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Labaram Deka Barua And Anr. v. The State
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Petitions Nos. 34 and 36 of 1950
Factual and Procedural Background
This order disposes of petitions Nos. 34 and 36 of 1950, which were filed under Section 491, Criminal P.C. The petitioners are Labaram Deka Barua (petition in case No. 34 of 1950) and Ranjit Dutta (petition in case No. 36 of 1950). Each petitioner was detained by separate orders signed by Mr. I. Majid, Secretary to the Government of Assam, dated 2-3-1950 under Section 3, sub-section (1), Preventive Detention Act (the opinion refers to the Preventive Detention Act, with varying year references in the text).
The detention orders stated that they were made to prevent the petitioners from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; grounds of detention were supplied to the petitioners and they were informed they could make representations to the Government before 30-3-1950. The grounds supplied in both cases were substantially identical in substance, each containing three grounds.
Ground 2 in each order alleged participation in a joint I.P.T.A. and Peace Conference at Naltapool (Natiool/Naltapool/Natiapool — as reproduced in the opinion) Railway Colony, Dibrugarh on 15–17 July 1949, and alleged that the petitioners incited or participated in volunteers who resisted police and that a Police Sub-Inspector (Gobinda/Govinda Chandra Das) was murdered in the course of those events. Grounds 1 and 3 alleged Communist connections and generally that the petitioners were acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety and the maintenance of public order.
At the time the detention orders were passed (2-3-1950), both petitioners were under-trial prisoners in connection with criminal proceedings arising out of the alleged attack on the police on 17-7-1949. The learned Government Advocate admitted that both were under-trial prisoners and were in custody as such when the detention orders were made.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a preventive detention order under Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act can validly be made in respect of a person who is already in custody as an under-trial prisoner for the same alleged conduct.
- Whether preventive detention may be predicated on matters that are the subject-matter of a pending prosecution (i.e., whether preventive action can be based on facts that are sub judice).
- Whether the grounds supplied in the detention orders (specifically grounds 1 and 3 versus ground 2) were sufficient in law to justify detention under the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners challenged the validity of the detention orders, pointing out that they were already under-trial prisoners in custody in connection with the same incident on which the detention orders relied (the alleged attack on the police on 17-7-1949).
Respondent / Government's Position
- The learned Government Advocate conceded that both petitioners were under-trial prisoners and were in custody when the detention orders were made. The same Government Advocate later stated that he was unable to support the detention orders.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re Venkataraman, A.I.E. (36) 1919 Mad. 629 (50 Cr. L.J. 748) | That the detaining authority's "satisfaction" must be honest, careful and deliberate — i.e., reached after due care and caution; "if satisfied" should be read as "reasonably satisfied". | The court relied on this principle to conclude that the stated satisfaction in the detention orders was not genuine or the result of due care and caution because the orders did not advance the purpose of detention where the petitioners were already in custody; therefore the orders fell outside the scope of Section 3. |
| Kamla Kant v. Emperor, A.I.R. (31) 1914 Pat. 864 (23 Pat. 252) | That it is undesirable and wrong for a detention order under preventive/defence rules to be made against a person who has been arrested and is before the court on a definite specific charge before trial; such detention may seriously prejudice the person detained. | The court cited this authority to support the proposition that preventive detention should not be based on matters that are the subject-matter of a pending prosecution and that making a detention order in such circumstances is undesirable and may cause serious prejudice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in a sequence of legal and factual points, grounded in the text of Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act as explained in the opinion:
- Interpretation of Section 3: The court explained that under Section 3 a State Government may detain a person if it is "satisfied" that detention is necessary to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The essential element is that the detaining authority must actually be satisfied that detention is necessary to prevent such action.
- Effect of prior custody: The court reasoned that if a person is already in custody, additional detention orders to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order are unnecessary because the person, being confined, cannot realistically act to prejudicial effect. Thus, in those circumstances the detaining authority could not genuinely be "satisfied" that further detention was necessary for the statutory purpose.
- Adequacy of stated satisfaction: The court held that the phrase "if satisfied" (as traditionally used) requires a reasonable, honest, careful and deliberate satisfaction by the detaining authority — not an arbitrary or irrational one. The court relied on In re Venkataraman for this standard.
- Application to these petitions: The court found that the detaining authority had overlooked the fact that the petitioners were already in custody at the time the detention orders were made. Given that oversight, the court concluded that the satisfaction stated in the orders could not be regarded as real or as the product of due care and caution. Accordingly, the detention orders were invalid on that ground alone.
- Sufficiency of the grounds: The court examined the specific grounds. It found that grounds 1 (association with the Communist Party) and 3 (that the petitioners were acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety) were, standing alone, inadequate because they either merely stated party connection without specific conduct linking them to illegal activity, or merely paraphrased the statutory language without particulars. Ground 2 — alleging participation in the attack on police on 17-7-1949 — was the only substantive foundation of the detention orders.
- Sub judice concern: The court observed that the allegations in ground 2 were precisely the subject of pending criminal prosecutions (the petitioners were under trial before a Special Magistrate at Dibrugarh), and therefore the matter was sub judice. Relying on Kamla Kant v. Emperor, the court held that preventive detention should not be based on matters that are the subject of pending prosecutions because it is undesirable to detain a person under a Detention Act concurrently with proceedings on a specific criminal charge; such detention may prejudice the detained person and preclude him from seeking bail to defend himself.
- Practical effect and Government's stance: The court noted that the detention orders effectively prevented the petitioners from asking for bail to defend themselves in the criminal proceedings, and that the Government Advocate stated he was unable to support the detention orders.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The petitions are allowed; the orders of detention are set aside, and the petitioners shall be set at liberty forthwith unless they have to remain in custody under some other order of a competent Court.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The detention orders challenged in petitions Nos. 34 and 36 of 1950 were quashed and the petitioners were ordered to be released immediately unless lawfully detained under some other competent court order.
- Legal principle applied: The court reaffirmed that a detaining authority's satisfaction under a preventive detention provision must be reasonably and honestly arrived at, and that detention orders cannot legitimately be used to detain individuals already in custody for the same alleged conduct or to base preventive detention on matters that are the subject of pending prosecutions.
- Broader precedent: The opinion invoked and applied existing authorities (In re Venkataraman and Kamla Kant v. Emperor) to support its conclusions. The court did not state that it was creating new law or laying down a new precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts before it; the direct consequence described in the opinion is the quashing of the detention orders in these particular petitions.
Additional Notes from the Opinion
A concurring note by Thadani C.J. appears in the opinion: he stated he was content to allow the two petitions on the sole ground that it is not desirable that detention under a Detention Act should run concurrently with detention pursuant to being accused of a non-bailable offence. He also expressly disclaimed being a party to other observations made by the other judge in the course of his judgment.
1. This order will dispose of petitions Nos. 34 and 36 of 1950. The petitions are under Section 491, Criminal P.C.
2. Labaram Deka Barua. petitioner in case No. 84 of 1960 and Ranjit Dutta petitioner in case no. 36 of 1950, were detained by two separate orders signed by Mr. I, Majid, Secretary to the Government of Assam, and passed on 2-3-1950 under Section 3, Sub-section (1), Preventive Detention Act, 1960 IV [4] of 1960.
3. The orders of detention in both the cases were passed with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The grounds of detention were supplied to the petitioners along with the orders and they were informed that they were at liberty to make any representation they desired, to the Government at any time before 30-3-1950. The grounds of detention supplied to the petitioners were in substance identical.
4. The grounds supplied to Labaram were as follows:
(1) That you are natively connected with the Communist party of India, the aim and object of which la to overthrow the present order by forcible methods and mass demonstrations.
(2) That you participated in the joint I.P.T.A. and Peace Conference in the Natiapool Railway Colony. Dibrugarh, on 15th, 16th, and 17th July 1949, and a large number of volunteers organised by you in the villages also participated. You contacted underground Communist and other overwing Communist leader) and adopted necessary measures to guard the Colon; by volunteers and were also a party in deciding to 'resist Police and unauthorised infiltration of outsiders. As a result of malicious and violent propaganda against the Government and Police, the volunteers and other participants resisted Polios and brutally murdered Police Sub-Inspector Govinda Chandra Das and you and other organisers of the Conference incited the participants, both males and females, to be armed with lathis, brickbats, acid bulbs, etc., to resist Police and the Deputy Commissioner. Accordingly the mob with the women and other girls in the front attacked Police with above-mentioned weapons of offence.
(3) That you are acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and maintenance of public order at Dibrugarh.
5. In the case of Ranjit Dutta also there were three grounds. Grounds 1 and 3 are exactly in the same terms as grounds 1 and 3 in the case of Labaram. Ground 2 though substantially the same is not in identical terms. It is reproduced below:
(2) That you came to participate in the joint I.P.T.A. and Peace Conference of the Communist Party in Naltapool Railway Colony Dibrugarh, as a delegate from Karimganj. You attended both delegate and other meetings held in the Colony on the 15th, 16th and 17th July, 1949, were a party to all decisions. You came In touch with the Communist leaders of the province and, outside during the sessions. You are one of the leading members who incited the volunteers and others to resist Polios and unauthorised visitors. You were aware of the collection of acid, acid bulbs, lathis, brickbats, etc., in the Colony and of the purpose, but instead of preventing the same, you rather encouraged them 10 boldly resist Police. On 17-7-1949 you were among the mob who resisted and attacked Police with lathis, brickbats, acid, etc., when they came with the Deputy Commissioner in search of Police Officers and men who were reported to be assaulted. It was discovered later that S. I. Gobinda Chandra Das was brutally murdered and it was done at the instance of leaders including you.
6. The petitioners challenge the validity of these orders. They have pointed out in their petitions that they are under-trial prisoners and are in custody in connection with the case arising out of the alleged attack on the Police on 17-7-1949. This incident forms the subject-matter of grounds 9 in the case of each of the two petitioners. The learned Government Advocate admits that both are under-trial prisoners and were in custody as such when the detention orders were passed against them on 2 3.1950.
7. Under Section 3, Preventive Detention Act, 1950, a State Government if satisfied that it is necessary to make an order that a person be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order may make an order directing that he be detained. It is necessary that the detaining authority should feel satisfied that detention of an individual is necessary in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. A man can act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order if be is at large. Detention prevents him from acting in a manner which may interfere with the maintenance of public order. When a person is already in detention, it is obvious that another order of detention is not necessary. He is not in a position to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detaining authority, in these circumstances, cannot feel statisfied that an order of detention is necessary for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 3 of the Act, for by serving the order of detention on him, the situation does not improve at all, the person on whom the order is served being already in confinement.
8. The orders of detention though they speak of the satisfaction of the Government have no relation to the realities of the situation. No detention order could have been considered necessary on 2-3-1960 in the case of these petitioners in order merely to prevent them from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and if the object was as stated in the order the satisfaction of the detaining authority spoken of in the detention orders was neither real nor could it be said to have been felt after due care and caution. The words "if satisfied" in Section 3 of the Act occurred in almost all the Provincial Public Safety or Maintenance of Public Order Acts. They have been interpreted as meaning 'reasonably satisfied.' An arbitrary or an irrational state of being satisfied does not appear to have been contemplated, in my opinion. As held in In re Venkataraman A. I. E. (36) 1919 Mad. 629:(50 Cr. L.J. 748), the satisfaction has to be honest, careful and deli. berate arrived at by the detaining authority after exercising due care and caution. Where the purpose for which a detention order is passed is not at all advanced by the order, it is obvious that the satisfaction stated in the order of detention was not the result of due care and caution and the order could not be regarded as covered by or within the scope of B. 3 of the Act.
9. In the two petitions before us it is apparent that the fact that the petitioners were in detention already was overlooked. The satisfaction, therefore, of the detaining authority in these cases cannot be regarded as real; and these petitions should succeed on this ground alone.
10. There is another interesting point which arises in these oases. The petitioners are undertrial prisoners. They are being prosecuted for alleged participation in an attack on the police on 17-7-1949. Their alleged participation in this affair is the only important ground on which the detention orders are based. Grounds 1 and 3, which are exactly in the same terms in both the oases, standing by themselves, would not have justified the detention of the petitioners. The first ground in each case merely states that the petitioner was connected with the Communist Party, the aim and object of which is to overthrow the present order by forcible methods and mass demonstrations. There is nothing in this ground to indicate that the petitioners were engaged in any activity for the furtherance of the purpose of the Communist Party or that they were inciting people to overthrow the present Government by violent methods. Ground 3 gives no information at all. All that it says is that the petitioners were acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety and the maintenance of public order. This is merely borrowing the language of the Act. It is not at all shown in that manner, where and when they have been acting in a way that was regarded as prejudicial to public safety. Ground 2, thus, is the only foundation of the order and the subject-matter of ground 2, viz., the alleged participation of the pertitioners in an attack on the Police or their abetment of it is also the subject-matter of a criminal case pending before a Special Magistrate at Dibrugarh. Thus, what is alleged against the petitioners in this ground of detention has still to be proved by the prosecution in the Criminal case pending against them. The matter is clearly 'sub judice' and the decision of the Court as regards individual accused including the petitioners cannot be anticipated,
11. Preventive action which the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 seeks to legalise may not be based on a matter which is the subject matter of a pending prosecution. As held in Kamla Kant v. Emperor A.I.R. (31) 1914 pat. 864: (23 Pat. 252), in a case under the Defence of India Rules, when a man is arrested and brought before the Court on some definite and specific charge it seems very undesirable and quite wrong for an order of detention to be made against him before he has been tried on the charge and his guilt or innocence finally determined. The order of detention in such circumstances may result in serious prejudice to the person detained.
12. The orders effectively prevent, the detenus from asking for bail in order to defend themselves and thus easily expose themselves to the attack that they are beyond the scope of Section 3 of the Act. The detention orders in question are unsustainable and the petitioners cannot be held to be in lawful custody. The learned Government Advocate has stated that be is unable to support these orders.
13. These petitions, therefore, must be allowed. The orders of detentions are set aside. The petitioners shall be set at liberty forthwith unless they have to remain in custody under some other order of a competent Court.
14. The petitioner in case No. 34 has complained that by reason of the fact that he is an under, trial prisoner, he has been deprived of the privileges of a detenus. In view of the order that we make consideration of his complaint that privileges of a detenu are denied to him is not necessary.
15. Thadani C.J.I am content to allow the two petitions on the sole ground that it is not desirable that the detention of a person under a Detention Act should run concurrently with his detention in pursuance of his being accused of a non-bailable offence.
16. I should not be understood as being a party to any of the observations which have been made by my learned brother in the course of his judgment.
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