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Mrs. Meera Puri Accused, v. The State Of Nagaland .
Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion (Appeal arising from conviction under S. 302 IPC)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges a conviction under Section 302, Penal Code, and a sentence of imprisonment for life. The accused is Mrs. Meera Puri, wife of Major Puri of 10 Assam Rifles, stationed at Mokokchung, Nagaland.
On 4 April 1969 at about 5:00 P.M., a party including the deceased, ten‑year‑old Alemnaro Ao, her mother (P.W.2), aunt (P.W.4) and two cousins were on the circular road at Mokokchung when two ladies in the compound of Major Puri's house shouted and dogs came barking. As the party prepared to return, a gunshot (“Thak” sound) was heard. The deceased was struck by a bullet and identified immediately that “the younger one” of the two ladies had shot her. She was taken to the military hospital and then to the civil hospital; she died at 9:00 A.M. on 6 April 1969.
Prosecution examined 16 witnesses. Eye‑witnesses included P.Ws. 2, 4, 10 and 11. The prosecution relied on the eye‑witnesses' testimony, a pre‑death statement recorded by Dr. Longri Ao (Ext. P‑3), the post‑mortem report by Dr. L.M. Murry (P.W.5), and ballistic examination by Mr. N. Jauhari (P.W.9) relating the seized rifle and garments to a 22 bore rifle shot. The trial court convicted the accused under S.302. On appeal, the court reviewed identification, forensic and medical evidence and reappraised the legal character of the offence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the accused (Mrs. Meera Puri) fired the shot that caused the death of Alemnaro Ao (i.e., the question of identity and responsibility for the firing).
- If the accused fired, whether the facts and evidence establish the offence of murder under S. 302, Penal Code, or instead a lesser offence such as culpable homicide not amounting to murder or an offence under S. 304‑A, Penal Code.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Accused's) Arguments — as represented by Mr. J.P. Mitter
- Submission that no case under S. 302, Penal Code, has been made out; accordingly conviction under that section should not stand.
- Criticism of trial court's remark suggesting that unless the accused plead a particular defence (e.g., that the shot was fired only to drive away dogs or by accident), she could be deprived of benefit of such a position — argued that this is incorrect in law.
- Suggested possibility that the bullet ricocheted (touched off some object) before hitting the child; submitted that ballistic examination was inadequate to conclude otherwise.
- Contended that the evidence does not establish intention to cause death or knowledge that the act would in all probability cause death.
Respondent's (State's) Arguments — as represented by the Advocate‑General, Nagaland
- Contended that the charge under S. 302 had been made out on the evidence.
- Alternatively, contended that at least an offence under S. 304‑A, Penal Code, was established.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohd. Rangawalla v. Maharashtra State, AIR 1965 SC 1616 | Approved an observation (of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Onkar Rampratap) that for S. 304‑A criminal liability requires death to be the direct result of a rash/negligent act which is the proximate and efficient cause. | The court relied on this authority to articulate and apply the proximate‑cause requirement for conviction under S. 304‑A and to distinguish S. 302 from S. 304‑A in the facts of the present case. |
| Emperor v. Onkar Rampratap, (1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 679 (quoted via Mohd. Rangawalla) | Observation that to impose liability under S. 304‑A the death must be the direct result of a rash and negligent act and must be the causa causans (proximate and efficient cause), not merely a causa sine qua non. | Cited (through Mohd. Rangawalla) as statement of the test for liability under S. 304‑A; used to support the court's conclusion that the accused's act was the proximate and efficient cause of death without intention to kill. |
| Chamman Lal v. State, AIR 1954 All 186 | Definition/explanation of criminal negligence as "a gross and culpable neglect" — failure to exercise the care which the circumstances required. | Used to characterise the accused's firing as criminally negligent (culpable rashness and negligence) fitting within S. 304‑A. |
| Tika Ram v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 300 | Statement that S. 304‑A does not apply where there is intention to cause death or knowledge that the act will probably cause death; it applies where death is caused by a rash or negligent act without such intention/knowledge. | Applied to distinguish murder (S. 302) from offences under S. 304‑A and to support appellate finding that S. 304‑A (not S. 302) was attracted by the facts. |
| Sadhu Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 271 | An instance where a person who fired (purportedly to frighten) was held not guilty of murder but guilty under S. 304‑A as the act was rash and negligent without intent to kill. | Cited as a closely analogous precedent where Supreme Court reduced conviction from murder to S. 304‑A under similar factual circumstances; used to support reducing the present case to S. 304‑A. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded through the following principal steps, based strictly on the evidence and submissions reproduced in the opinion:
-
Assessment of forensic and medical evidence:
- Post‑mortem (P.W.5) established perforating wounds consistent with a bullet injury; internal findings included multiple intestinal perforations, torn mesentery vessels, blood in peritoneal cavity and generalized peritonitis; death by haemorrhage/peritonitis was sufficient to cause death.
- Ballistic expert (P.W.9) found the seized rifle had been fired previously; holes in the garments corresponded to a 22 bore rifle shot; spectrographic lead around garment holes and a test firing lent support to the conclusion that the shot could be from the rifle seized (the rifle produced by the husband of the accused).
- The court concluded it was safe to depend on the ballistic opinion and that the child died as a consequence of the bullet injury discharged from the seized rifle.
-
Evaluation of identification evidence (who fired):
- Key eyewitnesses (P.Ws.2 and 4 — mother and aunt) stated that immediately after the shot the deceased identified “the younger one” of the two ladies in the compound; only two ladies were present — the accused (about 22) and her Ayah (about 40), so the younger clearly referred to the accused.
- The deceased's contemporaneous oral statement and subsequent recorded dying declaration (Ext. P‑3) repeatedly stated a woman from the quarter (from which dogs came out) fired at her and that she could identify the quarter and person.
- Other eyewitnesses (P.Ws.10 and 11 — Major Jagjit Singh and a carpenter) saw Mrs. Major Puri (the accused) with a 22 bore rifle and described hearing a rifle fire and seeing the accused with the rifle; the trial court and the appellate court found these witnesses' demeanour and evidence trustworthy despite attempts to impeach them on timing and other peripheral matters.
- The court considered and rejected the argument that the absence of the accused's name in the first information report fatally undermined the eyewitnesses' identification; it held the FIR is not substantive evidence that overrides credible eyewitness testimony and gave context (informant's preoccupation with medical treatment, hesitancy to name a colleague's wife in writing) for the omission.
- The absence of a formal test identification parade was considered of limited consequence because P.Ws.2 and 4 knew the accused from before.
- On balance, the court was satisfied that the accused fired the rifle from which the fatal bullet was discharged.
-
Determination of the character of offence (murder v. culpable negligence):
- The court examined whether the accused intended to cause death or knew her act would probably cause death (elements required for murder/S.302). It found reasonable doubt on intention/knowledge: the accused likely fired to scare dogs or to frighten, possibly aiming upward from a lower level, and did not aim deliberately to kill the child.
- The court acknowledged a possible alternative explanation (ricochet) raised by defence counsel and that ballistic evidence could not conclusively establish distance or trajectory; this generated reasonable doubt about specific intent to kill.
- However, the court held that firing a loaded rifle in that manner in a hilly area with children nearby was rash and negligent. The accused “let go the loaded rifle rashly and negligently without due care and attention for the safety of the children and other persons in the neighbourhood.”
- Relying on authorities (Mohd. Rangawalla, Chamman Lal, Tika Ram, Sadhu Singh), the court applied the legal test for S. 304‑A: death must be the direct, proximate and efficient result of a rash/negligent act (causa causans). The court found that requirement satisfied here: the accused's act was the direct and proximate cause of the child's death without intervening negligence.
- Consequently, the court gave the accused benefit of doubt on S. 302, acquitted her of murder, but held her guilty of an offence under S. 304‑A for culpable rashness and negligence.
-
Sentence and ancillary orders:
- The court imposed a sentence under S. 304‑A: the period of imprisonment of four months already undergone, and a fine of Rs. 2,000, in default two months' rigorous imprisonment.
- The court directed that the fine, if paid, be paid as compensation to P.W.2 (the mother of the deceased).
- The appeal was allowed to the extent of altering the conviction and sentence (acquittal under S. 302; conviction under S. 304‑A with modified sentence and fine/compensation directions).
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appellant (Mrs. Meera Puri) is acquitted of the charge under Section 302, Penal Code, and is convicted under Section 304‑A, Penal Code.
Consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):
- Direct effect on the parties: The conviction under S. 302 and life sentence were set aside. The accused was convicted under S. 304‑A and sentenced to four months' imprisonment already undergone and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000 (in default two months' rigorous imprisonment).
- Monetary award: The court ordered that any paid fine shall be given as compensation to P.W.2 (mother of the deceased).
- Precedential/broader implications: The court applied existing authorities to distinguish intentional murder from death caused by a rash/negligent act. The opinion does not claim to establish a new legal precedent; it applies established principles (as cited) to the facts to reduce the conviction from S. 302 to S. 304‑A.
Order: Appeal allowed in part — conviction and sentence under S. 302 set aside; conviction under S. 304‑A upheld and sentence/compensation ordered. M.C. Pathak, J. agreed. "Order accordingly."
Goswami, C.J:— This appeal is against the judgment of conviction under S. 302, Penal Code, and sentence of imprisonment for life. The accused (Mrs. Meera Puri) is the wife of a certain Major in 10 Assam Rifles described as Major Puri, stationed at Mokokchung in Nagaland.
2. The prosecution case is briefly as follows: On 4th April, 1969, at about 5.00 P.M, the deceased Miss Alemnaro Ao, a young girl of about ten years of age, was going by the circular road at Mokokchung with her mother Mrs. Asangla Ao (P.W 2), her aunt Miss Amenla Ao (P.W 4) and her two cousins, who were the daughters of Obangtemjen Ao (P.W 1). P.W 1 has married the sister of P.Ws 2 and 4. This small party walking by the road taw some edible leaves below the road and the children went down to pick these up. At this time, two ladies were seen in the compound of Major Pari's house at a short distance from the hospital road which is at a higher level than the house situated on a slope of a hill. The area is hilly. The two ladies came down to the corner of their compound and shouted “Jao Jao”. After that, two dogs came barking at them. Some earth was pelted at the dogs by the mother. The mother also called back the children to return. As the party was about to return, a ‘Thak’ sound of a gunfire was heard and when they looked towards the side from which the sound was coming, they saw the accused lowering down a gun. The deceased was hit by a bullet; and she immediately gave out that “Mother, out of the two ladies the younger one has shot me”. The daughter was picked up by the mother and P.W 4 was sent to report to P.W 1. He came within about fifteen minutes and took the child to the military hospital, where however there was no doctor available and in an army vehicle she was brought to the civil hospital where the doctors treated her. The small child died two days after on 6th April, 1969 at 9.00 A.M On the above facts, the accused stands charged under S. 302, Penal Code for committing murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Alemnaro Ao by firing at her with a 22 bore rifle.
3. Prosecution has examined sixteen witnesses, out of which P.Ws 2, 4, 10 and 11 are the eye witnesses to the occurrence. Prosecution rests on their evidence as also on a statement of the deceased recorded by the doctor Longri Ao (P.W 3) prior to her death. The statement is marked as Ext. P-3. Prosecution also examined Dr. L.M Murry (P.W 5), who found on post-mortem examination one perforated wound on the left iliac fossa 1½″ medial to the left illi chest and another perforated wound at the back on the tip of the left 12th rib. There was no charring or blackening at or near the wound. On internal examination, he found small perforation in the small intestine at four places and one perforation in the large intestine. There was a tear in mesentery which had torn several mesentery vessels. There was also a perforating wound at the psoas muscle on the left side. Blood had collected in the peritoneal cavity. The first perforating wound was through and through and is corresponded to the second perforating wound at the back. No bullet was found inside the body. The size of the wound was quite small and he is not quite sure whether it could be caused by 22 bore bullet. He however opined that the injury was caused by some small be re fire arm. In his opinion, death was caused due to intra peritoneal bleeding with generalised peritonitis causing circulatory failure and in the ordinary course it was sufficient to cause death. In cross-examination he states that he has not given the measurements of the wounds. The back wound was about 4″ higher in level than the front wound. He himself has fire arm and he knows its use. Mr. N. Jauhari (P.W 9) is the Assistant Director of Central Forensic Laboratory cum-Assistant Chemical Examiner to the Government of India in Calcutta. He is the Ballistic Expert to whom the rifle which was produced by the husband of the accused and the ammunitions which were seized from the accused's house with the Samiz, underwear and frock which were in the wearing of the deceased were sent for examination by the police along with the report of the post mortem. He submitted his report Ext. P-7. He stated in court that after chemical examination he found that the rifle bore evidence of being fired before it was received by him. It was however not possible to give its duration. He examined the three garments. No blackening or charring was found around the hole in the garments. He could not give the distance of firing. The frock and the underwear were found to have one hole each corresponding to the wound on the left iliac fossa. No hole corresponding to the second wound on the tip of the left 12th rib could be found on any of the garments. P.W 9 states that in the event of the frock hanging in the normal manner, this suggests the possibility that the holes in the garments are the holes through which the bullet entered before causing the wound on the left iliac fossa. According to him, it probably came out of the second wound of the left 12th rib but failed to penetrate the frock. The fact that the wound on the left 12th rib is located at a place where the body was not covered by the underwear could account for the absence of another hole in the underwear. He however stated that these observations needed confirmation in the light of observations made by the autopsy surgeon about the nature and appearance of the two wounds. Spectrogaphic examination revealed lead around the edges of the holes of the garments. The visual appearance of the holes was also similar to that produced by firing the ammunition seized from the accused's rifle (Ext. M. 4). He therefore concluded that the holes in the garments could be produced by 22 bore rifle shot. He stated in the course of cross-examination that due to loss of energy it is possible that the bullet may not have passed through the garments after passing through the body and hence might have fallen down at the place where the victim was hit. He fired seven rounds from the seized rifle for experiment and tested by firing one round on a piece of cloth taken from the frock. Prom the evidence of the doctor as well as the Ballistic Expert, it is established that the wounds found on the person of the deceased were caused by a bullet injury. We are also satisfied that bullet was fired from the rifle seized from the accused's husband. The Ballistic Expert fired one round from this rifle with a bullet seized from the house of the accused through a piece of cloth taken from the frock and he has therefore sufficient materials on which he based his conclusion, and we are satisfied that it is safe to depend upon his opinion. We are also satisfied that the child died as a consequence of the bullet injury.
4. The most important question is who has caused the bullet injury on the person of the deceased. The occurrence took place at about 5.00 P.M After about fifteen minutes, P.W 1 arrived and he sent the first information report to the Thana which was registered at about 6.00 P.M P.W 1 is a Gazetted Officer and relation of the deceased. At the time of occurrence, P.W 2 and the deceased were living with him. In the brief written report to the police station, he merely stated that “one small girl named Alemnaro was shot at in abdomen from one quarter of Assam Rifles and now in military hospital. Kindly do necessary action immediately.” It is therefore submitted on behalf of the accused that the absence of the name of the accused in the first information report goes to show that no one knew who had fired from the rifle. P.W 1, in the course of cross-examination, has stated that before he had sent the written report to the police he was informed by the mother of the injured girl that the shot was fired at from Major Puri's house. He also stated in examination in chief that when the injured girl was taken from the place of occurrence to the Military Hospital, she had pointed out the house from where she was fired at by a lady after taking aim at her. He also stated that P.W 4 had met him as he was coming down from his house which is about two furlongs from the place of occurrence. She did not tell him who had fired. He also did not ask her about it. He further stated in cross-examination that after the arrest was made, he came to know that a woman was involved in the case. It is submitted that the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 4 is unreliable judged from the evidence of P.W 1 and the absence of the name of the accused in the first information report. The first information report is not a piece of substantive evidence. It is difficult to accept the argument that from mere absence of the name of the accused in the first information report, the entire evidence of P.Ws 2 and 4 should be rejected. The first information report can be used to corroborate the statement of the informant or to contradict him. But because of some infirmity in the first information report given by a witness who has not seen the occurrence, the evidence of the eye-witnesses cannot be rejected if otherwise the evidence is trustworthy. One has to remember that P.W 1 is a Government Officer and having not seen the occurrence, even if he could gather about the identity of the accused, he might feel hesitant to immediately put it in writing and might have intended only to set the police in motion for investigating into the case. Besides, the deceased being a relation and a small girl, he was more concerned about the medical attention which she would immediately need, rather than think about any other thing. We are therefore unable to give undue importance to the absence of the name of the accused in the first information report lodged in this case.
5. P.W 2 states that when the dogs came barking at them, she requested the owner to call back the dogs and the owner was Mrs. Major Puri. She knew the accused from before the occurrence. She also knew the other lady who was standing there. She was the Ayah of Mrs. Puri. The age of the Ayah is about 40 years. The accused being about 22 years at the time of the occurrence must be the younger of the two ladies. There is absolutely no doubt that in the compound of the accused there were only two ladies, the dogs and two men in the neighbourhood. P.W 2 in court has stated that “after hearing that ‘Thak’ sound I looked that side and saw the lady (points out towards the accused) taking down a gun. My daughter told me that “mother, out of the two ladies the younger one has shot me”. This is the first oral statement made by the deceased with regard to the bullet injury which later caused her death. This statement made by the deceased immediately she has received the injury is corroborated by her dying declaration recorded next morning in the hospital. There she said:
“I was shot at by a woman whom I saw from the courtyard of her quarter.
The same quarter from which dogs came out.
I saw her aiming at us then immediatly I was hit.
I can show the quarter and identify the person.
I can show the place where I was standing.
It is an Assam Rifle Officer's quarter.”
6. The oral statement of the deceased and her recorded statement clearly establish that the younger lady fired the shot. The medical evidence corroborates the bullet injury in the person of the deceased. P.W 2 however stated in cross-examination that she told P.W 1 that Mojor's wife had shot, but she did not, specifically say that it was Mrs. Puri. She also stated that her daughter had told P.W 1 in the hospital that Major's wife had fired at her. She also stated that she had herself seen the accused lowering down the gun. In cross-examination she denied the suggestion that she had not told the police that Mrs. Puri had fired. The police officer (P.W 14) had confirmed that she had not told in that manner. It is however very difficult to appreciate this question, as it is nowhere suggested to her that she had not stated that Major's wife had shot as the witness clearly stated that she had not referred to the accused as Mrs. Puri, but as Major's wife. This question in this form, therefore, was very much confusing to the witness.
7. P.W 4 is the other eye-witness who hae corroborated P.W 2. She knew the accused as well as the Ayah from before the occurrence. She had often seen the Ayah carrying a baby. She stated that as they were about to go back. “Thak” sound of gunfire was heard. She looked that side and saw the gun being lowered by the accused (pointing out towards the accused). She further stated that the deceased pressed her stomach and said that out of the two ladies the younger one had fired at her and so saying she collapsed. She immediately went home and found that one of the two other small girls had already informed P.W 1 and when she reached home P.W 1 was already stepping down from the house to proceed to the place of occurrence. She stated in cross-examination that when the lady was seen lowering down the gun, there were two men also in the neighbourhood and the Ayah was near the baby. She had not seen those men when the dogs were set at them with the words ‘Jao Jao’. She was asked in cross-examination whether she stated specifically before the police that one of the two ladies was “wife of that Major”. She replied; “I had stated before the Police like that”. The police officer (P.W 14), however, proved that she had not stated before him that one of those two ladies was “wife of that Major”.
8. Major Jagjit Singh (P.W 10) is another eye-witness. In 1969 he was posted to Transport Platoon of the Assam Rifles at Mokokchung. He was transferred from Mokokchung in September 1969 and he was stationed at Kerala before proceeding on leave to his home town at Patiala, from where he came and gave evidence in January, 1970. He saw the occurrence from the gate of the Gurdwara which was nearby and he was there with a carpenter (P.W 11) who was called to take measurement of the gate of the Gurdwara. He stated as follows:
“I heard some noise and barking of dogs. These persons ran towards the upper road shouting and the dogs were after them. While running to the upper road they picked up something to keep the dogs away. When they had reached the upper road and the dogs were 15 to 20 yards away from them. I heard a 22 bore rifle fire. I saw Mrs. Major Puri aiming 22 bore rifle towards these persons (ladies and children). After the firing, the girls shouted and ran away. There was a sharp bend after 5 yards and I did not see what happened after that.”
9. It is suggested in cross-examination that this witness bears grudge against the accused as he had behaved rudely with her in one of the parties. The witness denied this suggestion. The witness was asked about some irregularity in the matter of missing of 9000 litres of petrol from his department. He stated that there was such a report at a time when he was out of the headquarters at Jorhat. He denied the suggestion that the enquiry into the matter had been ordered by Major Puri. He asserted that it was Col. Pathania who was the then Commandant of 10 Assam Rifle had passed the order for enquiry. The suggestion was that he had some misunderstanding with Major Puri about this incident. The witness however emphatically denied the same. The evidence of this witness has been commented upon by the learned Counsel for the accused on the ground that he was examined by the Police on 4-5-1969 although he had stated in his evidence that he was examined by the police “after about ten days or so after the incident.” He also admitted to have given a written report to the police on being asked to do so by the police and the police officer also admitted that this was taken as he might not be available later. It is also pointed out that the witness had stated before the police that “he saw Mrs. Meera Puri standing in front of her house with a 22 bore rifle in her hand,” whereas in court he has stated that she was aiming the rifle towards the children. The witness explained that “the rifle was in Mrs. Puri's hand but it was supported from, the shoulder and hence I inferred that it was aimed.” From the above, it is suggested that this witness is absolutely unreliable and his evidence should be rejected. It is true that the police ought to have been able to find this witness Boon after the occurrence and recorded his statement. It must be however remembered that he is a Major in the Army and his unwillingness to volunteer against the wife of a colleague without being asked may be natural in the entire circumstances in which these army, men are placed in an out of the way hill-station. The comment about his examination by the police about ten days or so after the incident can also be attributed to an honest inaccuracy which by itself is not sufficient to dub this witness as a liar. When he gave evidence in January, 1970 after about nine months of the occurrence when he had already lost touch with the place and the people, it may be natural to have made such a bona fide mistake. The trial court has observed the demeanour of this witness and has accepted his evidence. We are also satisfied that his evidence is trustworthy.
10. Mangha Singh (P.W 11) is the remaining eye-witness. He is a carpenter and he-corroborates P.W 10. He stated that “when the children reached the bend, I heard a sound of ‘tak’ and saw Memsaheb with a rifle on her-shoulder. It was a 22 bore rifle. I knew Memsaheb very well since before. She is present here in court (points out towards the accused).” He has deposed about some approach by the accused's relations to prevail upon him not to give evidence. The trial court has also observed the demeanour of this witness and accepted his evidence as reliable. He stated in cross-examination that due to fear he had not gone to the place of occurrence himself. He also did not tell anyone about his seeing the occurrence at that time. He further stated that he was examined by the police 5 or 6 days after the occurrence and was called to the police station for that purpose. The approach of the accused's servant and relation was after about 10 or 15 days of the occurrence. He also admits that P.W 10 had helped his wife during her serious illness when the witness was away from home. It is strenuously contended that this witness is a false witness on his own evidence as he was examined by the police only on the 30th of April, whereas he has stated in his evidence that he was examined 5 or 6 days after the occurrence. We are not prepared to reject the entire testimony on the sole ground that he has stated before the court that he was examined by the police 5 or 6 days after the occurrence, when, in fact, the police officer had deposed that he was examined 26 days after the occurrence. He has corroborated the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 regarding the circumstances in which the incident has taken place and it is difficult to hold that he would be deposing falsely against the accused only at the request of P.W 10 against whom also no grudge has been established. We therefore accept his evidence as reliable.
11. It is also pointed out by the learned Counsel that the learned Judge has not relied upon the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 4 with regard to the identity of the accused. It is well settled that even if the trial court rejects certain evidence there is no legal bar in the appellate court accepting such evidence if it appears to be trustworthy alter considering the entire evidence independently. It is however true that the appellate court in doing so will give due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court. In this case, however, the trial court has not absolutely rejected the testimony of P.Ws 2 and 4. It has accepted their testimony on all matters except with regard to the identity of the accused on the ground that these two witnesses have not identified the accused in a test identification parade arranged by the police. If therefore we are satisfied that the identity of the accused is satisfactorily established, this observation of the trial court would not be of much consequence. We also do not think that absence of a test identification parade in this case is of great consequence. P.Ws 2 and 4 knew the accused from before and knew her to be the wife of the Major. In this view of the matter, the test identification parade would not be of great weight. As pointed out earlier, the fact that the deceased immediately shouted out that the younger of the two ladies had fired and there were only two ladies, the accused and her Ayah who was much older than the former, and the Ayah being busy with the baby the identity of the accused is clearly established in the evidence. Both P.Ws 2 and 4 state about the deceased's immediate state, meat after being bit by the bullet and this statement has not at all been challenged in cross examination. The deceased also made a similar statement in the dying declaration. P.Ws 10 and 11 have also identified her having seen her with the rifle in her hand immediately after the report of the gun fire. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion in agreement with the finding of the trial court that the accused fired from the rifle that has been seized and the bullet discharged from the rifle in her hand hit the deceased.
12. Having arrived at this conclusion, the next important question is what offence has been committed by the accused. In other words, has the:offence under S. 302, Penal Code, been made out? Mr. J.P Mitter, the learned Counsel for the accused, has drawn our attention to the following observations in the judgment of the trial court:
“In the instant case the accused has not pleaded that she had fired the shot to drive away the dogs which were running after the girl and by accident or by mistake the bullet had hit the unfortunate girl, or that she had fired the shot only to frighten away the girls without meaning to hit them, but by mistake one of the girls was hit. In the first case only an offence under. 30-1A, Penal Code might have been made out and in the other under S. 304-A or at worst under S. 304, Penal Code. In either case the punishment would have been quite light and even might have consisted of heavy fine only. However, no such pleading or even suggestion was made. On the other hand the accused had totally denied the entire occurrence.”
13. It is not correct in law that unless an accused takes a specific) plea by way of defence he may be deprived of the benefit of a position to which he may be entitled in law emerging out of the evidence and circumstances disclosed in the trial. The learned Counsel relying on the above observations of the trial court has strenuously argued that no case under S. 302, Penal Code, has been made out and there is no question of even conviction under S. 304-A, Penal Code. When this was put to the learned Advocate-General, Nagaland, who is appearing on behalf of the State, he contends that according to him the charge has been made out and, at any rate, there is no escape from conviction under S. 304-A, Penal Code. We have seen from the evidence of the Ballistic Expert that he could not give any idea about the distance from which the bullet was fired. We have however the evidence of the eye-witnesses wherefrom it is clear that the distance is not too far as the nearest point of the circular road near-about which the deceased was standing would be 35 to 40 yards from the accused's quarter. P.W 9 has also stated that due to loss of energy the bullet may not have passed through the garments and might have fallen down where the victim was hit. The bullet was however not found at the place of occurrence, nor was it found inside the body. The entire area was hilly and the place from where the accused fired was lower than where the deceased was standing. According to P.W 10, the children were outside the compound on a slope which was higher than the roof of Major Puri's house. He also stated in cross-examination that there was a temporary telephone post on the circular road which was more or less in line with the residence of Major Puri.
14. Mr. Mitter submitted that the injury could only have been caused by a bullet which had touched off some object and in consequence ricocheted at an angle before hitting the child and that the angle at which the ballet had thus ricocheted was reflected in the injury itself. The examination of the Ballistic Expert was not adequate and it is not possible on the evidence as it is to come to a conclusion one way or the other on the point raised by the learned Counsel. It is however difficult to say that there is no force in the submission made by the learned Counsel. It is therefore possible that the accused might have fired the shot to scare away the dogs or to divert the attention of the charging dogs from the children. The children were already alarmed and the mother was throwing earth towards the dogs who were running after the children. We are therefore prepared to give the accused benefit of doubt with regard to the offence under S. 302, Penal Code, and hold her not guilty under that section. We are not satisfied that the accused intended to cause death of the deceased by firing or knew that by this act of hers she would cause death of the deceased. That however does not absolve her from the responsibility for her rash and negligent act in firing towards the dogs with the children about, in a way completely regardless of the safety of human life in an undulating hilly area as it is. The accused let go the loaded rifle rashly and negligently without due care and attention for the safety of the children and other persons in the neighbourhood and also of those who may be using the public road.
15. We have not accepted that she aimed at the deceased child or fired at the party with the deliberate intention of causing death to her or to any one of them. P.W 10 only inferred that she was aiming at the children. The dying declaration mentions aiming, but in view of the fact that the deceased and P.W 10 were standing at different levels from the accused, who was admittedly standing at a lower level, it is possible that both the deceased and P.W 10 were honestly believing that the accused was aiming towards the children. It is probable therefore that she was aiming at the dogs or aiming high or upward from her lower level and this act of the accused cannot be conclusively held to be intentionally or knowingly aiming to kill the girl or anyone in the party because of the fact that the latter may be disturbing the dogs and the tranquillity of the bungalow by throwing stones at them and on the roof. We are therefore satisfied that the evidence produced by the prosecution has established a charge under S. 304-A, Penal Code, against the accused.
16. By her act in firing from the rifle in the way the did with the full knowledge of the children and others nearabout, she has done a rash and negligent act, which, although does not amount to culpable homicide, brings her within the mischief of S. 304-A, Penal Code. We consider her rash and negligent act in firing in that way as culpable rashness and negligence and not merely an error of judgment or defect of (sic) intelligence. Death of the child is the direct result of her rash and negligent act in firing the rifle. This rash and negligent act of hers is the direct, proximate and efficient cause of the child's death. The Supreme Court in Mohd. Rangawalla v. Maharashtra State, AIR 1965 SC 1616 at p. 1618, has approved of the following observation of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Onkar Rampratap, (1902) 4 Bom. L.R 679:
“To impose criminal liability under S. 304A, Penal Code, it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act most be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another's negligence. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine qua non.”
17. As has been stated in Chamman Lal v. State, AIR 1954 All 186:
“Criminal negligence is a gross and culpable neglect, that is to say, a failure to exercise that care and failure to take that precaution which, having regard to the circumstances, it was the imperative duty of the individual to take.”
18. Similarly, in Tika Ram v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 300, it is observed as follows:
“This section (referring to S. 304-A) obviously does not apply to cases where there is an intention to cause death or knowledge that the act done will in all probability cause death. It only applies to cases in which, without any such intention or knowledge death is caused by what is described as a “rash” or “negligent” act A negligent act is an act done without doing something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or an act which a prudent or reasonable man would not do in the circumstances Attending it.”
19. In a case of causing death by firing, reported in AIR 1954 SC 271, Sadhu Singh, S/O Harnam Singh v. State Of Pepsu, the facts of which may be briefly mentioned: A, a mahant, went to the house of B who was having a drink party. B was respectful to A and was over-anxious to show all hospitality to him. B was anxious that the Mahant should not go away from his house without taking meals and spending the night with him, and seeing that he was going away, in all probability B let go his gun without aiming it at the Mahant in order to prevent him from leaving his place by terrifying him to some extent. The shot hit A in chest and he died of the wound later on. On the above facts, their Lord ship of the Supreme Court held, that:
“On the materials placed on the record it could not be held proved that B had any intention of firing at the Mahant. He seems to have palled the trigger without aiming at the Mahant in a state of intoxication in order to see that by the gun fire the Mahant was prevented from leaving his place. It was a wholly rash and negligent act on B's part or at the worst was an act which would amount to manslaughter. It could not be held to constitute an offence of murder. B was, therefore, held guilty of an offence under S. 304A, Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment already undergone by him.”
20. This was a case in which the accused was convicted by the trial Court under S. 302, Penal Code and sentenced to transportation for life which was affirmed by the High Court and the Supereme Court acquitted him under S. 302, Penal Code, but sentenced him under S. 304A, Penal Code as noted earlier. We are also clearly of opinion that in the instant case the accused has committed an offence under S. 304A, Penal Code. We therefore hold her not guilty under S. 302, Penal Code and set aside the conviction and sentence under that section. The accused is convicted under S. 304A, Penal Code, and sentenced to the period of imprisonment of four months undergone by her and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. The entire fine, if paid, shall be paid as compensation to P.W 2, the mother of the deceased. The appeal is allowed as indicated above and conviction and sentence alter, ed accordingly.
M.C Pathak, J.:— I agree.
21. Order accordingly.
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