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Smt. Ramani Bala Devi v. Kanai Lal Malakar And Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal is by Srimati Ramani Bala Devi against an order of acquittal dated 29.3.1962 by Shri Bimal Deb, Magistrate First Class, Tripura.
The prosecution case (complaint lodged on 20.4.61 before the S.D.M., Sadar) was that on 19.4.61 at about 5:00 p.m., while returning from the house of Madhab Chandra Debnath and passing near the house of Shri Kamala Malakar, the accused Kanai Malakar, Kamala Malakar and Mohan Lal Das assaulted the complainant due to previous enmity. The complainant raised an alarm, bystanders rescued her, and she obtained medical examination before filing the complaint the next day.
The S.D.M. transferred the matter to Shri Bimal Deb, Magistrate First Class, who examined the complainant and summoned the three accused under Section 323 I.P.C. The accused denied the charge. Kamala Malakar pleaded that on the day of occurrence the wife of Gurudas caught her by the hair and that the complainant (Ramani) inflicted a blow with a sharp weapon causing serious injury; she said a complaint by her husband had been lodged and that the present complaint was intended as a counterblast.
The prosecution examined four witnesses. The defence led no oral witnesses but produced the F.I.R. of the cross case (G.K. No. 402 of 1961), an outdoor ticket of V.M. Hospital in the name of Kamala Malakar, and two discharge certificates of Kamala Malakar. The cross F.I.R. (G.R. No. 402 of 1961) was lodged by Kanai Malakar against Ramani Bala Debnath and others under Sections 148/324 read with Section 149 I.P.C.
The Magistrate, after considering the complainant's evidence, held that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused, giving them the benefit of doubt. The complainant-appellant challenged that acquittal before the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Magistrate delivered the judgment without properly appreciating and writing the judgment (procedural irregularity alleged by the appellant).
- Whether the judgment is invalid because it was purportedly delivered in the absence of the appellant's counsel (and whether absence alone invalidates a criminal judgment).
- Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficed to overturn the Magistrate's acquittal — i.e., whether there exist "substantial and compelling" reasons to set aside the acquittal.
- Whether certain documents relied on by the defence (the cross-case F.I.R., the outdoor hospital ticket and discharge certificates) were admissible in evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by learned Counsel for the appellant)
- The learned Magistrate delivered the judgment without appreciating or writing the evidence; multiple dates were given for judgment delivery and the judgment was allegedly pronounced without the judgment being ready, suggesting it may have been delivered without being written and signed on 29.3.62. This procedural illegality is argued to be not curable under Section 537 Cr.P.C.
- The judgment was delivered in the absence of the appellant's counsel; this absence, the appellant contends, invalidates the judgment.
- On the merits, the appellant contends that testimony of all the eyewitnesses overwhelmingly proved that the accused belaboured the appellant, and that the Magistrate erred in acquitting them without properly appreciating that evidence — causing a miscarriage of justice and meriting conviction on appeal.
- The appellant also argued that the defence documents (the outdoor ticket and discharge certificates) were inadmissible and that the Magistrate erred in admitting them.
Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by learned Counsel for the respondents)
- An appeal against acquittal is an extraordinary remedy and should be exercised sparingly; courts should not readily interfere with an order of acquittal.
- The cross-case F.I.R. and the public medical documents are admissible in evidence: the documents are public records and admissible under Sections 35 and 74 of the Evidence Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sheo Swamp v. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) | Held that High Courts have full power (under Sections 417, 418 and 423) to review the evidence on which an acquittal is founded; no limitation on that power, but appellate courts must give weight to (1) trial judge's view of credibility, (2) presumption of innocence, (3) accused's right to benefit of doubt, and (4) slowness to disturb findings of fact by a judge who saw witnesses. | The court relied on these principles as binding guidance: it acknowledged the High Court's full power to review acquittals but emphasised the need to give proper weight to trial judge's assessments and the presumption of innocence when considering whether to reverse an acquittal. |
| Prandas v. State (1950) | Reaffirmed Sheo-Swarup: the High Court may reverse an acquittal and there is no rule that it can do so only in cases of perverse findings; it reiterated the principles from Sheo-Swarup. | The court cited Prandas as confirmation that the High Court's power to review acquittals is plenary, reinforcing the legal framework within which the present appeal must be assessed. |
| Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab (1957) | Confirmed that while the High Court can review acquittals, the presumption of innocence is reinforced by acquittal and appellate courts must be slow to disturb trial judge's factual findings; there must be substantial and compelling reasons to disagree. | The court applied this principle to set the standard of review: it held that unless substantial and compelling reasons exist, the High Court should not overturn the trial Court's acquittal. The court used this as a standard for deciding whether to set aside the Magistrate's finding. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two broad strands: (A) evaluation of the procedural complaints about judgment delivery and (B) merits review of the evidence under the established standard for appeals against acquittal.
A. Procedural complaints regarding judgment delivery
- The court found nothing on the record to support the appellant's counsel's assertion that the Magistrate had informed him the judgment would be delivered on 31.3.62. The record showed 29.3.62 was fixed and that the judgment was delivered on that day.
- The court noted that if such an assertion was true it was the duty of the appellant's counsel to file an affidavit to substantiate it; no such affidavit was filed.
- On the contention that the judgment was delivered in the absence of the appellant's counsel, the court held that absence alone does not invalidate a criminal judgment. The court relied on Sub-clause (3) of Section 366 (as cited in the opinion) which provides that a judgment shall not be deemed invalid solely because of the absence of any party or pleader on the notified day or for defects in notice of the day and place.
- Additionally, the court observed that the appellant's counsel had notice of the date for delivery; therefore the contention that delivery in his absence invalidated the judgment did not succeed.
- The court further observed that a reading of the judgment shows it was delivered after appreciation of the evidence, contrary to the appellant's claim that the Magistrate had not written/appreciated the evidence.
B. Review of the evidence on merits
- The court set out the legal standard applicable to appeals against acquittal: High Courts have full power to review evidence underlying an acquittal but must be slow to disturb the trial judge's findings unless there are substantial and compelling reasons. The court cited Sheo Swamp v. Emperor, Prandas v. State, and Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab in support of this standard.
- On examining the evidence, the court noted that the documents produced by the respondents (F.I.R. and other documents) indicated there had been a scuffle between two women (the appellant and Kamala Malakar) and that both sustained injuries. However, the prosecution witnesses denied that fact, which the court described as a contradiction showing they had not spoken the truth on that point.
- The court accepted that there were cross cases arising from the same incident and noted it was unfortunate they were tried by different magistrates; had they been tried together the fact-finding might have been easier. Nevertheless, the court accepted that cross complaints existed and that both sides had injuries.
- The court explained the legal consequence of injuries on both sides: where injuries are present on both parties, the prosecution must explain cogently how the accused sustained injuries and who the aggressor was. In this case, the prosecution failed to explain the injuries on the respondent (Kamala Malakar), leaving a lacuna in the prosecution's case.
- Because of that lacuna — the prosecution's failure to explain the injuries on the other party and to resolve who was the aggressor — the court concluded that the prosecution evidence was incomplete and that no court should act on such evidence. Consequently, the Magistrate's finding of acquittal was correct on that factual record and could not be easily assailed.
- Regarding admissibility challenges: the appellant contended the cross-case F.I.R. and the medical documents were inadmissible. The court rejected the contention about the F.I.R., holding that when an occurrence is the subject of two cross cases the first information report in one case is admissible in the counter case (noting that in every case the entire statement may not be admissible). On the medical documents (outdoor ticket and discharge certificates), the court accepted the respondents' submission that they were public documents admissible under Sections 35 and 74 of the Evidence Act, being entries in an official register made by a public servant in the discharge of official duties.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED. The appeal was dismissed and the Magistrate's order of acquittal dated 29.3.1962 was upheld.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The acquittal granted by the Magistrate stands; the accused remain acquitted on the charges as adjudged by the Magistrate.
- Broader implications: The court applied established precedent regarding the High Court's power to review acquittals (Sheo Swamp, Prandas, Balbir Singh) and reiterated that the High Court should be slow to disturb findings of fact by a trial judge unless there are substantial and compelling reasons. The court found no such reasons in the present record. The opinion does not purport to establish a new principle of law beyond applying these settled authorities.
This summary is derived exclusively from the supplied opinion text. No facts, arguments, precedents, or conclusions have been added beyond what appears in that text.
C.
1. This is an appeal by Srimati Ramani Bala Devi, against the order of acquittal by Shri Bimal Deb, Magistrate first class, Tripura, dated 29.3.1962.
2. The facts leading to this appeal are Just a few and simple.
3. In order to understand trio case, a brief resume of the facts of the case is given below:
4. The prosecution case, as disclosed by Srimati Raman Bala Devi, appellant In her complaint, lodged before the S.D.M., Sadar, on 20.4.61, is that on 19.4.61, at about 5-00 p.m., while returning from the house of Madhab Chandra Debnath, when she reached on the road near the house of Shri Kamala Malakar, Kanai Malakar, Kamala Malakar and Mohan Lal Das, assaulted her due to previous enmity. When she was being beaten she raised an alarm, which attracted the passers by, who rescued her. After that she went to the Doctor, and got her injury examined by him, and then filed the complaint the next day in the Court of S.D.M., Sadar.
5. The S.D.M., Sadar, transferred the case to the file of Shri Bimal Deb, Magistrate First Class, who examined her and summoned all the 3 accused persons under Section 323 I.P.C.
6. The accused appeared in compliance with the summons and denied the charge. Srimati Kamala Malakar, while denying the charge pleaded that on the day of occurrence the wife of Gurudas caught her by the hair and Ramani inflicted blow on her person with a sharp weapon and due to that she received serious injury, and remained confined to bed in the hospital as an indoor patient for a couple of days. When her husband lodged a complaint against them in the Police Station about this occurrence, this complaint has been filed against them in order to counterblast that case.
7. The prosecution examined as many as 4 witnesses In order to bring home the charge against the accused persons. The accused respondents did not examine any witness In their defence, but filed the F.I.R. of the case under G.K. No. 402 of 1961, an out-door ticket of V.M. Hospital in the name of Kamala Malakar and 2 discharge certificates of Kamala Malakar. The F.I.R. of G.R. No. 402 of 1961 was lodged by Kanai Malakar against the accused Ramani Bala Debnath, Gurudas Debnath, Krishna Kanta Debnath, wife of Gurudas, Priya Das Kaibarta Das and Hachineea Kaibarta Das, under Sections 148/324, read With Section 149 I.P.C.
8. The learned Magistrate after considering the evidence led by the complainant held, that the prosecution utterly failed to prove the case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt, so they are entitled to acquittal. He, therefore, acquitted them by giving the benefit of doubt.
9. The complainant-appellant, being aggrieved by the Judgment of the learned Magistrate, has come In appeal to this Court.
10. The learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently urged that in this case the learned Magistrate delivered the judgment without appreciating the evidence, therefore it is a bad judgment, and hence it should be set aside. In order to show that the learned Magistrate delivered the Judgment without writing and appreciating evidence, he pointed out that in this case 4/5 dates were given for delivering judgment, but as the judgment was not ready so the case was adjourned every time. Lastly, 29.3.62, was fixed for delivering the judgment. On that date, upto 4-30 p.m., the judgment was not delivered and on the enquiry by the learned Advocate for the appellant, the learned Magistrate informed that the judgment would be delivered on 31.3.62 as it was not ready. Thereafter, on 31.3.62, when the Advocate came to know that the Judgment was pronounced on 29.3.62, he requested the learned Magistrate for allowing him to read the judgment, but he was not allowed to see it. On that the learned Advocate presented an urgent application for the copy of the judgment, but the copy of the judgment was not supplied to him till 4.4.62. In view of these circumstances. It should be presumed that the learned Magistrate delivered the judgment without writing and signing it on 29.3.62. It is therefore an illegality which is not curable under Section 537 Cr.P.C. and hence the judgment should be set aside.
11. This argument of the learned Advocate for the appellant is devoid of force. There is nothing on the record to show that in this case the learned Magistrate informed the learned Counsel for the appellant that the Judgment shall be delivered on 31.3.62. From the record it appears that 29.3.62 was fixed as the date for delivering the judgment, and it was delivered on that very day. In the presence of this documentary evidence, no reliance can be placed on the mere saying of the learned Advocate for the appellant. If there was any such thing as alleged by the learned Advocate in that case it was his duty to file an affidavit to substantiate this fact.
12. From the evidence on the record, it is obvious that the Judgment was pronounced on 29.3.62, A reading of the judgment also shows that it was delivered after the appreciation of the evidence.
13. Now, the only argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that it was delivered in his absence. But his mere absence on the notified date for delivering the judgment does not invalidate the Judgment. On this point, tie Sub-clause (3) of Section 366 is quite clear. According to this section, no judgment delivered by any Criminal Court shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only of the absence of any party or his pleader on the day or from the place notified for the delivery thereof, or of any omission to serve, or defect in serving, on the parties or their pleaders, or any of them, the notice of such day and place.
14. Besides that in this case, the learned Counsel for the appellant had the notice of the date of delivery of the judgment, therefore his present contention does not stand to reason.
15. The learned Counsel for the appellant next urged that by the testimony of all the eye-witnesses, it was overwhelmingly proved that the accused were the persons who belaboured Sreemati Ramani Bala Devi. But the learned Magistrate, without appreciating the evidence acquitted the accused persons, and hence the judgment of the Magistrate is clearly wrong. As this Judgment has caused a serious miscarriage of justice, so it should be set aside and the accused be convicted.
16. The learned Counsel for the respondents, is order to controvert this argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant, strongly urged that the appeal against acquittal is an extra-ordinary remedy, therefore it should tie exercised sparingly. He also pointed out that the settled practice is that the Courts should not interfere with the order of acquittal.
17. Now before discussing and weighing the evidence of prosecution witnesses in meticulous details, shall discuss the law on this point.
18. As regards the question of the powers of the High Court in regard to appeals against acquittal, opinions differed in the several High Courts. In 1934, when the question was raised before the Privy Council in the case Sheo Swamp v. Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) Lord Russell of Killowen repudiated the view apparently supported by that judgments of some Courts in India, that the High Court has no power or Jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in cases in which the lower Court had 'obstinately blundered', or has 'through incompetence, stupidity or perversity' reached such 'distorted conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice', or has in same other way so conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a glaring miscarriage of Justice or has been tricked by the defence so as to produce a similar result". It was held that Sections 417, 418 and 423 give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that the order of acquittal should be reversed. There is no limitation upon that power. But in exercising that power and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
19. When the matter came for the first time before the Supreme Court in 1950, In the case Prandas v. State it was heard by six Judges and agreeing fully with Sheo-Swarup AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) (sup.), it was held that it is not correct that the High Court has no power to reverse an acquittal order, unless it is perverse or the lower Court has misdirected itself causing a miscarriage of justice, and the principles laid down in that case were reaffirmed. Since then in a number of cases the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo-Swarup AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) have been wholly approved and also reproduced in some decisions of the Supreme Court.
20. Again, in the year, 1957, the case of Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, came before the Supreme Court (S) and in this case their Lordships observed that it is now well settled that though the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused person is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial Court and the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses must be given proper weight and consideration; and the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses must also be kept in mind, and there must be substantial and compelling reasons for the appellate Court to come to a conclusion different from that of the trial Judge.
21. In view of these rulings, it is clear that the High Court has full power to review the evidence, upon which an order of acquittal is founded, but it should be slow in setting aside an acquittal order till there are no "substantial and compelling" reasons for doing so.
22. Now, in the light of the principle as laid down by the Privy Council, and the Supreme Court, I shall examine the evidence led by the appellant in order to see as to whether there are substantial and compelling reasons for setting aside the order of acquittal.
23. From the copy of F.I.R. and other documents filed by the respondents, it appears that there was a ?scuffle between the two ladies only, that is, the appellant and the respondent Kamala Malakar, and clue to that both or them received injuries. But it is surprising to note that all the P.Ws. have denied this" fact. By this, it is obvious mat they have not spoken the truth. At the time of argument, the learned Advocate admitted that there were cross cases about this incident, but they were tried separately by different Magistrates. It was unfortunate that they were not tried by one and the same Magistrate. If they had been tried by the same Magistrate in that case the Magistrate would not have found much difficulty in arriving at right decision. Any way it is an established fact that there were two cross complaints, and in the scuffle that took place on 19.4.61, the appellant and the respondent Kamala Malakar were injured. When there were injuries on both sides (the accused and the complainant) in that case it was the duty of the prosecution to explain cogently how the accused sustained injuries and who was the aggressor. Without such explanation, the prosecution evidence could not be complete and no Court would be prepared to act on evidence which leaves a lacuna. In the instant case, the prosecution did j not explain the Injuries on the person of the respondent; so in view of the lacuna left, the prosecution is not entitled to succeed. I, therefore, find that in the light of these facts, the finding of the learned Magistrate is correct and It cannot be assailed easily. The learned Counsel for the appellant further contended, that the F.I.R. of the cross case which has been produced In this case is not admissible in evidence, but the learned Magistrate admitted it in evidence, so on that account also the judgment should be treated as perverse. This argument too is without substance. Where an occurrence forms the subject of two cross cases, the first information report in one case is admissible in the counter case in which the informants themselves stand their trial, though in. every case the entire statement may not be admissible. In view of the occurrence being the subject of two cross cases it is admissible in evidence.
24. The learned Counsel for the appellant further urged that the Outdoor ticket and the two discharged certificates are inadmissible in evidence, so the Magistrate should not have admitted them in evidence. By admitting them in evidence he erred and hence he came to an erroneous finding.
25. The learned Counsel for the respondents in order to rebut this argument contended that they are the public documents and admissible In evidence on the combined effect of Sections 35 and 74 of the Evidence Act. I too feel that there is no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. These documents have been produced to show the entries in the Official Register made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties, therefore they are admissible in evidence.
26. No other argument was advanced 6y the learned Advocate.
27. In view of the reasons mentioned above, I am constrained to hold that there is no force In this appeal and it is hereby dismissed.
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