- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Rajkumar Manisana Singh v. Nameirakpam Angou Singh And Anr.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (complainant) is the owner of a motor jeep (No. MNS 1368). The vehicle was hired by the Police on 18-6-1961 to carry police personnel from Imphal to Khoubum camp. The driver was M. Ibungohal Singh and a conductor Kh. Senapati Singh accompanied him. The appellant alleges that on the morning of 19-6-1961, while the driver and conductor were at a canteen taking tea, the first respondent (a Police Officer) entered the jeep and drove it, damaging the gearbox and other parts so that the vehicle became unfit for use. After repairs costing about Rs. 1,000, the vehicle was returned to the appellant on 2-7-1961. The damage was reported to the Superintendent of Police (Imphal) on 28-6-1961.
Procedurally, an earlier complaint (Criminal Misc. Case No. 1 of 1961) was filed by the driver against the first respondent under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act, but the first respondent was "discharged" on 15-8-1962 due to the absence of both parties. The appellant thereafter filed Criminal Case No. 1 of 1962 on 14-4-1962 against the first respondent under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act (and against the driver under Sections 426, 84 and 109 IPC). The Magistrate (Second Class, Transport) heard the case under the Motor Vehicles Act provisions (the Magistrate's competence was limited to those Act provisions), heard the appellant and several witnesses, received a written statement from the first respondent denying the offence, and ultimately acquitted the first respondent on the basis of benefit of doubt. The Magistrate did not pass any order against the driver, who was said to be absconding.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the first respondent is guilty of the offences under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
- Whether the present case is not maintainable and is barred by Section 403, Criminal P.C. (i.e., whether the prior dismissal/discharge constituted an acquittal and bars re-prosecution).
- Whether the Magistrate was correct in dropping the proceedings against the driver, Meitram Ibungohal Singh.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant alleged that the first respondent entered and drove the parked jeep and caused the damage described; repairs cost about Rs. 1,000.
- The appellant argued that the Magistrate erred in allowing the first respondent to file a written statement (contending that the accused should have been examined and that allowing a written statement was improper in a summons case).
- The appellant also argued that the earlier Criminal Misc. Case No. 1 of 1961 (filed by the driver) and the present case differ because the present case included additional IPC sections against the driver as well as the Motor Vehicles Act counts; therefore, the appellant contended they were not the same.
- The appellant contended that the "discharge" in the earlier case did not legally amount to an acquittal (relying on authorities concerning warrant cases under Chapter XXI Cr. P.C.).
- It was also contended that the plea of "autrefois acquit" was not taken in the lower court and thus could not be raised for the first time in the appeal.
- The appellant alleged collusion between the first respondent and the driver in the prior case, suggesting the first respondent had managed to escape culpability previously.
First Respondent's (Respondent's) Arguments
- The learned Counsel for the first respondent contended that the dismissal (or "discharge") of the earlier complaint petition (Criminal Misc. Case No. 1 of 1961) amounted to an acquittal under Section 247, Cr. P.C., and that therefore a subsequent complaint for the same offence is barred by Section 403, Cr. P.C.
- Implicitly, the respondent relied on the legal effect of the prior order (discharge/acquittal) to argue that the present second complaint was not maintainable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ponuswami Odayar v. Ranaswatni Thathan, AIR 1924 Mad. 15 (FB) | Cited as part of authorities indicating a consensus among some High Courts that Section 842 Cr. P.C. does not apply to summons cases. | Used to support the proposition that allowing a written statement in a summons case does not vitiate proceedings; i.e., the Magistrate's conduct in permitting a written statement was not fatal. |
| Parisa Raghavulu v. Borra Kotayya, AIR 1956 Andhra 51 | Cited with similar effect: High Court authority on non-applicability of Section 842 to summons cases. | Relied upon to show consensus and to justify that the Magistrate's acceptance of a written statement in a summons case was not improper. |
| Kaliappan v. Kaliappan, AIR 1961 Mad 854 | Cited among cases holding that Section 842 does not apply to summons cases. | Used to support the court's view that written statements in summons cases are not per se impermissible or vitiating. |
| K Vidyanand v. Erramma, AIR 1961 And Pra 391 | Cited for the same principle as above. | Applied as part of the line of authority showing acceptance of written statements in summons cases; supported the court's conclusion that allowing a written statement did not vitiate the proceedings. |
| Sidheswar Ganguly v. State Of West Bengal, AIR 1958 (SC) 143 | Supreme Court decision holding there is no provision in the Cr. P.C. under which a written statement can be filed by an accused (as cited in the opinion). | The court noted this earlier Supreme Court view but reconciled it with later authority (Harbhajan Singh) and other High Court views to conclude the Magistrate's conduct in allowing a written statement did not vitiate the proceedings. |
| Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97 | Supreme Court ruling that the filing of a written statement by an accused need not always be deprecated. | Relied upon to justify that permitting a written statement in the instant summons case did not invalidate proceedings; used to support the Magistrate's discretion. |
| Public Prosecutor v. A. V. Ramiah, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 892 | Cited as authority that when a complainant is absent and the Magistrate acquits under Section 247, that acquittal bars fresh trial. | Applied to hold that the earlier dismissal/discharge amounted to an acquittal and therefore the second complaint was not maintainable. |
| Jai Prakash v. State, AIR 1961 All 377 | Authority supporting the legal effect of acquittal under Section 247 when complainant is absent. | Used to support the conclusion that the earlier order barred subsequent prosecution for the same offence. |
| State v. Chand Meah, AIR 1961 Tripura 49 | Authority to the same effect regarding the effect of an acquittal under Section 247. | Relied upon in concluding that the second complaint was barred. |
| Kanai Hizra v. Golap Hizra, AIR 1958 Cal 197 | Cited among authorities that an acquittal under Section 247 has the effect of barring a fresh trial. | Applied in the group of authorities supporting the court's finding that the earlier discharge amounted to acquittal and barred re-trial. |
| Fula Bewa v. Banamali Das, AIR 1953 Orissa 257 | Another precedent cited on the legal effect of a prior acquittal under Section 247. | Included among authorities relied upon to bar the second complaint. |
| Rasik Tatma v. Bhagwat Tanti, AIR 1958 Pat 289 | Cited as authority on the consequence of an acquittal under Section 247. | Used with other authorities to show the bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offence. |
| State v. Kuldip Singh, AIR 1960 Punj 149; AIR 1961 Tripura 48 | Cited as further authority supporting the proposition that an acquittal under Section 247 bars reprosecution. | Relied on in forming the conclusion that the second complaint was not maintainable. |
| Indra Devi v. D.J. Sukh, 1961 (1) Cri L.J. 589 (All) | Cited among authorities upholding the legal effect of prior acquittal/dismissal where Section 247 applied. | Counted among cases supporting the court's conclusion on bar to the second complaint. |
| Thingujam Tona Singh v. Puvam Gulap Singh, 1961 (2) Cr L.J. 507 (Mani); AIR 1961 All 877 | Cited as authority consistent with the line that prior acquittal under Section 247 prevents fresh complaint. | Applied as part of the weight of authority that bars a second complaint. |
| Haveli Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1966 Punj 82 | Cited among authorities on the effect of prior acquittal/dismissal. | Included in the court's list of supporting authorities for barring fresh trial. |
| Kuppagiri Atchamma v. Jakki Reddi Koti Reddi, AIR 1955 Andhra 197 | Authority dealing with trial of warrant cases under Chapter XXI Cr. P.C. | The court observed these rulings relate to warrant cases and therefore have no application to an order of "discharge" wrongly passed under Section 247 in a summons case. |
| Dattu Pant v. Advya Chari, AIR 1956 Hyd 127 | Authority concerning warrant cases (Chapter XXI Cr. P.C.). | Held not applicable to the present situation (a summons case discharge under Section 247). |
| Dasarath Singh v. State, AIR 1956 Cal 260 | Authority on warrant-case procedure. | Stated to be inapplicable to the present summons-case discharge scenario. |
| Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 415 | Supreme Court authority about warrant-case trials under Chapter XXI Cr. P.C. | Cited by appellant but the court held it had no application to a discharge under Section 247 in summons cases. |
| Emperor v. Menghraj Devidag, AIR 1921 Sind 187 | Cited as authority that legal pleas (such as autrefois acquit) can be taken in appeal. | Applied to hold that the plea of autrefois acquit could be raised for the first time in the appeal. |
| All Bux v. Emperor, AIR 1934 All 877 | Authority supporting that legal pleas may be raised in appeal. | Relied upon to permit the respondent to raise the plea in appeal. |
| Jagannath Rao Dani v. Emperor, AIR 1985 Nag 23 | Cited among authorities that legal pleas may be entertained in appeal (as recorded in the opinion). | Used to support the proposition that the plea could be raised in the appeal. |
| Thadi Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 1 (FB) | Authority on the availability of raising legal pleas in appeal. | Applied to justify entertaining the plea of autrefois acquit on appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in three main strands corresponding to the three points for determination.
-
On the question of guilt (Point (i)), the court examined the evidence adduced by the prosecution (the appellant and four witnesses). It observed:
- The appellant (P.W.1) had no personal knowledge of the alleged driving or damage because he was not present when the incident occurred.
- P.W.2 (the conductor Khongbantabam Senapati Singh) stated he heard a vehicle start from inside the military barracks and later found the jeep missing and at a distance; he explicitly admitted he did not see who actually drove the vehicle and thus had no personal knowledge identifying the driver.
- P.W.3 (Moirangthem Gopal Singh) only testified to meeting a driver carrying spare gearbox parts and did not know subsequent facts identifying the driver who allegedly caused damage.
- P.W.4 (Chabungbam Iburgohal Singh) confirmed the vehicle was unserviceable but did not know ownership, driver identity, registration number or conductor identity.
- P.W.5 produced an inspection certificate but no evidence directly identifying the perpetrator.
-
On the procedural and res judicata point (Point (ii)), the court considered that the driver had earlier filed Criminal Misc. Case No. 1 of 1961 against the first respondent under the same Motor Vehicles Act sections and that the first respondent had been "discharged" on 15-8-1962 due to absence of both parties. The first respondent contended that the earlier dismissal amounted to an acquittal under Section 247, Cr. P.C., thereby barring a second complaint under Section 403, Cr. P.C.
- The court examined the wording and effect of Section 247, Cr. P.C., noting that when a complainant is absent the Magistrate shall acquit the accused (unless adjournment is proper), so a "discharge" in the prior judgment amounted to an acquittal in law.
- The court relied on a number of authorities to the same effect and held that the acquittal under Section 247 bars fresh trial for the same offence under Sections 403/408 Cr. P.C.
- The court also addressed appellant's arguments that the two cases differed (because the later case listed additional IPC offences) and noted that the Magistrate in the later case had taken the case on file only under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act (he lacked jurisdiction to try IPC offences). Therefore, as to the first respondent the offences in both proceedings were the same.
- The court rejected the appellant's contention that authorities about warrant cases (Chapter XXI Cr. P.C.) controlled the result, holding that those authorities do not apply to a discharge under Section 247 in a summons case.
- The court also accepted that the plea of autrefois acquit is a legal one that may be raised in appeal even if not raised below, and cited authorities to that effect.
- On the question of the dropped proceedings against the driver (Point (iii)), the court found that the driver was absconding and that the Magistrate should have recorded the evidence in the driver's absence under Section 512, Cr. P.C., and later revived the case against him when he was arrested and produced. The court therefore held that the Magistrate's failure so to do was erroneous and the order so far as it related to the second accused (the driver) was liable to be set aside.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal fails and is dismissed against the first respondent.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The acquittal of the first respondent is upheld (the court found that evidence did not establish guilt and that the earlier discharge/acquittal barred re-prosecution under the cited provisions).
- The second complaint filed by the appellant against the first respondent is not maintainable because the earlier discharge amounted to an acquittal under Section 247, Cr. P.C., which bars subsequent prosecution for the same offences under Sections 403/408 Cr. P.C.
- As to the driver (Meitram Ibungohal Singh), the court set aside the Magistrate's order in respect of the second accused and directed the Magistrate to record the evidence in the driver's absence under Section 512, Cr. P.C., keep the case as a 'long pending case' under Section 512, and revive it once the absconding accused is arrested and produced.
- The court expressly found that the Magistrate's allowance of a written statement by the accused in a summons case did not vitiate the proceedings, relying on the authorities and the discretion available to the Magistrate under the relevant Cr. P.C. provisions.
- No broader or novel legal precedent was announced; the decision applies settled principles (as applied in the opinion) to the facts—specifically, evidentiary insufficiency for conviction, effect of Section 247 acquittal on subsequent complaints, and proper procedure for dealing with an absconding accused under Section 512.
Order: Appeal dismissed against the first respondent; direction to the Magistrate to record evidence against the absconding driver and keep the case pending under Section 512, Cr. P.C., to be revived upon arrest and production of the accused.
1. This is an appeal filed under Section 417(C), Criminal P.C., by the complainant in Criminal Case No. 1 of 1962 on the file of the Magistrate Second Class (Transport), Manipur, against the acquittal of the first respondent for an offence under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
2. The case of the appellant is that he is the owner of Motor Vehicle Jeep No. MNS, 1368, that on 18-6-1961 it was hired by the Police to take some Police personnel to Khoubum camp from Imphal, that the driver M. Ibungohal Singh, was accompanied by a conductor Kh. Senapati Singh, that the jeep reached Khoubum on 18-6 1961, that in the morning of 19-6-1961 when the driver and the conductor were taking tea at a canteen, the first respondent who is a Police Officer, entered into it and drove it, that he damaged the gear box and different parts of the jeep in such a way that it became unfit for use and that after repairing the Vehicle at a cost of about Rs. 1,000 the Vehicle was brought back to the complainant appellant on 2-7.1961. It is also the case of the appellant that on 28-6.1961, the matter was reported to the Superintendent of Police, Imphal, that on 14-8-1961 the drives lodged a complaint is Criminal Case No. 1 of 1961 before the Transport Magistrate but that the 1st respondent was "discharged" on 15.8-1962 due to the absence of both the parties. The appellant filed Criminal Case No. 1 of 1962 on 14-4-1962 against the first respondent under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act and against M. Ibungobal Singh under Sections 426, 84 and 109, I.P.C.
3. The Magistrate took the case on file under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act, because he could try cases only under the said Act. The appellant examined himself as P. Ws. 1 and 4 witnesses (Khongbantabam Senapati Singh, Moirangthem Gopal Singh, Chabungbam Iburgohal Singh and Haorougbam Amujao Singh) as P. Ws. 2 to 5. The first respondent filed written statement denying the offence. The Magistrate discussed the evidence and held that though there was a probability that the first respondent might have entered into the jeep, when it was parked, and drove it, still there is no evidence to substantiate the offence and that, therefore, the first respondent is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The learned Magistrate did not pass any order against the second accused, as he was said to have absconded.
4. The points which were argued and which arise for determination are:
(i) whether the first respondent is guilty of the offences under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
(ii) whether the present case is not mainnable and is barred by Section 403, Criminal P.C. and
(iii) whether the Magistrate was correct in dropping the proceedings against the driver --Meitram Ibungohal Singh.
5. Point No. (i):
So far as the complainant appellant (P. W. 1) is concerned, he had no personal knowledge because he was not present in the jeep either on 18.6-1961 or on 196.1961, when the first respondent was alleged to have driven the jeep. P. W. 2 (Ehongbantabam Senapati Singh) deposed that on 19-6-1961 at about 5.80 a.m. when he and the driver were about to return to Imphal from (a canteen) in Khoubum, he heard the sound of starting of are vehicle from inside the military barracks, that he came out and found that the jeep was not in front of the barrack but that he did not know who drove the jeep, that ha and the driver went and saw the jeep at a distance of about half a furlong from the military barracks, that the first respondent told them that the jeep was unfit for being driven forward, that the driver brought it back with the back gear to the military bar. racks and that the driver also found that there was some defect in the gear. It is also his evidence that the driver was sent to Imphal for bringing some parts of the gear. He proved Ext. A/1, copy of the application dated 28-6-1961 filed by him before the Superintendent of Manipur about the damage caused to the vehicle. He further stated that when he accused the first respondent that be caused the damage to the vehicle, the first respondent denied having caused any damage to it. It is also his evidence that, after the gear was repaired, be and the driver returned to Imphal, In the cross-examination he stated that he did not know what was mentioned n original of Ext. A/1 but that he wrote the original after consultation with P. W. 1 (R. E. Manisara Singh). He admitted that he did not see the person who actually drove the vehicle. So, he too had no personal knowledge about the person who drove the jeep.
P. W. 3 (Moirangthem Gopal Singh) stated that when he was proceeding in his jeep to wards Imphal he met a driver who carried a sack containing some spare parts of a motor vehicle, that P. W. 8 learnt that he was carrying some parts of a gear box for being repaired in Imphal, that the said driver got down at Keisampat Junction and that P. W. 3 did not know anything further as to what had happened subsequently. P. W. 4 is Chabungbam Ibohal Singh. He deposed that he was working as a Pharmacist of Manipur Rifles, that he was residing at the Canteen of Khoubam camp, that he found that the jeep was in an unserviceable condition but that he did not know to whom the jeep belonged, that he did not know the driver of the jeep, that he did not know the registration number of the jeep and that he did not know, even the conductor, P. W. 5 is Haorongbam Arojao Singh. He stated that he has a mechanic running a Motor Workshop in Imphal and that he inspected the jeep in question and issued Ext. A/7 (certificate). This is all the evidence on record. This evidence certainly cannot bring home the guilt of the first respondent.
6. The first respondent was not examined. He filed written statement denying his guilt. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the Magistrate went wrong in all -wing the first respondent to file a writ, ten statement. The case is a summons case triable according to the provisions of Chapter 20 Cr. P.C. Under Section 245, Cr. P.C. it is not mandatory for the Magistrate to examine the accused. Sub-section (1) of Section 215 lays down that after, taking the evidence referred to in Section 214, Cr. P.C. and such further evidence (if any) as he may, of his own motion, cause to be produced, he may examine the accused. If he finds the accused to be not guilty, be should record an order of acquittal. Under Sub-section (2) if he find the accused guilty, then he should pass sentence upon him according to law. So, Section 245, Cr. P.C., gives discretion to Magistrate either to examine or not to examine an accused under Section 342, Cr. P.C.
Vide AIR Commentaries on Cr P.C., 6th edition, Vol. II at pages 2264 and 2269, wherein it was mentioned that there is consensus of opinion between the High Courts of Madras, Andhra Pradesh and the erstwhile Hyderabad that Section 842 Cr. P.C. does not apply to summons cases. Vide Ponuswami Odayar v. Ranaswatni Thathan AIR 1924 Mad. 15 (FB) Parisa Raghavulu v. Borra Kotayya AIR 1956 Andhra 51, Kaliappan v. Kaliappan AIR 1961 Mad 854 and K Vidyanand v. Erramma AIR 1961 And Pra 391. Though, the Supreme Court held in Sidheswar Ganguly v. State Of West Bengal . AIR 1958 8 C 143 that there is no provision in the Cr. P.C. under which a written statement can be filed by an accused, the Supreme Court held in a subsequent case in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1966 SC 97 that the Filing of written statement by an accused person need not always be deprecated. So the conduct of the Magistrate in allowing the first respondent to file the written statement does not vitiate the proceedings,
7. For the above reasons I find point (i) in the negative.
8. Point No. (ii):
It is common ground that the driver of the Vehicle Neitram Ibungohal Singh filed Criminal Misc. Case No. 1 of 1961 on the file of the Magistrate Second Class (Transport) under the same Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the first respondent but that he was "discharged" on 15-8.1962 due to the absence of both the parties. The contention of the learned Counsel for the first respondent is that the dismissal of the complaint petition amounted to an acquittal under Section 247, Cr. P. C and that a second complaint for the same offence is not maintainable under Section 403, Cr. P.C. His contention is well founded. Under Section 247. Cr. P.C. when a complainant is absent, the Magistrate shall acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. Therefore, even though the Magistrate wrote in the previous judgment that he ''discharged" the first respondent, the "discharge" amounted to ac. quiltal according to law. There are also a number of authorities on this point to the same effect. Vide Public Prosecutor v. A. V. Ramiah AIR 1958 Andh Pra 892. Jai Prakash v. State AIR 1961 All 377 and State v. Chand Meah AIR 1961 Tripura 49. As such, the acquittal under Section 247 Cr. P.C. bars fresh trial of the first respondent for the same offences under Section 408 Cr. P.C.
Vide also Kanai Hizra v. Golap Hizra AIR 1958 Cal 197 Fula Bewa v. Banamali Das AIR 1953 Orissa 257 Rasik Tatma v. Bhagwat Tanti AIR 1958 Pat 289 State v. Kuldip Singh AIR 1960 Punj 149 AIR 1961 Tripura 48; Indra Devi v. D.J. Sukh 1961 (1) Cri L.J. 589 (All), Thingujam Tona Singh v. Puvam Gulap Singh 1961 (2) Cr L.J. 507 (Mani) AIR 1961 All 877 and Haveli Ram v Municipal Corporation of Delhi AIR 1966 Punj 82. So, the second complaint filed by the appellant is not maintainable.
9. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended, firstly, that the former Criminal Misc. Case No. 1 of 1961 was filed by the driver against the first respondent under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act but that the second criminal case was filed not only under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act but also under Sections 426, 84 and 109 I.P.C. against the driver also and that, therefore, both the cases differ. But, a perusal of the records shows that the Magistrate Second Class (Transport) took the second case on file against the first respondent only under Sections 126 and 127 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as he had no authority to try oases punishable under the Indian Penal Code. So, both the cases relate to the same offences so far as the first respondent is concerned.
10. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the order or "discharge" of the first respondent in the previous case does not legally amount to acquittal. He relied on Kuppagiri Atchamma v. Jakki Reddi Koti Reddi AIR 1955 Andhra 197 Dattu Pant v. Advya Chari AIR 1956 Hyd 127 Dasarath Singh v. State AIR 1956 Cal 260 and Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 415, relating to the trial of warrant cases under Chapter XXI of Criminal P.C. These rulings have no application to an order of "discharge" wrongly passed under Section 247, Criminal P.C., in a summons case.
11. The third contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the plea of "autrefois acquit" was not taken by the first respondent in the lower Court and that he is not entitled to raise it in this appeal. But, as this is a legal plea, it can be taken even in the appeal Vide Emperor v. Menghraj Devidag AIR 1921 Sind 187 : All Bux v. Emperor AIR 1934 All 877 : Jagannath Rao Dani v. Emperor AIR 1985 Nag 23 and Thadi Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1960 Andh Pra 1 (FB).
12. Fourthly, he argued that the 1st respondent and the driver colluded in the prior criminal case and that the 1st respondent managed to escape. But, it is the admission of the appellant that be got the case instituted. So, he must have been astute about his case.
13. For the above reasons, I find point No. (ii) against the appellant.
14. Point No. (iii):
So far as the driver is concerned, the Magistrate should have recorded the evidence in his absence under Section 512, Criminal P.C., as he has been absconding The case should have been revived against him after he was arrested and produced before him. So, the order of the Magistrate so far as the second accused is concerned is liable to be set aside. Finding accordingly.
15. In the result, the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed against the first respondent. The Magistrate is directed to record evidence against the driver -- Meitram Ibungohal Singh and keep the case as 'long pending case' under Section 512, Criminal P.C. and revive it after the absconding accused is arrested and produced before him.
Alert