, Rs.15,000 awarded. Cited among authorities supporting consideration of the child's prospects when assessing compensation for parents.
Assam State Transport Corporation v. K. Nessa Mazumdar, (1990) 2 G.L.R 16 : 1990 (1) G.L.J 474 On the rate and nature of interest to be allowed in such cases; observed that interest is compensatory and may be aligned with rates payable on delayed refunds under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court applied this approach to set interest at 12% per annum up to 30.9.84 and 15% per annum thereafter on the award amount.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first framing the question: whether the compensation of Rs.20,000 was adequate and, if not, what should be awarded.

It reviewed submissions and evidence. The insurer's reliance on the New India decision (limiting minor-death compensation to shock and pain) was addressed directly. The court concluded that the proposition that compensation in cases of a minor's death should be confined only to shock and pain sustained by claimants is not sound.

The court's core analytical points were:

  • Shock and pain are relevant but are only one component; there is no good reason to confine determination of compensation for a minor's death solely to mental shock and pain.
  • Future prospects and loss of expectancy (dependency that might arise later) are relevant considerations even though they involve some speculation; the mere fact that some speculation is necessary does not justify excluding that element entirely.
  • Determination of foreseeable expectancy should be made within reasonable limits using available material: family background, academic and extracurricular achievements of the child, and other relevant facts—so as to minimize speculative valuation.
  • The court accepted the evidence (testimony of the father and school teachers and school records) that the deceased was bright in studies and sports and that the parents' expectations were reasonable and justified.
  • On the basis of the evidence and realistic assessment, the court concluded that an award should include (a) an amount for shock and mental agony and (b) compensation for loss of expectancy/support to the parents.
  • The court fixed Rs.10,000 as reasonable compensation for shock and mental agony.
  • For loss of expectancy the court rejected the appellants' higher arithmetic (Rs.100,000) as unrealistically optimistic but accepted a more conservative estimate: that the child might have settled by about age 26 and could have provided around Rs.400 per month to the parents, yielding Rs.50,000 for loss of expectancy.
  • Accordingly, the court arrived at a total compensation figure of Rs.60,000 (Rs.50,000 for loss of expectancy + Rs.10,000 for shock).
  • The court also addressed interest, following the approach in Assam State Transport Corporation v. K. Nessa Mazumdar, and awarded interest at rates tied to delayed-refund rates under the Income Tax Act, 1961: 12% per annum up to 30.9.84 and 15% per annum thereafter, from the date the claim petition was filed until recovery.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The appeal is partly allowed. The claimants are awarded Rs.60,000 as compensation.

Specific directions and immediate consequences:

  • The respondents are directed to pay Rs.60,000 to the claimants.
  • Interest is awarded at 12% per annum from the date the claim petition was filed up to 30.9.84 and at 15% per annum from 1.10.84 until recovery.
  • Any payments already made are to be adjusted against the award.
  • Each party shall bear their own costs of the appeal.

Implications of the court's reasoning (as stated in the opinion):

  • The court held that future prospects/loss of expectancy of the parents can legitimately be considered when assessing compensation for the death of a minor; compensation should not be confined solely to mental shock and pain.
  • The court emphasized assessing loss of expectancy within reasonable limits using available evidence to minimize speculation (family background, the child's academic and other achievements, etc.).
  • The opinion applies these principles to the facts of this case to increase the award. The judgment articulates a methodology for factoring in expectancy for minors, but the opinion itself does not make any explicit pronouncement about establishing a binding new precedent beyond its reasoning in this case.

Any section of this summary is based exclusively on the content contained in the provided opinion and does not include information beyond the text of that opinion.

Show all summary ...

J.M Srivastava, J.:— This is claimants appeal against the judgment and award dated 21.11.1983 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Kamrup), Guwahati.

2. The claimants who are the parents had claimed compensations for the death of their seven year old son, the only child, in an accident on 7.11.77 caused by a motor bus belonging to the respondent No. 1 and at the time driven by the respondent no. 2, which was insured with the respondent no. 3. The claimants had expected their deceased son who was bright in studies to do well in life and accordingly the claim was made for Rs. 1 lakh. The claim was resisted by the respondents on the ground inter alia that the claim was excessive. The learned Tribunal on consideration of the evidence produced, by the impugned judgment and award held, that the deceased had died as a result of the accident caused due to rash and negligent driving of the bus for which the opposite-parties the present respondents were liable. The compensation payable was determined at Rs. 20,000/- which was allowed.

3. Aggrieved, the claimants have come in appeal and Sri D.K Bhattacharjee, learned connsel appearing on their behalf has contended that the deceased was the only son of the claimants, was a good student also good in sports and considering that the claimant father was a Junior Commissioned officer in the Indian Army, it was expected that the deceased would have done well in life and hence compensation determined at Rs. 20,000/- was much too inadequate. The learned counsel for the claimants has contended that atleast Rs. 1 lakh should be allowed.

4. The respondent no. 1 and 2 have not put in appearance in this appeal.

5. Shri A.K Choudhury, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Insurance Co. respondent no. 3 has argued that considering the age of the deceased the compensation allowed was fair and adequate and further that ia the case of minor, the expectancy or dependency is just speculation and accordingly it was not safe criteria for determination of compensation.

6. We have considered the submissions for the parties and the evidence on record.

7. The question for determination in this appeal is that whether the compensation allowed was adequate and if not what should be the compensation payable.

8. Shri A.K Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent Insurance Co. has relied upon The New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sangey Tsering, (1989) 1 GLR 416 where this court took the view that the injury which is caused on the death of a minor, is related to the mental shock and pain sustained by the claimants and compensation is to be allowed on that basis. The determination of compensation on the basis of working out dependency did not find favour.

9. Shri D.K Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the claimants appellants has cited K.L Pasriya v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co., 1986 ACJ 252 (P & H) where for the death of a 5 year old son Rs. 20,000/- was allowed as compensation to the parents and it was held that dependency and multiplier had to be evaluated for the purpose, M.M Patel v. Union of India, 1982 ACJ 426 (Gujarat) where for the death of 13 year old boy Rs. 54,000/- had been allowed, it was held that in evaluating a chance, positive approach to life and optimistic view should be taken; M. Mazzafar v. M. Shaikh, 1980 ACJ 516 (J & K) where for the death of a son 12 year old compensation was enhanced from Rs. 10.000/- to Rs. 25,000; Abdul Wahab v. Chandra Prakash, 1986 AZJ 1087. Allahabad where for the death of 2 year old in an accident Rs. 25,000/- as compensation Rs. 5,000/- for mental shock and agony suffered and Rs. 20,000/- towards reasonably foreseeable support in the normal Course was allowed; Altah Baksh v. D.N Panda, 1983 ACJ 650, Orissa where for a 8 month old female child Rs. 8,000/- had been allowed; E. Enjanadevi v. Arumugham, 1983 ACJ 625 (Madras) where for the death of 12 year old son Rs. 15,000/- had been allowed.

10. It should be clear from the above that the view has been taken that even in case of death of minor child it is reasonable and proper to take into consideration the future prospects for determination of compensation payable on the basis of criteria as may be available for a particular case. The view that compensation in the case of death of a minor child is only for the ‘shock and pain’ sustained by the claimants does not appear to be sound and correct.

11. We have considered the matter and think that while shock and pain may and do constitute one of the consideration, there is no good reason to confine the determination of compensation for the death of a minor in an accident only for the injury of shock and pain caused to the claimants. We see no good reason why the future prospects should not be duly taken into consideration, for future prospects even in cases of death, other than those of minors death, also tend to be in the realm of speculation. In case of death of a grown up peson who had actual caning capacity even though there is some material basis to detarmine the loss never-the less the expectancy has some measure of speculation in the determination of future prospect. While the measure of speculation may be more in the case of a minor yet in principle we find no justification for refusal of the claim only on the ground that the exercise shall be more speculative. It is true it may be difficult to determine the amount of compensation payable yet the basic fact should not be ignored or brushed aside that the parents do suffer irreparable injury due to the death of their child and there is hardly a parent who does not expect some support from his or her child when he or she was grown up and even though the dependency may not arise until some time later, loss of expectancy does occur and should be compensated as far as it may be reasonably possible to determine with as minimum speculative approach as may reasonably be possible. We therefore think that in the case of death of a minor child the claimant parents expectation from the child have to be taken into consideration for determination of just compensation payable.

12. It is true that determination of compensation in the case of death of a child may be more difficult but within resaonable limits, on the basis of the family background the academic and other activities and achievements of the child, reasonable expentancy which the parent might have had from their child may be assessed and taken taken as fair basis for determination of payable compensation.

13. The claimant the parent of deceased who was their only child must have sustained terrible shock, pain hurt, a tremendous sense of loss and almost unbearable agony and anguish for which money cannot be anywhere near just compensation yet in the absence of anything better, monetary compensation helps to some extent to make the injury somehow endurable. We think Rs. 10,000/- for the injury should be seasonable compensation.

14. We have as earlier said not been able to pursuade ourselves to share the view expressed in New India (GAU) Supra and think that the claimant parents are entitled to compensation for loss of expectancy also.

15. PW. 1 Uman Singh the father stated about expectations he and his wife had from his only son Who was bright in studies and sports. The boy was taking special coaching in English in the expectation to be taken abroad by his uncle.

16. PW-2 Daji Pawt teacher in the school where the deceased studied, had testified that the deceased was good at studies and sports. PW-3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 had also testified to the same effect. Ext. 1 to Ext. 5 school records produced also bear ont the above version. The above evidence was reliable and on its basis we accept that the claimants son the deceased was good at studies and sports and the expectation of the claimants that the deceased would have done well in life was reasonable and justified.

17. Shri D.K Bhattacharjee learned counsel for the appellants has argued conisdering that the accident took place on 7.11.77 when the deceased was 7 year father 38/36 years and mother 29 years of age, the parents would have borne the responsibility of support and education of the deceased upto the age of about 22 years that is for about 15 years, that thereafter the claimants could have reasonable-expectancy of life at 70 years the multiplier for the father could safely be 16 years and for the mother 26 years—an average of 21 years. Shri Bhattacharjee learned counsel for the appellants has further worked out expectancy at about Rs. 800/- per month which the parents could be expected to receive from the son i.e Rs. 9,600/- per year by allowing deduction for uncertainties of life Rs. 1,00,000/- (one lac) was the compensation amount payable.

18. It would be more realistic to think that the deceased would have settled in life by the age of about 26 years and could be expected to provide about Rs. 400/- p.m for the parents and accordingly we think it would be reasonable to say that Rs. 50,000/- should be fair and adequate compensation for loss of expectancy.

19. Together with compensation of Rs. 10,000/- for shock etc. the claimants should receive Rs. 60,000/- as compensation. The accident in which the clasmant's son had lost life, had occurred in 1977. The claim was made and the Tribunal made the award on 21.11.83, we think interest on the compensation payable should also be allowed. In Assam State Transport Corporation v. K. Nessa Mazumdar, (1990) 2 G.L.R 16 : 1990 (1) G.L.J 474 rate of interest that may be allowed in such cases was considered and in para 10 it was observed.—The nature and character of interest is also well settled that interest is compensatory and when awarded it partakes the character of additional compensation. The rate of interest that may be allowed, as observed in Assam State Supra, to have some reasonable basis may be as per the rate of interest payable on delayed refund under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The rate should therefore be 12% per annum upto 30.9.84 and 15% per annum thereafter.

20. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. The claimants shall receive Rs. 60,000/- as compensation from the respondents together with interest at 12% per annum thereon from the date the claim petition was filed upto 30.9.84 and at 15% per annum from 1.10.84 until recovered. Any payments already made, shall be adjusted. Parties, shall bear their own costs of this appeal.