Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Keventer Agro Limited v. Kalyan Vyapar Pvt. Ltd.

Delhi High Court
May 24, 2013
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted the suit on or about 1 November 2011 originally against Defendant No.1, alleging that since around September/October 2007 the plaintiff was permitted permissive use and occupation of the first floor of Building No.9, Masjid Moth Commercial Complex, Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi, to set up its office and was given peaceful and vacant possession. The plaintiff alleged it was given a first option to purchase the entire property, made substantial improvements (including replacing flooring and installing tiles), and ran its export division office from the first floor with the defendant's consent. The plaintiff alleged interference with access (including obstruction to terrace access in June 2010 and confirmed possession entries in August 2010) and alleged that on 24–25 October 2011 the defendant's security locked the main door, preventing ingress and egress. The plaintiff filed a police complaint and sought injunction and mandatory reliefs.

Summons were issued on 4 November 2011. On 17 November 2011 the counsel for the then sole defendant informed the Court that the property had been sold to Defendant No.2 (M/s Compass Tracom Pvt. Ltd.) by Sale Deed dated 4 August 2011; Defendant No.2 was impleaded, a Court Commissioner was appointed to report on possession and inventory, and interim orders restrained creation of third-party interest and directed maintenance of status quo by later order dated 13 December 2011.

The plaintiff applied to amend the plaint to seek specific performance of an Agreement of Sale said to be in its favour and cancellation of the Sale Deed in favour of Defendant No.2; that amendment was allowed on 16 May 2013 (without prejudice to Defendant No.2's pleas). The Commissioner reported the first floor in a broken state, main door key with Defendant No.2, and items with competing ownership claims. The plaintiff filed IA/LA No. 20198/2011 for interim reliefs including restoration of access and return of goods. Defendant No.2 filed IA No. 6590/2013 seeking permission to let out the suit property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a licensor's transferee (Defendant No.2) can be restrained at an interim stage from interfering with a licensee's (plaintiff's) access and use of licensed premises, or whether the licensee's remedy on eviction/dispossession is limited to compensation under Section 64 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882.
  2. Whether the plaintiff, claiming permissive use/licence and alleging forcible obstruction, is entitled to mandatory interim relief (restoration of use/possession) of the first floor.
  3. Whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case for specific performance of the Agreement dated 3 August 2010 relied upon by the plaintiff.
  4. Whether Defendant No.2 can be permitted to let out the property during the pendency of the suit and, if so, on what terms and safeguards.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff was in settled possession and had permissive use and occupation (a licence) of the first floor and was illegally deprived of its use; it sought interim relief restraining defendants from obstructing access and use of the first floor.
  • If the property is let, the plaintiff's entitlement to the first floor (which it had been using) would be frustrated; plaintiff pressed for interim relief to allow it to use the first floor while other floors could be let with rents deposited in court.
  • The plaintiff contended that Section 64 of the Easements Act should not be read as limiting the remedy to compensation alone; reliance was placed on M.S. Baliga (Karnataka) and a Full Bench decision where repossession of a forcibly evicted licensee was ordered; argued that forcible disturbance of settled possession is impermissible and that the defendant's acts amounted to vandalism removing doors, furniture and flooring.
  • The plaintiff contended the license was irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the Easements Act because it had carried out works of permanent nature (replacement of flooring and installation of tiles).
  • The plaintiff relied also upon a claimed Agreement to Sell (3 August 2010) as a basis for specific performance and contended a prima facie case existed on that basis.

Defendant No. 2's Arguments

  • Defendant No.2 stated that it received vacant physical possession of the entire property from Defendant No.1 on 4 August 2011 and has been in uninterrupted possession since then.
  • The Agreement dated 3 August 2010 relied upon by the plaintiff was alleged to be fabricated/collusive and not an Agreement between plaintiff and Defendant No.1; the plaintiff had not originally claimed relief based on that Agreement.
  • Defendant No.2 paid Rs. 10 crores as sale consideration to Defendant No.1 and is entitled to realize returns; the document relied upon by the plaintiff is said not even to be an enforceable Agreement to Sell (no price, not between relevant parties).
  • The Sale Deed in favour of Defendant No.2 records delivery of actual physical possession to Defendant No.2; Defendant No.2 reiterated other pleas set out in written statement.
  • Defendant relied on precedents (notably K. Sreenivasan and a Kerala High Court decision) that Section 64 limits the remedy of a licensee to compensation and not to recovering occupation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jiwan Das v. Narain Das, AIR 1981 Delhi 291 Authority cited for the proposition that a plaintiff would have no claim to rents of floors other than the one claimed; cited with Sunil Kapoor. Referred to when considering entitlement to rent of other floors; court accepted that plaintiff has no claim to rents of floors other than the first floor and that such rents belong to Defendant No.2.
Sunil Kapoor v. Himmat Singh, 167 (2010) DLT 806 : 2010 (115) DRJ 229 Same line as Jiwan Das — used for the proposition on entitlement to rents of other floors. Court relied on this authority to conclude plaintiff would have no claim to rent of floors other than the first floor.
M.S. Baliga v. Mangalore City Corporation, AIR 1998 Karnataka 76 Holds that Section 64 of the Easements Act does not take away remedy of restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act; both compensation and restoration remedies are available. Plaintiff relied on this authority to argue both remedies remain open; the Court noted the authority but ultimately followed higher authority (Supreme Court) on Section 64's effect.
Society of Holistic Child Development India v. Church of North India Synod, 167 (2010) DLT 216 An order of re-possession of a licensee forcibly evicted was made (Section 64 not noticed in that decision). Plaintiff cited this case as supportive of repossession relief; Court noted it but preferred to follow Supreme Court precedent interpreting Section 64.
Corporation of Calicut v. K. Sreenivasan, (2002) 5 SCC 361 : AIR 2002 SC 2051 Holds that under Section 64 an evicted licensee's remedy is limited to recovery of compensation and not to recovery of occupation. The Court applied and followed this Supreme Court holding, treating it as determinative of the effect of Section 64 on an evicted licensee's remedies and rejecting plaintiff's contention to the contrary.
Trivandrum Golf Club v. State of Kerala, (Kerala High Court) FAO No. 63/2010 (17 May 2010) Decision (Division Bench) cited as supporting the proposition that Section 64 limits remedy to compensation. Defendant relied on this decision; Court noted it alongside Sreenivasan in concluding Section 64 limits remedy to compensation while clarifying force is not permitted.
Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370 (para 97(4)) Authority cited for the principle that settled possession cannot be disturbed forcibly. Plaintiff relied on this to argue settled possession should not be disturbed; Court acknowledged the principle but held Section 64 as interpreted by the Supreme Court governs the remedy of an evicted licensee.
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137 : AIR 2004 SC 1801 Cited in support of the proposition that settled possession cannot be disturbed. Referred to by plaintiff; Court treated it as part of authorities emphasising protection of settled possession but still applied Section 64 jurisprudence.
Rame Gowda v. M. Varadapra Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769 Cited along with the above to support the position against forcible disturbance of possession. Noted by the Court in assessing plaintiff's contention about settled possession; Court nevertheless applied Sreenivasan on remedies available to a licensee.
Mohammad Abdul Jamil v. Manzoor Ahmad, AIR 1932 Allahabad 572 Cited for the proposition that carrying out works of permanent nature can render a licence irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the Easements Act. Plaintiff invoked this authority to contend license was irrevocable; the Court found on a prima facie view that the pleaded works (flooring/tiles) did not qualify as works of permanent character under Section 60(b).
Chandulal v. MCD, AIR 1979 Del 174 (Full Bench) Held that use of reasonable force against a licensee is permissible. Cited by the Court to observe that reasonable force against a licensee may be permissible and as part of the legal landscape distinguishing lease from licence rights.
Shri Ahjit Singh v. Smt. Adarsh Kaur Gill, AIR 2005 Delhi 205 Court's duty to ensure no unnecessary pecuniary loss is caused to party ultimately found entitled; where property lies vacant and can earn income, Court may permit utilization. The Court relied on this authority to justify permitting Defendant No.2 to let out the property during pendency to avoid deterioration and pecuniary loss, subject to safeguards.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by reference to the factual record (Commissioner’s report and photographs) and applicable law regarding licences and remedies on eviction.

Key analytical steps taken by the Court (as expressed in the opinion):

  1. Established present factual position: Defendant No.2 controls the entire property and the plaintiff is not presently able to enter. The Commissioner reported the first floor in a broken state and the main door key with Defendant No.2.
  2. Addressed statutory provision Section 64 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882: the Court invited counsels' submissions whether Section 64 — which provides that a licensee evicted without fault is entitled to compensation from the grantor — means that a licensee's only remedy on eviction is compensation and not restoration of possession.
  3. Considered plaintiff's arguments that Section 64 should not be read as excluding restitution and relied upon authorities (M.S. Baliga and other cases) supporting availability of restoration under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act; also considered plaintiff's contention that its works were of permanent character under Section 60(b) making the licence irrevocable.
  4. Placed primary reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Corporation of Calicut v. K. Sreenivasan, which the Court characterized as unequivocally laying down that Section 64 limits the remedy of an evicted licensee to compensation and not to resumption of occupation. The Court noted the Supreme Court’s clarification that this does not permit use of force by licensors.
  5. Rejected plaintiff's contention that the licence was irrevocable under Section 60(b) on a prima facie view, holding that the pleaded works (replacement of flooring and tiles) did not, at this stage, qualify as works of permanent character within the meaning of Section 60(b).
  6. Rejected the argument that Section 64 applies only against the grantor and not the transferee: once Defendant No.1 transferred the property to Defendant No.2, Defendant No.2 stepped into the grantor's shoes and the licensee's rights cannot be said to be enforceable only against the erstwhile owner.
  7. Found on a prima facie assessment that the plaintiff has in fact been dispossessed (deprivation of use) and that more than one and a half years had elapsed since that deprivation. The photographs suggested that even if access were permitted, substantial further investment would be needed to make the first floor habitable.
  8. Concluded that an interim mandatory order restoring use of the first floor to the plaintiff would amount to granting relief of possession which was not justified on the material before the Court; no case for interim mandatory relief was made out.
  9. Balanced the parties' interests on the petition by Defendant No.2 seeking to let the property so it would not lie unused and deteriorate and so that Defendant No.2 might obtain income rather than suffering pecuniary loss. The Court invoked Shri Ahjit Singh to support permitting utilization when a property lies vacant and can fetch income, subject to adequate safeguards.
  10. On the basis of the above, the Court permitted Defendant No.2 to let the entire property for not more than three years, subject to Court approval of the Lease Agreement and specified conditions intended to protect the plaintiff's interests (including an undertaking to reimburse rent of the first floor to the plaintiff if plaintiff succeeds in establishing it was in possession and was forcefully dispossessed).
  11. Emphasized that all observations were prima facie and would have no bearing on final adjudication in the suit.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The applications were disposed of and Defendant No.2 was permitted to let out the entire property for a period not exceeding three years subject to Court approval of the Lease Agreement and specified conditions.

Direct consequences and safeguards ordered by the Court:

  • The earlier order dated 13 December 2011 (maintaining status quo qua title and possession and construction) was made absolute subject to the modifications below permitting letting out.
  • Letting is permitted only for up to three years and Defendant No.2 must obtain this Court's approval of the Lease Agreement prior to parting with possession to any tenant.
  • The Lease Agreement must expressly provide that the letting is subject to further orders in the proceeding and that in the event the tenant fails to vacate after expiry of the lease and the plaintiff succeeds in the suit, the tenant shall be liable to be evicted by orders in this suit only.
  • The Court recorded that rents of floors other than the first floor belong to Defendant No.2 as owner; as a safeguard the Court required an undertaking from Defendant No.2 and its directors that if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing prior possession and forcible dispossession of the first floor they will reimburse the rent earned from the first floor to the plaintiff; that undertaking must be filed when seeking approval of the proposed Lease Deed.

Broader implications: The Court applied binding Supreme Court authority (Corporation of Calicut v. K. Sreenivasan) to hold prima facie that an evicted licensee's remedy is limited to compensation under Section 64 of the Easements Act and declined to grant interim mandatory possession. The observations were expressly stated to be prima facie and not determinative of the final adjudication; the decision therefore does not purport to create a new precedent beyond its application of existing authorities.

Disposition: The applications (IA Nos. 17339/2011, 20198/2011 and IA No. 6590/2013) were disposed of in terms recorded in the judgment.

Show all summary ...

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

IA. No. 17339/2011 & IA. No. 20198/2011 (both of the plaintiff u/O 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC) & IANo. 6590/2013 (of the defendant no. 2 for interim directions).

1. The plaintiff had instituted the present suit, originally against the defendant no. 1 only, pleading (i) that the plaintiff and the defendant Company had certain business transactions and pursuant to that, around September/October, 2007 the defendant permitted the plaintiff permissive use and occupation of the first floor of property No. 9, Masjid Moth, Commercial Complex, Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi, to enable the plaintiff to set-up its office therein and handed over peaceful and vacant possession to the plaintiff; (ii) the defendant further agreed that the plaintiff shall have first option to purchase the entire said property; (iii) that on the assurances and representations of the defendant, the plaintiff after entering into possession made substantial improvements in the suit premises and spent several lacs of rupees; the plaintiff changed the entire flooring and installed tiles on the flooring; (iv) the plaintiff started running its export division office from the said first floor with the express consent and permission of the defendant Company that the plaintiff shall have permissive vise and possession and first option to purchase the entire property; (v) around June, 2010 the defendant created hindrance and obstructed the employees of the plaintiff from accessing the terrace where the water tanks were situated; the plaintiff filed a Police complaint against the defendant on 4th June, 2010 and with the intervention of the Police the plaintiff was permitted access to the terrace; that on 3rd August, 2010 the defendant confirmed that the said first floor is under the possession of Shri Motilal Bothra and Shri M.K Jalan, Chairman of the plaintiff Company and agreed that the plaintiff shall have the first option to buy the said property and 30% of sale proceeds of the said building shall be given to Mr. M.K Jalan; and, (vi) on 24th October, 2011 when the employees of the plaintiff came in the morning they found that the security guards of the defendant had locked the main door thereby creating a hindrance in the egress and ingress of the plaintiff; again on 25th October, 2011 the employees of the plaintiff found the main door locked and the plaintiff could not get access to the staircase leading to the first floor; that the Police failed to take any action.

The plaintiff accordingly on or about 1st November, 2011 instituted the present suit (a) for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from blocking the egress and ingress of the plaintiff and its employees to the first floor of the property or creating any hindrance or hurdle in use thereof; and, (b) for mandatory injunction directing the defendant to comply with their obligations.

2. Summons of the suit were issued on 4th November, 2011. Though the plaint was accompanied by IA. No. 17739/2011 for interim relief restraining the defendant from obstructing the access of the plaintiff and its employees to the first floor of the premises but no exparte ad interim relief was granted in favour of the plaintiff. On the next date i.e 17th November, 2011 the counsel for the then sole defendant informed of the property having been sold to the defendant no. 2 M/s. Compass Tracom Pvt. Ltd. vide Sale Deed dated 4th August, 2011; accordingly the said M/s. Compass Tracom Pvt. Ltd. was impleaded as defendant no. 2 and vide order of the same date a Court Commissioner was appointed to report as to who is in possession of the first floor and to also prepare an inventory of articles lying on the first floor and to take photographs. Vide ad interim order of the same date the parties were also restrained from creating third party interest in respect of the first floor till further order. Vide subsequent order dated 13th December, 2011 the parties were directed to maintain status quo with respect to the possession of the property.

3. The plaintiff thereafter applied for amendment to, in addition to the relief already claimed, claim reliefs of, specific performance of the Agreement by the defendant no. 1 of sale of the entire property to the plaintiff and of cancellation of the Sale Deed executed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the defendant no. 2 and for other ancillary reliefs and to incorporate in the plaint pleas in support of the said additional reliefs. Vide order dated 16th May, 2013, without prejudice to the pleas of the defendant no. 2, the said amendment was allowed.

4. The Court Commissioner has filed a report to the effect, that the first floor had no door; construction material (broken) such as used but dismantle wooden boards and bricks, some certificates/documents of the plaintiff, AC Unit, wall cabinets, wall cupboard, pile of broken/used bricks and other miscellaneous office items were found lying on the first floor with both parties claiming the ownership thereof; it has been reported that the entire first floor is in a broken state and the key of the main door of the building was in possession of the defendant no. 2 and the entry to the first floor can only be through the said main door.

5. The plaintiff has filed LA No. 20198/2011 for interim relief (i) restraining the defendant no. 2 from interfering with the access of the plaintiff and its employees to the first floor of the property and from disturbing with the peaceful use and occupation of the plaintiff of the first floor, (ii) for a direction to the defendant no. 2 to restore the first floor to its original position and to return the valuable equipments, papers and belongings to the plaintiff; (iii) and, to restrain the defendants from creating any third party rights in respect of the entire property.

6. The defendant no. 2 has filed IA No. 6590/2013 supra seeking permission for letting out of the suit property.

7. It is the plea of the defendant no. 2 that the vacant physical possession of the entire property including the first floor was handed over by the defendant no. 1 to the defendant no. 2 on 4th August, 2011 and the defendant no. 2 since then is in uninterrupted possession of the entire property; that the defendant no. 1 has colluded with the plaintiff to fabricate the Agreement dated 3rd August, 2010 between Shri M.K Jalan and Shri Vinay Maloo; that the plaintiff while filing the suit had not claimed any relief on the basis of the said Agreement; that the defendant no. 2 has paid sale consideration of Rs. 10 crores to the defendant no. 1 for the said property and ought to be permitted to reap returns thereof; that the document dated 3rd August’ 2010 is not even an Agreement to Sell which can be specifically enforced; that the plaintiff was not in possession of the property at the time of filing the suit against the defendant no. 1 and was in fact aware of the sale in favour of the defendant no. 2 as is evident from the Resolution dated 19th October, 2011 of the Board of Directors of the plaintiff authorizing institution of the suit not only against the defendant no. 1 but against other person or Company also; that inspite of that ex parte order was sought to be obtained against the defendant no. 1 only; that though in the plaint as originally filed the cause of action was stated to have accrued on 24th October, 2011 but the Resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing the institution of the suit was of 19th October, 2011; that though the plaintiff was earlier mentioning the address of the suit premises on its letterhead but the letterhead containing the extract of the Resolution dated 19th October, 2011 does not mention the address of the suit premises and all which is indicative of the plaintiff having vacated the suit property prior to the execution of the Sale Deed by the defendant no. 1 in favour of the defendant no. 2 on 4th August, 2011.

8. The senior counsel for the plaintiff and the counsel for the defendant no. 2 have been heard on all the three applications aforesaid. The senior counsel for the defendant no. 1 has chosen not to address any arguments.

9. It is not in dispute that as of today the control of the entire property is with the defendant no. 2 and the plaintiff is not even able to enter the property. It was as such enquired from the senior counsel for the plaintiff as to why the property should not be permitted to be put to use during the pendency of this suit by allowing letting thereof for a period of not more than three years and after approval of the Lease Deed by this Court and with a provision being made for the rent so earned by the property, all subject to the final outcome of the suit.

10. The senior counsel for the plaintiff contended that the plaintiff was in settled possession of the property and has been illegally deprived of the use thereof and has sought the interim relief of restraining defendants from obstructing the use by the plaintiff of the first floor of the property. It is contended that if the property is ordered to be let, it would mean that the plaintiff would not be entitled to use of the first floor of the property which was in its settled possession. The senior counsel for the plaintiff thus pressed for the interim relief allowing the plaintiff to use of the first floor and contended that the other floors can be permitted to be let out with the rent thereof being deposited in this Court to be released in favour of the plaintiff if succeeds in its claim for specific performance of the Agreement of Sale of the entire property.

11. It was at the outset enquired from the senior counsel for the plaintiff as to how the plaintiff can be entitled to the rent of the floors other than the first floor, even if ultimately succeeding in the suit for specific performance of the Agreement of Sale in as much as the right of the plaintiff to the property and to the rent therefrom would accrue only upon the title to the property pursuant to a decree for specific performance being conveyed to the plaintiff and not prior thereto. Attention of the senior counsel for the plaintiff in this regard was invited to the judgment of this Court in Jiwan Das v. Narain Das, AIR 1981 Delhi 291 and Sunil Kapoor v. Himmat Singh, 167 (2010) DLT 806 : 2010 (115) DRJ 229 holding so.

12. The senior counsel for the plaintiff agreed that the plaintiff would have no claim to rent of the floors other than the first floor and the same need not be deposited in this Court and the same right fully belongs to the defendant no. 2 who today is the owner thereof.

13. As far as the right claimed by the plaintiff at this interim stage to the use of the first floor is concerned, it is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant no. 1 had permitted the plaintiff ‘permissive use and occupation’ of the first floor to set up its office therein and the plaintiff was given the right of license with respect to the said first floor.

14. It was as such been enquired from the senior counsel for the plaintiff, that the rights claimed by the plaintiff to the first floor being merely as a licensee, how the plaintiff can seek a relief in the nature of re-possession. Attention of the counsels in this regard was invited to Section 64 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 which is as under:—

“64. Licensee's rights on eviction. - Where a license has been granted for a consideration, and the licensee, without any fault of his own, is evicted by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the license, the right for which he contracted, he is entitled to recovery compensation from the grantor.”

It was enquired whether not the aforesaid is indicative of a licensee once evicted from the licensed premises having the right only of recovery of compensation and having no right of re-possession or restoration of use.

15. On request of the counsels time was granted to enable the counsels to consider the aforesaid provision.

16. The senior counsel for the plaintiff after studying the matter contended that:—

(i). that the relief provided of compensation is only against the grantor of the license and grantor in the present case was the defendant no. 1 and thus the limitation even if any in Section 64 would not be available against the defendant no. 2 who is the purchaser of the property from the defendant no. 1;

(ii). that Section 64 cannot be read as limiting the right only to that of compensation. Attention in this regard is invited to M.S Baliga v. Mangalore City Corporation, AIR 1998 Karnataka 76 holding that Section 64 of the Easements Act does not take away the remedy of restoration of possession available to a forcibly dispossessed licensee under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and such a dispossessed licensee has both remedies available to him i.e to recover compensation under Section 64 of the Easements Act and to seek restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and one remedy does not bar the other;

(iii) reference was also made to Society of the Holistic Child Development India v. Church of North India Synod, 167 (2010) DLT 216 where an order of re-possession of a licensee forcibly evicted was made, though Section 64 of the Easements Act was not noticed;

17. Attention of the senior counsel for the plaintiff was however invited to Corporation of Calicut v. K. Sreenivasan, (2002) 5 SCC 361 : AIR 2002 SC 2051 laying down that under Section 64 supra even if a licensee is evicted, though grounds for revocation of license do not exist or forcefully evicted, his only remedy is to recover compensation from grantor and not to recover occupation. The counsel for the defendant no. 2 in this regard also invited attention to a judgment dated 17th May, 2010 of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in FAO No. 63/2010 titled Trivandrum Golf Club v. State of Kerala to the same effect.

18. The senior counsel for the plaintiff however contended that it is not the case of the plaintiff that it has been dispossessed from the licensed premises, rather it is the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is still in possession, use and occupation of the premises and is only being obstructed from its right of accessing the premises. It was contended that the judgment of the Supreme court in K. Sreenivasan cannot be read as permitting the licensors to forcefully remove the licensees from the premises and that if it were to be so held, would lead to anarchy. It was further contended that the law of this county is that settled possession cannot be disturbed forcibly. Reliance in this regard is placed on para 97(4) of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Seqiieira, (2012) 5 SCC 370 and Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137 : AIR 2004 SC 1801 and Rame Gowda v. M. Varadapra Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769. It was argued that the defendant no. 2 in the present case has totally vandalised the premises by removing the door to the first floor which was under lock and key of the plaintiff, by forcibly removing the furniture, fixtures and goods of the plaintiff lying therein and by ripping apart the entire flooring. The same was demonstrated from the photographs taken at the time of Local Commission. It was contended that the defendant no. 2 who has indulged in such vandalism, in equity cannot be allowed to reap the benefits of the illegalities committed by it and the ends of justice require the plaintiff to be put back into possession of the first floor and/or being permitted the use thereof. It was yet further contended that the plaintiff had also carried out the works of permanent nature in the said first floor and the license in its favour was thus irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the. Easements Act. Reliance in this regard was placed on Mohammad Abdul Jamil v. Manzoor Ahmad, AIR 1932 Allahabad 572. It was further urged that the plaintiff also has a prima facie case on the basis of the Agreement to Sell by the defendant no. 1 in its favour and for which reason also it is in the interest of justice that the plaintiff be restored the use of the first floor. From the written statement/replies of the defendant no. 1 it is contended that the defendant no. 1 has admitted to the plaintiff being in use of the first floor till sale to the defendant no. 2 and thus the impugned actions of obstructing the access of the plaintiff to the first floor and of vandalism are attributable to the defendant no. 2 only and the version of the defendant no. 2 of the plaintiff having left the premises cannot be believed.

19. Per contra, the counsel for the defendant no. 2 contended that the Agreement of which specific performance is claimed by the plaintiff is not an Agreement at all and the claim for specific performance cannot be maintained thereon. It was further argued that the Agreement to Sell in favour of the defendant no. 2 in pursuance to which the Sale Deed in favour of the defendant no. 2 has been executed is of a date prior to the Agreement in favour of the plaintiff. It was yet further contended that the Sale Deed in favour of the defendant no. 2 records the defendant no. 1 having given the actual physical possession of the entire property to the defendant no. 2. Else the pleas aforesaid are reiterated

20. The Supreme Court in K. Sreenivasan supra though unequivocally laying down that Section 64 limits the remedy of an evicted licensee to that of claiming compensation only and not to resume occupation, has clarified that the same should never be understood as permitting use of force. Once the Supreme Court has laid down so, the plaintiff cannot be heard to contend to the contrary. Rather it is quite evident that the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 64 of the Easements Act so was fully aware of the possible consequences thereof.

21. As far as the plea of the plaintiff of its license being irrevocable for the reason of having carried out works of permanent nature in the premises is concerned, all that has been pleaded in paras 5 & 22 of the amended plaint is that the plaintiff has made substantial investments in the property on the assurances given by the defendant no. 1 and having changed the entire flooring and installing tiles on the flooring. I am afraid the same, on a prima facie view of the matter, cannot qualify as works of permanent character within the meaning of Section 60(b) of the Easements Act.

22. The plea of the plaintiff of Section 64 being applicable only to the grantor has to be noticed to be rejected. It is not disputed that the defendant no. 1 who was the grantor of the license has transferred the property to the defendant no. 2. The defendant no. 2 has thus stepped into the shoes of the grantor and once the property has been transferred it cannot be said that the rights of the licensee are against the erstwhile owner of the property only.

23. I am also unable to hold that the plaintiff has not been dispossessed. In the context of a license, dispossession/eviction has to be necessarily deprivation of use of the licensed premises in as much as the licensee in any case has no right to the property and possession is but a facet of one such right to the property and the only right of a licensee is to use of the premises. More than one and a half years have elapsed since the plaintiff has been so deprived of the premises. The state of the first floor as apparent from the photographs is such that the plaintiff even if permitted access to the property cannot start using the same. Considerable investment will again have to be made on the first floor of the property to make the same habitable. At this interim stage it is not very clear as to till when the plaintiff was in use of the property; though the senior counsel for the plaintiff has invited attention to telephone bills and electricity bills showing use of the property till immediately before 24th October, 2011 but the same are also not found to be of much relevance as anyone can use the telephone connection and electricity.

24. An order at this stage, restraining the defendant no. 2 from obstructing the plaintiff and its employees accessing the first floor, will tantamount to grant of mandatory interim relief permitting the plaintiff use of the property and of which it admittedly was not in use on the date of institution of the suit. No case for grant of interim mandatory relief is made out. It is also worth mentioning that hearing on these applications was held owing to the urgency shown by the counsel for the defendant no. 2 for letting out of the property and the plaintiff, after having obtained ad interim order against the defendants, was not in a hurry to press the relief of being allowed access to the property and had rather behind the back of the counsel for the defendant no. 2 on 22nd March, 2013 got the matter adjourned to 13th August, 2013. The relief of being allowed use of first floor was agitated only as a response to the permission sought by the defendant no. 2 for letting out of the property.

25. Mention at this stage can also be made to the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Chandulal v. MCD, AIR 1979 Del 174 holding that use of reasonable force against a licensee is permissible.

26. I am even otherwise of the opinion that unless such a distinction is maintained, the difference between a lease or license would disappear and would amount to taking away a right of the owners of the property of granting license for use of their properties.

27. As far as prima facie claim of the plaintiff for specific performance is concerned, though the plaintiff in the plaint has also stated that it has first option to purchase but has not sought relief of pre-emption but only the relief of specific performance of the Agreement dated 3rd August, 2010. The said Agreement is in fact not even between the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 but is between Mr. Vinay Maloo and Mr. M.K Jalan and is as under:—

“The following has been agreed between Mr. M.K Jalan and Mr. Vinay Maloo:

The Building No. 9 at Masjid Moth Commercial Complex, Greater Kailash Part II is currently under the possession of Shri Motilal Bothra and Shri M.K Jalan. Both of them would mutually agree on the market price of the property and if Mr. Jalan wants to buy the property at the agreed market price, he will have the first option on the same. Mr. K.L Bothra's (representative of Mr. Vinay Maloo) consent will be taken while determining the market price.

30% of the sale price will be given to Mr. M.K Jalan (as mutually agreed between Mr. M.K Jalan and Mr. Moti Lal Bothra), which will be kept in Escrow by Mr. M.K Jalan for overall settlement of his account.

Mr. Vinay Maloo confirms that this understanding is irrevocable.

Date: 3rd August, 2010.”

28. The counsel for the defendant no. 2 has rightly argued that there is no mention even of the price and the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1 cannot even be said to be parties to the said Agreement, and further that without any agreement as to price, the same cannot be an enforceable Agreement.

29. For all the aforesaid reasons I am of the view that the request of the defendant no. 2, while not opposing the existing interim orders to be made absolute till the decision of the suit, seeking permission for letting out of the entire property is a reasonable one. No purpose would be served in allowing the property to lie unused during the pendency of the suit and which would only further deteriorate the property. This Court in Shri Ahjit Singh v. Smt. Adarsh Kaur Gill, AIR 2005 Delhi 205 has held that it is the duty of the Court to ensure that no unnecessary pecuniary loss is caused to the party ultimately found entitled to the property; it the property is under occupation and enjoyment, status quo can be maintained without allowing transfer, but where property is lying vacant and is capable, of fetching income, the Court must permit utilization thereof. It may also be mentioned that in the event of the plaintiff losing the suit, unless the permission for such letting is granted, there would be no way to compensate the defendant no. 2 from the losses which it would suffer for keeping its property unused.

30. Accordingly while making the earlier order dated 13th December, 2011 directing all the parties to maintain status quo qua title and possession and construction of the property, absolute, the defendant no. 2 is permitted to let out the entire property on the following terms:—

(a). that the said letting out will not be for more than three years.

(b). that the defendant no. 2 before parting with possession of the property to the tenant shall seek approval of the Lease Agreement from this Court.

(c). that it will be a term of the said Lease Agreement that the letting will be subject to further orders in this proceeding and upon the tenant failing to vacate the property after the expiry of the period of the Lease and the plaintiff succeeding in the suit, the tenant shall be liable to be evicted therefrom by orders in this suit only.

31. As aforesaid, the defendant no. 2 being the owner is entitled to rents of the other floors. As far as the rent of the first floor is concerned, taking a prima facie view of the matter it is felt that undertaking of the defendant no. 2 and its Directors to in the event of the plaintiff succeeding in establishing that it was in possession of the first floor and has been forcefully dispossessed therefrom, they will reimburse the rent so earned of the first floor to the plaintiff, would sub-serve the ends of justice. The said undertaking be also filed while seeking approval of the proposed Lease Deed.

32. Needless to state that all observations made hereinabove are on a prima facie view of the matter and will have no bearing over the final adjudication in the suit.

33. The applications are disposed of.