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Inx News Pvt. Ltd. v. Pier One Construction Pvt. Ltd. .
Judicial Opinion Summary — IA No. 10631/2013 (condonation of delay in re-filing)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns IA No. 10631/2013, an application for condonation of delay in re-filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("1996 Act"). A signed award dated 01.10.2012 was received by the petitioner on the same date. The petitioner filed the Section 34 petition on 02.01.2013 (01.01.2013 being a holiday), but the Registry raised objections and the petition was re-filed and returned on multiple occasions as follows:
- Initial filing: 02.01.2013; re-filed 14.01.2013, returned same day; re-filed again on 28.01.2013.
- Registry directed removal of objections on 29.01.2013; petitioner re-filed on 21.05.2013; petition returned on 31.05.2013 for objections remaining on record.
- All objections were ultimately removed on 04.07.2013 and the petition first came up for hearing before the court on 10.07.2013. The matter was relisted to 11.11.2013 after the respondent entered appearance and sought time to file a reply.
The applicant claimed a delay of 105 days in re-filing; the Registry reported a delay of 157 days; the respondent indicated that the delay between 02.01.2013 and 31.05.2013 alone was 149 days. The non-applicant/respondent filed a reply contesting the condonation application. The court heard submissions and evidence relevant to the explanation for the delay.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the court has the power to condone delay in re-filing a petition under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and if so, on what basis.
- Whether the reasons advanced by the petitioner (change of counsel and illness of the petitioner's legal head) constitute "sufficient cause" and reflect the petitioner's bonafides to justify condonation of the delay.
- Whether precedents under the Arbitration Act, 1940 relied upon by the petitioner are applicable to an application under the 1996 Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as summarized from the opinion)
- The delay was neither malafide nor deliberate; it largely resulted from a change in counsel and the illness of the petitioner's legal head (Mr. Dinesh Banth).
- The court should not apply the strict rigour used in examining initial filings when considering delay in re-filing.
- The petitioner relied on three judgments (Indian Statistical Institute v. Associated Builders; S.R. Kulkarni v. Birla VXL Limited; DSA Engineers v. HUDCO) to support a more lenient approach to condonation in re-filing.
Respondent's Arguments (as summarized from the opinion)
- The court must rigorously examine the delay in re-filing in view of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act and apply the New Act's provisions rather than those of the 1940 Act.
- The delay between 02.01.2013 and 31.05.2013 is 149 days (not 105 days as claimed by petitioner) and the re-filed petition has been materially changed compared to the earlier petition returned by the Registry.
- The reasons offered for condonation (change of counsel and illness of Mr. Dinesh Banth) are untenable: the respondent placed on record an e-mail (13.03.2013) indicating counsel declined to appear over fee disputes, and medical documents that, in the respondent's submission, indicated only day-care admission rather than the operation asserted by the petitioner.
- The respondent relied on Division Bench decisions (Executive Engineer v. Shree Ram Construction Co.; Delhi Transco Ltd. v. Hythro Engineers Pvt. Ltd.) and the court's prior orders to argue against condonation on the facts of this case.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Indian Statistical Institute v. Associated Builders, (1978) 1 SCC 483 | Relied upon by the petitioner to argue for a less strict approach to delay in re-filing (principles from earlier arbitration regime). | The court noted this and similar authorities pertain to the Arbitration Act, 1940; it held that those judgments are not applicable to the 1996 Act regime for the purposes of this case. |
| S.R. Kulkarni v. Birla VXL Limited, 1998 V AD (Delhi) 634 | Relied upon by the petitioner for leniency in condoning delay (authority from pre-1996 Act jurisprudence). | The court observed the judgment relates to the 1940 Act and therefore would not have applicability to the instant case under the 1996 Act. |
| DSA Engineers (Bombay) v. HUDCO, 2003 1 AD (Delhi) 411 | Relied upon by the petitioner to support a more liberal view on condonation of delay based on prior arbitration law. | The court held that this judgment pertains to the 1940 Act and is not applicable as a precedent under the 1996 Act in this matter. |
| Executive Engineer (Irrigation and Flood Control) v. Shree Ram Construction Co., 2010 (10) AD Delhi 180 | Relied upon by the respondent to show strict timelines for filing objections to an arbitral award and to support rigorous scrutiny of condonation requests under the 1996 Act. | The court treated this Division Bench authority as reflecting a strict approach to timelines under Section 34(3); it accepted that while the court retains power to condone delay, such power must be exercised only when sufficient cause and bonafides are shown. |
| Delhi Transco Ltd. & Anr. v. Hythro Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 2012 (3) Arb. LR 349 (Delhi) | Relied upon by the respondent to support the proposition that timelines for Section 34 are strict and warrant rigorous examination of condonation pleas. | The court referenced this Division Bench view as supportive of strict timelines, and used it as part of the context in which the present condonation plea was evaluated. |
| Union of India v. M/s. Ravinder Kapoor (IA Nos. 7795/2013 & 7796/2013 in OMP 477/2013) | The court's own earlier decision, which followed the Division Bench views in Shree Ram Construction Co. and Delhi Transco Ltd. | The judge indicated that his earlier judgment followed the Division Bench approach and cited it in support of the position that strict timelines are to be respected, subject to sufficient cause being shown. |
| DDA v. Durga Construction Co., FAO (OS) 485-86/2011 (judgment dated 07.11.2013) | Recently decided Division Bench authority referenced as settling any doubt about the court's power to condone delay in appropriate cases under the 1996 Act. | The court referred to this decision as confirming that the court retains the power to condone delay in re-filing where sufficient cause is shown; it was used to support the legal framework applied in this opinion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, closely reflecting the factual record and legal materials placed before it:
- Power to condone delay: The court accepted that it has the power to condone delay in re-filing where the initial filing was within the period prescribed by Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act. However, the exercise of that power depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and requires demonstration of sufficient cause reflecting the applicant's bonafides.
- Applicability of precedents: The court examined the authorities relied upon by the petitioner (which pertain to the Arbitration Act, 1940) and held that those judgments are not applicable to the present matter under the 1996 Act. The court relied instead on Division Bench decisions under the 1996 Act that emphasize strict timelines for filing objections to arbitral awards.
-
Examination of documentary record: The court scrutinized the evidence the petitioner placed on record to substantiate its reasons for delay:
- There was no discharge summary or other documentary proof that Mr. Dinesh Banth underwent an operation on 02.04.2013, despite the petitioner's averment.
- An e-mail dated 13.03.2013, produced by the petitioner, showed the erstwhile counsel declined to appear because of fee-related issues, undermining any contention that counsel change was solely due to unavoidable circumstances.
- Most objections raised by the Registry on 14.01.2013 remained on record until 04.07.2013, indicating delay in removing objections.
- The affidavit accompanying the petition was sworn by Mr. Aman Thukral (authorized representative), not by Mr. Dinesh Banth.
- The petitioner’s calculation of delay (105 days) was incorrect; the period from 02.01.2013 to 31.05.2013 alone amounts to 149 days.
- Temporal gaps in explanation: The court observed that the two reasons advanced (change of counsel and illness) both occurred in March 2013 (mid- and late-March/early April). The petitioner offered no explanation for the delay occurring before March 2013 or the delay in April and May 2013 when objections continued on record.
- Improper alteration of petition: The court expressed concern that, while removing objections, the petitioner had "changed the entire framework of the petition." The court noted that when petitions are returned for removal of Registry objections, counsels are not entitled to alter the framework of the petition; amendments should be sought in court after listing so that they are made in accordance with law.
- Conclusion on sufficiency of cause: Given the lack of documentary proof for the alleged operation, the fee-related reason for counsel withdrawal, the extended periods without explanation, and the improper changes to the petition framework, the court concluded that the reasons advanced did not amount to sufficient cause reflecting bonafides. Accordingly, the condonation application had to be rejected.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application for condonation of delay (IA No. 10631/2013) is dismissed.
Implications and direct effects:
- As a direct consequence of dismissing the condonation application, the court ordered that the related petition (OMP 673/2013) and the remaining application (IA No. 10629/2013 seeking stay) would also be dismissed. The court stated: "In view of the dismissal of IA No. 10631/2013 the necessary consequences will have to follow, which are, that the petition and the remaining application would also have to be dismissed. It is ordered accordingly."
- The opinion emphasizes that timelines for filing objections under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act are to be strictly observed and that the court's power to condone delay will be exercised only where sufficient cause and bonafides are demonstrated by the applicant; this application did not meet that standard on the facts before the court.
- No broader or new precedent was formulated by the court in this opinion beyond applying existing Division Bench authority and the principles stated in the opinion to the facts of this case. The decision's immediate effect is the dismissal of the condonation application and the related petition and stay application in the instant matter.
This summary is strictly confined to the statements and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal conclusions not present in the source text.
Rajiv Shakdher, J.:—
IA No. 10631/2013 (condonation of delay in re-filing)
1. This is an application filed for condonation of delay in re-filing. In the application, it is averred that there is a delay of 105 days in refiling the main petition. However, as per the report of the Registry, there is a delay of 157 days.
2. The relevant dates which are set out in the petition and which have been conveyed by the learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner are as follows:—
2.1 The award dated 01.10.2012 was received by the applicant/petitioner on the same date. The petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short the 1996 Act) was filed by the applicant/petitioner on 02.01.2013, 01.01.2013 being a holiday, the petition was filed immediately thereafter, as indicated above, on 02.01.2013 Since the Registry raised objections, the petition was re-filed on 14.01.2013 The Registry, however, took a view that objections had not been removed and therefore, the petition was returned on 14.01.2013 The applicant/petitioner re-filed the petition, once again, on 28.01.2013
2.2 The Registry pointed to the applicant/petitioner on 29.01.2013, that it should remove the objections “properly”. The applicant/petitioner appears to have re-filed the petition, on 21.05.2013
2.3 According to the Registry, objections which had been pointed on 14.01.2013, continued to remain on record, and therefore, once again, the petition was returned on 31.05.2013
2.4 It appears, that finally, the applicant/petitioner removed all objections on 04.07.2013 The petition, came up for hearing, before this court, for the first time, on 10.07.2013
2.5 On that date, since the respondent entered appearance, and had, sought time to file reply to the captioned application, the petition was relisted today i.e, 11.11.2013
3. The non-applicant/respondent has filed a reply.
3.1 Broadly, the objections taken by the non-applicant/respondent are as follows:—
(i). That the delay between 02.01.2013 to 31.05.2013 is 149 days, and not, 105 days;
(ii). The re-filed petition has been completely changed. This is sought to be demonstrated, by placing before the court a copy of the earlier petition filed with the Registry (a copy of which was obviously served on the non-applicant/respondent), and comparing the same with, the copy placed presently, on record.
(iii). The reasons for condonation of delay are untenable. The non-applicant/respondent contests the averments made in the application that seek to explain the delay between 02.01.2013 and 31.05.2013, on two grounds. The first, that there was a change in counsel. For this purpose, reliance is placed on an e-mail dated 13.03.2013 issued by the erstwhile counsel for the applicant/petitioner. Second, that the legal head of the petitioner i.e, one Mr. Dinesh Banth, had taken ill. It is averred that Mr. Dinesh Banth had a stone lodged in his kidney, for which, he was admitted to the hospital, in March, 2013, and operated upon on, 02.04.2013
(iii)(a). As indicated above, the non-applicant/respondent contests this position by referring to the documents placed on record which, according to the non-applicant/respondent, only demonstrates that Mr. Dinesh Banth had admitted himself, in the hospital only for day care. It is, therefore, the contention of the non-applicant/respondent that there was nothing on record to suggest that the said gentleman was, operated upon, as averred in the application.
(iv) The delay is malafide and no sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay.
4. To be noted, the applicant/petitioner has filed a rejoinder; with which, most of the documents relied upon, concerning the illness of Mr. Dinesh Banth, have been filed. The applicant/petitioner has also placed on record the objections raised by the Registry from time to time.
5. The learned counsel for the parties have argued in line with the averments raised in their respective pleadings filed before me.
5.1 It is the submission of Mr. David, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the delay is neither malafide nor deliberate. It is his contention that a large part of the delay occurred on account of the change in counsel and due to the illness of the legal head of the petitioner. Mr. David contended that the court while examining the delay in re-filing need not adhere to the strict rigour, which it may be required to adopt, while examining the delay in the initial filing. In support of his submissions, Mr. David has relied upon the following three judgments:—
Indian Statistical Institute v. Associated Builders, (1978) 1 SCC 483; S.R Kulkarni v. Birla VXL Limited, 1998 V AD (Delhi) 634; and DSA Engineers (Bombay) v. Housing & Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO), 2003 1 AD (Delhi) 411.
6. On the other hand, Mr. Bhola, who appears for the non-applicant/respondent submitted that this court would have to rigorously examine the delay in re-filing in view of the provisions of the Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act. He submits that examination of the delay in re-filing should be governed by the provisions of the New Act i.e, 1996 Act and not by keeping in mind the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (in short the 1940 Act).
6.1 The learned counsel for the non-applicant/respondent submits that while the frame of the petition on record is different from that which was filed in the first instance, the affidavit on record remains the same, that is, the one which was filed with the earlier petition.
6.2 To be noted, the affidavit is dated 02.01.2013, and is sworn by, one, Mr. Aman Thukral; an authorised representative of the petitioner.
6.3 The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that at no stage did Mr. Dinesh Banth represent the applicant/petitioner, and that, Mr. Aman Thukral, represented the applicant/petitioner before the arbitrator. Therefore, it is the learned counsel's contention that, the reason advanced to explain the delay; which is that the legal head, Mr. Dinesh Banth, had to be operated upon, and thus, the delay in re-filing ought to be condoned; is to say the least, nebulous and unworthy of acceptance.
6.4 In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the nonapplicant/respondent has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in the case of The Executive Engineer (Irrigation and Flood Control) v. Shree Ram Construction Co., 2010 (10) AD Delhi 180; and Delhi Transco Ltd. & Anr…. v. Hythro Engineers Pvt. Ltd…., 2012 (3) Arb. LR 349 (Delhi).
6.5 The learned counsel has also relied upon a judgment dated 23.09.2013 delivered by me, in: IA No. 7795/2013 and 7796/2013 filed in OMP 477/2013, in the case of Union Of India v. M/S. Ravinder Kapoor. In the said judgment, I have followed the view taken by the two separate Division Benches in the aforementioned cases i.e, Shree Ram Construction Co. and Delhi Transco Ltd.
6.6 Having regard to the above, I am of the view that the court does have the power to condone the delay in re-filing if the initial filing is within the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act. The result, however, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is my reading of the Division Bench judgments of this court in Shree Ram Construction Co. and Delhi Transco Ltd. that the court is not emasculated of its power to condone the delay, [and therefore, in a given case it may condone the delay] if sufficient cause is shown. The reasons, advanced, to explain the delay should reflect the bonafides of the applicant. I may only point out that if there was any lurking doubt with respect to this approach, it has been set at rest by yet another Division Bench of this Court in a recent judgment dated 07.11.2013, passed in FAO (OS) 485-86/2011, titled: Dda… v. Durga Construction Co.…. Co.
6.7 Thus, what has to be examined in this case is: whether sufficient cause is shown to explain the delay.
7. A perusal of the record would show that the following facts obtain in the case:—
(i). The petitioner received a signed copy of the award dated 01.10.2012, on the same date.
(ii). There is nothing on record to show that Mr. Dinesh Banth was operated on 02.04.2013 There is no discharge summary filed; which is ordinarily issued, after an operation conducted by a hospital.
(iii). A perusal of the e-mail dated 13.03.2013, (put on record by the applicant/petitioner), would show that the lawyer then representing it, declined to appear for the applicant/petitioner because he had issues vis-a-vis the inability of the applicant/petitioner to take a decision qua his professional fee.
(iv). Most of the objections, which were raised on 14.01.2013 when, the applicant/petitioner was returned the petition, continued to appear on record even uptil 04.07.2013
(v). The petition, which is placed on record, is accompanied by an affidavit of Mr. Aman Thukral; the authorised representative of the petitioner, and not that of, Mr. Dinesh Banth.
7.1 The learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner has confirmed that Mr. Dinesh Banth continues in the employment of the applicant/petitioner.
7.2 According to the applicant/petitioner, there is delay of 105 days. This obviously is an incorrect calculation. If only the period between 02.01.2013 and 31.05.2013 is taken note of, that itself accounts for 149 days.
7.3 Be that as it may, the moot question is: whether the delay has been properly explained. It is noted that there are two reasons given for seeking condonation of delay. The first reason, advanced is that; the lawyer for the petitioner had to be changed. The second reason articulated is, the illness of Mr. Dinesh Banth. Both events occurred in the month of March, 2013. The first event occurred somewhere in the middle of March, 2013, while the second event occurred at the end of March, 2013 and beginning of April, 2013. There is no explanation for delay which occurred prior to March and that which occurred in the months of April and May, 2013. As indicated above, the objections were finally removed on 04.07.2013
8. In my view, the reasons advanced by the petitioner do not supply sufficient cause, and therefore, the captioned application will have to be rejected. The time lines fixed, for filing objections to the award, are strict as indicated in three separate judgments of the Division Benches of this court in the following cases: Shree Ram Construction Co.; Delhi Transco Ltd. and Anr.; and Durga Construction Co. It may be worthwhile to note that a Special Leave Petition as also a review petition was preferred against the judgment rendered in the case of Delhi Transco Ltd. which were dismissed on 24.01.2013 and 21.03.2013 respectively. Similarly, a Special Leave Petition preferred in the case of Shree Ram Construction Co. was also dismissed.
8.1 Since the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner pertain to the 1940 Act, therefore, in my view, they would not have any applicability to the instant case. The regime under the 1996 Act, is perceptibly different to that of the 1940 Act. In any event, the condonation of delay is an aspect which turns on facts and circumstances of each case. Even if the test enunciated in the judgments relied upon by the petitioner is applied to the present facts, in my view, the applicant/petitioner has been negligent in not removing the objections in time.
8.2 As indicated above, there are vast periods qua which there are no explanations rendered by the applicant/petitioner.
9. I am also deeply concerned with the fact that the applicant/petitioner while removing objections changed the entire framework of the petition. When petitions are returned, the counsels involved are not entitled to change the framework of the petitions. The petitions are returned only for removing objections pointed by the Registry. If the amendments are required to be made, the correct course would be to move the concerned court after the petition is listed in court, so that steps are taken in accordance with the law, to incorporate the necessary amendments.
10. In foregoing circumstances, the application being without merit, is dismissed.
OMP 673/2013 and IA No. 10629/2013 (stay)
11. In view of the dismissal of IA No. 10631/2013 the necessary consequences will have to follow, which are, that the petition and the remaining application would also have to be dismissed. It is ordered accordingly.
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